SOVEREIGN SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA. WHICH PROSPECTS FOR A EUROBOND?

SUMMARY: In this paper, we provide new evidence on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads and “market sentiment” effects in the euro area in order to evaluate the rationale for a common Eurobond jointly guaranteed by euro-area Member States. We find that default risk is the main driver of yield spreads, suggesting small gains from greater liquidity. Fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of default risk but only as they interact with other countries’ yield spreads; i.e. with the global risk that the market perceives. More important, the impact of this global risk variable is not constant over time, a clear sign of contagion driven by shifts in market sentiment. This evidence points to a discontinuity in the disciplinary role of financial markets. If markets can stay irrational longer than a country can stay solvent, then the role of yield spreads on national bonds as a fiscal discipline device is considerably weakened, and issuing Eurobonds can be economically justified.

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Sovereign Spreads in the EURO Area. Which prospects for a Eurobond?

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1. INTRODUCTION

The dramatic increase in interest rate differentials displayed by the euro sovereign debt crisis, has led economists and policy makers to reconsider the possibility of a European government bond jointly issued and guaranteed by euro-area Member States. The idea that a common Eurobond could offer relief to Member States with weaker fiscal fundamentals, like Italy and Spain, and help solve the debt crisis has emerged in the policy debate and in the media in 2010 and, finally, gained strength in the summer of 2011.

Issuance of a common Eurobond, first analyzed in the Giovannini Group Report (2000), was originally viewed as a strong form of debt management cooperation with the potential of promoting further market integration and greater liquidity. In the wake of the US financial crisis, Eurobond proposals have stressed that a common bond would satisfy the global demand for a risk-free asset and better compete with US Treasuries for the global financial flows in search of a “safe-haven”, thereby strengthening the use of the euro as a reserve currency (see e.g. Gros and Micossi 2009, Mayordomo et al. 2009, De Grauwe and Moesen 2009). The euro debt crisis has generated sizeable and highly volatile yield spreads of Member States’ bonds on German Bunds. In light of this...

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evidence, a new argument has gained strength: that Eurobonds could provide better market access to weaker Member States, by insulating these countries from financial contagion, and lower the risk of crisis propagation (see e.g. Delpla and von Weizsacker 2010, Jones 2010, Juncker and Tremonti 2010, ELEC 2010). On the other hand, Issing (2009) has argued that a common Eurobond is not such a good idea as the “medicine” of a common Eurobond would not cure the fiscal problems of its weakest members, but would instead prolong their reliance on debt, thus taking away the effect of market discipline on their fiscal policies. Further arguments against Eurobonds have been put forth by Gros (2011).

In this paper, we first investigate the determinants of interest-rate differentials between euro-area Member States in order to provide the relevant stylized facts on the relative importance of liquidity and default risk. As we find that default risk is the main driver of yield spreads, suggesting small gains from greater liquidity, in the remaining part of the paper we focus on arguments for and against Eurobonds based on their effects on default risk and its redistribution across participating issuers.

A Eurobond jointly guaranteed by euro-area Member States by ensuring market access (and better borrowing conditions) to weaker Member States does not only reduce their risk of default but also the risk of crisis propagation to States with relatively better fundamentals either from contagion or interdependences in the real and financial sectors. In particular, a Eurobond can insulate more fiscally responsible States against the effect of contagion, i.e. a rise in yield spreads (and thus in funding costs) due to a shift in market sentiment. On the other hand, issuance of a common Eurobonds could lower incentives for fiscal adjustment, since it prevents financial market from exerting their disciplinary role through higher interest rates. Hence, the economic rationale for a Eurobond program very much depends on whether yield spreads reflect market sentiment and contagion or the market’s efficient assessment of fiscal fundamentals.

To shed light on the relative role of fiscal fundamentals and market sentiment in the pricing of default risk in yield spreads, and thus in the propagation of the euro debt crisis, we estimate a Global VAR of 10-year yield spreads on Bunds. We find that fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of default risk but only as they interact with other countries’ yield spreads; i.e. with the global risk that the market perceives. More important, the impact of this global risk variable is not constant over time, a clear sign of contagion driven by shifts in market sentiment. This evidence points to a discontinuity in the disciplinary role of financial markets. If markets can stay irrational longer than a country can stay solvent, then the role of yield spreads on national bonds as a fiscal discipline device is considerably weakened, and issuing Eurobonds can be economically justified.

In light of this evidence, we then discuss and provide new evidence on the other benefits and costs of a Eurobond program. Contrary to the ‘safe-haven’ argument, we find that German Bunds do not suffer from a lack of liquidity, and thus higher costs, compared to US Treasuries despite a smaller market size. Moreover, insuring the default risk of Member States with weaker fundamentals is not without costs for safer Member
States: their expected liabilities will increase and, if the Eurobond did not reach the same credit quality as German Bunds, an event that we cannot rule out, their borrowing conditions would also worsen.

This suggests that the political opposition to a common issuance program is well motivated and that a Eurobond will never be issued without a renewed aim for a stronger EU political union.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze sovereign spreads in the euro area by presenting the relevant stylized facts and by proposing a new nonlinear Global VAR model. Section 3 evaluates the trade-off between market discipline and crisis prevention for a Eurobond backed by joint guarantees in the light of the empirical results of Section 2. Section 4 is then devoted to assess the feasibility of a Eurobond program. Finally, Section 5 presents the policy conclusions of our analysis.

2. SOVEREIGN SPREADS IN THE EURO AREA

To assess the potential for a European government bond issued by euro-area Member States, we first examine the degree of integration in the European government bond market and its determinants. The relevant stylized facts are on the relative importance of liquidity and default risk premia in determining yield spreads in the euro area, and on the link between fiscal fundamentals and default risk premia priced in yield spreads.

2.1. The Yield Spreads on German Bunds

The European Monetary Union (EMU) brought to life an integrated market for fixed-income government securities in the euro-area. Common euro denomination made bonds issued by euro-area Member States close, but not perfect, substitutes. Figure 1 reports the yields to maturity on 10-year bonds issued by Germany and by three high-yielders: Italy, Portugal, and Spain. The Figure shows that 10-year yields converged significantly, narrowing from highs in excess of 300 basis points in the pre-EMU period to less than 30 basis points about one year after the introduction of the Euro. Yet, bonds issued by euro-area Member States have never been regarded as perfect substitutes by market participants: interest rate differentials never disappeared, and became sizeable during the course of 2008 and 2009. The euro debt crisis in 2010 and 2011 brought about differentials of the same, or even greater magnitude, than those of the pre-euro era.

Insert Figure 1 about here

There are different possible explanations for these interest rate differentials. The first one is credit risk; sovereign issuers that are perceived as having a greater solvency risk, must pay investors a default risk premium. The second explanation is liquidity risk, that is, the risk of having to sell (or buy) a bond in a thin market and, thus, at an unfair price
and with higher transaction costs. Small issuers with low volumes of bonds outstanding and thus small markets must compensate investors with a liquidity premium. Before the introduction of the Euro, also expectations of exchange rate fluctuations and different tax treatment of bonds issued by different countries were relevant. Different tax treatments were eliminated or reduced to a negligible level during the course of the 90s. The introduction of the Euro in January 1999 virtually eliminated the expectations on exchange rate fluctuations, at least until the most recent events that might have induced some positive probability on the event of the collapse of the EMU.²

The availability of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) for the more recent part of the sample allows us to measure the default-risk premium component. A CDS is a swap contract in which the protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of premium payments to the protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if the bond goes into default. The difference between a CDS on a Member State bond and the CDS on the German Bund of the same maturity is a measure of the default risk premium of that State relative to Germany. Note that, as clearly discussed in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), CDS is direct measure of the default risk but not of the probability of default, as the price of a CDS depends both on the probability of default and on the expected recovery value of the defaulted bond. Moreover, such measure is not perfect; CDS differentials might also reflect the different liquidity of different sovereign CDSs, as well as counterparty risk (i.e. the risk that the protection seller of the CDS is not able to honor her obligation when the bond goes into default). Their imperfections notwithstanding, CDS differentials provide us with an interesting benchmark to assess what are the main factors driving yield differentials.

