# Comparison of Experiments in Monotone Problems 

Alfredo Di Tillio ${ }^{1}$ Marco Ottaviani ${ }^{2}$ Peter N. Sørensen ${ }^{3}$

June 22, 2022

[^0]
## Decisions under Uncertainty and Experiments

- Uncertainty: Unknown state of nature $\theta \in \Theta$, prior probability $\pi(\theta)$
- Experiment: Observe $s \in S$ with probability $P(s \mid \theta)$

$$
\Longrightarrow \quad \text { Posterior } \quad \pi(\theta \mid s)=\frac{\pi(\theta) P(s \mid \theta)}{\sum_{\theta^{\prime}} \pi\left(\theta^{\prime}\right) P\left(s \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}
$$

- Decision: Take action $a \in A$ to maximize

$$
\sum_{\theta} \pi(\theta \mid s) u(a, \theta)
$$

## Blackwell's Comparison of Experiments (1951)



Experiment $P$ is more informative than experiment $Q$ when $P$ allows higher expected utility than $Q$ for every decision problem

## Blackwell's Comparison of Experiments (1951)



Experiment $P$ is more informative than experiment $Q$ when $P$ allows higher expected utility than $Q$ for every decision problem

$Q$ is a garbling of $P$

## Garbling

Let $P: \Theta \rightarrow \Delta(S)$ and $Q: \Theta \rightarrow \Delta(T)$ be two experiments.
$Q$ is a garbling of $P$ if there exists $g: S \rightarrow \Delta(T)$ such that

$$
Q(t \mid \theta)=\sum_{s} P(s \mid \theta) g(t \mid s) \quad \forall \theta
$$

i.e. with experiment $P$ you can "imitate" experiment $Q \ldots$

## Comparison of Experiments in Monotone Problems

We restrict attention to monotone decision problems.
To fix ideas: $A=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$, with $u\left(a_{2}, \theta\right)-u\left(a_{1}, \theta\right)$ increasing in $\theta$.

- Fewer decision problems: more experiments are comparable


## Comparison of Experiments in Monotone Problems

We restrict attention to monotone decision problems.
To fix ideas: $A=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$, with $u\left(a_{2}, \theta\right)-u\left(a_{1}, \theta\right)$ increasing in $\theta$.

- Fewer decision problems: more experiments are comparable

What makes good information in monotone problems?
We present new findings

- For the case where the better experiment $P$ has binary support, we provide two new characterizations of dominated experiments $Q$


## Comparison of Experiments in Monotone Problems

We restrict attention to monotone decision problems.
To fix ideas: $A=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$, with $u\left(a_{2}, \theta\right)-u\left(a_{1}, \theta\right)$ increasing in $\theta$.

- Fewer decision problems: more experiments are comparable

What makes good information in monotone problems?
We present new findings

- For the case where the better experiment $P$ has binary support, we provide two new characterizations of dominated experiments $Q$
- We consider further parts of Blackwell's theorem (not today)


## Looking Ahead: Monotone Problems $\Leftrightarrow$ IDO Preferences

States and actions are ordered so that (Quah-Strulovici, 2009)

- For all $\theta^{\prime}>\theta$ and $a^{\prime}>a$,

$$
u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta\right) \geq(>) u(a, \theta) \quad \Longrightarrow \quad u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta^{\prime}\right) \geq(>) u\left(a, \theta^{\prime}\right)
$$

whenever $u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta\right) \geq u\left(a^{\prime \prime}, \theta\right)$ for all $a^{\prime \prime}$ with $a \leq a^{\prime \prime} \leq a^{\prime}$
If action $a^{\prime}$ is the best action in the interval $\left[a, a^{\prime}\right]$ when state is $\theta$, $a^{\prime}$ remains the best action in $\left[a, a^{\prime}\right]$ when state is raised to $\theta^{\prime}$

## Looking Ahead: Monotone Problems $\Leftrightarrow$ IDO Preferences

States and actions are ordered so that (Quah-Strulovici, 2009)

