

Historical Roots of Political Extremism: The Effects of Nazi Occupation of Italy*

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Abstract

The Italian civil war and the Nazi occupation of Italy in 1943–45 occurred at a critical juncture, just before the birth of a new democracy. We study the impact of these traumatic events by exploiting geographic heterogeneity in the duration and intensity of civil war, and the persistence of the battlefield along the “Gothic line” cutting through Northern-Central Italy. The Communist Party, which was more active in the resistance movement, gained votes in postwar elections in areas where the Nazi occupation was both longer and harsher, mainly at the expense of centrist parties. This effect persists until the late 1980s and appears to be driven by equally persistent changes in political attitudes. These results suggest that civil war and widespread political violence reshape political identities in favor of the political groups that emerge as winners. This benefits extremist groups and hurts moderates, since the former are more involved in violent conflict.

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1. Introduction

In any democracy there are key historical junctures, when new parties are born and young generations build new political identities breaking with the past. These special circumstances can have lasting effects on the nature and intensity of political conflict: On the supply side of politics, the goals and identities of political organizations can be shaped by traumatic events that give rise to new political parties; on the demand side, intense and widespread common social experiences can shape the political attitudes of citizens for years to come. For instance, writing a century after the US civil war, [Campbell et al. \(1960\)](#) argued that partisan affiliations were still largely shaped by the geographic boundaries of that conflict. Similarly, the Great Depression had a lasting influence on the image of the Republican party as the party that mishandled those dramatic events.

Wars, and in particular civil wars, are examples of such critical junctures. A democracy born out of a civil war inherits a legacy of polarization and conflict that puts it in a very different starting position, compared to one where the political system evolved more gradually and peacefully. The consequences of intense and widespread violence for the functioning of the subsequent democracy are far from obvious, however. A civil war could exacerbate political conflict and lead to radicalization and political extremism. But political violence could also leave such a scar that citizens and political leaders react in the opposite direction, so as to avoid future repetitions of conflict. Moreover, civil wars can directly impact on the party system, as military factions evolve into political organizations. The general goal of this paper is to study these different effects, and to explore the consequences of widespread political violence for the subsequent functioning of an advanced democracy.

We study empirically the domestic political consequences of the Italian civil war and Nazi occupation during the final two years of World War II. From July 1943 to May 1945, Italy was a battleground between the Allied and the German forces. Italians themselves were split, with troops loyal to the fascist regime fighting alongside the Germans and resistance fighters helping the Allies. The civil war left a strong imprint on the post-war political system: Political parties evolved out of the resistance movement, with key political leaders having played an important role in the resistance movement, and political institutions were designed to minimize the risk of a relapse into civil war or dictatorship. The intensity of the war varied across Italy, however, since the Allies freed Southern and much of Central Italy almost immediately, while Northern-Central Italy remained under Nazi occupation for much longer. Moreover, the Nazi troops became particularly aggressive toward partisans and civilians alike in the later stage of the war, from the Summer of 1944 onwards.

Using data at the municipality level, we first look at the country-wide association between the

duration of Nazi occupation and the post-war votes to extreme-left parties, also controlling for the intensity of violence, the presence of partisan brigades fighting against the Germans, pre-war electoral outcomes, and socio-economic characteristics. We find that both the duration of the Nazi occupation and the intensity of war violence are positively correlated with the post-war vote share of the Communist Party. Most of these effects last until the late 1980s, when the party system created in the aftermath of World War II (WWII) collapsed because of both internal and external factors (i.e., judicial scandals and the end of the Cold War). We instead find no correlation with turnout.

Despite the richness of our original data, this evidence could be driven by omitted confounders at the municipality level. To identify a causal effect, the rest of the paper exploits the fact that the battlefield between the Germans and the Allies remained stuck for over six months near the so called “Gothic line,” a defensive line cutting Northern-Central Italy from West to East. Specifically, we apply a geographic Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to municipalities just above and just below the Gothic line, comparing their voting outcomes in the post-war national elections. The compound treatment is that, North of the line, the violent German occupation was both longer and harsher, and so were the civil war and the fighting by the resistance movement, while South of the line the Allies conducted a much less extractive occupation, free speech was allowed, and Italian political movements started claiming self-government responsibility for their country.

Our main causal result from RDD is that the vote share of the extreme-left parties in the post-war elections is larger in the municipalities just North of the line. This effect is quantitatively important (about 9 percentage points or higher for the communists in the 1946 elections), and again persists until the end of the so called “First Republic” in the early 1990s. The communist gain above the line is mainly at the expense of the catholic vote share, although this finding is less robust, suggesting that the communists may also have gained votes from other moderate or center-left parties. Municipalities North of the line are also less likely to vote for the extreme right-wing parties linked to supporters of the old fascist regime, but this effect occurs later in time and is much smaller in magnitude. We find no difference in voters’ turnout. Thus, a longer exposure to Nazi occupation and to civil war affected electoral outcomes, in the direction of more extremist left-wing votes. It is also worth noting that the longer German occupation and civil war hurt the Christian Democrats more than the extreme right-wing parties, implying a shift to the extreme also amongst center-right voters. As a result, overall political polarization increased where the civil war and Nazi occupation lasted longer.

These findings support the general idea that the circumstances surrounding critical historical junctures are important determinants of the political identities of citizens and organizations, with post-conflict political extremism being inflated by the longer duration of the civil war and of a foreign

occupation that is unanimously regarded as violent and extractive by the historical literature.

What are the channels that drive these effects? We contrast two possible explanations. First, a longer exposure to civil war and foreign occupation might directly affect voters' political attitudes. The Italian Communist Party was more active in the resistance movement than the others, and it had opposed Mussolini from the start (the Catholics instead had voted him in office). The shared emotions associated with the violent German occupation could have led voters to identify with the political party that, more than others, was the symbol of the victorious resistance movement. This mechanism is consistent with other studies which have shown that exposure to civil conflict reinforces group identification (see below). Second, a longer Nazi occupation might have affected post-war political organizations, since North of the line the resistance movement remained active for longer, and this may have given an advantage to the Communist Party in building grassroots organizations.

Although based on stronger assumptions than the RDD causal inference on the main effects, the evidence is more consistent with the first hypothesis, that is, the channel going through voters' attitudes rather than political organizations. First, in the OLS analysis, the communist vote share in post-war elections is correlated with the intensity of violence, but not with the presence of partisan brigades (i.e., fighters and active supporters of the resistance movement). This is true both with regard to episodes of Nazi and Fascist violence against civilians and partisans, and to the location of two particularly violent Nazi divisions that left a "blood trail" behind them. Second, in the RDD analysis, we find that partisan brigades were equally widespread just North and just South of the line, and their presence had no influence on the effects of the Nazi occupation on voting outcomes (i.e., the treatment effect is homogeneous in areas with and without partisan brigades). Third, the extreme right-wing parties, which were obviously more free to self-organize North of the line, did not benefit from this greater freedom, on the contrary they garnered more support South of the line.

Finally, contemporaneous survey data show a discontinuity in memories of the civil war around the line. Specifically, in November-December 2015, we conducted a random survey of about 2,500 individuals resident in 242 municipalities within 50 Km from the Gothic line. Memory of the civil war is stronger North of the line and amongst individuals who have a left-wing political orientation. There is also some weak evidence of mildly more anti-German attitudes North of the line. These findings too are suggestive that the mechanism underlying the reduced form effects operates through political attitudes and the memory of Nazi occupation.

Despite its importance, the rigorous empirical literature on these issues is not very large. Two recent papers have applied geographic RDD to WWII data. [Ochsner and Roesel \(2016\)](#) study the demarcation between the Soviet and US occupation zones in Austria during 1945-1955. They show

that there was a large scale Nazi migration away from the Soviet zone, which led to long lasting right-wing extremism into the US zone. [Ferwerda and Miller \(2014\)](#) study the demarcation between German and Vichy zones within France. They find a more active resistance movement in the German zone. These results are challenged by [Kocher and Monteiro \(2015\)](#), who argue that they are driven by the non-random location of the demarcation zone. [Dell and Querubin \(forthcoming\)](#) exploit discontinuities in the US military strategies during the Vietnam war, and find that bombing increased the political activities of the communist insurgency and reduced non-communist civic engagement.

The idea that political realignments occur at critical junctures, such as external or civil wars, through the definition of new political identities and new political organizations, has been emphasized by [Mayhew \(2004\)](#). See also [Sundquist \(2011\)](#) on the long lasting legacy of the US civil war. The notion of political realignments also motivates [Balcells \(2011\)](#), who studies the political attitudes of war veterans in the Spanish civil war of 1936–38. Her results are consistent with ours, although she looks at opinion polls rather than actual behavior. [Costalli and Ruggeri \(2015\)](#) also study the effect of the Italian civil war on the immediate post-war election, and some of their findings are consistent with ours, although they do not look at the Nazi occupation as treatment, only focus on the 1946 election, and do not exploit any geographic RDD to make causal inference. Finally, [Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya \(forthcoming\)](#) apply geographic RDD to study the long term consequences of the partition of Poland between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Poland.

A few papers have studied the effects of civil wars in Africa, generally showing that such events reinforce ethnic identities and increase political participation ([Blattman, 2009](#); [Bellows and Miguel, 2009](#); see also the survey in [Bauer et al., 2016](#)). [Canetti and Lindner \(2015\)](#) and [Canetti-Nisim et al. \(2009\)](#) study the effects of violence in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, through interviews and with a psychological approach. They show that the stress associated with prolonged exposure to the threat of violence leads to political radicalism. [Grosjean \(2014\)](#) studies survey data on the legacy of civil wars in 35 countries in Europe and Central Asia; she finds that civil war is associated with an erosion of social and political trust. [Miguel et al. \(2011\)](#) find that football players from countries recently exposed to civil wars behave more violently (as measured by yellow and red cards).

Finally, our paper is also related to a larger literature on the persistence of political attitudes and cultural traits. [Acharya et al. \(2015\)](#) document that contemporary differences in political attitudes across counties in the US South are correlated with the local prevalence of slavery around 1860, but this correlation is not present amongst second generation immigrants in those same counties. [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) find strong persistence in anti-Semitism within Germany over more than five centuries. [Fouka and Voth \(2013\)](#) find evidence suggesting that Nazi occupation had persistent

cultural effects in Greece: During the recent Greek financial crisis, sales of German cars fell more in the areas where German troops committed war crimes against civilians. [Avdeenko and Siedler \(2016\)](#) study German longitudinal data and document the importance of the intergenerational transmission of political extremism from fathers to sons. [Lupu and Peisakhin \(2017\)](#) study the effect of the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars in a 2014 multigenerational survey. They find that descendants of affected individuals hold more hostile attitudes toward Russia and participate more in politics.

2. Historical Background

This section summarizes the main events that led to the birth of the post-WWII Italian political system. Since we will compare the elections in the immediate post-war period to the latest free elections before the fascist dictatorship, we start with a brief account of the Italian political system before the advent of fascism. We then turn to the WWII period—discussing the nature of the foreign occupation and of the civil war (i.e., our treatment)—and finally to the post-war Italian political system.¹

2.1 Pre-war period

At the end of World War I, Italy was a constitutional monarchy and the government was supported by a parliamentary majority of liberal-moderate representatives elected in 1913. Socialist and catholic movements were emerging, however. These new parties appealed to Italian voters who had only recently been enfranchised.

Before the consolidation of Mussolini's dictatorship, three free elections were held in 1919, 1921, and 1924 under universal male suffrage. Average turnout was around 60%. In 1919 and 1921, the electoral system was proportional, but voters could cast a preference vote for candidates running in different lists (the so called “panachage” system). In 1924, the electoral system entailed a large majority premium that gave two thirds of the seats to the party gaining a relative majority in a single national district, and assigned the remaining seats to the other parties according to proportional criteria. Thus, none of these electoral rules was identical to the pure proportional system with preference votes created after WWII, although all of them had important elements of proportionality.

In the 1919 election, the Italian political system was essentially split between three groups: A liberal-moderate coalition representing the political elites that had ruled Italy in the previous decades, and two emerging and antagonistic political groups, the catholics and the socialists. These new parties were on different positions on many issues, and were unable to form viable political alliances between them. In 1919 the liberal coalition retained a relative majority but, despite a large absenteeism rate, it

¹A more detailed historical account of these periods and episodes is provided in [Romanelli \(1995\)](#), [Leoni \(2001\)](#), [Baldissara et al. \(2000\)](#), [Collotti et al. \(2000\)](#), [Collotti et al. \(2006\)](#), [Gentile \(2015\)](#), [Pavone \(1991\)](#), and [Matta \(1996\)](#).

lost many votes and seats to the socialist and catholic parties. This outcome led to a short period of instability, which resulted in a new election in 1921.

The main novelties of the 1921 election were the gains obtained by the fascist candidates, who ran in the same lists as the traditional liberal bloc, and the fact that the Communist Party entered the ballot for the first time.² The votes and seats obtained by the catholics and socialists were roughly unchanged (or slightly lower) compared to 1919. After a period of political violence and instability, in 1922 Mussolini was asked by the King to form a government. He received a vote of confidence by a parliamentary majority that included the catholic party, while the socialists (and a small communist group) voted against him. Mussolini soon changed the electoral law to a proportional system with a large majority premium for the party with a relative majority (see above). In 1924, a new election was held, and the fascist party obtained two thirds of the votes. Although formally free and regular, this election was held in a climate of violence and intimidation. Within a few years Mussolini further consolidated his power into a dictatorship. As a result, elections in 1919, 1921, and 1924 are not easily comparable between each other, but each of them displays within-municipality variation that conveys information on the underlying political preferences of the (local) population. General elections were held in Italy also in 1929 and 1934. Following a parliamentary reform enacted in 1928, these elections were held in the form of a referendum with only the Fascist party running and with a voting system that did not guarantee the secrecy of the vote.³ Moreover, to our knowledge, no data are available at the municipal level. This is the reason why we ignore these elections.

2.2 War period

2.2.1 *The Gothic line*

We can date the beginning of the Italian “civil war” (Pavone, 1991) in July 1943, when the Allies landed in Sicily. Since then and until May 1945, Italy was ravaged by war. On one side were the Germans, supported by the forces that remained loyal to Mussolini. On the opposite side were the Allies, supported by the Italian resistance movement (operating in the areas occupied by the Germans). Throughout this period, the overall estimated casualties were about 360,000, of which about 155,000 Italians. The Italian victims of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war were 70,000–80,000. Of

²The Italian Communist Party was founded on January 21, 1919 in Livorno as a split from the socialist movement.

³Voters could vote either “Yes” or “No” to approve the list of deputies appointed by the Grand Council of Fascism. Voters were provided with two equally sized sheets, white outside, inside bearing the words “Do you approve the list of members appointed by the Grand National Council of Fascism?” The electoral sheet with the “Yes” was also accompanied by the Italian flag and a fascist symbol, the one with the “No” had no symbol. Inside the voting booth there was a first ballot box where the voter left the discarded sheet and then delivered to the scrutineers the chosen sheet, so that they would ensure that it was “carefully sealed.” Turnout was around 90% and approval of the fascist list over 98%.

these, at least 10,000 were civilians killed by Nazis or fascists, about 30,000 were resistance fighters, and about as many were fascists (see [Gentile, 2015](#), pp. 4–5). In addition, about 40,000 civilians were deported to Germany (of which 7,500 were Jews), 90% of these died (see [Rochat, 2005](#), p. 443).

The battlefield moved overtime, but it remained stuck for several months near a defensive line prepared by the Germans in Central Italy, the so called “Gothic line.” Figure 1 illustrates the areas under German occupation, by number of days, as well as the Gothic line. Northern-Central Italy remained under German occupation for over two years, while the South for two to five months. As can be seen from Figure 1, the Germans were able to stop the Allies for several months between Rome and Naples (along the so called “Gustav Line,” which was held by the Germans between December 1943 and May 1944). From there, the battlefield moved rapidly toward Northern-Central Italy, in the area between Florence and Bologna, where the Germans had prepared a strong and continuous line of defense. Preparation for the Gothic line had began well in advance, while the Germans were still trying to defend the area South of Rome. This allowed the Germans to prepare an effective defense system, which stopped the Allies between the Summer of 1944 and the Spring of 1945. The Gothic line was conceived as the last defense for German retreat. The barrier extended from the Western coast between *La Spezia* and *Massa* to the Eastern coast between *Pesaro* and *Rimini*. Basically, the line consisted of defensive positions and bunkers, hundreds of thousands of mines and booby traps, and a continuous anti-tank ditch almost six miles long; “Allied aerial reconnaissance photographs showed a dense network of machine-gun posts, gun positions and ditches.” ([Holland, 2008](#), p. 301).⁴

As can be seen from Figure 1, during the Summer of 1944 the battlefield remained stuck in an area about 50 Km South of the Gothic line. The continuous line in Figure 1 is the Gothic, which was held by the Germans between November 1944 and April 1945. The line was finally overcome by the Allies in April 1945, and in May the Germans surrendered control of Italy. The battles around the Gothic line brought much destruction to the area, with heavy casualties amongst Germans (around 48,000), Allies (32,000), and Italian fascists, partisans and civilians (altogether 30,000–40,000), see [Montemaggi \(1980\)](#). As discussed below, the Allies were extremely close to overcome the Gothic line before the Winter of 1944, but a combination of hard weather and divergences between the US and UK—with the former prioritizing the invasion of France and the latter paying more attention to the Mediterranean—froze the battlefield at the Gothic line for six months.

