

Television and Divorce: Evidence from Brazilian *Novelas*

Alberto Chong and Eliana La Ferrara^{*}

Abstract

In this paper we study the link between television and divorce in Brazil. We exploit variation in the timing of availability of the signal of Rede Globo –the network that had a virtual monopoly on telenovelas in the country- across municipal areas. Using three rounds of Census data (1970, 1980 and 1991) and controlling for area fixed effects and for time-varying characteristics, we find that the share of women who are separated or divorced increases significantly after the Globo signal becomes available. The effect is robust to controlling for potential determinants of Globo's entry strategy and is stronger for relatively smaller areas, where the signal reaches a higher fraction of the population.

JEL Classification Codes: O1, J12, N36

Key words: Divorce, Television, Brazil, Soap Operas, Media, Women, Empowerment

^{*} Chong: Inter-American Development Bank; La Ferrara: Bocconi University and IGIER. Correspondence: albertoch@iadb.org; eliana.laferrara@unibocconi.it. We thank Fabio Canova, Jakob Svensson and an anonymous referee for useful comments. Silvia Redaelli and Vanessa Rios provided excellent research assistance.

1. Introduction

While policymakers have long believed that television can influence preferences and opinions in the population, until recently there has been very little evidence on the actual role of television, its possible impact channels, the role of content, the permanence of its effects, among others. In developing countries, the role of television is of particular relevance as it is a medium to reach out large sectors of the population at relatively low cost.

This paper addresses the link between television and one particular dimension of family relations: divorce. Divorce is a salient topic from the point of view of development. In fact it has been observed that the possibility of divorce gives women leverage to achieve greater gender equality within marriage, e.g., in the distribution of work (Yodanis, 2005). Unilateral divorce laws have also been shown to decrease domestic violence, spousal homicide and suicide (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006). At the same time, divorce may have long term adverse effects on children (Gruber, 2004).

Our analysis focuses on Brazil, which is an interesting case study because divorce rates increased rather dramatically in the last three decades, in spite of the stigma traditionally associated with it. It is estimated that divorce rates in Brazil increased from 3.30 per 100 marriages in 1984 to 17.7 in 2002 (United Nations, 2007), a steeper trend than comparable Latin American countries.

While many social and political factors underlie these profound changes, in this paper we advance the hypothesis that the spread of television and the type of values and lifestyles portrayed on TV may have contributed to the increase in divorce rates. This makes Brazil an ideal case study for a second reason. Soap operas (or *novelas*, as they are called in Brazil) are by far the most popular TV program, and are broadcast by a network that has maintained a virtual monopoly of the sector for almost three decades, Rede Globo. As we discuss below, the images broadcast in Rede Globo's novelas typically include themes related with criticism to traditional values and the circulation of modern ideas such as female empowerment and emancipation, both in the work sphere and in private life. Separation and divorce are a natural reflection of these attitudes (Rios-Neto, 2001; Fadul, 1999).

We use Census data for the period 1970-1991 and exploit differences in the timing of entry of Rede Globo into different municipalities. We find that, after controlling for time and area fixed effects, as well as for time varying characteristics, areas that receive the Globo signal have significantly higher separation and divorce rates. Our results are robust to controlling for variables that might have driven Globo's entry strategy, such as TV ownership rates and an Index of Potential Consumption used by the network, and appear not to be driven by selection. Also, the effect is stronger in geographically smaller municipalities, where the share of population reached by the signal of a given antenna is likely higher.

Our paper fits within a strand of recent research that has addressed the role of television on socio-economic outcomes in developing countries. In related work, La Ferrara, Chong and Duryea (2008) study the effects of television on fertility choices in Brazil. Using a similar empirical strategy as this paper, they find that women living in areas covered by the Globo signal have significantly lower fertility. They also provide suggestive evidence that novelas, and not just television, affected individual choices. Jensen and Oster (2008) use data on five Indian states for the period 2003-2008 and show that the entry of cable TV led to increases in subjective measures of female autonomy, enrollment gains and declines in pregnancy rates. Olken (2006) investigates the effects of television and radio on social capital in Indonesia and finds that stronger signal leads to less participation in social activities and lower trust. Few recent papers have also explored the role of media *content*. Dahl and DellaVigna (2008) focus on the effects of movie violence on crime in the US. Paluck (2008) estimates the effects on beliefs and norms of a radio soap opera featuring messages of intergroup tolerance in Rwanda.