Figures 2 and 3 report interest-rate differentials for euro-area Member States (blue line)—i.e. the spreads of 10-year government bond yields on German Bund yields—along with the associated CDS spreads (red line) and the residual non-default component (black line). We group the yield spreads on Bunds and the associated CDS into high yielders (Figure 2) and low yielders (Figure 3).³

Insert Figure 2-3 about here

The following facts emerge from the data:

i) There is a clear tendency of all spreads on Bunds in the euro-area to comove, but the nature of the comovement is not constant over time. The CDS spread, i.e. the default risk component of the yield spread, accounts for virtually the entire differential (and its variability) in the case of high yielders over the

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² For the pre-EMU period expected exchange rate depreciation and risk can be directly identified via the difference between the 10-year Fixed Interest Rate Swaps in local currency by the European countries, as these spreads are immune from sovereign default and liquidity risk. The data show that most of the pre-EMU fluctuations in spreads of high yielders on Bunds are attributable to this component. Since the inception of the Euro 10-year Fixed interest rate swaps differential among Euro area member States are equal to zero by definition.

³ We do not present data for Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia because times series are not long enough given the short spell of time these countries have spent within the EMU. Data for Luxembourg are also not reported.
whole sample period, whereas it does so in the case of two low-yielders, Belgium and France, only during the euro-debt crisis period.

ii) The non-default component of the yield spread is very small for all Member States with only few exceptions: Finland, the Netherlands, and for France during the global financial crisis. These components are clearly time-varying and fluctuate between around 10 basis points in calm periods and around 50-60 basis points during crises.

iii) The case of Finland where the default risk component is always close to zero, makes it clear that in a global crisis the liquidity premium rises to determine a positive comovement between the Finnish spread and all other euro-area spreads.

iv) For all countries, non-default components are unlikely to reflect expectations of depreciation of the exchange rate. In fact, the data from the euro-debt crisis period suggest that the entire spread for the high-yielders is explained by the default component. Therefore, the event of an EMU collapse has negligible probability in the absence of default of one or more Member States. The evidence of a time varying non-default component not related to expectations of depreciation of exchange rates is consistent with time varying models of the liquidity premia as the one proposed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and the empirical evidence on a time-varying liquidity premium in the euro are co-movning with the default risk premium, reported in Beber et al. (2009) and Favero et al. (2010).

There is an important fact about the comovements of interest-rate spreads in the euro area: their interdependence is not constant over time. To illustrate this phenomenon we consider two high-yielders, Greece and Italy, and one low-yielder, Finland. We report in Figure 4 the Greek, the Italian and the Finnish 10-year spreads on Bunds along with the spread between yields on US Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, a variable often used to describe the market attitude toward risk. We consider the full sample 2003-2010 and three subsamples, the low-volatility period (2003-2007), the financial crisis (May 2007-August 2009) and the Greek debt crisis (September 2009-July 2010).

Insert Figure 4 about here

A changing correlation pattern clearly emerges from the data. Over the low-volatility period, Italy and Greece are placed in the same class of risk by the market and their spreads on Bunds are very highly correlated, despite the fact that the two markets are very different in terms of their size and therefore their liquidity. During the financial crisis the credit risk of the two high-yielders diversify. In fact, both the Italian and the Greek spread positively react to the increase in the Baa-Aaa spread but their response is different; the Greek spread widens up to 300 basis points, while the Italian spread peaks at 150. Interestingly, during the financial crisis also the Finnish spread on Bunds
responds slightly to international risk because of an increase in the liquidity premium. Finally, during the Greek crisis, the surge in the interest rate on Greek bonds, not only leads the Greek spread to a value of nearly one-thousand basis points, but it appears to strongly affect the Italian spread that even rises above the US Baa-Aaa spread to reach almost 200 basis points.

This evidence suggests that the major component of yield spreads is default risk, and raises the issue of contagion from default risk. In the next section, we propose an econometric model of interdependence in euro-area bond spreads and we also address the issue of contagion, i.e. of the existence of structural breaks in interdependence.

2.2. The Econometric Evidence

The preliminary data analysis in the previous section has shown that the main driver of yield differentials in the euro area is default risk and that there is a clear time-varying comovement among differentials. The relevant issue unresolved by the descriptive analysis is the relative weight of fiscal fundamentals and “market sentiment” in the determination of yield spreads. We address this issue within the framework of a Global VAR model for the spreads on Bunds, where the dynamics of each spread is determined by its fundamentals relative to the German ones and a global variable that models the exposure of each country’s spread to the other spreads in the euro area in terms of the “distance” between their fiscal fundamentals. We adopt the following specification for a system of ten equations for the 10-year interest-rate spreads on German Bunds for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, using weekly data over the period June 2006-August 2011.

\[
\begin{align*}
(Y_t^i - Y_t^{GER}) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1(Y_{t-1}^i - Y_{t-1}^{GER}) + \beta_2E_t(b_t - b_t^{GER}) + \beta_3E_t(d_t - d_t^{GER}) \\
&+ \beta_4(Baa_t - Aaa_t) + \beta_5(Y_t^i - Y_t^{GER}) + \beta_6(Y_{t-1}^i - Y_{t-1}^{GER}) + \epsilon_t \\

(\sum_{j \neq i} w_{ij} (Y_j^i - Y_t^{GER})) &= dist_{ij} \\

dist_{ij} &= 0.5 \times E_t(b_t - b_j) / 60 + 0.5 \times E_t(d_t - d_j) / 3 \\

w_{ij}^* &= \frac{1}{dist_{ij}} \text{ if } dist_{ij} < 1, \text{ otherwise } w_{ij}^* = 0 \\

w_{ij} &= \frac{w_{ij}^*}{\sum_{j \neq i} w_{ij}^*}
\end{align*}
\]
The model relates yield spreads on Bunds to local fundamentals and common factors. Local fundamentals are chosen to capture default risk\(^4\). Following Attinasi et al. (2010), we include the average for a 2-year period of the expected budget balance to GDP ratio \((d_i)\) and debt to GDP ratio \((b_i)\). The expected variables are the European Commission Forecasts, that are released on a bi-annual basis. We include in the model the difference between each country’s forecast and the forecast of the same variables for Germany. Our specification is completed by the inclusion of two global risk factors. The first one is an international factor, the US corporate Baa-Aaa spread, computed on the basis of the data made available in the FRED database of the Federal Reserve of St. Louis. The second factor is constructed to deliver country-specific stochastic trends for the impact of other countries’ yield spreads, in which the levels of the spreads of all other countries are mapped into the factor by taking into account their “distance” from the country considered, as measured by differences in fiscal fundamentals. We call this factor ‘global spread’. For each country, the global spread is determined by a weighted average of the yield spreads in all other countries where the weights are constructed to make the global spread more dependent on the spreads of those countries that are more similar in terms of fiscal fundamentals. The global spread variable is inspired by the construction of global variables in the GVAR modeling approach (see, e.g., Pesaran et al. 2004, and Dees et al. 2007), where global macro variables are constructed for each country by using trade weights. Using the distance in terms of fiscal fundamentals makes the global variable country-specific and the weights more volatile than in standard GVAR based on trade weights. Note that the global spread variables vary at the weekly frequencies only for the fluctuations in the spreads, while the low frequencies fluctuations depend both on the fluctuations in the spreads and on the changes in the weights. As the latter occurs only at biannual frequency, no endogeneity problems for the weights should arise.

The time-varying weights, related to the changing forecasts for fiscal fundamentals, have the potential of explaining the changing correlation of spreads discussed in the descriptive data analysis. To illustrate the point we report in Figure 5 the global spreads for a typical low-yielder, the Netherlands, and a typical high yielder, Ireland.

\[\text{Insert Figure 5 about here}\]

Note that, in the no-crisis period, the global spread variables for the Netherlands and Ireland are very strongly correlated with a very similar mean, while in the wake of a crisis the two global variables diverge as the higher distance of the Netherlands from the high-yielders generates a lower mean and a lower volatility for its global spread.