Figure 2 zooms in the area around the Gothic line, illustrating the size and elevation of each municipality and how the battlefield moved during the Summer of 1944. There are three demarcation lines. The line labeled “Allies” is where the Allies stopped between August and mid-September 1944.

⁴It is estimated that over 50,000 Italian forced workers were involved in building the Gothic line ([Ronchetti, 2009](#)).

The line labeled “Fall 1944” is the original line set up by the Germans. Between late August and mid-September 1944 the Allies succeeded in breaching this line (so called operation “Olive”). The line labeled “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945” is where the Germans managed to contain the US-British offensive. From the end of October onwards, the Allies and the Germans were fighting along this line. It was finally breached in April 1945. Our RDD is on the Northern-most line “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945,” which was held for the longest period. Below we also run placebo checks on the other two lines.

For the sake of our empirical analysis, it is important to note that the position of the last line of defense was not only the outcome of a German decision. It was also largely due to random events, which forced the Allies to stop their offensive between late October 1944 and the Spring of 1945. In August 1944, the Allies withdrew several divisions from the Italian front to launch a new offensive in Southern France. This decision was highly controversial: It was supported by the Americans, who wanted to create a distraction for the Germans from the ongoing battles in the rest of France, but it was opposed by the British, who instead leaned toward a stronger offensive in Italy. The American point of view prevailed, and this weakened the efforts of the Allies in Italy at a critical point in time (see [Churchill, 1959](#)). A second important random event was the weather, which deteriorated harshly in late October. These are the words used by Churchill to describe those critical moments in October 1944: “The weather was appalling. Heavy rains had swollen the numberless rivers and irrigation channels [...]. Off the roads movement was often impossible. It was with the greatest difficulty that the troops toiled forward. [...] Not until the spring were the armies rewarded with the victory they had so well earned, and so nearly won, in the autumn” (see [Churchill, 1959](#), p.839).

2.2.2 Foreign occupation and resistance movement

In the North, Mussolini tried to revamp the fascist regime by claiming statehood for the areas under German occupation (with the exclusion of two territories directly annexed to the German Reich, close to the Alps and to the Northern Adriatic coastland) and by setting the new capital of his *Repubblica Sociale Italiana* (RSI) in the small town of *Salò*. But this experiment resulted in little more than a Nazi-backed puppet state, dependent entirely upon Germany and with no autonomous domestic or foreign policy of any sort. The Nazi occupation of Northern Italy is unanimously deemed as violent and extractive by the historical literature. As Rudolf Rahn, the German diplomat who was the plenipotentiary to the RSI, put it: “Everything in occupied Italy must be exploited by us for our war effort” (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 111). This meant coerced labor and deportations, handing over of all gold reserves, shutting down of factories to ship equipment to Germany, full control of the remaining factories for military purposes, and food reserves (if any) packed off to Germany.

In Allied-held Italy, all areas close to the battlefield were directly run by the Allied Military Government (AMG) and then, as the front advanced up toward the North, they were passed back to the authority of the Italian government, formally appointed by the King. At first, under prime minister Pietro Badoglio, the political legitimacy of the government was weak, since the monarchy was implicated with the fascist regime. But then the political parties outlawed by the fascist regime and active in the resistance movement (see below) gradually took responsibility and joined the governments lead by Ivanoe Bonomi from June 1944 until the end of WWII.

Although the autonomy of the government was severely limited by the Allied Control Commission, self-determination was much stronger South of the line and, most importantly, free speech was moving Italy closer to democracy. In particular, the Bonomi government started having greater responsibility after September 1944, when Churchill and Roosevelt made a joined declaration shaping the future path toward Italy's self-determination and economic recovery. The sharp divide between the political (and psychological) situation North vs South of the Gothic line is best described by Italian lieutenant Eugenio Corti (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 251, italics ours): "I wondered if the British and Americans realized that *behind their lines* one could feel a respect for men. It felt like this whenever one saw notices where occupation troops threatened fines and at most jail sentences that *on the other side* were invariably punished with death. We would no longer hear talk of executions, and this fear—which makes man nothing more than a beast—would no longer hang over us."

Throughout the civil war period, the resistance movement grew rapidly, from a few thousands of fighters in the Fall of 1943 to several tens of thousands one year later. In addition, it is estimated that around 20,000 civilians were directly connected to the resistance movement, even if only few of them nested into political coordination (see [Bocca, 2012](#), p. 265). Although the movement was spontaneous and did not have strong party affiliations, the leaders of the various groups were active members of political parties that the fascist regime had disbanded. Three main political affiliations can be identified: The left-wing groups, linked with the communist and socialist parties; the catholic groups, linked with the Christian Democratic party; and other centrist groups, linked with liberals that had opposed Mussolini. In addition there were several other small groups with no explicit political affiliation. The left-wing brigades, and to a smaller extent the catholic, were by far the largest and more active organizations. The political parties active in the resistance movement joined forces in the "National Liberation Committee," which gave crucial support to the Bonomi governments.

In the North, the civil-war nature of the conflict was reinforced by the decision of Mussolini to give birth to the "black brigades," paramilitary groups directly run by the Fascist Party, who also attracted tens of thousands of volunteers, although poorly trained and equipped.

According to historical accounts, the effects of German occupation on the civilian population were not evenly distributed in time and space. [Gentile \(2015\)](#), in particular, stresses two stylized facts. First, combat troops near the front line were more ruthless and prone to hurt civilians than other troops in charge of logistics and administration. This reflected both the selection and composition of such troops, as well as the additional stress and danger that they faced. Second, following hierarchical orders, the German attitudes and tactics changed over time, and became particularly aggressive toward partisans and civilians alike from the Summer of 1944 onwards, when the danger posed by the resistance movement became more apparent. On June 17, 1944 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in chief in the Mediterranean, issued an order promising indemnity to soldiers who should exceed “normal restraint” in the choice of repression methods.⁵

Our (local) source of exogenous variation—the Gothic line—captures a treatment made up of both (i) the extractive Nazi occupation that characterized the last period of WWII and (ii) the civil war between the fascist and partisan brigades. The compound nature of this treatment reinforces its interest, as it is not uncommon to find such a bundle and both elements operate along the same spectrum of political alignment. The control group includes municipalities occupied by the Allies, where free speech was allowed and self-determination by Italian authorities gradually developed.

2.3 Post-war period

The resistance movement and the political parties to which it was linked played a key role in the immediate aftermath of the war. Several leaders of the movement became prominent political figures and were elected in the post-war Parliament for several legislatures. The civil war contributed to shape the political identity of these parties and gave them a visibility and popularity that they had not enjoyed before, also due to the repression imposed by the fascist regime.

The first key decision of the new political leadership was to hold an election for a constitutional assembly. The election was held in 1946, simultaneously with a referendum on whether to abandon the monarchy. Monarchy lost and Italy became a Republic. With this election, suffrage became universal, thus women had the right to vote for the first time. The electoral rule for the constitutional assembly and for all subsequent elections until 1992 was proportional. All the main parties presented lists of candidates at the constitutional assembly, and the party system did not change significantly afterward. Hence, the election for the constitutional assembly is comparable to subsequent political

⁵Nazi authorities also tried to make this clear to the Italian population. In the Summer of 1944, German planes dropped leaflets over Central Italy with the warning: “Whoever knows the place where a band of rebels is in hiding and does not immediately inform the German Army, will be shot. Whoever gives food or shelter to a band or to individual rebels, will be shot. Every house in which rebels are found or have stayed, will be blown up” (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 145).

elections. The first regular election was held in 1948. The only difference in party labels is that in 1948 the communist and socialist parties ran together under the label of “Popular Front,” whereas they had run separately in the 1946 constitutional election. In 1953 and in subsequent elections they split again. Monarchist parties progressively disappeared from the political scene; the last election in which they ran was in 1968. On the extreme right, a party close to the fascists, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), was founded on December 26, 1946 and appeared on the ballot in the 1948 election, but consolidated its vote share (around 5–7%) only from the 1953 election onwards.

The political system that emerged in the late 1940s reflected the legacy of the civil war in several respects. First, as already noted, most political leaders had played an important role in the resistance movement, at least in the period 1943–45. Second, the party system was highly polarized. On the left the largest party were the communists (the biggest communist party in Western countries), which at the time had strong ideological and financial links with the Soviet Union, while the extreme right remained loyal to the fascist regime.⁶ Third, and partly as a result of such deep ideological polarization, one of the main goals of the Constitutional assembly was to create a very inclusive and consensual political system, to minimize the risk of violent conflict. This resulted in a strictly proportional electoral system, perfect bicameralism, and several checks and balances that diluted executive powers.

The main features of the Italian post-war political system remained roughly unchanged until the early 1990s, when several things changed. First, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Italian Communist Party made a credible and pronounced shift toward social democracy. Second, the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party collapsed under the weight of corruption scandals, leaving room for new moderate forces led by Silvio Berlusconi. Third, the electoral rule was changed to a mixed-member system. Our analysis ends just on the edge of this transition.

3. Data

This section describes the variables we have collected. A more detailed definition of each variable and the original sources are reported in Appendix A. The unit of observation is the municipality.

3.1 Political outcomes

We measure political outcomes by the percentage of votes received by political parties at the 1946 election for the constitutional assembly, and in all subsequent 10 national elections for the Chamber of

⁶Until the early 1990s, the two biggest parties were the Christian Democrats, the ruling party over all of this period, with average vote shares of 35–40%, and the Communist Party, whose vote share grew from 15–20% right after the war to more than 30% in 1976. The vote share of the Socialist Party oscillated around 10–15%.

Deputies until 1987 included.⁷ We exclude the small region of Aosta Valley from our sample because it always had a different electoral system. Moreover, due to its particular position and history, its political scene has always been dominated by local parties.

We consider three political groups. First the radical left, measured by the votes given to the Communist Party. We call this variable *Communist*. Since in 1948 the communists and the socialists formed a single electoral list, we also consider the votes received by these two parties together, and we call it *Communist and Socialist*. The second group is the Christian Democratic Party, which we call *Catholic*. The third group, which we call *Right Wing*, consists of the MSI and smaller parties that supported the monarchy. The source of the electoral data is the Italian Ministry of Interior.⁸

We also collected data on political outcomes before the war, for the elections held in 1919, 1921, and 1924. Here the source is [Corbetta and Piretti \(2009\)](#), who carried out a serious and meticulous work of reconstruction for that period. The Communist Party was very small in the 1921 and 1924 elections (and did not exist in 1919), so we lump together the socialist and communist votes in the pre-fascist period to gain precision. The right-wing vote cannot be separately measured in 1921, since fascists were running together with the more traditional and moderate liberals in that election. Hence, for the pre-fascist period we only collect the *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist* variables.

Since there are several missing observations, in our baseline analysis we fill the missing observations in each election exploiting the remaining two elections plus additional observables. Thus, to fill the missing observations in, say, vote shares for the catholics in 1924 we impute predicted values of an OLS regression of the available vote shares on non-missing vote shares for the catholics in 1919 and 1921 plus a few other observable covariates.⁹ This allows us to gain over 3,000 observations. Unfortunately, even after filling in the missing observations in this way, we are still left with about 2,300 municipalities (out of 8,100) for which no information on pre-war political outcomes is available. Since we want to condition on pre-war outcomes in most of our analysis, our baseline sample consists of the about 5,700 municipalities for which we have both post-war and pre-war political outcomes. Below we verify the robustness of the results to the pattern of missing observations.

⁷Electoral years for national elections are 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1987. Less than 5 years between one election and the next indicates early termination.

⁸Since we are interested in how the Nazi occupation shifted political preferences from a moderate to an extreme-left vote, we also compute the difference between the vote to the communist and to the catholic party. This variable is called *Communist minus Catholic*. In the same spirit, we also use the variable *Communist and Socialist minus Catholic*.

⁹Specifically, we control for population density in 1921, illiterate share in 1921, and regional fixed effects.

3.2 War-related variables

To explore the mechanisms that could affect political outcomes, we collected several variables related to the Nazi occupation and the civil war. First, we coded the presence of partisan brigades in the municipal area. Taking advantage of [Baldissara et al. \(2000\)](#), we coded the areas over which each partisan brigade mainly fought. We distinguish between left-wing brigades and other partisan brigades (lumping together catholic groups, liberals, and others).

The second set of variables codes episodes of violence by the fascists or by the Germans. We define a dummy variable for municipalities that had at least one episode of violence, and we also distinguish between episodes where the majority of victims were civilians or partisans. The source is the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” ([ANPI-INSMLI, 2016](#)). This recent database describes all the massacres and the individual murders of civilians and resistance fighters killed in Italy after September 8, 1943 by Nazi troops or by paramilitary groups of the RSI, outside of the armed conflict.¹⁰ The episodes of violence range from the first murders in the South to the withdrawal massacres committed in the days after the Liberation. This database was constructed by more than 90 researchers under the supervision of a joint historical commission established by the Italian and German governments in 2009. In a previous version of our paper, written before this database became publicly available, we had collected data on violence from a variety of primary sources. Although the two datasets (the Atlas and our own database) largely overlap and the results are similar, here we only rely on the publicly available data. Appendix A provides details on the primary sources used in the previous version.

Third, we collected data on deportations to Germany. During WWII, about 40,000 Italians were deported to Germany (about 7,500 were Jewish). Thanks to [Mantelli and Tranfaglia \(2013\)](#), we have data on the number of political deportations by municipality of capture (about 6,500 individuals) and by municipality of birth (around 14,000 individuals). We do not know the date of capture, however. Even though there are more missing observations, we rely on the municipality of capture, rather than of birth, because internal migration would introduce larger measurement error in the birth data.

Our fourth set of variables codes the location of specific German troops. According to [Gentile \(2015\)](#), two divisions were particularly violent and were responsible for a very large number of criminal episodes against civilians: The 16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and the “Hermann Goering” division (the latter was created in 1933 as a political police by Hermann Goering when he was Minister of Interior; it later became a regular combat force, but it maintained the tradition of an elite special unit). Based on the German archives consulted by [Gentile \(2015\)](#), we

¹⁰The data span from February 1943 to May 1945, but only 21 out of 5,594 events are dated before September 1943.

have records on the precise location of these troops throughout the Italian civil war. We construct a dummy variable that equals 1 for municipalities within 15 Km from the location of either one of these divisions. We call this dummy variable *Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions*.¹¹

We restrict attention to those two specific divisions, discarding all the other SS or Luftwaffe divisions, since in the reconstruction made by our main source ([Gentile, 2015](#)) they were responsible for the majority and most dramatic episodes of violence (e.g., *Sant'Anna di Stazzema* and *Marzabotto*). According to the very detailed reconstruction in the book by Gentile, the “Reichsfuhrer-SS” division was responsible for over 20% of all civilian casualties due to the Nazi occupation. And at the Nuremberg Trials, the “Hermann Goering” division was included in the group of “notable offenders” for having participated in a large number of criminal episodes. Both divisions were composed of highly ideological young men, loyal to Nazism, and with previous experience in the violent war in Eastern Europe, where Nazi troops committed several atrocities against civilians. The exceptional violence of these divisions can be seen in Figure B.1 in Appendix B, which traces their location with dots. The shaded areas refer to the number of recorded violent episodes against civilians (darker areas denote a higher number of episodes). Clearly the location of these two divisions is associated with a higher density of episodes of violence, particularly in Central Italy.

Finally, we coded the duration of the German occupation (measured in fraction or multiple of years) in each province, from the detailed maps in [Baldissara et al. \(2000\)](#). We were able to reconstruct the duration of the German occupation at the municipal level only near the Gothic and the Gustav lines, where the battlefront was more clearly defined. Throughout the rest of Italy, data on the duration of the German occupation are at the province level only.