- For all $\theta^{\prime}>\theta$ and $a^{\prime}>a$,

$$
u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta\right) \geq(>) u(a, \theta) \quad \Longrightarrow \quad u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta^{\prime}\right) \geq(>) u\left(a, \theta^{\prime}\right)
$$

whenever $u\left(a^{\prime}, \theta\right) \geq u\left(a^{\prime \prime}, \theta\right)$ for all $a^{\prime \prime}$ with $a \leq a^{\prime \prime} \leq a^{\prime}$
If action $a^{\prime}$ is the best action in the interval $\left[a, a^{\prime}\right]$ when state is $\theta$, $a^{\prime}$ remains the best action in $\left[a, a^{\prime}\right]$ when state is raised to $\theta^{\prime}$

IDO (interval dominance order) class of preferences includes:

- Milgrom-Shannon (1994) single-crossing preferences
- Karlin-Rubin (1956) monotone preferences


## Equivalent Comparisons 1: Less Utility $\rightarrow$ LR Box

## Likelihood Ratio Order

In experiment $P$, signal $s^{\prime}$ is LR-greater than $s\left(s^{\prime}>_{L R} s\right)$ when

$$
\frac{P\left(s^{\prime} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}{P\left(s^{\prime} \mid \theta\right)}>\frac{P\left(s \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}{P(s \mid \theta)} \quad \forall \theta^{\prime}>\theta
$$

or equivalently

$$
\frac{\pi\left(\theta^{\prime} \mid s^{\prime}\right)}{\pi\left(\theta \mid s^{\prime}\right)}>\frac{\pi\left(\theta^{\prime} \mid s\right)}{\pi(\theta \mid s)} \quad \forall \theta^{\prime}>\theta
$$

## Likelihood Ratio Order

In experiment $P$, signal $s^{\prime}$ is LR-greater than $s\left(s^{\prime}>_{L R} s\right)$ when

$$
\frac{P\left(s^{\prime} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}{P\left(s^{\prime} \mid \theta\right)}>\frac{P\left(s \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)}{P(s \mid \theta)} \quad \forall \theta^{\prime}>\theta
$$

or equivalently

$$
\frac{\pi\left(\theta^{\prime} \mid s^{\prime}\right)}{\pi\left(\theta \mid s^{\prime}\right)}>\frac{\pi\left(\theta^{\prime} \mid s\right)}{\pi(\theta \mid s)} \quad \forall \theta^{\prime}>\theta
$$

An implication of IDO utility:

- Quah-Strulovici, Theorem 2: If $s^{\prime}>_{L R} s$, the optimal action at $s^{\prime}$ is no smaller than the optimal action at $s$


## Pictures with Three States

$\Theta=\left\{\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3}\right\}$ with $\theta_{1}<\theta_{2}<\theta_{3}$
Represent beliefs as points in a Marschak triangle:


## Binary IDO problem

Start from binary action problems, $A=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$ with $a_{1}<a_{2}$, then:
Green line: indifference


## Binary IDO problem

Start from binary action problems, $A=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$ with $a_{1}<a_{2}$, then:
Green line: indifference


1. green line crosses base of triangle \&
2. high action $a_{2}$ optimal left of green line, low action $a_{1}$ to right

## Binary Experiment

Binary experiment $\left(S=\left\{s_{1}, s_{2}\right\}\right)$ spreads arbitrary prior $\pi$ to posteriors $p, q$


## Likelihood Ratio Order

Belief $p$ dominates another belief $q$ in LR order $\left(p>_{L R} q\right)$ when

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{p_{2}}{p_{1}}>\frac{q_{2}}{q_{1}} \text { and } \frac{p_{3}}{p_{2}}>\frac{q_{3}}{q_{2}} \\
& \operatorname{Pr}^{\operatorname{Pr}\left(\theta_{2}\right)} \\
& \\
&
\end{aligned}
$$

## Likelihood Ratio Order

Belief $p$ dominates another belief $q$ in LR order $\left(p>_{L R} q\right)$ when

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{p_{2}}{p_{1}}>\frac{q_{2}}{q_{1}} \quad \text { and } \quad \frac{p_{3}}{p_{2}}>\frac{q_{3}}{q_{2}} \\
& \text { Pr( } \left.\theta_{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$\Leftrightarrow q$ lies below red line and above blue line

## Likelihood Ratio Order

Blue area: beliefs below $p$ in LR order Yellow area: beliefs above $p$ in LR order


## Likelihood Ratio Order

Blue area: beliefs below $p$ in LR order Yellow area: beliefs above $p$ in LR order


Thm of QS visible: any IDO indifference line through is steeper than rays: $p$ to right of line $\Rightarrow$ entire blue area to right of line