Our measure of the distance in terms of fiscal fundamentals includes both projections on debt to GDP and deficit to GDP ratios. We have assessed the performance of this specification of distance against a range of alternative specifications. In particular, we have considered alternative measures based on debt only, as some recent proposals on

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\(^4\) In a baseline version of our model we have also included the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity used by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) that labels a bond as illiquid if the bond prices move a lot in response to little volumes. However, we excluded this variable from the final specification as it turned out to be always non-significant.
Eurobonds (see Delpla and von Weiszacker 2010) concentrate on debt as the only criterion to identify the credit quality of different bonds. The evidence is that using debt as the only indicator of fiscal fundamentals delivers a global spread variable that performs much worse than that based on debt and deficit. Figure 6 illustrates this point for the case of Italy by reporting the domestic yield spread together with two alternative measures of the global spread: the one adopted in our model and an alternative one in which the distance is measured only by using the debt-to-GDP ratio.

**Figure 6 shows that the global spread based on debt and deficit does a much better job in capturing fluctuations of the domestic yield spread than the global spread based on debt only; the debt measure of the fiscal distance would have put Italy much closer to Greece, Portugal and Ireland in the euro debt crisis than the market has actually done. The debt-to-GDP ratio is one of the pricing variables of bonds but clearly not the only one. Default risk premia depend on fiscal sustainability and fiscal sustainability depends on the level of debt, on how it is financed, and on future primary surpluses.**

We have estimated the model over the period 2005-2011 to have a sample that includes three different periods of equal length: the calm period (2005-2007), the financial crisis period (2007-2009) and the euro-debt crisis period (2009-2011). The results of the estimation reported in Table 1 can be summarized as follows.

- **All spreads are very persistent.**
- **The global spread variables that use non-linearly the fiscal fundamentals are always significant with different impact coefficients.**
- **The Baa-Aaa spread is in general significant for the low yielders but it is not for the high yielders, with the exception of Ireland.**
- **The linear effect of the fiscal fundamentals is rather weak. Debt and deficit are simultaneously significant only in the case of Greece, while debt has also some marginally significant effect in the case of Portugal and Spain.**
- **Panel restrictions cannot be imposed on the system as the coefficients differ importantly across countries.**

The evidence reported shows that there is a relationship between yield spreads and fiscal fundamentals, but this is non-linear. Fiscal fundamentals do not matter per se but because they determine the sensitivity of the domestic yield spread to other countries' spreads. Fiscal fundamentals are important in the determination of the domestic spread as they define the distance between countries and therefore select the reference group relevant to determine the global spread variable. Countries with sound fiscal fundamentals are immune from the global risk priced in the yield spreads of countries in distress (at least, until August 2011), while weaker Member States are affected by global risk to the extent that they are fiscally closer to troubled countries. In such a framework,
markets do have a role as a discipline device as the interdependence among different countries might very well change over time but in a way related to fundamentals. On the other hand, when global risk factors (captured by global spreads) are muted, poor fiscal fundamentals are not priced in domestic yield spreads, which points to a discontinuity in the disciplinary role of financial markets.

The structural stability of the coefficients on the global spread variables is crucial to assess the presence of contagion: in fact, instability (i.e. time variation) of the impact of the global spread variable on domestic spreads would imply that episodes of contagion dominate the fundamentals driven interdependence across countries. To investigate this issue we consider first the results of subsample estimation over three periods: the calm period (2005-2007), the financial crisis period (2007-2009) and the euro-debt crisis period (2009-2011). The results, reported in Table 2, show that the coefficients on the global spreads are always statistically significant, but also that there is some evidence of instability, in particular during the euro debt crisis. Using the terminology introduced by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), this evidence shows the presence of contagion in the sense that the interdependence captured by the global trend, i.e. the impact of other countries’ spreads through fiscal fundamentals, might not be constant over time. If our specification captures correctly the fundamentals driving the spreads, then the effect of contagion can be used to measure the impact of “market sentiment” in driving yield differentials away from the path consistent with fundamentals.

To measure the effect of contagion we consider a case study for Italy and Spain and estimate a Multivariate GARCH model for the yield spread of each country and the associated global spread. This specification allows for a time-varying conditional variance-covariance between the yield spread of domestic bonds on Bunds and the global spread relevant for each country, and it can be used to generate a time-varying estimate of the impact of the global spread on the domestic spread. In practice, we estimate the following reduced form specification of our Global VAR:

$$\begin{bmatrix}
(Y_{it}^i - Y_{it}^{GER}) \\
(Y_{it}^i - Y_{it}^{GER})
\end{bmatrix} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \begin{bmatrix}
(Y_{it+1}^i - Y_{it+1}^{GER}) \\
(Y_{it+1}^i - Y_{it+1}^{GER})
\end{bmatrix} + \beta_2 E_{t-1} \begin{bmatrix}
FF_{t-1} \\
FF_{t-1}
\end{bmatrix} + \\
+ \beta_3 (Baa_t - Aaa_t) + H_{t}^{1/2} \begin{bmatrix}
u_t^i \\
u_{t}^{GR}
\end{bmatrix}$$

$$vech(H_t) = M + Avech(u_{t-1} u_{t-1}^t) + Bvech(H_{t-1})$$

$i = ITA, ESP$

This specification models the joint process of the yield spread of Italian (or Spanish) bonds on German Bunds and the global spread variable relevant to Italy (or Spain) as a persistent process with a mean determined by the expected fiscal fundamentals ($FF^{IT}$ are
the same fundamentals adopted in the system specification while FF are weighted average of the fiscal fundamentals of other countries with weights determined by the distance from Italy (or Spain) previously defined. The time-varying variance-covariance matrix of residuals, $H_t$, is modelled as a diagonal BEKK (Engle and Kroner 1995) system. Therefore, the conditional variances, covariances and correlation are allowed to vary over time.

The model provides us with a natural measure of contagion: the dynamic conditional beta in the terminology of Bali and Engle (2010), which is the coefficient determining the effect of a shock in the global spread on the Italian (or Spanish) spread.

\[ E\left(u_i^t|u_\tau^*\right) = \gamma_i, u_i^* \sim h_{12}^{-1} h_{22}^{-1} \]

Variations in the coefficient $\gamma_i$ reflect a time varying interdependence between the domestic spread and the global spread and they therefore illustrate how contagion affects Italy (and Spain) following a shock to the global spread. The time varying estimate of $\gamma_i$ are reported in Figure 7 along with the estimates obtained from the SUR model.

Insert Figure 7 about here

The Figure displays some evidence of contagion during the global financial crisis that becomes very strong during the euro debt crisis. During both crises the exposure of Italy and Spain to their global spread variables becomes much higher than that predicted on the basis of the distance from other euro-area Member States, as measured by fiscal fundamentals. Note also that the impact of contagion on the domestic yield spreads is very strongly correlated across the two countries. In Figure 8 we provide an estimate of the cost of contagion as measured by the difference between the impact effect of the global spread as estimated in the Multivariate GARCH model and in the constant parameter SUR system.

Insert Figure 8 about here

The estimates show that the effect of contagion in the euro debt crisis is very sizable as it stands at two-hundred basis points in the case of Italy, and at an even higher level in case of Spain.

What does our evidence say on the relative role of fiscal fundamentals and contagion and thus on the trade-off between setting incentives for fiscal discipline and reducing risk of crisis propagation through shifts in market sentiment? Domestic yield spreads do depend on fundamentals, non-linearly, but there is contagion on the top of interdependence. The long-run fluctuations in yield spreads are related to fundamentals, but such a relation is not constant over time and episodes of contagion can be traced in the data of our sample. This evidence tells us that it is well possible that markets can stay
away from the fundamentals driven equilibrium for longer than a country can stay solvent.

3. DO WE NEED A EUROBOND?

Several arguments have been put forth in favor of a common European government bond. Earlier proposals stressed that Eurobonds would promote further market integration, greater liquidity and a reduction in liquidity premia, possibly leading to lower borrowing costs. With the advent of the global financial crisis, the idea that a Eurobond could reach the status of a “safe-haven” benchmark competing with US Treasuries for global financial flows and strengthen the use of the euro as an international reserve currency also gained strength (see Monti 2010). Finally, the introduction of a Eurobond has been advocated as a solution to the euro debt crisis. In the latter proposals the role of a Eurobond is to ensure market access at better conditions during crises and reduce the risk of crisis propagation from contagion and interdependences. In what follows, we focus on the latter motivation that also involves an assessment of the credit status that a Eurobond would eventually achieve, and thus of the “safe-haven” argument. By contrast, we do not address liquidity issues as our descriptive evidence suggests that the liquidity-premium is a minor component of yield spreads and that the efficiency gains from further market integration are likely to be small. As crisis prevention has become the main concern, we restrict the attention to a particular type of Eurobond, one backed by joint and several guarantees.