3.3 Other city characteristics

From the Census we collected data on total resident population, population density, and literacy rates. We have data for 1911, 1921, and then 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. Some of these variables have been particularly difficult to collect, since early on the Italian Census was not completely digitalized. The source is the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). As an indicator of economic development, from the 1951 Census we also collected data on the number of industrial plants per capita in each municipality. Finally, we collected data on elevation at the city hall, and on maximum and minimum elevation in the municipality. Appendix Table B.1 reports summary statistics of the variables described above in the entire Italian sample; Appendix Table B.2 provides the same summary statistics for those municipalities within a 50 Km radius around the Gothic line.

¹¹We are grateful to Carlo Gentile for sharing with us his data on the location of these divisions, as well as data on crimes by these and other German troops.

4. Empirical Strategy

4.1 Prior hypotheses

Did the German occupation leave a mark on the post-war Italian political system? In particular, did it affect the support enjoyed by extremist political parties? A priori, there are three main reasons to expect a lasting impact, the first two operating directly on citizens' attitudes (the demand side of politics), and the third one operating on political organizations (the supply side).

First, in the areas under German occupation, the civil war between the fascists and their opponents was both longer and harsher. This in turn could lead to more entrenched and radicalized positions on both sides, reinforcing political identities and shaping attitudes in favor of both the communists and the extreme right-wing parties at the expense of the moderate parties. The Italian Communist Party tried indeed to capitalize on this identity channel in the aftermath of WWII, by pitching itself as the true guardian of the legacy of the resistance movement.

Second, the German occupation was actively opposed by the Italian resistance movement. To suppress it, Nazis often resorted to extreme forms of violence, not only against resistance fighters but also against civilians. This violence could leave a mark on political attitudes. A priori, the effect could go either way. On the one hand, Nazi violence (actual or just threatened) could lead to more antagonistic attitudes against the enemy. This would favor the communists, who were more involved in the resistance movement and stood up more forcefully against the Nazis. On the other hand, civilians could blame the partisan brigades (and hence mainly the communists), who were responsible for the German retaliation against civilians. Moreover, the extractive nature of the Nazi occupation, especially when contrasted to the Allies' behavior, could affect political attitudes directly.

Third, the German occupation could affect political organizations. Right-wing parties loyal to Mussolini were obviously more free to self-organize in the areas under German occupation. But the presence of active partisan brigades could also matter, since the post-war party system grew out of the resistance movement, and partisan brigades could be exploited to build grassroots organizations, as stressed by [Costalli and Ruggeri \(2015\)](#). Through this supply side channel, a longer German occupation should thus give an advantage to the Communist Party (since its partisan brigades were more active and better organized), as well as to the right-wing parties linked to fascism.

4.2 Econometric framework

Our estimation strategy exploits geographic heterogeneity in the duration and nature of the Nazi occupation. As discussed above, for military reasons, the Nazi occupation was longer and more violent

in some areas than in others. We start by looking at the OLS correlations in all of Italy:

$$Y_{ir}^{post} = \alpha_0 DUR_i + \alpha_1 V_i + \alpha_2 PB_i + x_i' \beta + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ir}^{post} is any (post-treatment) electoral outcome for municipality i in region r ; DUR_i is the duration of the Nazi occupation (measured in years); V_i measures the intensity of violence; PB_i measures the presence of partisan brigades; x_i is a vector of covariates including illiterate share and population size from the closest census, electoral outcomes in 1919, 1921, and 1924, altitude, longitude, latitude, and a constant; γ_r are region fixed effects; ε_i is the random error term, capturing all omitted factors. The parameter α_0 captures the association between the treatment and electoral outcomes.

Despite the interest of these country-wide correlations, some of the omitted factors in ε_i might be correlated with both the treatment and political outcomes. This is why, in order to identify the causal effect of the Nazi occupation, we implement a geographic RDD and compare post-war political outcomes in municipalities just above and just below the Gothic line. As argued in Section 2.2.1, this defensive line can be seen both as continuous and as good as random. Our identifying assumption is that, after controlling for distance from the line (and for latitude and longitude), being just North or just South of the Gothic line is a random event uncorrelated with other unobservable determinants of political outcomes. This assumption can be indirectly tested and cannot be rejected for a number of pre-treatment observables. Any difference in political outcomes between municipalities North vs South of the Gothic Line can thus be attributed to the difference in the duration of the Nazi occupation.¹² As discussed in Section 2.2.2, the treatment for being North of the line is a longer exposure to the Nazi occupation and to a more intense civil war for about six more months. Formally, we define d_i as the distance (in Km) from the Gothic line, with negative (positive) values identifying towns South (North) of the line, and estimate the following model in the interval $d_i \in [-\Delta, +\Delta]$:

$$Y_i^{post} = \sum_{k=0}^p (\delta_k d_i^k) + T_i \sum_{k=0}^p (\alpha_k d_i^k) + x_i' \beta + \eta_i, \quad (2)$$

where Y_i^{post} is any post-treatment outcome; T_i is a dummy identifying whether municipality i is North or South of the Gothic line; x_i is a vector of (time-invariant and pre-treatment) covariates; p captures

¹²In principle, similar estimates could be done around the Gustav line, where the Germans also stood for several months. A number of reasons discouraged us from doing so, however. First, the battle for the Gustav line occurred much earlier in time, when the resistance movement was not yet organized. The civil war did not reach those areas, and the civilian population did not suffer as much damage and casualties as in Central Italy. This also reflected German orders, which became much more intolerant and aggressive against civilians only at a later stage (see [Gentile, 2015](#)). Furthermore, pre-war voting outcomes are missing for a large number of municipalities around the Gustav line.

the order of the (spline) polynomial control function; η_i is the error term. The bandwidth Δ is either a (multiple) discretionary threshold or an optimal bandwidth as in [Calonico et al. \(2016\)](#). The parameter α_0 identifies the treatment effect of interest.¹³ To avoid comparing municipalities close to the line but located far from each other along the East-West dimension, we perform a series of robustness checks by including latitude and longitude or fixed effects for 25 Km intervals of the Gothic line in the vector x_i (see [Dell, 2010](#)) and, in our preferred specification, by using matching methods to compare nearest geographic neighbors just above and just below the Gothic line (see [Keele and Titiunik, 2014](#)).

RDD allows us to estimate the causal effect of the Nazi occupation on post-war elections, but does not uniquely identify a particular mechanism. To discriminate between alternative hypotheses, we need additional (and stricter) assumptions. First, note that if we replace the outcome variable in equation (2) with a set of pre-treatment variables Y_i^{pre} , we can run balance tests that should normally deliver zero effects in order for the RDD to be valid. If we instead replace the outcome variable with “contextual” factors that happen to be potentially present in the context of Nazi occupation, we can test for demand-side vs supply-side potential mechanisms. Assume, for example, that we find a significant discontinuity in contextual factors that are likely to affect voters’ behavior (the demand side), but not party organizations (the supply side). In order to interpret this as evidence of a demand-side mechanism, we also need to assume that there are no unobserved variables that impact on the supply side and that happen to have a discontinuity at the Gothic line. In our data, the variables V_i (intensity of violence) and PB_i (presence of brigades) seem natural candidates for demand-side and supply-side contextual factors, respectively.

In Section 5, we present the OLS baseline estimates of equation (1). In Section 6, we present the RDD estimates of the causal effects of the Nazi occupation on all political outcomes, as in equation (2), and contrast the potential mechanisms of these findings.

5. OLS Baseline Estimates

In this section we estimate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the vote share of the Communist Party in 1946 and subsequent elections (except 1948, when the communists did not run alone). The main independent variables of interest are the duration of Nazi occupation, different indicators of Nazi violence, and the presence of partisan brigades. Here, partisan brigades are de-

¹³The estimated coefficient $\hat{\alpha}_0$ from equation (2) is not directly comparable with $\hat{\alpha}_0$ from equation (1), because they are measured in different metrics and because the former is a local effect. Indeed, α_0 in (2) is the causal effect of six more months of Nazi occupation in a period associated with intense violence (experienced or threatened). For the sake of comparison between the OLS and RDD coefficients, one should keep in mind that, if we use DUR_i as the outcome variable of the RDD estimations defined in equation (2), we find point estimates in the range between 0.524 and 0.550 (depending on the estimation method; all statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level).

ned to be present if their area of operation overlaps with the area of the municipality (“intersect,” our preferred measure) or if their area of operation completely includes the area of the municipality (“within,” our second measure). We always control for latitude, longitude, altitude (maximum and at the city hall), illiteracy share in 1951, population size (in logs) in 1951, vote shares of communists and socialists and of catholics in the 1919, 1921, and 1924 elections, as well as region fixed effects.

5.1 Occupation and violence

The baseline OLS estimates with *Communist 1946* as dependent variable are displayed in Table 1. We report both robust standard errors (second row) and standard errors corrected for spatial correlation (third row) as in [Conley \(1996\)](#). In columns (1)-(3), the presence of partisan brigades is measured by the more comprehensive indicator (“intersect”), in columns (4-6) by the stricter indicator (“within”).

As can be seen from column (1) of Table 1—our preferred specification—the post-war vote share of the communists is positively associated with the duration of Nazi occupation (in years) and with the intensity of violence during the war, but not with the proximity to partisan brigades. Specifically, we use two indicators of violence: (i) a dummy variable for municipalities that had at least one episode of violence; (ii) a dummy variable for municipalities in a 15 Km radius from violent Nazi divisions.¹⁴ As discussed in Section 3, much of the German violence against civilians was due to two special divisions, the 16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and the “Hermann Goering” division. Even when no violence is recorded in historical sources, these special troops are more likely to have scared or harassed the local population.

According to the estimate in column (1), half a year of additional Nazi occupation is associated with an increase in the communist vote share of about 3.3 percentage points (i.e., about 21.8% of the average vote share in the whole sample of 5,559 municipalities with no missing values). The occurrence of at least one episode of violence is associated with an increase in the communist vote share by almost 1 percentage point (i.e., about 6.6%).¹⁵ Being close to the two violent Nazi divisions is associated with an increase in the communist vote share of about 2 percentage points (i.e., about 13.2%). The association between the communist vote share and the presence of partisan brigades (left-wing or others) is never statistically different from zero. When considering spatially corrected standard errors, years of occupation lose significance. This is not surprising, given that here (unlike in the RDD estimates around the Gothic line) years of occupation are mainly measured at the province level. The statistical significance of the correlation between communist votes and episodes of violence, which

¹⁴All results are similar if the dummy is redefined to capture municipalities within 10 Km (available upon request).

¹⁵Violence episodes where the majority of victims were civilians also have a positive point estimate; the same holds if we consider violence episodes where the majority of victims were partisan (results available upon request).

are always measured at the municipality level, survives to the spatial correction procedure. Column (4) shows that these correlations are robust to the use of the alternative and stricter measure of the presence of partisan brigades (described above).

In columns (2) and (3), we augment the baseline OLS specification to test for interactive effects. Columns (5) and (6) do the same but use the stricter measure of the presence of partisan brigades. We start with the interaction between the presence of any partisan brigades and the violence indicators—see columns (2) and (5).¹⁶ Anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes local residents blamed the partisans for the German retaliation. If so, Nazi violence that occurs where brigades are more active should shift fewer votes toward the communists. This is what we find. In column (2), the estimated coefficient on episodes of violence rises from 0.9 to 1.6, while the interaction coefficient is negative and significant and of about the same magnitude. Thus, episodes of Nazi violence are positively correlated with communist votes only in municipalities that do not intersect with the area of operation of any brigade. In column (5) the pattern is similar. This finding is reassuring also because it reduces identification concerns about omitted variables possibly correlated with both the propensity to resist German troops and the likelihood to vote for the communists. The effect of the location of violent Nazi divisions, instead, is not significantly affected by the presence of partisan brigades.

We then ask whether a longer German occupation has stronger effects in the presence of partisan brigades (supply side) or of the violent Nazi divisions (demand side), compared to areas where either brigades or violent German troops were absent—see columns (3) and (6). The interaction between years of occupation and the location of violent Nazi divisions is always positive and significant. Based on the estimates in column (3) and consistently with a demand side mechanism, the association between the duration of Nazi occupation and the post-war communist vote share is amplified by about 24% if the municipality was close to the location of violent Nazi divisions during the conflict. The interaction term with partisan brigades, instead, is negative and statistically significant in column (3), negative but not statistically different from zero in column (6). Thus, the Nazi occupation is associated with a shift toward the Communist Party mainly if partisans were not active in the area, and not the other way around as a supply mechanism would suggest.¹⁷

On the whole, both the baseline correlations and the interaction terms show that supply-side factors related to the presence of left-wing partisan brigades play little or no role in explaining the propensity

¹⁶Note that the presence of left or other partisan brigades are mutually exclusive, it never happens that a left-wing and another partisan brigade are present in the same municipality.

¹⁷Results are similar if we disaggregate the interaction term between left-wing vs other brigades. We also tested for the interaction between the duration of occupation and the dummy *At least one violence episode*, but the interaction term is never statistically significant. All results are qualitatively similar or even stronger if we restrict the sample to municipalities where the occupation lasted more than one year (i.e., above the Gustav line) and are available upon request.

to vote for the Communist Party after the conflict, while demand-side factors related to violence (either experienced or threatened) appear to be relevant in this respect.

5.2 Persistence

The correlations between political outcomes and both the duration of Nazi occupation and the intensity of violence also show some persistence across the Italian First Republic. To test for persistent correlations, we estimate column (1) in Table 1 for the elections between 1946 and 1987.¹⁸ Figure 3 depicts the estimated coefficients and (robust) confidence intervals for the duration of Nazi occupation, the dummy for proximity to violent Nazi divisions, the dummy for at least one episode of violence, and the dummy for the presence of left-wing partisan brigades (which is never statistically different from zero to begin with). Communist votes are positively associated with the duration of Nazi occupation until the 1960s and with the proximity to violent Nazi divisions until the 1990s, in both cases at the 5% significance level. The coefficient of the dummy variable for at least one episode of violence remains statistically significant at the 10% level (but not at the 5%) until the 1960s.

These estimates cannot be taken as entirely causal. Some (though not all) of the German violence was in retaliation against previous attacks by partisan troops, or induced by local hostility, so that there could be some omitted variables. Similarly, it is possible that elite troops were deliberately sent in areas with stauncher Italian opposition and more local communist support. According to the description by [Holland \(2008\)](#) and [Gentile \(2015\)](#), however, this does not seem likely. The location of these special divisions was generally driven by military or logistical concerns (the war against the Allies, or the need to rest and train new conscripts). Moreover, the OLS specification controls for the presence of partisan brigades (alone and interacted with observed violence) and for pre-war voting outcomes. Although not conclusive, therefore, these estimates support the idea that Nazi occupation and violence induced citizens to identify with radical political forces willing to resist the enemy, namely the communists. We now turn to a causal test of these findings by means of geographic RDD.

6. RDD Causal Effects

This section compares outcomes in municipalities just above and just below the Gothic line. Throughout we report five sets of RDD estimates. In the first four regressions, the control function in the running variable (distance from the line) is expressed as a first and second degree spline polynomial, and the sample is restricted to municipalities within 50 Km and 100 Km from the line. Following [Gelman and Imbens \(2014\)](#), we do not report polynomial specifications of higher degree. The fifth specification is a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth, estimated as in [Calonico et al. \(2016\)](#). In

¹⁸The only difference is that we now control for the Census data closest in time to the election used as outcome.

subsection 6.3, we discuss additional estimation methods to assess the robustness of our results.

6.1 Balance tests

We start by reporting balance tests for pre-treatment observables (Y_i^{pre}). Results are shown in Appendix Table B.3. Very few estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero, and no consistent pattern emerges. In particular, female population is always balanced, which helps comparability between pre-war and post-war elections, as Italy adopted universal suffrage only after WWII.¹⁹ Note that almost all of these variables have highly significant estimated coefficients in the OLS regressions estimated in Table 1 above (coefficients not reported), suggesting that they are relevant correlates of political outcomes. Overall, we infer that the sample is balanced just above and just below the line.

In Appendix Table B.4, we also consider pre-war political variables. Overall, vote shares in 1924 seem balanced. The 1919 and 1921 election outcomes seem more unbalanced, with the socialist and communist parties having more votes above the line. This unbalance is not particularly robust, however. First, it disappears in 1924. Second, the 1919 and 1921 vote shares are statistically different from zero in only five out of the ten RDD specifications in Appendix Table B.4, unlike for the main post-war election outcomes discussed in the next subsection. Third, the unbalance is much weaker or absent when we estimate the treatment effect by nearest-neighborhood matching (with replacement). We match municipalities above vs below the line based on latitude and longitude, within a given set of distances from the Gothic line. This estimator thus compares political outcomes in a municipality above the line with the closest municipality below the line, giving more weight to comparisons of closer municipalities. As discussed by [Keele and Titiunik \(2014\)](#), this avoids the pitfall of giving more weight to comparisons of municipalities that have a similar distance from the line, but are very far apart from each other in a spatial (or other) dimension. As shown in Appendix Table B.5, the 1921 election outcomes now appear balanced, and the 1919 elections are balanced within 25 Km of the line (where identification is more reliable), but not at 50 or 100 Km. Fourth, this lack of robustness is also confirmed visually by the placebo tests discussed below (see Appendix Figures B.5 and B.6).