## Likelihood Ratio Order

Similarly for another belief $q$ :


## Non-monotone LR experiment

A binary experiment violating monotone LR property:


## MLR

A binary experiment satisfying MLR (monotone LR):


## Aside: Two states

With only two states, signals of binary experiments can always be arranged to satisfy MLR

## Aside: Two states

With only two states, signals of binary experiments can always be arranged to satisfy MLR

In this case, Proposition 1 in Jewitt (2007) implies that our comparison notion (with IDO preferences) is equivalent to Blackwell's (unrestricted)

- Directly, binary action sets suffice when experiment $Q$ is binary
- In any such problem, actions can be ordered so IDO is satisfied


## Aside: Two states

With only two states, signals of binary experiments can always be arranged to satisfy MLR

In this case, Proposition 1 in Jewitt (2007) implies that our comparison notion (with IDO preferences) is equivalent to Blackwell's (unrestricted)

- Directly, binary action sets suffice when experiment $Q$ is binary
- In any such problem, actions can be ordered so IDO is satisfied

Three states is the simplest case where monotonicity makes a difference

## Likelihood Ratio Box

LR box (or LR interval) from $q$ to $p>_{L R} q$ is the set of beliefs $r$ such that

$$
p>_{L R} r>_{L R} q
$$



## Main Question 1: Better Experiment without MLR

Suppose first that binary experiment $(p, q)$ violates MLRP: Result: $(p, q)$ dominates (only) its Blackwell garblings


## Main Question 1: Better Experiment without MLR

Suppose first that binary experiment $(p, q)$ violates MLRP: Result: $(p, q)$ dominates (only) its Blackwell garblings


Proof:
For every experiment with at least one posterior outside the $p-q$ segment, there is an IDO problem that separates posteriors of that experiment, but does not separate $p$ from $q$

## Main Question 2: Better Experiment with MLR

Now suppose binary experiment $(p, q)$ satisfies MLRP.

## Main Question 2: Better Experiment with MLR

Now suppose binary experiment $(p, q)$ satisfies MLRP. Take another experiment with posteriors not all inside box, as in $(r, s)$ (going forward, notation abuse, s denotes one posterior)


## Comparing Experiments: LR Box

If comparison experiment $(r, s)$ has at least one posterior outside box:


Some IDO problem separates $(r, s)$ but not $(p, q)$.
$\Rightarrow(p, q)$ does not dominate any experiment with some posteriors outside box.

# Equivalent Comparisons 2: LR Box $\rightarrow$ Quasi-Garbling 

## Quasi-Garblings

$Q$ is a quasi-garbling of $P$ if for every order on $T$ there exists $g: \Theta \times S \rightarrow \Delta(T)$ such that

- $Q(t \mid \theta)=\sum_{s} P(s \mid \theta) g(t \mid \theta, s) \quad \forall \theta$
- $g\left(\cdot \mid \theta^{\prime}, s\right)>_{\text {FOSD }} g(\cdot \mid \theta, s) \quad \forall s$ and $\forall \theta^{\prime}>\theta$


## LR Box $\subset$ Quasi-Garblings

Consider experiment $Q$ with posteriors all inside box. Result: $Q$ is a quasi-garbling of $P$.
E.g. binary experiment $(r, s)$


## LR Box $\subset$ Quasi-Garblings

Proof for binary $P$ with $S=\left\{s_{1}, s_{2}\right\}$ and binary $Q$ with $T=\left\{t_{1}, t_{2}\right\}$. Assume $P$ satisfies MLRP when $s_{1}>s_{2}$.

Assume $t_{1}>t_{2}$ (case $t_{2}>t_{1}$ analogous).
Write $p_{\theta}:=P\left(s_{1} \mid \theta\right), g_{\theta}:=g\left(t_{1} \mid \theta, s_{1}\right)$ and $h_{\theta}:=g\left(t_{1} \mid \theta, s_{2}\right)$.
Fix any $\theta$ and $g_{\theta}, h_{\theta}$ such that $Q\left(t_{1} \mid \theta\right)=p_{\theta} g_{\theta}+\left(1-p_{\theta}\right) h_{\theta}$.
Consider higher state $\theta^{\prime}>\theta$ and equation

$$
Q\left(t_{1} \mid \theta^{\prime}\right)=p_{\theta^{\prime}} g_{\theta^{\prime}}+\left(1-p_{\theta^{\prime}}\right) h_{\theta^{\prime}} .
$$

When $P$ satisfies MLRP, $p_{\theta}$ increasing in $\theta$, so equation has solution $g_{\theta^{\prime}}, h_{\theta^{\prime}}$ such that $g_{\theta^{\prime}} \leq g_{\theta}$ and $h_{\theta^{\prime}} \leq h_{\theta}$.

