Eventi del Dipartimento di Scienze delle Decisioni
17 settembre 2019 ore 12:45 - 14:00
Aula Seminari 3.e4.sr03 - Via Roentgen 1
Teoria economica, Teoria delle Decisioni ed Economia Sperimentale
Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)
Roland Strausz (Humboldt-Universität Berlin) Abstract
We study the extent to which a collective reputation negates the benefits from pooling reputations across different markets. Modelling reputation in an infinitely repeated hidden action game with imperfect monitoring, we show that pooling reputations is beneficial when reputation is not collective, whereas, due to a free-riding problem, it is suboptimal if reputation is fully collective. For intermediate degrees of collectivity, active revenue management mitigates free-riding. Thus, pooling reputations is beneficial if the degree of collectivity is low enough or the discount factor exceeds a cutoff. Results apply to franchising, umbrella branding, licensing, and firms with team production.