Yet, even if the balance tests on pre-war elections do not point to the presence of structural unbalance around the Gothic line, they could still point to a problem of small sample bias because of their volatility. To cope with this potential issue, in what follows we report RDD results on the post-war vote shares conditional on pre-war vote shares.

A possible concern is that the slight unbalance in the prewar elections could have grown larger during the fascist period. Unfortunately, we do not observe political attitudes in the intervening years.

¹⁹Also the 1911 Census variables are balanced around the line (results available upon request).

Nevertheless, in Section 6.4, while looking at contextual factors during the conflict, we test whether the presence of partisan brigades, and in particular of communist brigades, is balanced above and below the line. The partisan brigades were a grassroots movement, and a significantly higher propensity to side with the communists during the fascist period should show up in a more diffused presence of partisan brigades. As discussed below, we do not find any unbalance along this dimension.²⁰

6.2 Election outcomes and persistence

We start by illustrating the difference between communist vs catholic votes in 1946 around the Gothic line. To remove possible effects of the slight imbalance in the 1921 elections, first we take the difference between the communist and catholic vote shares in 1946, and then we regress it on the vote shares of communist and socialist, and of the catholic, in all three pre-war elections (1919, 1921, and 1924). Appendix Figure B.3 depicts the estimated residuals of the difference in communist vs catholic vote shares. Darker shades correspond to a larger communist vs catholic vote (black indicates a missing observation). Overall, the figure suggests that a longer German occupation is associated with left-wing radicalism, compared to what happens below the line.

The formal RDD tests reported in Table 2 confirm this visual impression. Electoral outcomes refer to the 1946 election for the constitutional assembly and to the 1948 national election. In 1946 the Communist Party ran alone, while in 1948 it merged with the Socialist Party. For the sake of comparison, we also report the sum of socialist and communist votes in 1946. Panel A reports unconditional election outcomes. Panel B refers to conditional outcomes, namely the regressors also include the vote shares of communist and socialist, and of the catholic, in all pre-war elections. This conditioning method is used in all the analysis reported below, unless indicated otherwise.²¹

The results are very stark: For all estimation methods and for all indicators, the average vote share of the Communist Party (or of communists and socialists together) is significantly larger above the Gothic line. The size of the RDD coefficient is also large, generally about 9-10 percentage points or higher, depending on the estimation method and the outcome measure. Within 50 Km of the Gothic line, the Communist Party obtained on average about 36.7% of the votes, thus the effect of being above the line corresponds to over 25% of the average vote share. Taking into account that being just North vs just South of the line corresponds to an additional half year of occupation, if the effect were linear in time, one more year of Nazi occupation would increase the vote share of the extreme left by

²⁰This can also be seen by visual inspection in Appendix Figure B.2.

²¹In some of the robustness analysis reported in the next subsection, the local linear regressions did not converge when we included all the covariates on the RHS. When this is the case, we first estimate the residuals of the dependent variable on all the covariates and then we estimate the local linear regression on the estimated residuals.

over 50%. This is about double the effect estimated in the OLS regressions over all of Italy reported in the previous section.²²

The stronger communist vote is largely at the expense of the moderate catholic party. The catholic vote share is systematically lower above the Gothic line, by about 5 percentage points in the conditional estimates (about 19.3% of the average vote obtained by the Christian Democrats within 50 Km of the Gothic line). The vote share for the extreme right is balanced around the Gothic line in 1946, but it is smaller North of the line in the 1948 election, by about half percentage point in the conditional estimates. Note that the gain in the communist vote is generally estimated to be larger than the catholic (plus right-wing) loss, implying that other parties (the Socialist Party or other centrist parties) lost votes to the communists North of the line. Moreover, the composition of the moderate vote North of the line shifted toward the extreme right, since the catholic party lost many more votes than the right-wing parties. Thus, overall the longer Nazi occupation and civil war induced a shift to the extreme left in the immediate post-war elections, and increased the polarization of the electorate.²³

Appendix Figures 5 and 6 illustrate graphically the main polynomial regressions reported in Table 2, using a second order polynomial to fit the data. Each dot in the figures represents the average vote share in municipalities within 10 Km intervals North/South of the Gothic line. A statistically significant discontinuity is clearly visible, and it is particularly strong for the communist votes in 1946 (unconditional or conditional on pre-war elections).

Were these political effects a short lived reaction to the events associated with the war, or did they persist over time? The answer is that they lasted for several decades, until the end of the First Republic in the early 1990s. Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of RDD coefficients and confidence intervals for all elections between 1946 and 1987, estimated by local linear regressions conditioning on pre-war election outcomes (the last column in Panel B of Table 2). The left-wing parties retained a gain above the Gothic line, that shrinks from about 9 toward 5 percentage points in the late 1980s and remains statistically different from zero. The catholic party bears a loss of votes of 4-5 percentage points, also declining slightly in absolute value and statistically significant throughout the period. Interestingly, the extreme right-wing parties also lose votes above the line, but only from the 1950s onwards, and this effect too is quite persistent. Overall, the political effects of being exposed to a longer Nazi occupation North of the Gothic line are very large and persistent.²⁴

²²Also note that in the conditional regressions in Table 2 and in some of the robustness checks discussed below, the effect of being above the line is stronger on the communist votes alone than on the communist and socialist votes combined, suggesting that the effect is mainly a shift to the extreme left.

²³We also estimated these same RDD regressions with voters' turnout as dependent variable, but we found no significant discontinuity (results available upon request).

²⁴We also explored whether being North of the Gothic line alters the dynamics of election outcomes, by estimating

This persistence may have two alternative interpretations. First, there was a lasting effect on voters' attitudes. This would be consistent with existing evidence that political attitudes are transmitted within the family and are highly persistent (e.g., [Avdeenko and Siedler, 2016](#), [Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015](#)). The survey discussed in Section 6.5 supports this explanation, since we find that left-wing orientation today is correlated with a stronger memory of the civil war and with more congruence of the individual vote with that of the father. The second possibility is that there was a short term effect on political outcomes (due to a temporary effect on voters' attitudes or on political organizations) and this persisted over time due to a local incumbency advantage that enabled the Communist Party to preserve its gains over time. Although we cannot rule it out, this explanation is not very plausible, however, because municipal governments had very few policy tools at their disposal before 1993.

6.3 Robustness checks

In this subsection we discuss the robustness of the above causal inference. We first estimate the coefficients of interest with a nearest-neighborhood matching estimator based on Euclidean distance (with replacement) discussed above with reference to the pre-war election outcomes. In the conditional estimates, the dependent variable is the residual of post-war outcomes on all pre-war vote shares. We report two sets of matching estimates: One where we match based on latitude and longitude only, the other based on latitude, longitude, and pre-war electoral outcomes. The results, shown in Table 3, remain statistically significant for municipalities up to a distance of 50 Km from the line for the left-wing parties, while the results on catholic vote shares are weaker. At a distance of 100 Km, most estimated coefficients lose statistical significance, but this is less worrying because identification is sharper closer to the line. In general, it is particularly reassuring that the more local we get with our RDD estimation methods, the more robust the results are, exactly the opposite of what happens with the balance tests on pre-war political variables discussed above.

As apparent from Appendix Figure B.3, voting outcomes exhibit some patterns in the East-West direction. We thus want to be sure that the RDD estimates only reflect the impact of being North vs South of the line, without being contaminated by other geographic patterns in the data. For this purpose, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we estimate the same regressions with a first and second degree spline polynomial in distance that also includes as regressors a first and second degree polynomial in latitude and longitude, as well as the interaction of latitude and longitude and

an AR(1) process of the vote shares above and below the line, and by estimating the correlation of vote shares in all subsequent dates with the vote shares in 1946 or 1948. The answer is that there is no significant difference in these statistics just above and just below the line. Thus, the historical events associated with the Nazi occupation had persistent political effects, but did not alter the dynamic correlations of electoral outcomes.

the same interaction squared. The local linear regressions are estimated on the residuals of an OLS regression on the relevant independent variables. Thus, the unconditional estimates are run on the residuals of a regression of the vote shares on the latitude and longitude terms; and the conditional estimates are run on the residuals of a regression that, besides latitude and longitude, also includes the pre-war election outcomes. All results remain very similar, as shown in Appendix Table B.6.

Second, we split the Gothic line in 25 Km intervals and we test our hypothesis (again with spline polynomials and local linear regressions) including fixed effects (FE) for each interval. In the spline polynomial specifications, the fixed effects are included amongst the regressors; the local linear regressions are estimated on the residuals of an OLS regression on the relevant independent variables.²⁵ This is equivalent to comparing municipalities above and below the line within each of these 25 Km intervals. Appendix Table B.7 displays the results. All estimates are robust in terms of significance and magnitude. Results are similar if we also include a first degree polynomial in latitude and longitude in the same FE regressions estimated with a spline polynomial in distance from the line.²⁶

Appendix Figure B.4 reports placebo tests for the main variables of interest to test whether our results might be attributed to random chance rather than a true causal effect. We shifted the location of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 10 Km at a time, up to a distance of plus or minus 100 Km, and by 50 Km at a time, up to a distance of 250 Km. Estimation is by local linear regression as in the last column of Table 2. The results indicate a clear discontinuity in the estimated coefficient at the true location of the Gothic line, but not at the fake discontinuities. The catholic vote also displays a clear discontinuity, though the pattern is perhaps more ambiguous, and thus less robust.²⁷ We also estimated the same placebo tests on pre-war electoral outcomes. Here no clear pattern is evident, and the true location of the Gothic line generally does not stand out relative to the other positions—see Appendix Figures B.5 and B.6. This again corroborates the conclusion that no structural unbalance of pre-treatment political attitudes is evident.

Finally, we assessed the robustness of the results to the method of dealing with missing observations. Appendix Table B.8 reports the (unconditional) RDD estimates on the full sample that also includes municipalities for which all pre-war elections data are missing. The communist vote share

²⁵Namely, the unconditional estimates are run on the residuals of a regression of the vote shares on these 25 Km interval FE; and the conditional estimates are run on the residuals of a regression that, besides the 25 Km interval FE, also includes the pre-war election outcomes.

²⁶As a further check, we included FE for the electoral districts in the RDD regressions (there are 6 electoral districts within 50 Km of the Gothic line, and the line cuts through 3 of them). The results are similar and available upon request.

²⁷We also performed the same RDD analysis on the other two lines depicted in Figure 2 South of the final battle-front, namely the original Gothic line (labeled “Fall 1944”) and the Southern-most line (labeled “Allies”). No robust discontinuity on political outcomes is estimated around these two (placebo) lines.

in 1946 remains significantly higher above the line (by about 7 percentage points) in some though not all specifications, but in this sample the loss of votes of the catholic party and the gains in communist plus socialist votes are no longer statistically significant. Thus the results are weaker in the full sample, though we have no way of assessing whether this is due to some pre-existing imbalance in the vote shares of the 1920s. Appendix Table B.9 restricts the sample in the opposite direction, namely we only include municipalities for which we have data on all three pre-war elections (thus avoiding any imputation). Here the RDD estimates (conditional and unconditional) reveal even stronger effects than in the default sample, for both communist and catholic vote shares.²⁸

Overall, these robustness checks confirm that the positive effect on the communist vote share is very robust, while the inference that the increase in the communist vote is only at the expense of the catholic vote (rather than also at the expense of the socialists or of other moderate parties) is more sensitive to the sample and to the estimation method.

6.4 Contextual factors

How could the prolonged German occupation and associated civil war have such important political effects? As already mentioned, there are several potential channels, some operating on the supply side, others on the demand side of politics. To shed light on this issue, we repeat our RDD estimates with potential supply-side vs demand-side contextual factors as dependent variables. We use the presence of partisan brigades as proxy for supply-side mechanisms, and episodes of Nazi violence as proxy for demand-side mechanisms. Of course, detecting a non-zero effect in some of these proxies is simply a necessary but not sufficient condition to disclose a precise mechanism.

Table 4 shows that the presence of partisan brigades is balanced above and below the line, which seems to contradict the explanation that the Gothic line made a difference for the ability of the new political parties to establish and consolidate their grassroots organizations. We use different indicators of the presence of partisan brigades, namely, (i) whether the area of the municipality intersects with the operation area of a brigade (ii) whether the area of the municipality is contained in the operation area of a brigade, and (iii) the minimum distance of the municipality's city hall from the nearest point of the operation area of a brigade. None of these indicators shows a significant discontinuity at the Gothic line, with the (inconclusive) exception of minimum distance in only some specifications and with coefficients displaying opposite signs. This is apparent also from Appendix Figure B.2, which depicts the presence of brigades above and below the line—measure (i) above.²⁹

²⁸With this smaller sample of observations, and unlike in the last column of Table 2, the local linear regressions have to be estimated on the residuals of the vote shares on pre-war voting outcomes.

²⁹We also considered two other measures of the intensity of resistance activities: the number of brigades and the average

As the presence of partisan brigades is balanced around the RDD line, we can also test whether the treatment effect of a longer Nazi occupation is stronger in the areas with active partisan brigades, compared to the areas with no brigades. This hypothesis too is rejected by the data in Appendix Table B.10, where we repeat the RDD analysis separately in the two subsamples with and without presence of left-wing brigades, as measured by definition (i) above.³⁰ Indeed, the treatment effect of a longer Nazi occupation on the communist vote share is not stronger (if anything it is weaker) in the areas with active left-wing partisan brigades. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that a longer Nazi occupation favored the Communist party because of its stronger links with the partisan brigades.

Finally, note that the right-wing parties were free to act as they wished North of the line. Yet, they had no significant advantage above the line in the 1946 election, and actually lost votes from 1948 onwards relative to municipalities below the line (see Figure 4). This is also evidence that supply-side mechanisms do not seem to operate in our context.

The alternative explanation is that the Gothic line made a difference on the demand side, namely on political attitudes. In other words, a longer exposure to the Nazi occupation led to more antagonistic attitudes toward the enemy, and this favored the Communist Party, which was a stronger and more visible opponent of Nazism and Fascism. The Catholics too opposed the fascist regime and the German occupation, but they did so with less determination and supported Mussolini at the inception of the regime. In this explanation, persistence in political attitudes can account for why the effects are so long lasting. Indeed, anecdotal evidence and the survey discussed below suggest that the values and traditions of the resistance movements and the memory of the Nazi crimes are a key and long lasting component of left-wing post-war political culture in Central Italy (see [Spriano, 1967-1975](#)).

The plausibility of this explanation would be strengthened if demand-side contextual factors displayed a discontinuity around the Gothic line. We test for this channel in Table 5, which reports the RDD estimates for the occurrence of at least one episode of German or fascist violence in the municipality. We also disaggregate episodes of violence by whether a majority of the victims were partisans or civilians, and by whether they occurred before or after the end of October 1944, that is, the month when the Allies stopped South of the Gothic line.

Episodes of violence dated after October 1944 are significantly more widespread above the line, as expected, but episodes dated October 1944 or earlier occur more frequently below the line (the Germans also committed several atrocities during their retreat in the Summer of 1944). As a result, the overall occurrence of at least one episode is roughly balanced around the Gothic. However, the

area of operation of each brigade. They too are balanced around the Gothic line.

³⁰Results are the same if we measure the presence of partisan brigades as in definition (ii)—available upon request.

violence that arguably matters the most for potentially explaining the treatment effects on political outcomes is the one “contextual” to the treatment, that is, the violence associated with the Nazi occupation, the birth of the RSI action squads, and the more ruthless phase of the war. In fact, this late-in-the-conflict violence was both harsher and more politically connotated. Based on the 50 Km estimate in Table 5, the episodes of violence after October 1944 almost doubled just above the line.³¹

Furthermore, note that the recorded episodes only capture some of the violence actually born by civilians. In particular, forced labor, evacuations of villages, deportations are not included in the classification of episodes of violence. These other forms of violence were probably more diffuse North of the line, where the occupation lasted longer. Second, even where the violence did not actually occur, the threat of being hurt and the stress of the foreign occupation lasted longer North of the line, and this too could be reflected in political attitudes.

To capture some of these other forms of violence, we collected data on the number of individuals deported for political reasons to Germany and arrested in the municipality. This outcome is reported in the last line of Table 5. Here too the estimated coefficient is generally not statistically significant, although it is often positive. This variable is measured with great error, however, since we have data on only 6,500 deported individuals, out of a total of over 40,000 actually deported.