# Equivalent Comparisons 3: Quasi-Garbling $\rightarrow$ Less Utility 

## Informativeness of Quasi-Garblings

Let $p_{\theta}$ denote optimal probability of choosing $a_{2}$ in state $\theta$ under $P$.
If $Q$ is a quasi-garbling of $P$, probability of choosing $a_{2}$ in state $\theta$ under $Q$ has form

$$
g_{\theta} p_{\theta}+h_{\theta}\left(1-p_{\theta}\right)
$$

where $g_{\theta}$ and $h_{\theta}$ are both decreasing in $\theta$.
By linearity of payoffs, payoff under $Q$ is maximized when each sequence is, in fact, constantly 0 or constantly 1.

When both constantly 0 or both constantly 1 , you are not using information under $Q$.

When $g_{\theta}$ constantly 1 and $h_{\theta}$ constantly 0 , you are replicating what you get with $P$. When $g_{\theta}$ constantly 0 and $h_{\theta}$ constantly 1 , you are inverting what you do with $P$, something you could have done (but chose not to do) with $P$. Thus, in any case, A does better than B.

## Direct Proof that LR Box $\rightarrow$ Less Utility

Normalization WLOG: $u\left(a_{1}, \theta\right)=0$ for all $\theta$, and $u\left(a_{2}, \theta_{3}\right)>0>u\left(a_{2}, \theta_{1}\right)$


Picture shows hardest case (when $s$ leads to $a_{2}$ )
Only interesting IDO problem where different actions are taken at $r, s$
By IDO and LR-bounds, also $a_{2}$ optimal at $p$ and $a_{1}$ optimal at $q$

## Proof for binary-binary comparison

Claim: $(r, s)$ can be improved upon unless $s_{2} / s_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ or $r_{2} / r_{1}=q_{2} / q_{1}$ (or both)

- If both constraints are relaxed, room to reduce $P\left(s \mid \theta_{1}\right)$
- The change raises $s_{2} / s_{1}$ and reduces $r_{2} / r_{1}$, staying in LR box
- The change reduces weight on $u\left(a_{2}, \theta_{1}\right)<0$ in expected utility


## Proof for binary-binary comparison

Claim: $(r, s)$ can be improved upon unless $s_{2} / s_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ or $r_{2} / r_{1}=q_{2} / q_{1}$ (or both)

- If both constraints are relaxed, room to reduce $P\left(s \mid \theta_{1}\right)$
- The change raises $s_{2} / s_{1}$ and reduces $r_{2} / r_{1}$, staying in LR box
- The change reduces weight on $u\left(a_{2}, \theta_{1}\right)<0$ in expected utility

Same claim holds for $s_{3} / s_{2}$ or $r_{3} / r_{2}$

- Otherwise room to raise $P\left(s \mid \theta_{3}\right)$


## Proof for binary-binary comparison

Claim: $(r, s)$ can be improved upon unless $s_{2} / s_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ or $r_{2} / r_{1}=q_{2} / q_{1}$ (or both)

- If both constraints are relaxed, room to reduce $P\left(s \mid \theta_{1}\right)$
- The change raises $s_{2} / s_{1}$ and reduces $r_{2} / r_{1}$, staying in LR box
- The change reduces weight on $u\left(a_{2}, \theta_{1}\right)<0$ in expected utility

Same claim holds for $s_{3} / s_{2}$ or $r_{3} / r_{2}$

- Otherwise room to raise $P\left(s \mid \theta_{3}\right)$

For more than three states, it works inductively

## Proof for binary-binary comparison

Claim: $s \sim_{L R} p$ or $r \sim_{L R} q$ (or both)