Our work shares a similar motivation to some of the papers above. However, none of them has looked at the possibility that exposure to new role models may challenge traditional notions of family to the point of inducing marital dissolution. We think that focusing on

separation and divorce may be a particularly strong test of the potentially empowering role of TV, due to the obvious social visibility and to the stigma associated with divorce in many contemporary developing societies.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary of the political economy of divorce in Brazil in the last decades. Section 3 discusses the link between television and divorce. Section 4 describes our data and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2. A Brief History of Divorce Legislation

Until the late 19th century, the Church had exclusive responsibility for marriage in Brazil. In 1934, the political power of the Church was so strong that the Congress legalized the indissolubility of marriage, making Brazil the only country in Latin America with such a characteristic. During the 1950s and 1960s several attempts to legalize divorce or to pass bills related with annulations of marriage failed. However, these attempts dramatically raised awareness of this issue among Brazilians, so that by the early 1970s many people had become favorable to divorce (Vidal-Luna and Klein, 2006).

By this time, a relatively large number of congressmen had formed a coalition with the aim of seeking the passage of a divorce bill. This was not possible so long as the principle of the indissolubility of marriage held. In the mid 1970s legislators tried to vote in Congress to remove such principle, but they did not manage to reach the two-thirds of the votes required in each chamber. Eventually, the military government intervened and lowered the vote threshold required for a constitutional amendment from two-thirds to one-half of Congress, effectively permitting divorce to be legalized (Lima and Capparelli, 2004; Htun, 2003).

This action by the government is explained by the fact that the relationship with the Catholic Church grew strained over the years. At the beginning of a new dictatorship, in 1964, a strong relationship with the Church was established, but during the following years the government became more repressive and the Church more committed to the defense of human rights and the promotion of social justice. These opposite trajectories of Church and state set the stage for a collision in the mid-to-late 1970s.

In 1977 the military government unilaterally lowered the quorum required for a Constitutional amendment from two thirds to a simple majority. The official rationale was the government's desire to reform the judiciary, yet Brazilian observers maintain that facilitating divorce was the real motive, since it would further the president's political objectives in several ways.

The first was to strike a blow to the Church which had effectively assumed a role of political opposition as it harshly criticized the government's policies toward the poor (Htun, 2003). By promulgating legislation that was popular with the public, yet opposed by the Church, the government could take away some of the social authority of the Church. By legalizing divorce, the government was also able to pit the two principal opponents to military rule, the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB) and the Church, against one another. In fact, the MDB politicians were the main proponents of the divorce law that priests and bishops had vowed to defeat.

The 1977 vote resulted in a law that allowed divorce only after five years of *de facto* separation or three years of judicial separation, and individuals were allowed to obtain only one divorce in their lifetime¹. As this brief overview highlights, the issue of divorce was far from being a pure legislative matter, as it encompassed a wide range of cultural, social and political changes. We next discuss how television may have contributed to shape the attitudes of Brazilian in a way that complemented these changes.

3. Television and Divorce

¹ In 2007 a new divorce law that included more flexible reasons for divorce was introduced.

Whereas television has played a very important role in the integration and communication of many countries all over the world, such a role has been particularly important in Brazil. The military government that took power in 1964 saw the potential of television as a tool for integrating the country. As a consequence, the government pushed television deeper into the population in particular by promoting the growth of a chosen network to encourage national production. This network was Rede Globo, which was established in 1965 and to this day is the leader broadcasting company in the country. According to our data, only 0.1% of Brazil's Minimally Comparable Areas (AMCs –see below for a definition) received the Globo signal in 1970, but this number increased to 35.5 in 1980, 86% in 1991 and 90% in 2000. As we discuss in detail in La Ferrara et al. (2008), a key determinant of Globo's expansion strategy was the use of TV licensing as a clientelistic tool on behalf of the government. This is helpful from the point of view of our identification strategy, as it mitigates concerns about possible endogeneity of Globo's presence.

Regarding the spread of television in general, Brazil experienced a dramatic increase in TV ownership in the span of two decades. According to Census data, the share of households owning a TV across AMCs was on average 7.7% in 1970, 35.4% in 1980, 81.2% in 1991 and 82% in 2000.