6.5 Survey data

Why did a longer lasting German occupation lead to a shift toward left-wing political extremism? The evidence discussed above suggests that the answer has to do with how individual attitudes reacted to a prolonged exposure to the violent Nazi occupation and to the civil war. To further corroborate this interpretation, in November-December 2015, we conducted a survey of residents near the Gothic line. Our goals were to assess whether the memory of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war is stronger North of the Gothic line; whether anti-German sentiments are stronger; and whether left-wing political preferences are correlated with the memory of the Nazi occupation.

We conducted telephone interviews of 2,525 individuals, with at least 20 years of residence in their current municipality and above 40 years of age. The survey was conducted in 242 municipalities within 50 Km from the Gothic line (137 above and 105 below the line). All municipalities had a population of less than 25,000 inhabitants in 2011, and at least 7 individuals were interviewed in each municipality. The telephone interview lasted on average about 10 minutes, and contained about 30

³¹Results are similar if the outcome is the number of violent episodes or the number of victims in each municipality, rather than the occurrence of at least one episode. We also performed robustness checks on the sources, combining or replacing our main source (i.e., “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres,” ANPI-INSMLI, 2016) with the other sources mentioned in Appendix A, and the results are again similar (available upon request).

questions, including questions about current socio-economic status. Appendix Table B.11 provides the summary statistics of the main variables of interest.³²

Appendix Table B.12 reports balance tests around the Gothic for a number of socio-demographic variables and for political preferences. A more detailed definition of these variables is in Appendix Table B.13, together with the specific questions asked. Political preferences are elicited by asking: “How would you define your political position with a single word?” Possible answers are: Left, center-left, center right, right, independent, no answer. All variables are balanced, except perhaps a slight unbalance in age and gender, which anyway is not robust across estimation methods. There is also no evidence that today respondents North of the line are more likely to vote left, compared to those South of the line. This difference between our survey and the historical voting outcomes is likely to reflect the evolution of the Italian political system in the Second Republic (the Communist Party no longer exists, and its current re-incarnation, the Democratic Party, is a moderate party).

A more protracted and intense civil war should leave a stronger mark in the memory of citizens and on local traditions. Our survey thus included a number of questions to explore whether this is so. Specifically we asked: “Do you remember or were you told whether a member of your family was a victim of violence during WWII or took part in the civil war as a partisan or as a supporter of Mussolini?” We also asked whether the municipality ever organized events to commemorate the resistance movement, whether the respondent participated in such events, and how congruent were the respondent’s political preferences when young with that of his/her father (congruence is defined as casting a vote similar to that of the father in the respondent’s first election). Table 6, Panel A displays the RDD estimates of these variables around the Gothic line. As expected, the memory of the civil war is stronger North of the line. Except for having a family member who was victim of violence, all estimated coefficients are positive, and several of them are statistically different from zero. Congruence of political preferences between father and child is also stronger North of the line, suggesting stronger political traditions within the family.

In the same spirit, we attempted to elicit anti-German sentiments by asking the following questions. First, we asked whether the respondent agreed with the statements that the Euro had been beneficial for Italy, and that the Euro increased the risk of an excessive predominance of Germany. Since the Euro has been extensively criticized in the Italian press for being a straitjacket imposed by Germany, disagreement with the first statement and agreement with the second could be interpreted as reflecting an unsympathetic attitude toward Germany. Second, after a preliminary question sug-

³²Note that the sample of (phone) respondents is not representative of the voting population: It is older, since we imposed the requirement that age be over 40, and women are over-represented.

gesting that a wedding within the same nationality was more likely to be successful, we asked to rank the preferred nationality for the spouse of a close relative, choosing between German, Polish, British, and French. Table 6, Panel B presents the RDD estimates, after recoding all the variables so that a positive coefficient indicates anti-German sentiment North of the line. All estimates have the expected positive sign, except for wedding preferences of French vs German. Only a few of them are statistically significant, however, suggesting only weak evidence of more anti-German sentiments.³³

Finally, we explore the correlations between individual political positions and the memory of the civil war, in the whole sample of respondents around the Gothic line. The results are shown in Appendix Table B.14. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual political position is left or center-left, and estimation is by Probit. In columns (3) and (4) estimation is by ordered Probit, and the dependent variable equals 2 if the political position is left, 1 if center-left, and 0 otherwise. Throughout we control for gender, age, years of education, and dummy variables for home ownership, college education, having children, vital record, and being North of the Gothic line. As expected, individuals with a family member who took part in the civil war, or who suffered from WWII violence, or living in a municipality that commemorated the resistance are more likely to be on the left, irrespective of the specification. A left-wing position is also more likely if political attitudes when young were congruent with their father's position. Altogether these results suggest that a left-wing position is indeed more likely for individuals who retain a stronger memory of the civil war, and indirectly support the idea that a stronger exposure to the civil war left a persistent mark on political attitudes in favor of the Communist Party.

7. Conclusion

The civil war and the Nazi occupation of Italy occurred at a critical historical juncture, just before the birth of a new democracy and the establishment of a new party system. For the first time in a generation Italian citizens were choosing political affiliations and forming political identities. In this paper we exploit the geographic heterogeneity in the duration and intensity of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war, to study how these traumatic events shaped the newly born political system.

Our main finding is that, where the foreign occupation and the civil war lasted longer and were more intense, the radical left emerged as a much stronger political force. This effect was not just a

³³Besides the questions discussed above, the survey also included three questions that we did not use. First, a question on trust, that asked to rank different nationalities in terms of trustworthiness. This question was added later once the survey had already started, however, and as a result it was available only for a selected subsample of respondents. Second, we asked whether the respondent was surprised by the Volkswagen emission scandal. Interpreting this question was difficult however, and we ended up not using it. Third, we asked who had greater responsibility for the Greek crisis, whether Greece, Germany or the European Union. Answers to all these questions are balanced around the Gothic line.

temporary reaction to the war traumas, but persisted until the late 1980s, leaving a legacy of left-wing political extremism in the Italian political system. The communist gain was mainly (but not only) at the expense of the catholic party.

What accounts for this large impact? And why is it so persistent? We discussed two alternative explanations. They both revolve around the fact that the Communist Party was more active in the civil war and in the resistance movement. The first explanation stresses individual political attitudes: In reaction to a longer and more intense exposure to the violent Nazi occupation, voters identified with the radical political forces that stood up more forcefully against the enemy, and that in the end won the civil war. The second explanation emphasizes party organizations: The partisan brigades gave the communists an advantage in building a grassroots political organization in the areas where the resistance movement was active for longer.

We provided several empirical findings against the second mechanism, based on political organizations. First, there is no correlation between the presence of partisan brigades and voting outcomes; this is true both in the OLS regressions and in the RDD estimates. Second, the pro-Mussolini right-wing parties turned out to be slightly weaker, not stronger, in the areas under Nazi occupation (although the extreme right lost fewer votes than the catholics in the areas under longer German occupation).

Furthermore, several pieces of evidence support the first explanation, based on voters' attitudes. First, in the sample of all Italian municipalities, there is a strong and robust correlation between the communist vote and two indicators of Nazi violence, namely the occurrence of episodes of violence by Germans or fascists, and the location of two very violent elite German divisions. The correlation with the proximity of violent Nazi divisions also persists until the late 1980s. Moreover, the correlation between the communist vote and the Nazi occupation is amplified by the presence of these divisions. Violence episodes in the final phase of WWII, when the intensity of civil war and the ideological conflict between the fascist RSI and the resistance movement are harsher, are also larger North of the line—although violence throughout all the war years is balanced around the line. Second, a survey conducted in 2015 in municipalities around the Gothic line reveals that individuals with a stronger memory of the civil war are more likely to lean to the left. Moreover, there is a stronger memory of the civil war in the municipalities above the line, which endured a longer Nazi occupation.

Overall, our results have several implications of general interest, outside of the specific Italian context. First, civil war and widespread political violence reshape political identities in favor of the political groups that emerge as winners from the struggle. This goes to the benefit of more extremist political forces, which typically are more involved in violent conflict, compared to the more moderate groups. Second, these effects are very long lasting, and persist even when the cleavages that gave

rise to the civil war have disappeared. Third, these findings indirectly support an approach to voters' behavior that has a well established tradition in political science (e.g., [Campbell et al., 1960](#) and [Achen and Bartels, 2016](#)), but is more at odds with conventional theories in political economics. Citizens vote for the parties with which they identify on cultural, moral or social grounds. Political identification, in turn, is also shaped by intense and widely shared emotional experiences, and once formed it evolves slowly over time. The implications of this approach for the political analysis of economic policy remain to be explored.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: OLS Baseline Estimates

	Dependent variable: Communist 1946					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Years of occupation	0.066 (0.026)**	0.065 (0.026)**	0.075 (0.026)***	0.067 (0.026)**	0.066 (0.026)**	0.059 (0.027)**
At least one violence episode	0.009 (0.003)***	0.016 (0.004)***	0.008 (0.003)**	0.009 (0.003)***	0.010 (0.003)***	0.009 (0.003)***
Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions	0.020 (0.005)***	0.017 (0.006)***	-0.002 (0.009)	0.020 (0.005)***	0.020 (0.005)***	-0.001 (0.009)
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	0 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.087 (0.021)***	-0.005 (0.005)	0 (0.006)	0.037 (0.030)
Presence of other partisan brigades	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.075 (0.020)***	-0.003 (0.007)	0.002 (0.008)	0.032 (0.028)
At least one violence episode * Presence of partisan brigades		-0.014 (0.006)**			-0.014 (0.009)	
Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions * Presence of partisan brigades		0.009 (0.009)			-0.002 (0.015)	
Years of occupation * Within 15Km of violent Nazi divisions			0.015 (0.006)**			0.014 (0.006)**
Years of occupation * Presence of partisan brigades			-0.047 (0.011)***			-0.022 (0.015)
Number of observations	5,559	5,559	5,559	5,559	5,559	5,559
R-squared	0.575	0.575	0.577	0.575	0.575	0.575
Measure of presence of partisan brigades	Intersect	Intersect	Intersect	Within	Within	Within

Note: Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses in each second row; standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are displayed in parentheses in each third row. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. *Communist 1946*: Vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1946 election. *At least one violence episode*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in the period considered. *Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions*: Dummy equal to 1 if the minimum distance of the municipality from one occupied by either RFSS or HG Division is less than 15 Km (using city hall as reference point). *Presence of partisan brigades*: Dummy equal to 1 if the area of the municipality intersects (“Intersect”) or is completely contained (“Within”) in the area of operation of the partisan brigade of any (left wing or other) partisan brigade. Other regressors include: Share of illiterate 1951, logarithm of population 1951, latitude, longitude, maximum altitude in the municipality, elevation city hall, vote shares of Communist-Socialist and Catholic in 1919, 1921, and 1924.

Table 2: RDD Causal Effects – Electoral Outcomes

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates					
Communist 1946	0.132 (0.033)*** 275	0.165 (0.023)*** 742	0.097 (0.046)** 275	0.106 (0.035)*** 742	0.124 (0.031)*** 493
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.128 (0.038)*** 275	0.210 (0.026)*** 742	0.055 (0.053) 275	0.111 (0.040)*** 742	0.105 (0.042)** 309
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.128 (0.038)*** 275	0.191 (0.026)*** 742	0.089 (0.052)* 275	0.100 (0.039)** 742	0.115 (0.041)*** 309
Catholic 1946	-0.061 (0.030)** 275	-0.124 (0.021)*** 742	-0.039 (0.041) 275	-0.057 (0.032)* 742	-0.104 (0.022)*** 844
Catholic 1948	-0.091 (0.033)*** 275	-0.167 (0.023)*** 742	-0.081 (0.045)* 275	-0.076 (0.034)** 742	-0.088 (0.034)*** 313
Right Wing 1946	0 (0.008) 93	-0.007 (0.004)* 262	0.015 (0.014) 93	0.001 (0.008) 262	-0.007 (0.004)* 429
Right Wing 1948	-0.008 (0.003)*** 224	-0.006 (0.002)*** 599	-0.002 (0.004) 224	-0.007 (0.003)** 599	-0.006 (0.002)*** 561
Panel B: Estimates Conditional on Pre-War Elections					
Communist 1946	0.102 (0.025)*** 275	0.100 (0.020)*** 742	0.100 (0.033)*** 275	0.087 (0.027)*** 742	0.094 (0.024)*** 314
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.085 (0.028)*** 275	0.131 (0.021)*** 742	0.058 (0.036) 275	0.093 (0.031)*** 742	0.072 (0.025)*** 342
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.092 (0.028)*** 275	0.108 (0.021)*** 742	0.089 (0.037)** 275	0.080 (0.029)*** 742	0.082 (0.024)*** 352
Catholic 1946	-0.035 (0.024) 275	-0.060 (0.016)*** 742	-0.036 (0.032) 275	-0.052 (0.025)** 742	-0.047 (0.019)** 603
Catholic 1948	-0.067 (0.026)** 275	-0.097 (0.018)*** 742	-0.078 (0.035)** 275	-0.067 (0.027)** 742	-0.065 (0.023)*** 372
Right Wing 1946	-0.003 (0.007) 93	-0.008 (0.004)* 262	0.013 (0.012) 93	0.001 (0.008) 262	0.009 (0.006) 38
Right Wing 1948	-0.005 (0.003)* 224	-0.004 (0.002)** 599	-0.002 (0.003) 224	-0.005 (0.003)* 599	-0.004 (0.002)** 455

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates in Panel B are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table 3: RDD Robustness – Nearest Neighbor Matching

	Nearest Neighbor Matching					
	Latitude and Longitude			Lat., Long., Pre War Elections		
	25 Km	50 Km	100 Km	25 Km	50 Km	100 Km
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates						
Communist 1946	0.076 (0.023)***	0.052 (0.021)**	0.006 (0.023)	0.063 (0.021)***	0.039 (0.018)**	-0.004 (0.017)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.067 (0.025)***	0.064 (0.023)***	0.031 (0.026)	0.077 (0.025)***	0.069 (0.022)***	0.034 (0.020)*
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.065 (0.026)**	0.049 (0.022)**	0.007 (0.024)	0.064 (0.025)***	0.042 (0.022)*	0.005 (0.018)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Catholic 1946	-0.033 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.021)	0.029 (0.024)	-0.040 (0.021)*	-0.027 (0.018)	0.022 (0.018)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Catholic 1948	-0.051 (0.023)**	-0.039 (0.022)*	0.009 (0.025)	-0.058 (0.021)***	-0.037 (0.019)**	0.008 (0.019)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Right Wing 1946	0.019 (0.014)	0.023 (0.015)	0.020 (0.011)*	0.021 (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)	0.020 (0.012)*
	32	93	262	32	93	262
Right Wing 1948	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0 (0.001)
	98	224	599	98	224	599
Panel B: Estimates Conditional on Pre-War Elections						
Communist 1946	0.062 (0.021)***	0.038 (0.020)*	-0.002 (0.023)	0.058 (0.019)***	0.030 (0.017)*	-0.009 (0.017)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.036 (0.019)*	0.036 (0.020)*	0.011 (0.021)	0.062 (0.021)***	0.049 (0.019)***	0.021 (0.018)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.044 (0.018)**	0.029 (0.017)*	-0.004 (0.018)	0.058 (0.021)***	0.030 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.016)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Catholic 1946	-0.029 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.020)	0.032 (0.024)	-0.044 (0.019)**	-0.023 (0.017)	0.023 (0.018)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Catholic 1948	-0.045 (0.020)**	-0.029 (0.020)	0.013 (0.026)	-0.060 (0.021)***	-0.031 (0.018)*	0.010 (0.020)
	115	275	742	115	275	742
Right Wing 1946	0.006 (0.013)	0.009 (0.014)	0.012 (0.011)	0.008 (0.014)	0.010 (0.015)	0.010 (0.011)
	32	93	262	32	93	262
Right Wing 1948	0.005 (0.003)*	0.005 (0.002)**	0.005 (0.002)**	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)*
	98	224	599	98	224	599

Note: Coefficients presented display the difference among mean above the line minus mean below the line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Nearest-neighborhood matching based on latitude and longitude (left) or on latitude, longitude, and pre-war election outcomes (right). Metric used: Euclidean distance with replacement. In the conditional estimates, the dependent variable is the residual of the vote share on pre-war election outcomes. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates in Panel B are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table 4: RDD Contextual Factors – Presence of Partisan Brigades

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Presence of partisan brigades (Intersect)	-0.171 (0.121) 275	0.066 (0.088) 742	-0.293 (0.182) 275	-0.217 (0.127)* 742	-0.229 (0.128)* 256
Presence of left wing partisan brigades (Intersect)	-0.019 (0.125) 275	0.146 (0.089) 742	-0.149 (0.185) 275	-0.018 (0.131) 742	-0.082 (0.134) 251
Presence of other partisan brigades (Intersect)	-0.152 (0.066)** 275	-0.079 (0.048) 742	-0.144 (0.070)** 275	-0.199 (0.068)*** 742	-0.140 (0.057)** 392
Presence of partisan brigade (Within)	-0.068 (0.066) 275	-0.027 (0.042) 742	-0.124 (0.094) 275	-0.115 (0.073) 742	-0.068 (0.053) 627
Presence of left wing partisan brigades (Within)	-0.017 (0.054) 275	0.007 (0.035) 742	-0.033 (0.075) 275	-0.043 (0.061) 742	-0.008 (0.035) 1097
Presence of other partisan brigades (Within)	-0.051 (0.040) 275	-0.034 (0.024) 742	-0.090 (0.060) 275	-0.073 (0.043)* 742	-0.048 (0.035) 570
Min. distance from partisan brigades	4.681 (1.892)** 275	-3.675 (1.457)** 742	3.732 (2.826) 275	4.445 (1.986)** 742	-1.282 (1.344) 888
Min. distance from left wing partisan brigades	3.687 (1.927)* 275	-5.522 (1.584)*** 742	3.782 (2.879) 275	2.796 (1.989) 742	3.438 (2.323) 192
Min. distance from other partisan brigades	6.573 (2.854)** 275	3.768 (2.095)* 742	0.173 (3.870) 275	10.547 (3.169)*** 742	6.518 (2.546)** 398

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Presence of partisan brigades*: Dummy equal to 1 if the area of the municipality intersects (“Intersect”) or is completely contained (“Within”) in the area of operation of the partisan brigade of any (left wing or other) partisan brigade. *Min. distance* from a partisan brigade is measured from the municipality’s city hall to the nearest point of the area of operation of a partisan brigade. See Appendix A for a description of left wing vs other partisan brigades, and for data sources.

