

Historical Roots of Political Extremism: The Effects of Nazi Occupation of Italy

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Abstract

We study the impact of the Italian civil war and Nazi occupation of Italy in 1943–45 on postwar political outcomes. The Communist Party, which was more active in the resistance movement, gained votes in areas where the Nazi occupation was both longer and harsher, mainly at the expense of centrist parties. This effect persists until the late 1980s. These results suggest that civil war and widespread political violence reshape political identities in favor of the political groups that emerge as winners. This benefits extremist groups and hurts moderates since the former are more involved in violent conflict.

1 Introduction

It is well understood that the presence of large extremist parties can hinder the functioning of democratic institutions. In the most severe cases, an extremist party can directly threaten the viability of democratic rule, or opposing groups may use its presence as an excuse to abandon democracy, as in Greece in 1967 or Chile in 1973. Even in stable democracies, the presence of large extremist parties raises policy uncertainty and volatility ([Bordignon, Nannicini and Tabellini, 2016](#)), makes political compromise more difficult, can prevent alternation of office between the incumbent and the opponent, and—in a dynamic setting—can induce distorting strategic behavior by the incumbent. The origin of political extremism is less well understood, however. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, extremist parties in Italy and France gathered over 30% and over 20% of the votes, respectively, while they were virtually absent in Austria, Germany, and the Anglo-Saxon countries. How can we explain such large differences in neighboring countries with a similar economic structure and at the same level of economic development?

In this paper, we argue that political extremism can emerge as a legacy of civil wars and foreign occupations. As discussed in [Walter \(2017\)](#), extremist groups have an advantage in such circumstances, because their radical ideology makes them more successful in solving the collective action problem and in organizing violence. After winning a war or an insurgency, extremist groups can turn their success into elector support. A civil war can also exacerbate political conflict and radicalize public opinion. Finally, civil wars can directly impact the party system, as military factions evolve into political organizations. The goal of this paper is to study these effects in an advanced democracy.

We study the domestic political consequences of the Italian civil war and Nazi occupation during the final two years of World War II. From July 1943 to May 1945, Italy was a battleground between the Allied and the German forces. Italians themselves were split, with troops loyal to the fascist regime fighting alongside the Germans and resistance fighters helping the Allies. The civil war left a strong imprint on the postwar political system. Political parties evolved out of the resistance movement, with key political leaders having played an important role in the resistance movement, and political institutions were designed to minimize the risk of a relapse into civil war or dictatorship. The intensity

of the conflict varied across Italy, however, since the Allies freed Southern and much of Central Italy almost immediately, while Northern-Central Italy remained under Nazi occupation for much longer, and was the turf of conflict between fascists and the resistance movement. Moreover, the Nazi troops became particularly aggressive toward partisans and civilians in the last stage of the war.

We first show that the vote share of the Communist Party in postwar national elections is higher in municipalities where the Nazi occupation was longer and more violent. We instead find no correlation with voters' turnout.

To identify a causal effect, the rest of the paper exploits the fact that—because of weather conditions and other exogenous factors—the battlefield between the Germans and the Allies remained stuck for over six months near the so-called “Gothic line,” a defensive line cutting Northern-Central Italy from West to East. We apply a geographic Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), comparing voting outcomes in municipalities just above vs below the line. The compound treatment is that, North of the line, the German occupation and the fighting by the resistance movement were both longer and harsher, while South of the line the Allies conducted a much less extractive occupation, free speech was allowed, and Italian political movements started claiming self-government responsibility for their country.

Our main result is that the vote share of the extreme-left parties in postwar elections is larger in municipalities just North of the line. This effect is quantitatively important (about 9 percentage points for the communists in the 1946 elections), and persists until the end of the “First Republic”. The communist gain above the line is mainly at the expense of the Catholic party, although this finding is less robust, suggesting that the communists may also have gained votes from other moderate or center-left parties. Municipalities North of the line are also less likely to vote for the extreme right-wing parties linked to the fascist regime, but this effect occurs later in time and it is smaller than the vote loss of the Catholics. Thus, political polarization increased where the civil war and Nazi occupation lasted longer. Again, we find no impact on voters' turnout.

What drives these effects? We contrast two explanations. First, on the demand side, a longer exposure to civil war and foreign occupation might directly affect voters' political attitudes. The Italian Communist Party was more active in the resistance movement than the others, and it had

opposed Mussolini from the start (the Catholics instead had voted him in office). The shared emotions associated with the violent German occupation could have led voters to identify with the political party that, more than others, was the symbol of the victorious resistance movement. Second, on the supply side, a longer Nazi occupation might have affected postwar political organizations. North of the line the resistance movement remained active for longer, and this may have given an advantage to the Communist Party in building grassroots organizations.

The evidence is more consistent with the first, demand side, hypothesis. First, in the OLS analysis, the communist vote share in postwar elections is correlated with the occurrence of violence and with indicators of opposition to the fascist regime before the start of the war, but not with the presence of partisan brigades in the area. Second, in the RDD analysis, we find that partisan brigades were equally widespread just North and just South of the line, and their presence did not enhance the effects of the Nazi occupation on voting outcomes (i.e., the treatment effect is homogeneous in areas with and without partisan brigades). Third, the extreme right-wing parties, which were more free to self-organize into a grass-root movement North of the line, did not benefit from this greater freedom.

Finally, contemporaneous survey data show a discontinuity in memories of the civil war around the line. Specifically, in November-December 2015, we conducted a random survey of about 2,500 individuals resident in 242 municipalities within 50 Km from the Gothic line. Memory of the civil war is stronger North of the line and amongst individuals who have a left-wing political orientation. There is also some weak evidence of mildly more anti-German attitudes North of the line. These findings too are suggestive that the mechanism underlying the reduced form effects operates through political attitudes and the memory of Nazi occupation.