- Relies on previous claim and $p>_{L R} q$
- If $s_{2} / s_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ and $r_{2} / r_{1} \geq q_{2} / q_{1}$ then $P\left(s \mid \theta_{1}\right) \leq P\left(p \mid \theta_{1}\right)$ and $P\left(s \mid \theta_{2}\right) \leq P\left(p \mid \theta_{2}\right)$ (algebra shows, next slide)
- Then also $s_{3} / s_{2}=p_{3} / p_{2}$ binds (algebra shows, next slide)
- And so on with more states, inductively
- Likewise for the case with $r$


## Proof for binary-binary comparison

Claim: $s \sim_{L R} p$ or $r \sim_{L R} q$ (or both)

- Relies on previous claim and $p>_{L R} q$
- If $s_{2} / s_{1}=p_{2} / p_{1}$ and $r_{2} / r_{1} \geq q_{2} / q_{1}$ then $P\left(s \mid \theta_{1}\right) \leq P\left(p \mid \theta_{1}\right)$ and $P\left(s \mid \theta_{2}\right) \leq P\left(p \mid \theta_{2}\right)$ (algebra shows, next slide)
- Then also $s_{3} / s_{2}=p_{3} / p_{2}$ binds (algebra shows, next slide)
- And so on with more states, inductively
- Likewise for the case with $r$

Finally, when $s \sim_{L R} p$

- then $P\left(s \mid \theta_{k}\right) \leq P\left(p \mid \theta_{k}\right)$ in all states (and proportional)
- Expected utility under $(r, s)$ is proportional (less than one-for-one) to that under $(p, q)$ which is positive


# Beyond Binary Dominated Experiments $Q$ 

## Argument with three states

Suppose dominated experiment has three posteriors $r, s, t$

## Argument with three states

Suppose dominated experiment has three posteriors $r, s, t$ Say $s$ lies on one side of $p-q$ segment while $r, t$ on the opposite side:


## Argument with three states

Suppose dominated experiment has three posteriors $r, s, t$ Say $s$ lies on one side of $p-q$ segment while $r, t$ on the opposite side:


View experiment ( $r, s, t$ ) as composite:
Starting from prior $\pi$, belief is spread

1. either to $\pi_{1}$ and then to $s$ or $r$,
2. or to $\pi_{2}$ and then to $s$ or $t$.

## Beyond Binary Dominated Experiment

Let $\lambda$ be such that $\pi^{1}=\frac{P(r) r+\lambda P(s) s}{P(r)+\lambda P(s)}$.
Let $P^{1}=P(r)+\lambda P(s)$ and $P^{2}=1-P^{1}=P(t)+(1-\lambda) P(s)$

## Beyond Binary Dominated Experiment

Let $\lambda$ be such that $\pi^{1}=\frac{P(r) r+\lambda P(s) s}{P(r)+\lambda P(s)}$.
Let $P^{1}=P(r)+\lambda P(s)$ and $P^{2}=1-P^{1}=P(t)+(1-\lambda) P(s)$
Define $\mu^{i} \in(0,1)$ such that $\pi^{i}=\mu^{i} p+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) q$.
Then $P(p)=\mu^{1} P^{1}+\mu^{2} P^{2}$, since $\pi=P(p) p+P(q) q=P^{1} \pi^{1}+P^{2} \pi^{2}$.

## Beyond Binary Dominated Experiment

Let $\lambda$ be such that $\pi^{1}=\frac{P(r) r+\lambda P(s) s}{P(r)+\lambda P(s)}$.
Let $P^{1}=P(r)+\lambda P(s)$ and $P^{2}=1-P^{1}=P(t)+(1-\lambda) P(s)$
Define $\mu^{i} \in(0,1)$ such that $\pi^{i}=\mu^{i} p+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) q$.
Then $P(p)=\mu^{1} P^{1}+\mu^{2} P^{2}$, since $\pi=P(p) p+P(q) q=P^{1} \pi^{1}+P^{2} \pi^{2}$.
We demonstrate that $U \geq V$ in three steps:
(i) $U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ where $U^{i}$ is utility from $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$,