Table 5: RDD Contextual Factors – Episodes of Violence

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A. At least one violence episode					
Nov. 1944-May 1945	0.259 (0.117)**	0.348 (0.072)***	0.204 (0.176)	0.260 (0.121)**	0.298 (0.105)***
	275	742	275	742	509
Feb. 1943-Oct. 1944	-0.228 (0.102)**	-0.127 (0.073)*	-0.279 (0.153)*	-0.246 (0.105)**	-0.210 (0.088)**
	275	742	275	742	400
Entire Period (Feb. 1943-May 1945)	-0.133 (0.081)	-0.014 (0.068)	-0.126 (0.111)	-0.143 (0.085)*	-0.129 (0.084)
	275	742	275	742	284
Panel B. At least one violence episode against civilians					
Nov. 1944-May 1945	0.238 (0.112)**	0.194 (0.066)***	0.192 (0.171)	0.232 (0.116)**	0.217 (0.085)**
	275	742	275	742	656
Feb. 1943-Oct. 1944	-0.266 (0.113)**	-0.233 (0.078)***	-0.272 (0.168)	-0.283 (0.116)**	-0.253 (0.095)***
	275	742	275	742	534
Entire Period (Feb. 1943-May 1945)	-0.133 (0.102)	-0.158 (0.077)**	-0.185 (0.140)	-0.168 (0.105)	-0.147 (0.093)
	275	742	275	742	393
Panel C. At least one violence episode against partisans					
Nov. 1944-May 1945	0.153 (0.090)*	0.309 (0.058)***	0.077 (0.116)	0.160 (0.090)*	0.288 (0.048)***
	275	742	275	742	1542
Feb. 1943-Oct. 1944	0.113 (0.127)	0.154 (0.084)*	-0.025 (0.187)	0.099 (0.132)	0.096 (0.116)
	275	742	275	742	432
Entire Period (Feb. 1943-May 1945)	0.151 (0.128)	0.342 (0.085)***	0.060 (0.189)	0.162 (0.133)	0.175 (0.126)
	275	742	275	742	379
Panel D. Number of deported people arrested in the municipality					
Entire Period	1.983 (1.182)*	-0.201 (1.899)	-0.427 (2.620)	2.508 (1.401)*	0.440 (1.299)
	275	742	275	742	238

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *At least one violence episode*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence. *At least one violence episode against civilians*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in which the majority of victims were civilians. *At least one violence episode against partisans*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in which the majority of victims were partisans. January 1943–August 1945 is the entire period for which we have episodes recorded. January 1943–October 1944 (November 1944–August 1945) is the period before (after) the battlefield moved to the RDD Gothic line.

Table 6: Survey Data – Historical Memory, Civil War, and Germany

	Polynomial Regression		Local RDD
	First order	Second order	
Panel A: Historical Memory and Civil War			
Family member was victim of violence during WWII	-0.018 (0.043) 2,270	0.019 (0.062) 2,270	-0.017 (0.064) 741
Family member took part in the civil war	0.110 (0.038)*** 2,252	0.092 (0.053)* 2,252	0.142 (0.057)** 689
Family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	0.123 (0.036)*** 2,252	0.127 (0.052)** 2,252	0.151 (0.056)*** 702
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	0.021 (0.040) 2,226	0.034 (0.055) 2,226	0.022 (0.052) 994
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	0.047 (0.044) 2,226	0.048 (0.063) 2,226	0.082 (0.070) 696
Congruence with fathers political preferences	0.170 (0.052)*** 1,713	0.157 (0.075)** 1,713	0.087 (0.093) 367
Panel B: Sentiment toward Germany			
Excessive German predominance	0.029 (0.046) 1,940	0.108 (0.063)* 1,940	0.058 (0.068) 632
The Euro was harmful for Italy	0.003 (0.041) 2,279	0.117 (0.058)** 2,279	0.043 (0.068) 693
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	0.047 (0.059) 1,054	0.163 (0.086)* 1,054	0.169 (0.105) 232
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	0.019 (0.067) 1,066	0.074 (0.099) 1,066	-0.023 (0.116) 339
Wedding preference, France over Germany	-0.096 (0.065) 1,064	-0.107 (0.096) 1,064	-0.144 (0.115) 304
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	0.033 (0.051) 1,081	0.101 (0.075) 1,081	0.074 (0.082) 383

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. See Appendix Table B.13 for variables' description.

Figure 1: Italy under Nazi Occupation



Figure 2: Evolution of the Gothic Line






Figure 3: Long-Term Persistence – OLS




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the variable *Years of occupation*, the dummy *Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions*, the dummy *At least one violence episode*, and the dummy *Presence of left wing partisan brigades* (interact), estimated for all national elections from 1946 to 1987 in specifications as in column (1) of Table 1 with *Communist* vote share as dependent variable. Data for the Communist Party are missing in 1948 as it ran with the Socialist Party.

Figure 4: Long-Term Persistence – RDD




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regressions as in the last column of Table 2, for all national elections from 1946 to 1987 and controlling for pre-war electoral results (conditional estimates). Data for the Communist Party are missing in 1948 as it ran with the Socialist Party; data for the Socialist Party are missing in 1948 as it ran with the Social Democratic Party; for the right-wing parties we restrict our attention to 1953 onwards to have consistent time comparisons, as by doing so we focus on the pro-fascism MSI and not on pro-monarchy parties.

Figure 5: RDD Discontinuities (Unconditional)



Note: (Unconditional) second order polynomial regressions at the 100 Km bandwidth shown in the fourth column of Table 2. Each dot corresponds to the average vote share for all municipalities within the corresponding 10 Km interval.

Figure 6: RDD Discontinuities (Conditional)



Note: (Conditional) second order polynomial regressions at the 100 Km bandwidth shown in the fourth column of Table 2. Each dot corresponds to the average vote share for all municipalities within the corresponding 10 Km interval.

A. Appendix [Not for Publication] – Data Sources and Description

The unit of observation is the municipality. We excluded the small region of Aosta Valley from our sample, because it always had a different electoral system. Moreover, its political scene has always been dominated by local parties. Geographic analysis used the Geographical Information Software (GIS) on the Italian 2001 administrative division map (Source: ISTAT).

A.1 Political outcomes

Pre-war political variables: We collected data on political outcomes before the war, for the elections held in 1919, 1921, and 1924. Here the source is [Corbetta and Piretti \(2009\)](#), who carried out a serious and meticulous work of reconstruction for that period. The Communist Party was very small in the 1921 and 1924 elections (and it did not exist in 1919), so we lump together the socialist and communist vote in the pre-fascist period using [Leoni \(2001\)](#) as reference. The right-wing vote cannot be separately measured in 1921, since fascists were running together with the more traditional and moderate liberals in that election. Hence for the pre-fascist period we only collect the *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist* variables. Since there are several missing observations, in our baseline analysis we fill the missing observations in each election exploiting the remaining two elections plus additional observables. Thus, to fill the missing observations in, say, vote shares for catholics in 1924 we impute predicted values of an OLS regression of the available vote shares on non-missing vote shares for catholics in 1919 and/or 1921 plus the following observables: Population density in 1921, illiterate share in 1921 and regional fixed effect. And similarly for 1919 and 1921 and when communists-socialists vote shares are missing. The parties in the *Catholic* definition are: In 1919 Partito Popolare Italiano; in 1921 Partito Cristiano del Lavoro, Partito Popolare Dissidente, Partito Popolare Italiano, and Popolari Dissidenti; in 1924 Partito Popolare Italiano. The parties in the *Communist and Socialist* definition are: In 1919 Blocco Socialista, Riformista, Repubblicano, Partito Radicale-Socialista-Repubblicano, Partito Sindacalista, Partito Socialista Indipendente, Partito Socialista Indipendente, Partito Socialista Italiano, Partito Socialista Riformista, Partito Socialista Ufficiale, Partito del Lavoro, Sindacato dell'Impiego, Socialisti Autonomi and Unione Socialista Italiana; in 1921 Partito Socialista Autonomo, Partito Socialista Indipendente, Partito Socialista Riformista, Partito Socialista Ufficiale, Partito Comunista and Partito Comunista d'Italia; in 1924 Partito Socialista Massimalista, Partito Socialista Ufficiale, Partito Socialista Unitario, Partito Comunista, and Partito Comunista d'Italia.

Post-war political variables: We measure political outcomes by the percentage of votes received by political parties at the 1946 election of the constitutional assembly, and in all subsequent 10 polit-

ical elections for the Chamber of Deputies until 1987 (namely 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983 and 1987). Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. We consider three political groups. First the radical left, measured by the votes given to the Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano). We call this variable *Communist*. Since in 1946 the communist and the socialists (Partito Socialista Italiano) formed a single electoral list, the Popular Front, we also consider the votes received by these two parties together, and we call it *Communist and Socialist*. The second group is the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana), that we call *Catholic*. The third group, called *Right wing*, consists of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (a party close to the fascists) and of smaller parties that supported the monarchy (namely: In 1946 Blocco Nazionale della Libertà, in 1948 and 1953 Partito Nazionale Monarchico, in 1958 Partito Nazionale Monarchico and Partito Monarchico Popolare, in 1963 and 1968 Partito Democratico Italiano di Unità Monarchica). Since we are interested in how the German occupation shifted political preferences from a moderate to an extreme left vote, we also compute the difference between the vote to communist and the vote to catholic parties. This variable is called *Communist minus Catholic*. In some analysis we also use the variable *Communist and Socialist minus Catholic*.

A.2 War-related variables

Episodes of violence: We collected data on the number of episodes in each municipality, the date, and the number and kind of victims. The full data set includes: The number of violent episodes in each municipality (this is the variable used in Appendix Figure B.1); date and municipality; total number of victims by status (civilian, partisan, soldier). Although the meticulous work done by the authors of “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres”, since combining multiple sources entails the risk of double counting, and since counting the number of victims entails likely measurement error, our preferred measure is a dummy variable, that equals 1 if in the municipality (and interval of time where applicable) there was at least one episode of violence. We also consider dummy variables for whether the majority of victims were partisans or civilians.

Our source is the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” ([ANPI-INSMLI, 2016](#)).³⁴ This database lists all the massacres and the individual murders of civilians and resistance fighters killed in Italy during Second World War (mainly after September 8, 1943) both by German soldiers and soldiers of the Italian Social Republic outside of the armed fights.³⁵ These range from the first murders in the South to the withdrawal massacres committed in the days after the Liberation. The historical inquiry was conducted locally by more than ninety researchers under the supervision of a joint historical com-

³⁴Data downloaded in April 2016.

³⁵The data span from February 1943 to May 1945, but only 21 out of 5,594 events are dated before September 1943.

mission established by Italian and German governments in 2009. The commission used the results of previous studies of the same kind made in Apulia, Campania, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, and Piedmont and used three main national common sources: (i) The database of violent crimes perpetrated against civilians during the German occupation of Italy, established by the Joint Historical Italian-German Commission and based on police reports stored in the Archives of the Historical Office of Army General Staff and the Historical Archives of the Carabinieri of Rome. (ii) The General Repository of war crime reports collected from 1945 by the Army Prosecutors office in Rome; this report was illegally dismissed in 1960 and was later recovered by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry while investigating on the reasons for the concealment of some files about Nazi-fascist crimes (14th Parliamentary term). (iii) The rulings and files of the judiciary proceedings debated in the Military courts during the last trial season (from 1994 until now).

This source was not immediately available to us, however. In a previous version we had started from a composite dataset that mainly relied on record of charges pressed to “Carabinieri” (Italian Police, [CSIT \(2012\)](#)), for violence episodes and massacres against Italian citizens and Allied personnel committed by Nazi-fascists forces in the period 1943-1945. We then integrated this source with the following additional sources: [Collotti et al. \(2000\)](#) and [Collotti et al. \(2006\)](#) and [Gentile \(2015\)](#).³⁶ This last source is particularly rich and detailed, since besides the Italian sources, it also incorporates episodes of violence reported in the German War Archives. Since [CSIT \(2012\)](#) (and partially also the other sources) reports single murders, we had assumed that two murders happening in the same municipality at no more than three days of distance were part of the same episodes. In order to avoid bias due to the same event counted twice we manually eliminated double episodes reported by [CSIT \(2012\)](#) or any other sources with meticulous checks on possible discrepancies on the location, the date or the number of victims involved in each episode.

Once we got access to the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” we recognized that this new source was more uniform and coherent than our first composite dataset, and thus in the current draft we only rely on the new source, the Atlas. Nevertheless, to assess robustness to possible measurement error, we merged the two data sets (our old composite dataset and the new data from the Atlas), trying to avoid double counting. The results reported in the paper are very similar to those obtained in the replications with this merged data set.

Line of conflict: Based on [Baldissara et al. \(2000, figure 23\)](#), we have reconstructed the evolution of the battlefield around two main lines of conflicts, geo-referencing the corresponding maps: The

³⁶We also consider [Matta \(1996\)](#) for robustness checks, however since he reported only partial information for each episode we excluded it from the main analysis

Gustav line and the Gothic line. In both cases, a few months of adjustments before the final settlement of the battlefield have been necessary. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the battlefield around the Gothic line. There are three demarcation lines. (i) The line labelled “Allies” is where the Allies stopped between August 1944 and mid-September 1944. (ii) The line labelled “Fall 1944” is the original Gothic line set up by the Germans. Between late August and mid-September 1944 the Allies succeeded in breaching this line (the so called operation “Olive”). (iii) The line labelled “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945” is where the Germans managed to contain the US-British offensive. From the end of October onwards, the Allies and the Germans were fighting along this line. It was finally breached in April 1945. Our RDD analysis is on the Northern-most line “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945”, which was held by the Germans for the longest period.

Years of occupation: Fraction (or multiples) of years of occupation by German troops. Data refer to provinces (all the municipalities in the same province have the same number of years of occupation), except for the provinces cut by a line of conflict (both for Gothic and Gustav line), where provincial data have been corrected as follows:

- For the municipalities above the line of conflict belonging to a province below the line, we assign the years of occupation of the closest province above the line.
- For the municipalities below the line of conflict belonging to a province above the line, we assign the years of occupation of the closest province below the line.

Definition of occupation: Physical presence of Nazi troops on the Italian territory, for military control or for defense against the Allies (for what concerns events after the Armistice of Cassibile). The starting date is the planning and constitution of the first Nazi troops of the Operation Achse (9 May 1943), after the end of the campaign of Tunisia. The aim of this operation was to react to the possible desertion of the Italian ally. Sources: Mainly [Baldissara et al. \(2000\)](#). Minor adjustments have been made using province specific references.

