Eventi del
2 2021 12:45 - 14:00
Aula seminari 3-e4sr03 (Roentgen 3rd floor)
Theory & Experiments Seminar Series
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators
Yakov Babichenko, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
A Bayesian persuasion problem, where a sender communicates with a receiver through a sequence of mediators is considered. The sender is the only informed agent and the receiver is the only one taking action. The sender and the mediators each have their own utility functions, which depend on the receiver's action and the state. For the case of a single mediator, the sender's optimal value is characterized in terms of a constrained concavification of his utility. The constraints originate from the interplay of the sender's and the mediator's objectives and have a clear geometric interpretation. For the case of multiple mediators we present a recursive formula that determines the sender's optimal value.
For further information please contact: erika.somma@unibocconi.it