One of the reasons for the growing influence of television over time is the strength of the oral tradition in the country. The success of Brazilian novelas can also be related to the high quality of the plot. In fact, several Brazilian authors who faced censorship from the military dictatorship started writing plots as a way to transmit new values and ideas to society. In addition to the fight for freedom, recurrent themes included criticisms to religious and traditional values, an appreciation of high standards of living and of "modern" lifestyles, female emancipation, adultery and criticisms to machismo (Rios-Neto, 2001; Fadul, 1999).

In order to gauge the extent to which these values may have shaped individual attitudes towards marital dissolution, we performed content analysis on the most popular novelas aired by Rede Globo since the start of its operations. In particular, we coded all the 7 pm and 8 pm novelas from 1965 to 2004 and recorded two variables for the main female character of each *novela*: (i) whether she was separated or divorced; and (ii) whether she was unfaithful to her partner. The results are illustrated in Figure 1. The data is divided into four decades, and the number of novelas (n) coded for each decade is reported in parenthesis.

[Insert Figure 1]

A first interesting fact is that the prevalence of extra-marital relationship is relatively high and constant over time. Between the mid 1960s and the mid 1980s already about 30% of the main female characters displayed on TV were unfaithful to their partners. This percentage declines to around 20% from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, to increase again above 30% in the following decade. These characters were therefore somewhat at odds with traditional models of "faithful wives".

A second revealing pattern in Figure 1 is that while separation and divorce were virtually absent from the plots until the mid 1970s, between 1975 and 1984 on average 20% of the main characters were divorced or separated. This was the decade when the debate on divorce was at its height and when divorce was legalized. Separation and divorce rates remained consistently high in subsequent years.

While this data does not allow drawing causal inference on the relationship between *novela* content and individual behavior, it provides suggestive evidence that our interpretation of the relationship between Globo penetration and divorce rates may be grounded in the specific type of programs broadcast by the network.

4. Data and Empirical Approach

Our empirical specification uses aggregate data at the Minimal Comparable Area (AMC) level –defined below- for three Census rounds: 1970, 1980, and 1991. We estimate:

$$y_{it} = X_{it}\beta + \gamma \text{Globo}_{it} + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the share of women divorced or separated in area j at time t , Globo_{it} is a dummy equal to 1 if area i received the signal of Rede Globo in year t , X_{it} is a set of time-varying controls at the area level, μ_i and λ_t are, respectively, area and year fixed effects, and ε_i is the error term. Time-varying controls X_{it} include the an index of household wealth², the average years of education of women, share of employed women in the AMC, average age and its square, share of catholic households, share of rural households and population density in each AMC.

Our dependent and independent variables are constructed aggregating individual level data from three Census rounds: 1970, 1980, and 1991. Our sample includes women aged 15 to 49. Since the geographic borders of Brazil's municipalities have changed over time, we use Minimal Comparable Areas (AMCs) as our spatial unit of analysis. This is the smallest defined geographic area provided by the Brazilian Statistical Institute that can be compared over time. In all there are 3,659 consistently defined AMCs for each round of the Census. The mean of our dependent variable, i.e. the share of women divorced or separated across AMCs, over the sample period is 2.8%.

Our second data source comes from Rede Globo. We collected information on the year and the location of broadcasting and retransmitting antennas as well as their radial reach. As in La Ferrara et al. (2008) this allows us to record which municipios received a Globo signal and the year in which they first started receiving it. We match this information with the AMC corresponding to each municipio, and construct the variable Globo_{it} which is equal to 1 if AMC i is within the signal radius of a Globo broadcasting or retransmitting station in year t , and 0 otherwise. Over the three periods, on average 40.5% of AMCs receive the Globo signal, with an upward trend starting at 0.1% in 1970 and reaching 86% in 1991.

The key identification assumption underlying our approach is that Globo entry in a market, though not random, was uncorrelated with pre-existing differences in divorce trends across areas, after controlling for time varying controls, for a common time trend, and for time invariant area characteristics. To shed light on the plausibility of this assumption we estimated a linear probability model for the presence of Globo in area i at time t as a function of lagged divorce rates, lagged values of the controls included in the main regressions (column 4 of table 2), plus area and time fixed effects. The coefficient on lagged divorce was -0.74 (standard error 0.83). We also estimated the same model as a function of lagged *changes* in divorce rates and in the same controls. The coefficient on lagged change in divorce was 0.43 (standard error 0.54). The coefficients on lagged controls and changes in controls were typically not statistically significant except for the education variable and for population density, which displayed negative coefficients. However, as we will show in Table 1, education is *positively* associated with divorce (population density is not significant), so if there is a bias due to unobserved correlates of education, it should work against finding a positive relationship between *novelas* and divorce. In any case, the above results suggest that changes in Globo coverage do not seem to be correlated to trends in unobserved determinants of separation and divorce.