Partisan Brigades: We geo-referenced the maps of [Baldissara et al. \(2000\)](#) (figures 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) that report the area of activity of partisan brigades during World War II. We created a dummy variable for the presence of partisan brigades equal to one if the municipality partly overlaps with the area in which a partisan brigade was active during the conflict (*Presence of partisan brigades (Intersect)*) or whether the area of the municipality is contained entirely in the operation area of a brigade (*Presence of partisan brigades (Within)*). We also consider the minimum distance of each municipality city hall from the area of activity of each brigade. The brigades considered are the following:

- Left wing brigades: Brigade Garibaldi (Italian Communist Party), brigade Giustizia e Libertà (Partito d' Azione), and brigade Matteotti (Italian Socialist Party).
- Other brigades: Brigade Fiamme Verdi (Christian Democrats) and residual autonomous brigades.

16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and “Hermann Goering” divisions

location: We coded the location of these two specific German divisions, particularly violent and responsible for a very large number of criminal episodes against civilians. We have records of the precise location of these troops throughout the Italian civil war. From this we construct a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the municipalities that are within 15 Km or 10 Km from where either of these divisions have been located (measured as distance between city halls). We restrict attention to those two specific divisions, discarding all the other SS or Luftwaffe divisions, since in the reconstruction made by our main source ([Gentile \(2015\)](#)) those are the troops responsible for the majority and most dramatic episodes (e.g., Sant’Anna di Stazzema, Marzabotto).

Deported: Number of political deportations to Germany by municipality of capture. Source: [Mantelli and Tranfaglia \(2013\)](#). We have data on only 6,500 individuals, out of about 40,000 deported.

A.3 Other city characteristics

Geographic variables: We collected data on city hall elevation, and on maximum and minimum elevation in the municipality. Source: National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We also created a grid of 25 Km width covering all the Italian territory.

Industrial plants per capita: We collected data on the number of industrial plants per capita in each municipality from the 1951 Census. Source: ISTAT.

Population and illiterate share: We collected data on total resident population, population density and literacy rates (1911, 1921, and then 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991). Census were easily available only from 1971 onwards. For all the other Censuses we manually digitalized the data. Source: ISTAT.

A.4 Structure of Italian municipalities

The administrative structure in Italy changed over the years. In 1948 there were 7,392 municipalities, in 2001 the number had increased to 8,100. In order to build a time consistent panel, we took 2001 as the reference year. For all the years different from 2001 we performed the following adjustments:

- Change the names: Some municipalities changed their names, the main reason was to avoid confusion; names must be mapped in order to have a complete series for each municipality. One example is Madesimo in province of Sondrio that before 1983 was called Isolato.

- Consider aggregations (i): Some municipalities merged into a single entity. For instance, at date t we observe municipalities A and B , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipality C corresponding to the merger of A and B . In 2001 we only observe municipality C . Then only municipality C is included in the sample. For date t when C did not exist yet, we impute to C the data of $A + B$.
- Consider partial aggregations (ii): It may be that some municipalities absorb a municipality that no longer exists. For instance at date t we observe A , B and X , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipality A and B while territory of X has been split (not necessarily equally) between A and B . In 2001 we only observe municipality A and B . Then only municipalities A and B are included in the sample. For date t when also X existed, we impute data of X to both A and B ; that is, at date t , we impute $A = A + X$ and $B = B + X$
- Consider disaggregations (i): Some municipalities split their territory in two or more municipalities. This situation is quite common in Italy, since Fascism tried to reduce the administrative centres, while the number of municipalities increased in the post-war period. For instance, suppose that at date t we observe only municipality C , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipalities A and B corresponding to the separation (not necessarily equally) of C . In 2001 we observe A and B , but not C . Then we include in the sample both A and B . For date t , when A and B did not exist yet, we impute to both of them the data of C ; that is, at t , we impute $A = C$, $B = C$.
- Consider partial disaggregations (ii): We also track the case where C still exists in 2001 but at $t' > t$ parts of C were dismembered to give birth to A and B , with C still existing today. In this case, for all date prior to t we impute $A = C$ and $B = C$.

We neglect changes in the boundaries that do not determine the end of a municipality or the birth of a new one, since they do not alter municipalities structures and since our variables mainly refer to shares. All these adjustments used records in ISTAT and Italian Agency of Revenue, tracking changes in the period of interest. The only exception are municipalities born from municipalities that still exist: In these cases we had to manually check each split. These adjustments were made for all data at the municipality level (Census and electoral data, but also episodes of violence). When a municipality has data imputed as described above, we retain only the shares (e.g., illiterate share) and we discard absolute values (e.g., total number of illiterates).

B. Appendix [Not for Publication] – Balance Tests, Robustness Checks, and Survey

Table B.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Communist 1946 (%)	5,559	0.151	0.142	0	0.768
Communist and Socialist 1946 (%)	5,559	0.375	0.213	0.002	0.914
Catholic 1946 (%)	5,559	0.421	0.169	0	0.950
Right Wing 1946 (%)	3,227	0.027	0.061	0	0.788
Communist and Socialist 1948 (%)	5,384	0.267	0.191	0	0.809
Catholic 1948 (%)	5,384	0.54	0.172	0.021	0.974
Right Wing 1948 (%)	5,199	0.033	0.062	0	0.732
Communist and Socialist 1919 (%)	5,698	0.298	0.251	0	1
Catholic 1919 (%)	5,698	0.277	0.213	0	1
Communist and Socialist 1921 (%)	5,698	0.270	0.213	0	1
Catholic 1921 (%)	5,698	0.276	0.212	0	1
Communist and Socialist 1924 (%)	5,698	0.140	0.128	0	1
Catholic 1924 (%)	5,698	0.138	0.153	0	1
Years of occupation	5,698	1.514	0.663	0.173	1.984
Presence of partisan brigades (Intersect)	5,698	0.360	0.480	0	1
Presence of left wing partisan brigades (Intersect)	5,698	0.269	0.444	0	1
Presence of other partisan brigades (Intersect)	5,698	0.091	0.288	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Feb. 1943-May 1945)	5,698	0.286	0.452	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Nov. 1944-May 1945)	5,698	0.122	0.328	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Feb. 1943-Oct. 1944)	5,698	0.214	0.41	0	1
Number of deported people arrested in the municipality	5,698	0.990	12.472	0	560
Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions	5,698	0.183	0.387	0	1
Maximum elevation of the municipality	5,698	789.4	796.1	2	4,554
Elevation of the city hall	5,698	316.9	290.3	0	2,035
Log of total population in 1921	5,698	7.776	1.024	4.431	13.561
Log of total population in 1951	5,698	8.045	1.050	4.304	14.317
Share of illiterates in 1921	5,698	0.236	0.201	0	0.857
Share of illiterates in 1951	5,698	0.090	0.086	0	0.457
Industrial Plants per capita in 1951	5,401	0.035	0.065	0.004	4.746

Note: See Section 3 for variables' description, and Appendix A for their sources and construction.

Table B.2: Summary Statistics Within 50 Km of the Gothic Line

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Communist 1946 (%)	275	0.367	0.135	0	0.699
Communist and Socialist 1946 (%)	275	0.635	0.151	0.15	0.911
Catholic 1946 (%)	275	0.259	0.121	0	0.667
Right Wing 1946 (%)	93	0.011	0.007	0.002	0.05
Communist and Socialist 1948 (%)	275	0.513	0.150	0.078	0.809
Catholic 1948 (%)	275	0.358	0.133	0.096	0.764
Right Wing 1948 (%)	224	0.012	0.009	0	0.050
Communist and Socialist 1919 (%)	275	0.536	0.218	0	1
Catholic 1919 (%)	275	0.226	0.149	0	1
Communist and Socialist 1921 (%)	275	0.364	0.188	0	1
Catholic 1921 (%)	275	0.249	0.197	0	1
Communist and Socialist 1924 (%)	275	0.138	0.109	0	1
Catholic 1924 (%)	275	0.084	0.092	0	1
Years of occupation	275	1.696	0.294	1.189	1.967
Presence of partisan brigades (Intersect)	275	0.473	0.500	0	1
Presence of left wing partisan brigades (Intersect)	275	0.400	0.491	0	1
Presence of other partisan brigades (Intersect)	275	0.073	0.260	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Feb. 1943-May 1945)	275	0.749	0.434	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Nov. 1944-May 1945)	275	0.295	0.457	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Feb. 1943-Oct. 1944)	275	0.651	0.478	0	1
Number of deported people arrested in the municipality	275	2.531	14.343	0	180
Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions	275	0.640	0.481	0	1
Maximum elevation of the municipality	275	619.1	602.2	2	2,165
Elevation of the city hall	275	203.0	270.2	0	1,388
Log of total population in 1921	275	8.821	0.841	7.256	12.217
Log of total population in 1951	275	9.001	0.883	6.713	12.738
Share of illiterates in 1921	275	0.263	0.107	0	0.609
Share of illiterates in 1951	275	0.098	0.040	0	0.236
Industrial Plants per capita in 1951	266	0.035	0.010	0.011	0.090

Note: See Section 3 for variables' description, and Appendix A for their sources and construction.

Table B.3: RDD Balance Tests – City Characteristics

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Share of illiterates 1921	-0.017 (0.023)	0.001 (0.017)	0.035 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.020)
	275	742	275	742	518
Share of illiterates 1951	-0.013 (0.009)	0 (0.006)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.008)
	275	742	275	742	413
Total population 1921	-1,165 (4,227)	-2,279 (3,083)	1,544 (3,634)	-691 (4,055)	-1,911 (2,875)
	254	702	254	702	984
Total population 1951	-192 (6,356)	-3164 (4,830)	1730 (4,860)	2761 (6,462)	1262 (5,201)
	266	729	266	729	442
Population density 1921	73.293 (49.112)	-116 (42.911)***	-15.642 (58.389)	80.821 (50.013)	15.444 (31.767)
	275	742	275	742	188
Population density 1951	106 (74.035)	-107 (57.938)*	-68.395 (80.422)	124 (72.687)*	17.404 (48.898)
	275	742	275	742	251
Female population 1921	-666 (2167)	-1260 (1580)	840 (1828)	-435 (2078)	-1050 (1484)
	254	702	254	702	968
Female population 1951	-112 (3349)	-1726 (2551)	903 (2504)	1440 (3413)	732 (2757)
	266	729	266	729	430
Plants/population in 1951	0 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.002)**	0.002 (0.005)	0 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
	266	724	266	724	405
Maximum elevation	-213 (164)	-121 (101)	-174 (248)	-78.010 (169)	-100 (120)
	275	742	275	742	742
Elevation city hall	2.267 (78.508)	96.470 (48.444)**	-96.962 (115)	74.569 (81.763)	85.556 (56.332)
	275	742	275	742	805

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. See Appendix A for data sources and description.

Table B.4: RDD Balance Tests – Pre-War Political Variables

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist and Socialist 1919	0.093 (0.046)** 275	0.209 (0.034)*** 742	-0.008 (0.060) 275	0.051 (0.048) 742	0.054 (0.050) 283
Catholic 1919	0.018 (0.036) 275	-0.065 (0.026)** 742	-0.001 (0.050) 275	0.055 (0.038) 742	0.014 (0.037) 354
Communist and Socialist 1921	0.087 (0.039)** 275	-0.005 (0.030) 742	0.031 (0.052) 275	0.141 (0.042)*** 742	0.084 (0.038)** 358
Catholic 1921	-0.027 (0.041) 275	-0.023 (0.031) 742	-0.047 (0.053) 275	-0.009 (0.043) 742	-0.017 (0.033) 724
Communist and Socialist 1924	0.035 (0.024) 275	0.004 (0.018) 742	0.040 (0.034) 275	0.051 (0.024)** 742	0.016 (0.018) 927
Catholic 1924	0.024 (0.020) 275	-0.016 (0.015) 742	0.004 (0.029) 275	0.040 (0.021)* 742	0.019 (0.019) 368

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Parties in the pre-fascist period have been lumped using as reference [Leoni \(2001\)](#). See Appendix A for more details on these aggregations.

Table B.5: RDD Nearest Neighbor Matching – Pre-War Political Variables

	Nearest Neighbor Matching Latitude and Longitude		
	25 Km	50 Km	100 Km
Communist and Socialist 1919	0.052 (0.033)	0.067 (0.028)**	0.055 (0.032)*
	115	275	742
Catholic 1919	0.021 (0.032)	0.015 (0.026)	0.014 (0.024)
	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1921	0.029 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.028)	-0.017 (0.026)
	115	275	742
Catholic 1921	-0.018 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.036)	0.004 (0.029)
	115	275	742
Communist and Socialist 1924	0.031 (0.019)	0.021 (0.016)	0.030 (0.016)*
	115	275	742
Catholic 1924	0.022 (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.023 (0.014)*
	115	275	742

Note: Coefficients presented display the difference among mean above the line minus mean below the line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Nearest-neighborhood matching based on latitude and longitude. Parties in the pre-fascist period have been lumped using as reference [Leoni \(2001\)](#). See Appendix A for more details on these aggregations. Metric used: Euclidean distance with replacement.

Table B.6: RDD Robustness – Controlling for Latitude and Longitude

	Polynomial Regression with controls				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates					
Communist 1946	0.111 (0.029)*** 275	0.140 (0.023)*** 742	0.101 (0.041)** 275	0.107 (0.033)*** 742	0.143 (0.028)*** 717
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.111 (0.032)*** 275	0.191 (0.024)*** 742	0.038 (0.043) 275	0.111 (0.035)*** 742	0.124 (0.039)*** 396
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.109 (0.033)*** 275	0.175 (0.025)*** 742	0.084 (0.046)* 275	0.109 (0.037)*** 742	0.119 (0.042)*** 317
Catholic 1946	-0.035 (0.025) 275	-0.100 (0.021)*** 742	-0.030 (0.032) 275	-0.051 (0.029)* 742	-0.091 (0.026)*** 659
Catholic 1948	-0.065 (0.027)** 275	-0.148 (0.024)*** 742	-0.074 (0.036)** 275	-0.076 (0.033)** 742	-0.091 (0.036)** 317
Right Wing 1946	0.004 (0.008) 93	0 (0.005) 262	0.015 (0.013) 93	0.004 (0.008) 262	-0.004 (0.006) 245
Right Wing 1948	-0.007 (0.003)*** 224	-0.006 (0.002)*** 599	-0.001 (0.003) 224	-0.007 (0.003)** 599	-0.007 (0.002)*** 557
Panel B: Estimates Conditional on Pre-War Elections					
Communist 1946	0.105 (0.025)*** 275	0.097 (0.019)*** 742	0.103 (0.033)*** 275	0.085 (0.027)*** 742	0.095 (0.024)*** 442
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.093 (0.027)*** 275	0.139 (0.020)*** 742	0.043 (0.033) 275	0.088 (0.029)*** 742	0.074 (0.029)** 309
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.095 (0.028)*** 275	0.121 (0.020)*** 742	0.086 (0.037)** 275	0.087 (0.030)*** 742	0.080 (0.026)*** 328
Catholic 1946	-0.032 (0.022) 275	-0.056 (0.016)*** 742	-0.031 (0.027) 275	-0.039 (0.024) 742	-0.058 (0.018)*** 790
Catholic 1948	-0.065 (0.024)*** 275	-0.102 (0.018)*** 742	-0.073 (0.031)** 275	-0.064 (0.027)** 742	-0.064 (0.024)*** 380
Right Wing 1946	0.002 (0.007) 93	-0.002 (0.005) 262	0.011 (0.011) 93	0.003 (0.008) 262	-0.011 (0.004)** 405
Right Wing 1948	-0.006 (0.003)** 224	-0.006 (0.002)*** 599	-0.001 (0.003) 224	-0.005 (0.003)** 599	0 (0.002) 511

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Local RDD uses residuals from OLS regressions on geographical variables (Panel A) and also on pre-war electoral results (Panel B) as dependent variables. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates in Panel B are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*. Other regressors include: Latitude, longitude, latitude squared, longitude squared, latitude*longitude, latitude*longitude squared.