## Beyond Binary Dominated Experiment

Let $\lambda$ be such that $\pi^{1}=\frac{P(r) r+\lambda P(s) s}{P(r)+\lambda P(s)}$.
Let $P^{1}=P(r)+\lambda P(s)$ and $P^{2}=1-P^{1}=P(t)+(1-\lambda) P(s)$
Define $\mu^{i} \in(0,1)$ such that $\pi^{i}=\mu^{i} p+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) q$.
Then $P(p)=\mu^{1} P^{1}+\mu^{2} P^{2}$, since $\pi=P(p) p+P(q) q=P^{1} \pi^{1}+P^{2} \pi^{2}$.
We demonstrate that $U \geq V$ in three steps:
(i) $U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ where $U^{i}$ is utility from $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$,
(ii) $V=P^{1} V^{1}+P^{2} V^{2}$ where $V^{1}$ is utility from $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{1}$ and $V^{2}$ is utility from $(s, t)$ with prior $\pi^{2}$, and

## Beyond Binary Dominated Experiment

Let $\lambda$ be such that $\pi^{1}=\frac{P(r) r+\lambda P(s) s}{P(r)+\lambda P(s)}$.
Let $P^{1}=P(r)+\lambda P(s)$ and $P^{2}=1-P^{1}=P(t)+(1-\lambda) P(s)$
Define $\mu^{i} \in(0,1)$ such that $\pi^{i}=\mu^{i} p+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) q$.
Then $P(p)=\mu^{1} P^{1}+\mu^{2} P^{2}$, since $\pi=P(p) p+P(q) q=P^{1} \pi^{1}+P^{2} \pi^{2}$.
We demonstrate that $U \geq V$ in three steps:
(i) $U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ where $U^{i}$ is utility from $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$,
(ii) $V=P^{1} V^{1}+P^{2} V^{2}$ where $V^{1}$ is utility from $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{1}$ and $V^{2}$ is utility from $(s, t)$ with prior $\pi^{2}$, and
(iii) $U^{i} \geq V^{i}$.

## Steps

(i) Experiment $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi_{i}$ has utility $U^{i}=\mu^{i} u_{p}+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) u_{q}$. $\Rightarrow U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ then follows from $P(p)=P^{1} \mu^{1}+P^{2} \mu^{2}$.

## Steps

(i) Experiment $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi_{i}$ has utility $U^{i}=\mu^{i} u_{p}+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) u_{q}$. $\Rightarrow U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ then follows from $P(p)=P^{1} \mu^{1}+P^{2} \mu^{2}$.
(ii) Experiment $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{1}$ has utility $V^{1}=\frac{P(r) u_{r}+\lambda P(s) u_{s}}{P^{1}}$.

Also, $V^{2}=\frac{P(t) u_{t}+(1-\lambda) P(s) u_{s}}{P^{2}}$.
$\Rightarrow V=P^{1} V^{1}+P^{2} V^{2}$ follows from definition of $V$.

## Steps

(i) Experiment $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi_{i}$ has utility $U^{i}=\mu^{i} u_{p}+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) u_{q}$. $\Rightarrow U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ then follows from $P(p)=P^{1} \mu^{1}+P^{2} \mu^{2}$.
(ii) Experiment $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{1}$ has utility $V^{1}=\frac{P(r) u_{r}+\lambda P(s) u_{s}}{P^{1}}$.

Also, $V^{2}=\frac{P(t) u_{t}+(1-\lambda) P(s) u_{s}}{P^{2}}$.
$\Rightarrow V=P^{1} V^{1}+P^{2} V^{2}$ follows from definition of $V$.
(iii) Binary experiment $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$ delivers utility $V^{i}$.

By earlier claim for binary experiments, $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$ yields

$$
U^{i} \geq V^{i}
$$

## Steps

(i) Experiment $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi_{i}$ has utility $U^{i}=\mu^{i} u_{p}+\left(1-\mu^{i}\right) u_{q}$.
$\Rightarrow U=P^{1} U^{1}+P^{2} U^{2}$ then follows from $P(p)=P^{1} \mu^{1}+P^{2} \mu^{2}$.
(ii) Experiment $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{1}$ has utility $V^{1}=\frac{P(r) u_{r}+\lambda P(s) u_{s}}{P^{1}}$.

Also, $V^{2}=\frac{P(t) u_{t}+(1-\lambda) P(s) u_{s}}{P^{2}}$.
$\Rightarrow V=P^{1} V^{1}+P^{2} V^{2}$ follows from definition of $V$.
(iii) Binary experiment $(r, s)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$ delivers utility $V^{i}$.