3.1. A common Eurobond backed by joint guarantees

The type of Eurobond that we consider is a single debt instrument issued by a group of euro-area Member States backed by joint and several guarantees: each participating issuer would guarantee the totality of the obligations of the common instrument, thereby making it an indivisible legal object. The debt-service obligations of each participating issuer would be specified in relation to the amount of funding obtained, but the cross-default nature of the joint guarantees would give an investor legal recourse to all the participating issuers, in case that not all the obligations of any issuer were fully met. The issuing entity could be an independent Euro debt agency or a newly created EMU Fund for on-lending to a group of participating euro-area Member States. This type of instrument is considered in the second and third hypotheses put forth in the Green Paper by the European Commission (2011) and is the third hypothesis in the Giovannini Group Report (2000). It is consistent with the proposals by Boonstra (2010), Delpla (2010), Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010), Jones (2010), Juncker and Tremonti (2010) and Muellbauer (2011).
The legal nature of such an instrument is different from a bond issued by an EU Institution in that its guarantees are explicit while in the latter case they derive from the EU legal order; i.e. from the legal obligations of the 27 Member States under the EU Treaty, if the EU bond were issued by the European Commission (EC), or from the capital that they subscribe, if it were issued by the EIB. However, since most of the economic arguments in the following analysis also apply to an EU bond, in what follows we shall refer to a Eurobond with explicit joint guarantees by euro-area-only Member States with little loss of generality.

Joint guarantees are needed to reap all of the potential benefits from a commonly issued Eurobond and, in particular, to make it an effective tool of crisis prevention that insulates weaker Member States from contagion. In fact, a commonly issued bond with country-specific shares backed by several guarantees, as those proposed by EPDA (2008), De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) and Monti (2010), would not provide much relief to weaker Member States facing a crisis because States with higher credit standings would remain liable only for the interest payments and principal redemption corresponding to their share of the bond, and not for the debt of the other issuers. A bond backed by several guarantees would have a rating reflecting the average of the credit standings of the participating Member States (weighted by their relative shares), and thus would never reach a “safe-haven” status and be held in foreign reserves. More important, as the yield on such bond would average those of participating issuers, a redistributive scheme would have to be devised to offset the higher borrowing costs incurred by creditworthy states making common issuance a zero-sum game except for the uncertain liquidity gains from market integration and the sure costs from complexity and inflexibility (see Favero and Missale 2010).

3.2. Crisis prevention versus fiscal discipline

The idea that Eurobonds could offer relief to Member States with weak fundamentals, like Italy and Spain, and help solve the euro-area debt crisis has emerged in the policy debate and in the media over the course of 2010 and, finally, gained strength in August 2011. Indeed, a European government bond backed by the joint and cross guarantees of the participating Member States could ensure market access at better conditions during crises to weaker sovereign issuers and reduce their risk of default. Although, it is

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6 This type of instrument is the fourth proposal in the Giovannini Group Report (2000). Issuance of a common bond by the EIB has been considered by Gros and Micossi (2009) for the purpose of financing a European Financial Stability Fund and by various authors for funding projects envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy (see e.g. Majocchi 2005).

7 The main difference in the two instruments lies in their legal and political feasibility. Issuance by a European Institution would encounter lower legal obstacles and could be more politically acceptable by fiscally sound Member States but would face stronger opposition by non-euro Member States, which would de facto cross guarantee the debt of the participating States (see Goldschmidt 2009). It is worth noting that the EC already funds its Balance of Payments Facility by issuing bonds with a AAA rating.
tempting to think of a Eurobond as providing insurance against credit risk, the opportunities for risk sharing are slim. First, movements in interest-rate spreads (a proxy for credit spreads) have a strong common component mainly driven by changes in international risk factors. Secondly, in the current situation, Eurobonds would imply a transfer of risk, away from Member States with lower credit standings onto safer issuers, that is unlikely to be reversed in the near future due to the persistence of relative fiscal positions.

Absent risk sharing opportunities, what is then the economic rationale for a common Eurobond? What needs to be argued is that, because a debt crisis in a Member State has negative spillovers to other States’ creditworthiness, a common debt backed by joint guarantees (or issued by an EU Institution) would reduce the risk of crisis propagation. If a country’s default on its debt increases the probability of default in other countries, either from contagion or interdependencies, then preventing a crisis in a Member State with weak fiscal fundamentals may improve debt sustainability in States with sounder finances. If these externalities were significant, the introduction of a Eurobond, by ensuring market access and better borrowing conditions to weaker Member States, could also reduce safer States’ exposure to default risk. Put it simply, providing insurance to weaker States, like Italy and Spain, would work as insurance for all; it would benefit all participating Member States except, perhaps, the most virtuous ones.

In fact, in the euro area, the probability that a country’s crisis propagates to other countries is particularly high because of strong real and financial links. A main channel of transmission is through cross-border holdings of national bonds and increased vulnerability of the European banking system. Another channel is through trade links. Finally, a debt crisis may propagate to other countries because of contagion; i.e. through a rise in yield spreads (and thus higher funding costs) due to a shift in market sentiment and/or risk awareness.

The most direct way of halting a liquidity crisis and preventing contagion is the existence of “a lender of last resort”, prepared to buy unlimited amounts of Member States’ bonds if necessary. As this is not currently possible as the ECB cannot be “the lender of last resort” within the current legal framework, Eurobonds can be an alternative solution. In fact, the yield on Eurobonds would be immune to the instability characterizing the impact of global risk factors (the global spread) observed in our econometric analysis. Thus, issuance of Eurobonds could temporarily ensure –up to a limit– the funding needed for the roll over of the maturing debt at a reasonable cost and give time, and financial breathing space, for fiscal adjustment.

Why then do economists as Issing (2009), Beck et al. (2011), Gros (2011) and Stark (2011) oppose the introduction of Eurobonds? The main argument against a jointly guaranteed Eurobond is that it would undermine fiscal discipline by removing incentives for sound budgetary policies. At worst, it could create a moral hazard problem in that a Member State may be tempted to free ride on other Members’ legal obligations to assume its debt in case of default. In particular, a common Eurobond prevents financial markets from exerting their disciplinary effects through higher interest rates. Then, with
less risk of default and lower cost of funding, Member States would be encouraged to run lax fiscal policies and take up more debt. This would weaken the credibility of the euro-zone as an area of stability and fiscal soundness.\textsuperscript{8}

The cross-default nature of the joint guarantees on Eurobonds would not only contravene the no bailout clause of the EU Treaty, but would heighten the risk of moral hazard. Pooling default risk may induce moral hazard since the credit risk stemming from individual lack of fiscal discipline would be shared by all participants.\textsuperscript{9}

To mitigate moral hazard and enforce fiscal discipline, the volume of Eurobonds issued on the behalf of each Member State should be limited to a specified percentage of its GDP, as suggested by Delpla (2010), Jones (2010), Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010, 2011). Furthermore, a Eurobond program requires increased surveillance and greater control of the design and implementation of national fiscal policies. As stressed by the EC (2011), the issuance of Eurobonds calls for substantial changes in the framework for economic governance in the euro area: “Any type of Stability Bond would have to be accompanied by a substantially reinforced fiscal surveillance and policy coordination as an essential counterpart, so as to avoid moral hazard and ensure sustainable public finances.”

Another argument against Eurobonds is that they lower the credit risk premium and thus the interest rate that weaker Member States have to pay on their debts. By preventing financial markets from exerting their disciplinary role, Eurobonds will further reduce the incentives for fiscal adjustment. Interestingly, the argument applies even if issuance of national bonds continued to remain substantial because lower default risk would translate into lower interest rates on national bond issues (assuming that their seniority would be the same as Eurobonds). In other words, Eurobonds would cross-subsidize the national bonds of weaker Member States.

The case for relying on the disciplinary effects of widening yield spreads depends on whether financial markets efficiently price risk. In fact, experience shows that market signals, i.e. yield spreads, can be dominated by swings in market sentiment and, more importantly, can remain weak for a long time and then change violently when it is too late to prompt fiscal adjustment.