Table B.7: RDD Robustness – 25 Km-Width FE

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates					
Communist 1946	0.131 (0.028)*** 275	0.181 (0.024)*** 742	0.111 (0.040)*** 275	0.124 (0.038)*** 742	0.142 (0.028)*** 670
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.132 (0.028)*** 275	0.234 (0.026)*** 742	0.056 (0.038) 275	0.129 (0.039)*** 742	0.108 (0.045)** 290
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.125 (0.031)*** 275	0.214 (0.027)*** 742	0.090 (0.043)** 275	0.121 (0.041)*** 742	0.126 (0.048)*** 310
Catholic 1946	-0.051 (0.023)** 275	-0.138 (0.022)*** 742	-0.034 (0.031) 275	-0.060 (0.033)* 742	-0.077 (0.027)*** 608
Catholic 1948	-0.083 (0.026)*** 275	-0.182 (0.025)*** 742	-0.077 (0.035)** 275	-0.087 (0.037)** 742	-0.094 (0.041)** 314
Right Wing 1946	0.006 (0.011) 93	0.003 (0.009) 262	0.009 (0.011) 93	0.008 (0.011) 262	-0.010 (0.003)*** 642
Right Wing 1948	-0.007 (0.002)*** 224	-0.006 (0.002)*** 599	-0.002 (0.003) 224	-0.007 (0.003)** 599	-0.008 (0.002)*** 572
Panel B: Estimates Conditional on Pre-War Elections					
Communist 1946	0.118 (0.025)*** 275	0.107 (0.021)*** 742	0.104 (0.033)*** 275	0.101 (0.031)*** 742	0.096 (0.024)*** 368
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.114 (0.027)*** 275	0.141 (0.022)*** 742	0.059 (0.032)* 275	0.104 (0.034)*** 742	0.079 (0.027)*** 329
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.109 (0.028)*** 275	0.119 (0.022)*** 742	0.089 (0.036)** 275	0.096 (0.033)*** 742	0.099 (0.030)*** 383
Catholic 1946	-0.044 (0.021)** 275	-0.058 (0.018)*** 742	-0.032 (0.027) 275	-0.048 (0.028)* 742	-0.034 (0.022) 475
Catholic 1948	-0.077 (0.024)*** 275	-0.097 (0.020)*** 742	-0.074 (0.032)** 275	-0.074 (0.031)** 742	-0.084 (0.027)*** 470
Right Wing 1946	0.003 (0.009) 93	0.002 (0.010) 262	0.008 (0.010) 93	0.007 (0.011) 262	0.010 (0.006)* 32
Right Wing 1948	-0.006 (0.003)** 224	-0.005 (0.002)** 599	-0.001 (0.003) 224	-0.005 (0.003)* 599	-0.006 (0.002)*** 441

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Local RDD uses residuals from OLS regressions on the 25 Km interval FE (Panel A) and also on pre-war electoral results (Panel B) as dependent variables. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates in Panel B are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table B.8: RDD Robustness – Full Sample Analysis

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	0.080 (0.035)** 329	0.112 (0.025)*** 829	0.040 (0.050) 329	0.055 (0.037) 829	0.069 (0.035)* 453
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.069 (0.046) 329	0.148 (0.030)*** 829	-0.009 (0.066) 329	0.053 (0.048) 829	0.045 (0.049) 371
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.075 (0.042)* 329	0.134 (0.029)*** 829	0.033 (0.060) 329	0.050 (0.044) 829	0.063 (0.044) 389
Catholic 1946	-0.006 (0.036) 329	-0.077 (0.024)*** 829	0.030 (0.051) 329	-0.002 (0.038) 829	-0.038 (0.030) 747
Catholic 1948	-0.040 (0.038) 329	-0.113 (0.026)*** 829	-0.023 (0.055) 329	-0.023 (0.040) 829	-0.035 (0.041) 402
Right Wing 1946	0.006 (0.006) 146	0 (0.004) 346	0.011 (0.008) 146	0.008 (0.006) 346	0.006 (0.005) 218
Right Wing 1948	0 (0.005) 278	0 (0.003) 684	0.003 (0.005) 278	0 (0.005) 684	0 (0.003) 802

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line on the entire sample of Italian municipalities (*i.e.* without dropping municipalities with missing pre-war political variables). Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy.

Table B.9: RDD Robustness – Non-Missing Pre-War Elections

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Unconditional Estimates					
Communist 1946	0.182 (0.048)***	0.220 (0.032)***	0.118 (0.079)	0.157 (0.052)***	0.168 (0.057)***
	142	438	142	438	178
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.167 (0.053)***	0.278 (0.036)***	0.026 (0.082)	0.140 (0.056)**	0.116 (0.069)*
	142	438	142	438	150
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.180 (0.053)***	0.267 (0.036)***	0.081 (0.083)	0.136 (0.056)**	0.142 (0.068)**
	142	438	142	438	147
Catholic 1946	-0.107 (0.039)***	-0.192 (0.027)***	-0.055 (0.060)	-0.108 (0.041)***	-0.099 (0.043)**
	142	438	142	438	185
Catholic 1948	-0.133 (0.044)***	-0.233 (0.031)***	-0.092 (0.070)	-0.115 (0.047)**	-0.117 (0.055)**
	142	438	142	438	150
Right Wing 1946	0.015 (0.018)	0 (0.010)	0.050 (0.025)*	0.012 (0.014)	0.002 (0.006)
	39	118	39	118	500
Right Wing 1948	-0.006 (0.003)*	-0.004 (0.002)*	0 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)
	112	333	112	333	179
Panel B: Estimates Conditional on Pre-War Elections					
Communist 1946	0.107 (0.035)***	0.127 (0.030)***	0.133 (0.046)***	0.096 (0.040)**	0.105 (0.043)**
	142	438	142	438	113
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.061 (0.038)	0.147 (0.032)***	0.038 (0.049)	0.065 (0.043)	0.016 (0.032)
	142	438	142	438	113
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.086 (0.039)**	0.125 (0.030)***	0.098 (0.050)*	0.049 (0.039)	0.053 (0.038)
	142	438	142	438	92
Catholic 1946	-0.051 (0.031)*	-0.093 (0.024)***	-0.054 (0.043)	-0.057 (0.032)*	-0.050 (0.030)*
	142	438	142	438	139
Catholic 1948	-0.078 (0.036)**	-0.122 (0.027)***	-0.098 (0.049)**	-0.058 (0.036)	-0.071 (0.034)**
	142	438	142	438	159
Right Wing 1946	0.012 (0.016)	0 (0.010)	0.045 (0.023)*	0.012 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.011)
	39	118	39	118	165
Right Wing 1948	-0.003 (0.004)	0 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.006)
	112	333	112	333	74

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line on the sample of Italian municipalities with all the three political variables pre-war (1919, 1921, 1924) not missing. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates in Panel B are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table B.10: RDD Causal Effects by Presence of Partisan Brigades

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Presence of Left Wing Partisan Brigades					
Communist 1946	0.114 (0.047)**	0.145 (0.035)***	0.017 (0.063)	0.100 (0.049)**	0.084 (0.051)*
	110	317	110	317	124
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.090 (0.055)	0.149 (0.040)***	0.018 (0.074)	0.059 (0.055)	0.070 (0.060)
	110	317	110	317	129
Communist 1946 cond.	0.106 (0.034)***	0.103 (0.027)***	0.054 (0.045)	0.105 (0.037)***	0.080 (0.031)**
	110	317	110	317	112
Communist and Socialist 1948 cond.	0.080 (0.037)**	0.089 (0.031)***	0.064 (0.051)	0.068 (0.039)*	0.066 (0.034)*
	110	317	110	317	152
Panel B: No Presence of Left Wing Partisan Brigades					
Communist 1946	0.158 (0.045)***	0.196 (0.032)***	0.202 (0.063)***	0.136 (0.052)***	0.159 (0.048)***
	165	425	165	425	214
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.184 (0.048)***	0.244 (0.034)***	0.207 (0.066)***	0.174 (0.054)***	0.191 (0.053)***
	165	425	165	425	186
Communist 1946 cond.	0.119 (0.039)***	0.098 (0.029)***	0.156 (0.047)***	0.098 (0.042)**	0.138 (0.041)***
	165	425	165	425	126
Communist and Socialist 1948 cond.	0.143 (0.042)***	0.133 (0.028)***	0.160 (0.048)***	0.130 (0.042)***	0.144 (0.039)***
	165	425	165	425	139

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line in the two separate subsamples (municipalities with presence vs no presence of a left-wing partisan brigade. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948. Estimates labeled as “conditional” are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table B.11: Survey Data – Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Male	2,491	0.299	0.458	0	1
Years of age	2,467	66.136	11.245	41	95
Years of residency	2,444	52.452	17.610	20	95
College level education	2,119	0.088	0.283	0	1
Years of education	2,119	9.683	4.241	0	21
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	2,112	0.911	0.286	0	1
One or more children	2,098	0.865	0.342	0	1
House ownership	2,029	0.934	0.248	0	1
Left wing political preferences	1,970	0.424	0.494	0	1
Center political preferences	1,970	0.072	0.258	0	1
Right wing political preferences	1,970	0.123	0.328	0	1
Independent political preferences	1,970	0.381	0.486	0	1
Congruence with father's political preferences	1,713	0.779	0.415	0	1
One family member took part in the civil war	2,270	0.320	0.467	0	1
One family member was victim of violence during WWII	2,252	0.226	0.419	0	1
One family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	2,252	0.191	0.393	0	1
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	2,226	0.704	0.456	0	1
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	2,226	0.330	0.470	0	1
Excessive German predominance	1,940	0.308	0.462	0	1
The Euro was harmful for Italy	2,279	0.259	0.438	0	1
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	1,054	0.275	0.447	0	1
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	1,066	0.604	0.489	0	1
Wedding preference, France over Germany	1,064	0.647	0.478	0	1
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	1,081	0.189	0.391	0	1

Note: See Appendix Table B.13 for variables' description.

Table B.12: Survey data – Balance Tests

	Polynomial Regression		Local RDD
	First order	Second order	
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Variables			
Male	0.045 (0.040)	0.017 (0.057)	0.141 (0.071)**
	2,491	2,491	558
Years of age	-0.500 (1.001)	-0.202 (1.431)	-3.396 (1.807)*
	2,467	2,467	599
College level education	0.035 (0.028)	0.034 (0.041)	0.041 (0.053)
	2,119	2,119	600
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.026 (0.043)	-0.069 (0.048)
	2,112	2,112	694
One or more children	-0.039 (0.034)	-0.069 (0.049)	-0.065 (0.051)
	2,098	2,098	826
House ownership	0.008 (0.026)	-0.021 (0.040)	-0.031 (0.053)
	2,029	2,029	638
Panel B: Political Preferences			
Left wing political preferences	0.060 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.068)	0.003 (0.065)
	1,970	1,970	918
Center political preferences	-0.011 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.035)
	1,970	1,970	1,011
Right wing political preferences	-0.026 (0.032)	0.008 (0.044)	0.006 (0.042)
	1,970	1,970	1,017
Independent political preferences	-0.023 (0.048)	0.037 (0.069)	0.008 (0.065)
	1,970	1,970	918

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. See Appendix Table B.13 for variables' description.

Table B.13: Survey Data – Variables Description

Variable	Definition	Question	Answers
Male	Dummy for male respondent		
Years of age	Age of the respondent		
Years of residency	Duration of the residency in the municipality		
College level education	Dummy equal to 1 if highest educational attainment is at least college (answers 1 or 2)	What is the highest educational degree you obtained?	1 - PhD/Master – 2 - College – 3 - Senior High School – 4 - Junior High School – 5 - Primary School – 6 - Primary School not finished
Years of education	Number of years spent at school (inferred from the answer to the previous question)		
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is married, widow(er), separated or divorced		
One or more children	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has at least one child		
House ownership	Dummy for house ownership		
Left wing political preferences	Dummy for left wing political preferences (answers 1 or 2)		
Center political preferences	Dummy for center political preferences (answer 3)		
Right wing political preferences	Dummy for right wing political preferences (answer 4 or 5)	How would you define your political position with a single word?	1 - Left – 2 - Center-Left – 3 - Center – 4 - Center-Right – 5 - Right – 6 - Independent
Independent political preferences	Dummy for independent political preferences (answer 6)		
Congruence with father's political preferences	Dummy for congruence with father's political preferences (answer 1)	How close were your vote to that of your father the first time you voted?	1 - Very close – 2 - Quite close – 3 - Not that close – 4 - Not close
One family member took part in the civil war	Dummy for the presence of a family member who took part in the civil war (answer 1 or 2)		
One family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	Dummy for the presence of a family member who took part in the civil war as a partisan (answer 1)	Do you remember, or were you told whether any member of your family took part in the civil war in the period 1943-1945? If so, as a partisan or as a Mussolini's supporter – 3 - No	1 - Yes, as a partisan – 2 - Yes, as Mussolini's supporter – 3 - No
One family member was victim of violence during WWII	Dummy for the presence of a family member who was victim of violence during WWII (answer 1)	Do you remember, or were you told whether a member of your family was a victim of violence or deprivations during WWII? If so, from whom?	1 - Yes (add description) – 2 - No
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	Dummy for the organisation of commemorating events in the municipality (answers 1 or 2)		
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	Dummy for the participation to commemorating events in the municipality (answer 2)	Do you remember whether your municipality has ever organized an event to commemorate the Resistance and the Partisan war? If so, did you attend?	1 - Yes, but I did not attend – 2 - Yes, and I attended – 3 - No
Excessive German predominance	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with excessive German predominance in Europe (answers 1 or 2)	How strongly do you agree with the statement "The Euro introduction has worsened the risk of an excessive German predominance in Europe"?	1 - Strongly Agree – 2 - Agree – 3 - Disagree – 4 - Strongly Disagree
The Euro was harmful for Italy	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes that the introduction of Euro has been harmful to Italy (answers 1 or 2)	How strongly do you agree with the statement "The introduction of Euro in Italy has been positive for our country"?	1 - Strongly Agree – 2 - Agree – 3 - Disagree – 4 - Strongly Disagree
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	Dummy for Poland ranked over Germany		
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	Dummy for UK ranked over Germany	I am going to present different nationalities. Would you tell, in order, for which ones of them you wouldn't be particularly happy in the event of the wedding of a relative with a person of that nationality.	
Wedding preference, France over Germany	Dummy for France ranked over Germany		
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	Dummy for Germany ranked last		


Note: The first column indicates the name of the variable used in the analysis. The second includes a brief description and, when appropriate, columns 3 and 4 contain the relevant survey question with possible answers. The original questionnaire was administered in Italian, the content has been translated to the benefit of non-Italian speakers.

Table B.14: Survey Data – Left-Wing Political Preferences

	Left-wing preferences (a)		Left-wing preferences (b)					
	(1)	(2)	Non-Left	Center-Left	Left	Non-Left	Center-Left	Left
Family member was victim of violence during WWII	0.058 (0.027)**	0.059 (0.027)**	-0.054 (0.025)**	0.009 (0.004)**	0.045 (0.021)**	-0.058 (0.025)**	0.010 (0.004)**	0.049 (0.021)**
Family member took part in the civil war	0.064 (0.030)**	0.079 (0.030)**	-0.059 (0.027)**	0.010 (0.005)**	0.050 (0.023)**	-0.073 (0.027)**	0.012 (0.005)**	0.061 (0.023)**
Congruence with father's political preferences	0.052 (0.025)**	0.046 (0.026)*	-0.065 (0.024)**	0.011 (0.004)**	0.055 (0.020)**	-0.060 (0.024)**	0.010 (0.004)**	0.050 (0.020)**
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	0.185 (0.029)**	0.174 (0.029)**	-0.174 (0.029)**	0.029 (0.005)**	0.146 (0.024)**	-0.173 (0.029)**	0.028 (0.005)**	0.144 (0.025)**
Number of observations	1,481	1,481		1,481			1,481	
Wald	58.817	94.724		56.775			90.896	
Other covariates	NO	YES		NO			YES	


Note: Coefficients represent marginal effect at the mean value for Probit regressions in columns (1) and (2), for ordered Probit regressions in columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Dependent variables: (a) dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual declared Left or Center-Left political preferences; (b) Categorical variable equal to 2 if the individual declared Left political preferences, to 1 if Center-Left preferences, to 0 otherwise. Other covariates include: Age, sex, years of education, and dummies for house ownership, college education, children, vital record, and position with respect to the Gothic line. See Appendix Table B.13 for variables' description.

Figure B.1: Violence Episodes and Municipalities Occupied by “HG-RFSS”




Note: Geographic distribution of violence episodes (by number/intensity) and of violent Nazi divisions (16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and “Hermann Goering”). See Appendix A for historical sources.

Figure B.2: Presence of Partisan Brigades




Note: Geographic distribution of left-wing and other partisan brigades. See Appendix A for historical sources.

Figure B.3: Communist minus Catholic in 1946




Note: Geographic distribution of the residuals of the variable *Communist minus Catholic 1946* regressed on all pre-war electoral outcomes in 1919, 1921, and 1924.

Figure B.4: Placebo Coefficients – Post-War Outcomes




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regression as in the last column of Table 2, shifting the position of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 10 Km at a time up to plus or minus 100 Km (first row), and by 50 Km at a time up to plus or minus 250 Km (second row).

Figure B.5: Placebo Coefficients (10 Km) – Pre-War Elections



Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regression as in the last column of Table B.4, shifting the position of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 10 Km at a time up to plus or minus 100 Km.

Figure B.6: Placebo Coefficients (50 Km) – Pre-War Elections



Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regression as in the last column of Table B.4, shifting the position of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 50 Km at a time up to plus or minus 250 Km.