By earlier claim for binary experiments, $(p, q)$ with prior $\pi^{i}$ yields

$$
U^{i} \geq V^{i}
$$

Argument generalizes for dominated experiment with $n$ posteriors in box

## Literature

## Closest literature

- Lehmann (1988) imposed MLR on experiments (improved by QS)
- Nothing known about case where better $(p, q)$ violates MLR
- Gets only part of our box (MLR $(r . s)$ ) when $(p, q)$ has MLR
- Kim (2021) proposes another comparison
- Characterization (monotone quasi-garbling) a priori restricts how signals in non-MLR $(r, s)$ should map to actions
- Kim's notion gives more than our LR box (we have more DM problems)
- If $s$ must map to high action, it only gives $p>_{L R} s$ and $r>_{L R} q$
- Far more when also dominating $(p, q)$ violates MLR:
$r$ LR-above some point on $p-q$ line, $s$ LR-below
- To recover our result: monotone quasi-garble for any order on signals
- Athey and Levin (2018) likewise: monotone signal-to-action map
- They generalize Lehmann by permitting other orders than MLR
- We let experiment's monotonicity depend on decision problem


## Why Drop MLR?

## Why Drop MLR?

1. The MLR is strong: possible to order states and signals such that $P\left(s^{\prime} \mid \theta\right) / P(s \mid \theta)$ rises in $\theta$ for every pair $s^{\prime}>s$
2. Even when the MLR thus holds, some decision makers may have IDO preferences when $\Theta$ is differently ordered

- For example, best state for investment-action when a moderate political party wins
- But opinion polls are MLR when states are left-right ordered


## General Dominating Experiments (in progress)

## General Dominating Experiment: In Progress

We are working toward a general characterization

- If $P$ has a least and greatest signal in the LR order, any less informative $Q$ must have its support in the LR-interval between those
- Let us illustrate the issue in belief space


## General Dominating Experiment: In Progress

We are working toward a general characterization

- If $P$ has a least and greatest signal in the LR order, any less informative $Q$ must have its support in the LR-interval between those
- Let us illustrate the issue in belief space
- The appropriate generalization of the LR box may lie in the space of $\operatorname{Pr}\left(a_{j} \mid \theta_{k}\right)$ profiles rather than beliefs
- Under Blackwell, the set of $\operatorname{Pr}\left(a_{j} \mid \theta_{k}\right)$ profiles expands for better experiments
- IDO allows a weaker experiment to have profiles in a slightly larger set, akin to our LR-box


## General Dominating Experiment

- Experiment $P$ has support $p^{1}, p^{2}, p^{3}$, while $Q$ is supported on the other six points $s^{1}, s^{2}, s^{3}, r^{1}, r^{2}, r^{3}$
- Mass at $p^{2}$ can be combined with mass from $p^{1}$ to dominate outcomes from $Q$ in the smaller, red box (i.e., $r^{1}, s^{1}$ )



## Possible Value Functions

Another part of Blackwell's characterization theorem:

- Experiment $P$ is better than experiment $Q$ if and only if, for every prior $\pi, P$ gives higher expected value than $Q$ for any convex value function


## Possible Value Functions

Another part of Blackwell's characterization theorem:

- Experiment $P$ is better than experiment $Q$ if and only if, for every prior $\pi, P$ gives higher expected value than $Q$ for any convex value function
- For any decision problem, value function is convex and continuous in posterior beliefs
- conversely, any convex continuous function is a value function for some decision problem


## Possible Value Functions

Another part of Blackwell's characterization theorem:

- Experiment $P$ is better than experiment $Q$ if and only if, for every prior $\pi, P$ gives higher expected value than $Q$ for any convex value function
- For any decision problem, value function is convex and continuous in posterior beliefs
- conversely, any convex continuous function is a value function for some decision problem
- When restricting attention to monotone problems
- what other properties do value functions have in addition to convexity?


## Conclusion

We explore Blackwell's program to compare experiments

- restricted to IDO decision problems

When the better experiment $P$ is binary

- If $P$ satisfies MLR, it dominates all experiments supported in its LR-interval $\Leftrightarrow$ all its quasi-garblings
- Otherwise, $P$ dominates all Blackwell-garbled experiments $\Leftrightarrow$ all its quasi-garblings
More generally
- Fruitful to explore the feasible profiles of (random) state-action maps
- Possible to characterize IDO-based value functions


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Bocconi
    ${ }^{2}$ Bocconi
    ${ }^{3}$ Copenhagen