The economic rationale for a Eurobond program very much depends on whether yield spreads reflect the market’s assessment of fiscal fundamentals or contagion, that is, a shift in market sentiment following the emergence of other countries’ fiscal distress. The euro-area sovereign debt crisis triggered by the insolvency of Greece, Ireland and Portugal provides an interesting case study. In section 2.2 we have investigated whether the rise in Italian and Spanish spreads is due to contagion or just reflects poor fiscal fundamentals, i.e. high debts, low growth and expected budget deficits.

Our empirical analysis offers some evidence of the importance of the role of market sentiment to create episodes of contagion. While fiscal fundamentals matter in the

\textsuperscript{8} See Issing (2009), Becker (2010) and Berrigan (2010) for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{9} Moreover, with jointly guaranteed debt the possibility of imposing strict conditionality on financial support, as it now happens with the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), would be lost.
pricing of default risk, they do so only to the extent that they determine the sensitivity of domestic yield spreads to other countries' spreads; i.e. to the global risk that the market perceives. When global risk factors are muted, fundamentals have no effect on domestic spreads. More importantly, the impact of the global spread variable is not constant over time, a clear sign of contagion driven by shifts in market sentiment.

Financial markets do set incentives for fiscal discipline but they do so discontinuously; their overreaction to global risk factors is itself an important source of instability and crisis propagation. Our evidence suggests that yield spreads are significantly driven by market sentiment and that relying only on the disciplinary effects of financial markets to halt a crisis may not be enough. As market irrationality and contagion play a significant role in the pricing of default risk, issuance of Eurobonds is economically justified as an alternative to the lack “a lender of last resort”; Eurobonds could halt the debt crisis in Italy and Spain and its spreading to safer Member States.

4. FEASIBILITY

Will a Eurobond ever be issued? The introduction of a common Eurobond backed by the several and joint guarantees of the participating euro-area Member States faces both legal obstacles and strong opposition by safer Member States. The cross-default nature of such guarantees are not only against the spirit but most likely violates the no bailout clause, i.e. the letter of Art 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thus may require changes in the EU Treaty. A common Eurobond also faces strong political opposition by Germany and other Member States with sound budgetary policies and low debts. In what follows we examine the costs of Eurobonds for safer issuers that motivate resistance to a common issuance program and the possible benefits that could mitigate such position.

4.1. Political Opposition

Political opposition has two motivations. The first is that a common Eurobond relaxes fiscal discipline and creates a moral hazard problem, as already discussed in Section 3.2. The second, more compelling, problem regards the sharing of the benefits and costs of the program. Member States with the highest credit standings lose from the mutualisation of default risk, in that they assume the credit risk of weaker Member States, while they are likely to gain very little from the greater liquidity of a Eurobond. Member States with sound budgetary policies and low debts could even face higher credit risk premia and borrowing costs if the Eurobond did not reach the same credit quality of their national bonds. In the best case scenario, a Eurobond jointly guaranteed by all euro-area Member States would have the same credit quality, and risk premium, as the national bonds of safer issuers, but the latter would see their risk exposure increased.
Even if their borrowing costs did not change, safer Member States would see their expected liabilities, and thus debt burdens, increase, as they will have to pay in the case a risky issuer defaulted on its obligations\textsuperscript{10}.

The cost of a Eurobond issuance program, and its implications for the interest rates to be paid on national bonds, is further investigated in the next sections.

\textbf{4.2. Borrowing costs with the introduction of a Eurobond}

The incentive to participate in common issuance depends, among other factors, on the borrowing costs that Member States would face with the introduction of a commonly guaranteed Eurobond. In turn, such costs will derive not only from the credit standing that the Eurobond would eventually achieve, but also from its impact on the default risk of participating issuers and thus from changes in the credit quality of their national bonds.

The credit standing of Eurobonds would first, and foremost, depend on whether they are \textit{de jure} senior to the outstanding national bonds. In fact, the recent proposal by Delpla and von Weizsacker (2010, 2011) of making Eurobonds (i.e. the Blue Bonds) senior to the remaining nationally guaranteed debt (i.e. the Red Bonds), and enforcing limits to their amount, would practically produce Eurobonds without risk. If instead Eurobonds have the same seniority of the old national bonds, evaluating their credit quality is more complicated. In what follows we assume that this must be the case for the simple reason that making the old national bonds junior relative to the Eurobonds would violate the term of the contract specified in national bond covenants, which would amount to an explicit repudiation of past obligations.\textsuperscript{11}

Then, under the assumption of equal seniority, and credible joint guarantees, the credit quality of Eurobonds (but not their liquidity) would depend on the credit standings of the Member States that guarantee the bond issues regardless of whether they use Eurobonds for funding.\textsuperscript{12} Participation to the common program should, hence, be viewed as the provision of the guarantee.

It is also worth noting that the overall borrowing costs of a participating Member State is likely to be affected even if it does not tap the market with Eurobonds. For instance, if the Eurobonds were not be perceived as safe as German Bunds, the higher risk assumed by Germany in guaranteeing the Eurobond would translate into a higher default risk premium and thus into higher interest rates to be paid by Germany on Bund issues. On the other hand, to the extent that market access under the Eurobond program reduces the default risk of Member States with weaker fundamentals, the latter will face lower risk premia and enjoy better borrowing conditions also on the national segment of their debt.

\textsuperscript{10} Issuance by an EU Institution would also be problematic and even more so because EU Member States outside the euro-area would guarantee the Eurobond without sharing its benefits.\textsuperscript{11} See Gros (2010, 2011) for a further discussion of the problems induced by seniority rules.\textsuperscript{12} A country could guarantee the bond but not obtain the proceeds from its sale; it would be liable for other countries’ borrowing and thus bear the risk of their default but no cost in case of repayment.
These considerations immediately suggest that devising a transfer scheme to equitably redistribute the benefits and costs of Eurobond issuance is a difficult task. In particular, a redistributive scheme could not rely on market signals, say, on the interest-rate differentials between nationals and Eurobonds, as market prices would inevitably incorporate the risk redistribution induced by the Eurobond program.

It is then clear that Eurobonds should be of the highest credit quality, say, as safe as German Bunds, to have a chance to be agreed upon by euro-area Member States and minimize redistribution problems. In particular, an increase in borrowing costs that a Eurobond of lower credit quality would imply, will never be acceptable to Germany on top of bearing the default risk of weaker Member States.

4.3. The credit quality of a Eurobond: A tentative assessment

The credit standing of a Eurobond would reflect the creditworthiness of the participating euro-area Member States, in particular, that of larger economies: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Under the maintained assumption of equal seniority, the creditworthiness of participating States would depend on their total debt outstanding and on their fiscal capacity, i.e. the net present value of their projected primary surpluses. To the extent that countries with stronger fiscal fundamentals, in particular those with larger economies, France and Germany, have excess fiscal capacity to guarantee the Eurobond debt of weaker issuers, the credit standing of Eurobonds would be greater and the default risk premium lower than the weighted average of the credit standings and risk premia of the participating Member States.

While the net present value of future primary surpluses that investors expect cannot be measured, actual data and forecasts on euro-area government debt are available from the EC database. The total debt of euro-area Member States is currently at 89% of GDP, a figure well above the Maastricht 60% limit but still consistent with sustainability from an historical perspective. As shown in Figure 9, the euro area gross debt-to-GDP ratio also stands well when compared to Japan \(^{13}\) and the US, two countries that have not been struck by the debt crisis yet.

**Insert Figure 9 here**

Indeed, the market perception of a default risk on the euro-area debt and thus the debt crisis itself are puzzling when such debt is viewed as the obligation of a single fiscal entity. Why is the euro debt more risky than the US and Japanese debts? There are different answers to this question, among which their different type of holders, government regulations in the case of Japan, and the fact that the US and Japanese debts can be more easily monetized. Indeed, many observers have stressed the lack of a “lender of last resort” as a major source of weakness of the euro area financial system (see e.g. De Grauwe 2011 and Wyplosz 2011a).