5. Findings

[Insert Table 1]

Table 1 contains our main set of results. It reports ordinary least squares coefficients and standard errors clustered by AMC. In the first two columns we run a simple regression on the

² The index is constructed using principal component analysis from durables ownership and access to basic services (electricity, sanitation, etc.).

full sample including time dummies and area fixed effects to control for differences in time-invariant unobservables across locations. We start with State (*Unidade Federacao*) fixed effects in column 1, and move to AMC fixed effects in column 2, which gives a full panel fixed effects regression. In each regression, the coefficient of the Globo variable is .002 approximately, and is significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the effect is relatively small, corresponding to and increase in separation and divorce rates of about 1/10 of a standard deviation (as well as 1/10 of the mean). However, it is non-negligible if compared to the effect of other relevant variables. In particular, *ceteris paribus* Globo coverage has the same effect as an increase of almost ½ year in women’s education, in a context where the mean of women’s years of education over the period is 3.2 years.

In columns 3 to 4 we include a number of controls, described in the previous section, to account for time-varying differences across AMCs. For these cases, the coefficients on the Globo variable are very similar: .0017 and .0014, respectively. The results of our benchmark specification (column 4) show that AMCs with women who are more educated, work, are younger, and live in non catholic and non rural households, tend to have more divorced or separated women.

[Insert Table 2]

In Table 2 we provide additional results to corroborate our interpretation. As mentioned above, a key determinant of Globo’s expansion path was clientelistic behavior on behalf of the licensing authorities. It is possible, though, that being a commercial network Globo may have targeted areas in which the propensity to divorce was growing faster for reasons not captured by the controls in our regressions. One key indicator that Globo might have used in its targeting policy should have been the prevalence of TV ownership in a given area. In column 1 of Table 2 we include among the regressors the share of households owning a TV and we find that it is uncorrelated with divorce rates, and that the coefficient of our Globo variable is unaffected both in size and in significance.

A second possible variable for the network’s targeting policy is the Index of Potential Consumption (IPC) estimated by the *Instituto Target Pesquisas e Servicos de Marketing*, an index use by Globo in order to measure the acquisitive power of the different areas.³ We include the IPC in column 2 and find again that this variable is uncorrelated with divorce and has no effect on our coefficient of interest.

In columns 3 and 4 we exploit variation in the coverage variable related to the size of the AMC. Because our construction of the Globo variable attributes coverage to the entire AMC as long as some part of the AMC is within the radial reach of the antenna in a given year, we are effectively overestimating coverage (and underestimating the impact of coverage on divorce). The extent of this underestimation is more sizeable, the greater the size of the AMC. In column 3 we include an interaction between Globo coverage and AMC size (in thousands of squared kilometers). Note that we only add the interaction, and not size per se, because the latter is time-invariant and all regressions in Table 2 include AMC fixed effects. We find that the interaction term has a negative coefficient, as expected, though not significant at conventional levels. In column 4 we allow the coefficient of Globo coverage to differ for AMCs that are below-median size and AMCs that are above the median. As expected, we find that the estimated effect of greater for the sample of smaller AMCs. Note that we think it is unlikely that this result may reflect differences in Globo’s targeting policy, as we are already controlling for the main variable that could affect Globo’s entry and that is related to area size, namely, population density.

6. Conclusions

This paper has explored the effect of television expansion on the pattern of marital dissolutions in Brazil over the period 1970-1991. Building on the empirical strategy used by


³ We were not able to receive the index directly from the Instituto Target, but we constructed it from raw data using the methodology described by Target in its supporting documentation.

La Ferrara et al. (2008) to study the impact on fertility patterns, we focus here on divorce and separation rates. Our analysis draws on the experience of a country where television, and in particular soap opera, watching is extremely widespread and cuts across social classes. We find that exposure to modern lifestyles as portrayed on TV, to emancipated women roles and to a critique of traditional values was associated with increases in the share of separated and divorced women across Brazil's municipal areas. Our findings have potentially important policy implications for developing countries and confirm previous research by Jensen and Oster (2008), La Ferrara et al (2008), and Paluck (2008), which suggest that media programs have the potential of targeting specific groups at low cost and may be employed as a public policy tool.