\(^{13}\) The Japanese case is rather peculiar in that net debt for Japan is much smaller than gross debt, however the comparison we propose holds even when net debt is considered.
In what follows, we focus on two other explanations. One is that potential fiscal capacity in the US and Japan is greater than in the euro-area because of better growth prospects and lower government spending and tax rates. The other explanation is that the euro-area debt is not backed by the fiscal capacity of a single government, but it is just the sum of the liabilities of different countries that do not have a common fiscal policy, not to speak of a political unity. The decomposition by ranges of ratings in Figure 9, pointing to the critical share of Italian (S&P A+) and Spanish (S&P AA+) debt, is suggestive of this segmentation.

If the problem is one of potential fiscal capacity, then Eurobonds will only reach a slightly better credit quality than the average of the national bonds of participating States. If instead fiscal autarky is the explanation, they could even be safer than US Treasuries, but this would require strengthening fiscal surveillance and policy coordination, if not a greater fiscal unity.

Further insight on the credit standing that Eurobonds would eventually achieve can be obtained by looking at the bonds issued by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to finance investment projects. EIB bonds are backed by the capital subscribed by EU Member States, have a Aaa rating, and are the debt instruments which come closest to what could be an Eurobond backed by joint and several guarantees.

4.3.1. The interest rate on Eurobonds issued by the EIB

To gain further insight on the potential credit quality of a Eurobond, we look at the performance of EIB debt by constructing, from various EIB bond issues, the interest rate on a synthetic EIB bond with residual term to maturity as close as possible to 10 years. Figure 10 reports the yields on 10-year EIB bonds along with the yields on 10-year German Bunds and the yield on 10-year Finnish bonds. We note first that the yield differential between the EIB bonds and German Bunds climbed from near zero to 100 basis points, over the course of the US financial crisis, to go back to a level of about 30 basis points thereafter. The euro debt crises had initially a very limited impact but, in the heat of the August 2011 crisis, the spread has reached again values around 100 basis points.

Interestingly, Figure 10 also shows that, until August 2011, the interest rate on EIB bonds has followed closely that on 10-year Finnish bonds, paying only a small premium over it. As Finnish bonds have no credit risk but very low liquidity, this evidence points to the illiquidity of EIB bonds as the major source of variation for their interest-rate differential with German Bunds and is consistent with the idea that a common Eurobond would pay a very small premium, possibly due to liquidity, with respect to German Bunds. However, in the August 2011 crisis, the interest rate on EIB bonds diverges from that on Finnish bonds showing a premium greater than 50 basis points, a clear sign that investors no longer perceive EIB bonds as safe as Finnish bonds and require a credit risk
premium to hold them. This evidence raises serious doubts that in the current crisis a common Eurobond would reach the credit quality of German Bunds.

4.3.2. The credit quality of a Eurobond; concluding remarks

Although the euro debt-to-GDP ratio appears sustainable, evidence on the yield spread of EIB bonds suggests that a Eurobond guaranteed by all euro-area Member States may not reach the same credit standing as German Bunds. The emergence of a yield spread of French OATs on Bunds greater than 150 basis points in November 2011 sheds further doubts on this possibility.

There are however two arguments in favor of Eurobonds that we have not considered so far and that deserve attention. The first concerns the credibility effect from the announcement of the program. To the extent that the introduction of a Eurobond signals a political will for greater fiscal unity and cooperation paving the way for a deeper reform of EU fiscal governance, this may lead to a revision in the expected fiscal capacity of the euro area and its debt sustainability.

The second argument is crisis prevention. If a country’s default on its debt increases the probability of default in other Member States, either from contagion or interdependences in the real and banking sectors, then halting a debt crisis in weaker Member States might improve debt sustainability in States with relatively better fundamentals. The emergence of a default risk premium on French government bonds is a clear sign that the euro debt crisis is spreading fast even to countries with better credit standings. Indeed, our analysis in section 2.2 shows that the effect of contagion is significant, suggesting that the introduction of a common Eurobond could reduce the risk of crisis transmission to more fiscally responsible States.

Because of the lower risk of crisis propagation, and credibility effects, we cannot exclude that the credit quality of the euro-area debt would improve following the introduction of Eurobonds, and that they will be perceived as safe as German Bunds.

4.4. The gains from a ‘safe-haven’ Eurobond

The discussion in the previous sections suggests that providing explicit guarantees on a common Eurobond is not without cost for safer Member States. In the best case scenario, their expected liabilities will increase, and if the Eurobond did not reach the quality of their national bonds, their borrowing costs will also increase.

This raises the issue of whether liquidity gains can partly compensate safer Member States, in particular Germany, for assuming the risk of weaker Member States. Indeed, it is often argued that a common Eurobond would better satisfy the global demand for a ‘safe-haven’ asset than German Bunds, if its market size approached that of US Treasuries. The idea is that, since safe German Bunds are in scarce supply, a common Eurobond would attract the demand by international investors and strengthen the use of
the euro as international reserve currency. In turn, this would reduce the borrowing costs for all euro-area sovereign issuers.

However, for a Eurobond to reach the international benchmark status of US Treasuries two conditions must be satisfied: i) Eurobonds should be of the same credit quality of German Bunds, and; ii) their market should reach a similar size of the US market, which requires large outstanding volumes to the point of replacing national bonds markets. Nothing ensures that both conditions will be satisfied.

The claim that German Bunds suffer from a lack of liquidity compared to US Treasuries is investigated in the next section.

4.4.1. The yield differential between German Bunds and US Treasuries

The descriptive analysis of Section 2 clearly illustrates that the contribution of liquidity to the explanation of euro-area yield spreads over German Bunds is very small except for safe and small issuers, like Finland and the Netherlands. However, this analysis cannot offer hints on the potential liquidity gains from the full integration of the euro-debt market that a common Eurobond might realize, and thus on the reduction in the funding cost of German (and euro) debt relative to the US debt. In fact, as shown in Figure 11, the euro-area bond market is very close in size to the US market but the German Bund market represents only 23% of the euro-area market and is thus much smaller than the US one.14

A natural question arises on whether German Bunds have to pay a liquidity premium due to their smaller market size and the lack of international benchmark status that is instead enjoyed by US Treasuries. Answering this question is made easier by the fact the CDS spread between US and Germany is negligible, and so is their relative credit risk premium, but it is made more difficult by the existence of a fluctuating euro-dollar exchange rate. To filter out exchange-rate expectations from the interest-rate differential between German and US bonds, we use the difference between the 10-year Fixed Interest Rate Swaps in euro and in US dollars that is immune from sovereign default and liquidity risks. We report, in the second panel of Figure 11, four series: the 10-year yield spread between US and Germany; the 10-year US-German Asset Swap Spread (defined as the difference between the yield spread and the spread between the 10-year Fixed Interest Rate Swaps); the US Baa-Aaa spread; the differential between CDS on 10-year US and German bonds.

As shown in Figure 11, in the period preceding the financial crisis the asset swap spread points to a sizeable liquidity premium, around a mean of 40 basis points, paid by German Bunds over US Treasuries. Hence, in the pre-crisis period, a common Eurobond market would have enabled the euro-area market to better compete with the US market as the most liquid market globally.

14 Data are taken from the BIS database and refer to the volumes of bonds outstanding with a maturity longer than one year.
However, when the financial crisis hits the markets and the Baa-Aaa spread starts fluctuating away from its low-risk period mean, the liquidity premium paid by German Bunds on US Treasuries disappears, and in fact is reversed, shadowing the US Baa-Aaa spread to reach a discount of over 50 basis point at the peak of the crisis. Interestingly, as the Baa-Aaa spread reverts toward its pre-crisis level, the asset swap spread initially seems to converge back toward a small premium but, with the onset of the Greek-debt crisis, it goes back to a discount level, fluctuating initially in the range of 20-30 basis points, to then increase slightly above 50 basis points in the heat of the August 2011 crisis. During the euro debt crisis the US-German Asset Swap spread cannot be explained by the default risk component as the CDS spread indicates that US Treasuries are perceived as less risky than German Bunds. While expected exchange rate fluctuations play a relevant role in the explanation of the yield spread during the financial crisis, when yield differentials and asset swap spreads have the opposite sign, and are negatively correlated, they are remarkably stable in the euro debt crisis.

Hence, while in the pre-crisis period US Treasuries did enjoy the status of the most liquid and safest benchmark globally, they appear to have lost their ‘safe-haven’ appeal thereafter. In fact, the data tell us that in the two different crises international portfolio shifts generated a discount on German Bunds with respect to US Treasuries, despite the smaller size of the German Bund market.

How should this evidence be interpreted? A first possible explanation is that the financial crisis has generated a flight to safety towards German Bunds that has reversed the pre-crisis situation; interestingly this reversion has lasted over the euro debt crisis, probably due to a portfolio shifts towards German Bunds away from bonds issued by riskier Member States. However, this interpretation is not consistent with the behavior of CDS spreads that would instead justify a flight to quality from German to US bonds.

A second explanation lies in the relative supply increase of US Treasuries that could have required an increase in their proper risk premium to be accommodated in international investors’ portfolios.

A third explanation is that, with the outbreak of the crisis, the liquidity of German Bunds has increased, closing the gap with US Treasuries. If this were the case, then there would be no liquidity gain for Germany from a common Eurobond market.

Whatever is the explanation, what matters for our purposes is that the argument that Germany may still be penalized by a market size much smaller than the US market, and that it could benefit from a common Eurobond market is not supported by the data.16

15 While it would worth looking at traded volumes to better understand the apparent reversal in international benchmark status, data are difficult to find because US Treasuries and German Bunds are mostly traded over the counter.

16 A referee made us notice that the fact that the German Bund future was the dominant contract before the Euro, and it has quickly become virtually the only future contract on Government Bonds in the Euro, plays an important role in determining the very high liquidity of 10-year Bunds.
4.5. A compensation scheme: Conditional Eurobonds

Evidence that Germany and, most likely, other safe Member State would gain very little from the greater liquidity of Eurobonds while they would certainly lose, since they would assume the credit risk of weaker States and might incur in higher borrowing cost, raises the issue of an equitable sharing of the costs and benefits of a Eurobond program. A compensation scheme is then needed to provide participation incentives and overcome political opposition.

To this end, various proposals have been advanced based on compensating transfers across States indexed either to financial parameters, e.g. national bond spreads (De Grauwe and Moesen 2009) and CDS spreads (Mayordomo et al. 2009), or to fiscal parameters (Boonstra 2010 and Muellbauer 2011).

Financial indexation is however problematic since the introduction of Eurobonds would affect the default risk priced in national bonds and thus distort market signals; i.e. reference parameters, either interest rates or CDS (see Section 4.2).

Indexation to fiscal parameters, such as the deficit and/or the public (and private) debt relative to GDP overcomes this difficulty. In the proposal by Muellbauer (2011) “Conditional Eurobonds” are jointly guaranteed bonds issued by a new European authority, where administratively set spreads determine the annual side payments that countries rated below Aaa will have to pay to Aaa rated countries in order to access the program. The administrative spreads would depend on fiscal fundamentals (plus unit labour costs, and current account to GDP ratio in the original proposal) with the mapping being set in a transparent way by the European authority.

This scheme would compensate the taxpayers of fiscally virtuous countries for their risk in guaranteeing the bonds of the weaker countries while insulating the yield spreads of the latter from the effect of contagion. A main advantage of this proposal is that the side payments would be conditional on a set of clear performance targets determined by EU authority and thus will change every year to reflect progress in fiscal consolidation. This would provide a clear incentive for fiscal adjustment making up for the weakened role of financial markets in ensuring fiscal discipline.

Our evidence on the role of contagion and fiscal fundamentals in determining sovereign yield spreads and the discussion of the costs and benefits of a Eurobond program provide strong support for conditional Eurobonds.

4.6. An alternative proposal

Over the past few months, alternative proposals have been made to solve the European crisis. Among these, the introduction of European Safe Bonds (ESBies) proposed by the Euro-nomics Group (2011) deserves particular attention. ESBies are securities issued by a European Debt Agency (EDA) that buys –on the secondary market– sovereign

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17 In particular, see Beck et al. (2011) and Wyplosz (2011b).
bonds of Member States in fixed proportions reflecting their GDPs, and tranches them in two securities; a senior tranche, the ESBies, and a junior tranche with a tranching cut-off of \( x\% \). The senior tranche (preferentially treated by the ECB and potentially guaranteed through a credit enhancement) should constitute a safe instrument, as the first \( x\% \) lost in the pool, because of some potential sovereign default in Europe, would be absorbed by the junior tranche and have no effect on the payment of the ESBies.

The aim of the proposal is to provide the markets with a safe euro-denominated instrument to solve the European banking crisis. If the tranching cut-off were conservatively set, the losses from a potential sovereign default would be confined to the junior tranche, allowing the EDA to offer ESBies purged by default risk and thus potentially safer than German Bunds.\(^{18}\) Were the tranching cut-off not too high, ESBies would be in larger supply than Aaa rated bonds in the EDA portfolio and could then satisfy the demand of banks for a safe-haven asset now in scarce supply.

Although ESBies can provide a solution for the European banking crisis and set the stage for an orderly resolution of sovereign defaults (as the ensuing losses will be automatically borne by the holders of the junior tranche) the proposal does not directly address the euro sovereign debt crisis. In fact, the benefits for the sovereign issuers would be indirect; they would come from disentangling the risk of a banking crisis from the risk of sovereign default. However, as argued below, the safety and liquidity that ESBies provide to the banking sector are not without costs for Member States while the benefits would mainly accrue to safer States which are in a fiscal position to rescue their banking sectors exposed to the debt of weaker States. The introduction of ESBies may actually harden the conditions at which Member States borrow for two reasons. First, in order to succeed, the bond re-packaging must create value which incidentally requires that preferences toward risk be polarized with some investors willing to hold the junior tranche. Since the re-packaging changes the relative supply but not the total amount of bonds in the market, the price of national bonds must fall, their yield must rise, to accommodate in investors' portfolios a higher value of the two EDA securities, unless additional demand for national bonds is crowded in, which is unlikely in view of the assumed preferences of investors. Secondly, the preferential treatment that the ECB should grant to ESBies in repo and discounting operations, coupled with a call for banking regulators to assign a zero-risk weight only to the safest national bonds, would reduce the quality and the demand for national bonds issued by weaker Member States. In fact, this does not seem to be a problem for the proponents of ESBies in that "Currently, the riskiest sovereign bonds have artificially high prices (low yields)…" (Euro-nomics Group 2011, pag.5). We have provided evidence that this is not the case: because of contagion, the yields on Italian and Spanish bonds are currently higher than

\(^{18}\) It is however worth noting that Convertible Debt Obligations (CDO), as the ESBies, are not totally immune to extreme episodes of contagion, that might materialize in a Euro break-up scenario. As a matter of fact the riskier than expected nature of CDO based on Mortgage Backed Securities was one of the main drivers of the amplification mechanism of the initial adverse shock in the housing market during the 2007-08 subprime loans crisis.
their fundamentals-driven equilibrium. Preferential treatment and regulatory changes, if not the introduction of ESBies itself, may further increase the borrowing costs, especially of the weaker Member States. And, an increase of Italian and Spanish yields above the already high levels observed in November 2011, would push Italy and Spain on the verge of default, in turn, affecting the pricing of the junior tranche and testing the tranching cut-off.

Against these costs run the potential benefits of a solution of the banking crisis. If the default risk priced in the bonds of Member States mainly reflected the expected costs of a bailout of their banking sectors, a reduced exposure to the banking crisis could lower the yields on their bonds. Which effect would prevail is hard to tell and may depend on the country considered. For instance, safer Member States, like France, with some fiscal space left to rescue their banks could see their borrowing conditions improve whereas the opposite might be true in the case of Italy where fiscal conditions leave no room for maneuver. No doubt, the sovereign debt and banking crises are closely intertwined. Eurobond proposals address the sovereign debt crisis while ESBies the banking crisis; nothing guarantees that solutions for either one will automatically work for the other.

There is however a potential role that ESBies could play in the solution of the debt crisis if, contrary to the original proposal, the EDA were allowed to buy the national bonds in the primary market. As a default materializes because of the lack of demand for the be roll over of debt, the purchase of new bonds by the EDA, as well as the issuance of Eurobonds, could halt a liquidity crisis by ensuring a stable, though limited, flow of funding. It is fair to say that primary market intervention, if substantial, would impair market discipline and would not be justified if the European debt crisis just resulted from poor fiscal fundamentals. But, if the crisis, as many believe, features the characteristics of a run on public debt, providing an alternative to the lack of a lender of last resort would contribute to its solution (see Wyplosz 2011b).