References

- Dahl, Gordon and Stefano DellaVigna (2008), "Does Movie Violence Increase Violent Crime?", forthcoming in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Fadul, Ana Maria (1999) "Novela e Família No Brasil", manuscript, Congresso Brasileiro de Ciências de Comunicação, Rio de Janeiro.
- Gruber, Jonathan (2004), "Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long-run Implication of Unilateral Divorce", *Journal of Labor Economics*, 22(4), 799-833.
- Htun, M. (2003), *Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships and Democracies*, Cambridge University Press
- Jensen, Robert and Emily Oster (2008), "The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women's Status in India", mimeo, University of Chicago.
- La Ferrara, Eliana, Alberto Chong, and Suzanne Duryea (2008), "Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from Brazil", BREAD Working Paper No. 172.
- Lima, Venicio A. de, and Sérgio Capparelli (2004). "Comunicação e Televisão: desafios da pós-globalização" São Paulo: Hacker Editores.
- Olken, Benjamin (2006), "Do Television and Radio Destroy Social Capital? Evidence from Indonesian Villages ", NBER Working Paper 12561.
- Paluck, Elizabeth Levy (2008), "Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda", forthcoming in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.
- Potter, Joseph, Carl Schmertmann and Suzana Cavenaghi (2002), "Fertility and Development: Evidence from Brazil", *Demography*, 39(4), 739-61.
- Rios-Neto, Luiz (2001) "Television, Value Constructs, and Reproductive Behavior in Brazilian Excluded Communities, manuscript, XXIV General Population Conference, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Brazil.
- Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers (2006), "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(1), 267-288.
- United Nations (2007) World Economic and Social Survey: Development in an Ageing World, Geneva.
- Vidal Luna, F. and H. Klein (2006), *Brazil since 1980*, Cambridge University Press, 282 p.
- Vink, Nico (1988), *The Telenovela and Emancipation: A Study of Television and Social Change in Brazil*. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute.
- Yodanis, Carrie (2005), "Divorce Culture and Marital Gender Equality", *Gender and Society*, 19(5), 644-659.

Figure 1: Novela content and marital dissolution



Source: Authors' coding of Rede Globo novelas

Table 1: Globo coverage and divorce*Dependent variable: Share of women aged 15-49 who are divorced or separated in AMC*

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Globo coverage	0.0019 (0.0004)**	0.0015 (0.0006)**	0.0017 (0.0004)**	0.0014 (0.0005)*
Household's wealth			-0.0026 (0.0002)**	-0.0031 (0.0003)**
Years of education			0.0006 (0.0003)*	0.0047 (0.0005)**
Share employed			0.0194 (0.0018)**	0.0233 (0.0028)**
Age			-0.0268 (0.0111)*	-0.0319 (0.0123)**
Age squared ^(a)			0.4939 (0.1948)*	0.5858 (0.2154)**
Share catholic			-0.024 (0.0029)**	-0.0257 (0.0072)**
Share rural			-0.036 (0.0012)**	-0.0163 (0.0028)**
Population density ^(a)			0.0189 (0.0365)	-0.02 (0.0118)
Constant	0.0242 (0.0002)**	0.0242 (0.0002)**	0.4288 (0.1574)**	0.4814 (0.1759)**
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area fixed effects	State	AMC	State	AMC
Observations	10977	10977	10977	10977
R-squared	0.3886	0.7157	0.5264	0.7415

Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the AMC level.

(a) Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 1000

Table 2: Robustness and interpretation*Dependent variable: Share of women aged 15-49 who are divorced or separated in AMC*

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Globo coverage	0.0016 (0.0006)**	0.0014 (0.0005)*	0.0015 (0.0006)**	
Globo coverage*Size of AMC (in '000s km2) ^(a)			-0.0245 (0.0187)	
Globo coverage AMC<=median size				0.0021 (0.0007)**
Globo coverage AMC>median size				0.0007 (0.0006)
Share Owning TV	-0.0024 (0.0014)			
Index of Potential Consumption		0.0906 (0.1672)		
Controls ^(b)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area fixed effects	AMC	AMC	AMC	AMC
Observations	10977	10977	10977	10977
R-squared	0.7417	0.7415	0.7416	0.7418

Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the AMC level.

(a) Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 1000

(b) Controls include those in column 4 of table 1.