The issuance of Eurobonds could ensure the funding needed for the roll over of maturing debt and give time for fiscal adjustment. The same result could be achieved if EDA bought national bonds in the primary market funding its portfolio by issuing a junior tranche and ESBies, a sort of super-safe Blue Eurobonds. Both solutions would distort market signals, though in different ways, and would require a scheme to compensate safer issuers and impose fiscal discipline on Member States with weaker fundamentals.

5. POLICY CONCLUSIONS

Should euro-area Governments issue a Eurobond? In this paper we have provided an evaluation of the potential benefits and costs of a Eurobond backed by the joint and several guarantees of euro-area Member States. As default risk is the main driver of interest-rate differentials, the efficiency gains from greater liquidity appear to be small and appealing only to small safe issuers. Contrary to the ‘safe-haven’ argument, German
Bunds do not seem to suffer from a lack of liquidity, and thus higher costs, compared to US Treasuries despite a smaller market size. Moreover, insuring the default risk of Member States with weaker fundamentals is not without costs for safer Member States: their expected liabilities will increase and, if the Eurobond did not reach the same credit quality as German Bunds, an event that we cannot rule out, their borrowing conditions would also worsen. Finally, fiscal fundamentals seem to matter in the pricing of credit risk as they determine the sensitivity of domestic yield spreads to other countries’ spreads. Countries with weak fiscal fundamentals are affected by the global risk priced in the yield spreads of countries in distress to the extent that they are fiscally closer to the latter.

However, we also find that sovereign yield spreads are significantly affected by market sentiment and contagion. Fiscal fundamentals per se are not significant determinants of yield spreads but only as they interact with other countries’ spreads; i.e. with the global risk that the market perceives. More importantly, the impact of this global risk variable is not constant over time, a clear sign of contagion in the definition of Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Then, a shift in market sentiment following the emergence of a country fiscal distress may propagate a debt crisis to relatively safer countries through a rise in yield spreads that worsen their borrowing conditions. The effect of contagion for Italy is estimated to be as high as 200 basis points during the August 2011 crisis, while it is even greater in the case of Spain.

Although financial markets set incentives for fiscal discipline, they do so discontinuously; their overreaction to global risk factors is itself an important source of instability and crisis propagation. If markets can stay irrational longer than a country can stay solvent, then their disciplinary role is considerably weakened, and issuing a Eurobond can be economically justified.

Absent “a lender of last resort”, Eurobonds could halt the debt crisis in Italy and Spain and its spreading to safer Member States. Issuance of a Eurobond, by ensuring market access and better borrowing conditions, would not only reduce the risk of default in weaker Member States but could also avoid the propagation of the crisis to more fiscally responsible States, either from contagion or interdependences in real and financial sectors. The emergence of a sizeable yield spread on French bonds in the last months of 2011 is evidence that the market already assigns a probability that the Italian and Spanish debt crisis will spread to safer issuers. Then, providing insurance to States with weaker fundamentals would work as insurance for all; it would benefit all participating Member States except, perhaps, the most virtuous ones.

As the risk of default will be shared by all participating Member States, a Eurobond program will require reinforced surveillance and credible fiscal rules to avoid moral hazard and enforce fiscal discipline, making up for the weakened role of financial markets. More importantly, the Eurobond program should be carefully designed for an equitable sharing of its costs and benefits. Since safer issuers would gain very little in terms of liquidity, while they would assume the credit risk of weaker countries, and
possibly incur in higher borrowing costs, a compensation scheme is needed to provide participation incentives and overcome political opposition.

Our empirical evidence speaks strongly in favor of “Conditional Eurobonds” where administratively set spreads related to fiscal fundamentals determine the annual side payments that countries rated below Aaa will have to pay to Aaa rated countries in order to access the program. These transfers would compensate the taxpayers of fiscally virtuous countries for their risk in guaranteeing the bonds of the weaker countries. A main advantage of Conditional Eurobonds is that the side payments will be conditional on clear performance targets, and thus will provide a strong incentive for fiscal consolidation making up for the weakened role of financial markets in ensuring fiscal discipline.

It is however our feeling that efforts to design a perfect Eurobond program will never be enough to convince its opponents. What Europe and the Euro need is a renewed aim for a stronger EU political union. Indeed, it is hard to think of solutions of the euro debt crisis without further steps towards political integration. Sustainability requires institutional changes; for instance, a new entity in charge of crisis management with independent decision power and some form of fiscal union to address macroeconomic imbalances with a common policy. Indeed, it is easier to think of a common Eurobond as a valuable instrument and the natural byproduct of a common fiscal policy. Unfortunately, a reform of EU fiscal governance takes time while time to halt the crisis is running out very fast. Why then not to think of a Eurobond program as the first step towards greater fiscal integration? No doubt, the introduction of a Eurobond could signal a political will for greater fiscal unity, paving the way for deeper reforms of EU fiscal governance.

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Table 1 – Spreads on Bunds, Seemingly Unrelated Regression, Sample August 2005-August 2011, weekly data

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Coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level using the standard t-distribution are reported in bold.

\[
(Y_t - Y_t^{GER}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Y_t - Y_t^{GER}) + \beta_2 E_t(b_t - b_{GER}) + \beta_3 E_t(d_t - d_{GER}) \\
+ \beta_4(Baa_t - Aaa_t) + \beta_5(Y_t^{r} - Y_t^{GER}) + \beta_6(Y_t^{r} - Y_t^{GER}) + \epsilon_t
\]
Table 2 – Spreads on Bunds, Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal), subsample evidence

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<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
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Adj R - squared | 0.83 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 0.89 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
Mean Dep. Variable | 0.03 | 0.45 | 1.62 | 0.25 | 1.11 | 7.06 | -0.02 | 0.87 | 3.99 | 0.23 | 0.72 | 1.35 | 0.12 | 0.62 | 3.38 |
SE of Regression | 0.006 | 0.034 | 0.162 | 0.010 | 0.064 | 0.574 | 0.005 | 0.083 | 0.351 | 0.008 | 0.044 | 0.122 | 0.017 | 0.039 | 0.252 |

Coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level using the standard t-distribution are reported in bold

\[
(Y_i - Y_i^{GER}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (Y_{i-1} - Y_{i-1}^{GER}) + \beta_2 E_i (b_i - b_{GER}) + \beta_3 E_i (d_i - d_{GER}) + \beta_4 (Baa_i - Aaa_i) + \beta_5 (Y_i - Y_i^{GER}) + \beta_6 (Y_{i-1} - Y_{i-1}^{GER}) + u_i
\]
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Coefficients significant at the 5 per cent level using the standard t-distribution are reported in bold

\[
(Y_{t}^{i} - Y_{t}^{GER}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Y_{t-1}^{i} - Y_{t-1}^{GER}) + \beta_2E_i(b_i - b_{GER}) + \beta_3E_i(d_i - d_{GER}) + \beta_4(Baa_i - Aaa_i) + \beta_5(Y_{t-1}^{i} - Y_{t-1}^{GER}) + u_{t}
\]
Figure 1. 10-Y Government bond yield spreads in the Euro area. Spreads are differences between 10-year yields in % annual terms.

Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial
Figure 2. Post-EMU Spreads of Euro area vs. German 10-year bond yields

Yield differentials are presented in % annual terms and refer to the 10-year maturity of the term structure of interest rates, the most actively traded maturity in the Eurozone government securities market. German bond yields are taken as the reference.

Source: Datastream/Thomson Financial
Figure 3a. The default and non default component in yields spreads – Low Yielders
Figure 3b. The default and non default component in yields spreads – High Yields
Figure 4. Changing Correlations

Sources: Datastream/Thomson Financial and our calculations.
Figure 5. Global Spreads for an high-yielder and for a low-yielder. Sources: Authors Calculation.

Figure 6. Global Spreads based on different indicators of distance. Sources: Authors Calculation.
Figure 7. Interdependence and Contagion between the Local spreads and the Global Spreads

Sources: Authors Calculation.

Figure 8. The impact effect of Contagion on local yield
Figure 9. The interest rate on Eurobonds issued by the EIB

Figure 10. The composition by rating range of euro-area and non-euro area government debt
Figure 11. Interest Rate differential between German Bunds and US Treasuries