Despite its importance, the rigorous empirical literature on these issues is not very large - see also the surveys by [Walden and Zhukov \(2020\)](#) and [Davenport et al. \(2019\)](#). Two recent papers have applied geographic RDD to WWII data. [Ochsner and Roesel \(2020\)](#) study the demarcation between the Soviet and US occupation zones in Austria during 1945-1955. They show that there was a large scale Nazi migration away from the Soviet zone, which led to long lasting right-wing extremism into the US zone. [Ferwerda and Miller \(2014\)](#) study the demarcation between German and Vichy zones within France. They find a more active resistance movement in the German zone. These results

are challenged by [Kocher and Monteiro \(2016\)](#), who argue that they are driven by the non-random location of the demarcation zone. Other papers have applied geographic RDD to explore the legacy of conflicts. [Dell and Querubin \(2018\)](#) exploit discontinuities in the US military strategies during the Vietnam war, and find that bombing increased the political activities of the communist insurgency and reduced non-communist civic engagement. [Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya \(2015\)](#) apply geographic RDD to study the long term consequences of the partition of Poland between Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia.

Several papers have studied the effects of civil wars in Africa, South Asia, and in the Middle East, generally showing that such events reinforce ethnic identities ([Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014](#), [Blattman 2009](#), [Bellows and Miguel 2009](#), [Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014](#), [Bauer et al. 2016](#), [Camarena and Hagerdal 2020](#)) and tend to increase violence and radicalization ([Besley and Reynal-Querol 2014](#), [Canetti and Lindner 2015](#), [Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009](#), [Grosjean 2014](#), [Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath 2011](#)). The effects on political participation are more mixed, with some of these papers finding that civil wars increase participation, while others find the opposite - see in particular [Gallego \(2018\)](#) and the survey by [Walden and Zhukov \(2020\)](#). Regarding blame attribution or elite influence on political extremism, [Condra and Shapiro \(2012\)](#) use geocoded data on violence in Iraq and show that armed actors are punished for the collateral damage they inflict; while [Spenkuch and Tillmann \(2018\)](#) find that Catholics were far less likely to vote for the Nazi party than their Protestant counterparts, as the Catholic Church vehemently warned its parishioners about the dangers of extremist parties in Weimar Germany.

Our empirical findings are consistent with an important tradition in political science, which has studied key historical junctures such as external or civil wars, when new parties are born and young generations build new political identities breaking with the past. [Mayhew \(2004\)](#) has argued that these special circumstances have lasting effects on the nature and intensity of political conflict. On the supply side of politics, the goals and identities of political organizations can be shaped by traumatic events that give rise to new political parties. On the demand side, intense and widespread common social experiences can shape the political attitudes of citizens for years to come. For instance, writing a century after the US civil war, [Campbell et al. \(1960\)](#) argued that partisan affiliations were still

largely shaped by the geographic boundaries of that conflict.¹ Similarly, the Great Depression had a lasting influence on the image of the Republican party as the party that mishandled those dramatic events. The notion of political realignments also motivates [Balcells \(2011\)](#), who studies the political attitudes of war veterans in the Spanish civil war of 1936–38. Her results are consistent with ours, although she looks at opinion polls rather than actual behavior. [Costalli and Ruggeri \(2015\)](#) and [Costalli and Ruggeri \(2019\)](#) also study the effect of the Italian civil war on the immediate postwar election, and some of their findings are consistent with ours, although they do not look at the Nazi occupation as treatment, only focus on the 1946 election, and do not exploit any geographic RDD to make causal inferences. [Dehdari and Gehring \(2022\)](#) take advantage of quasi-exogenous division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War to provide evidence about group identity formation, showing that being exposed to occupation and repression for many decades caused a persistently stronger regional identity.

Finally, our paper is also related to a larger literature on the persistence of political attitudes and cultural traits. [Acharya, Blackwell and Sen \(2018\)](#) document that contemporary differences in political attitudes across counties in the US South are correlated with the local prevalence of slavery around 1860, but this correlation is not present amongst second generation immigrants in those same counties. [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) find strong persistence in anti-Semitism within Germany over more than five centuries. [Fouka and Voth \(2021\)](#) find evidence suggesting that Nazi occupation had persistent cultural effects in Greece; during the recent Greek financial crisis, sales of German cars fell more in the areas where German troops committed war crimes against civilians. [Avdeenko and Siedler \(2017\)](#) study German longitudinal data and document the importance of the intergenerational transmission of political extremism from fathers to sons. [Lupu and Peisakhin \(2017\)](#) study the effect of the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars in a 2014 multigenerational survey; they find that descendants of affected individuals hold more hostile attitudes toward Russia and participate more in politics. [Iwanowsky and Madestam \(2019\)](#) study the impact of the violent Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia on political behavior and beliefs four decades later; they find more killings by the regime are associated with larger turnout and greater support for anti-authoritarian parties. [Rozenas and Zhukov \(2019\)](#)

¹See also [Sundquist \(2011\)](#) on the long lasting legacy of the US civil war.

study the impact of Stalin’s “terror by hunger” in Ukraine and find that this induced more opposition to Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a historical summary. The data are described in section 3. In section 4 we outline our priors and empirical strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present our empirical estimates, first based on OLS regressions and then with RDD. Section 7 illustrates the results of the survey we conducted around the Gothic line, and the last section concludes.

2 Historical Background

This section summarizes the main events that led to the birth of the post-WWII Italian political system. Since we compare the elections in the immediate postwar period to the latest free elections before the fascist dictatorship, we start with a brief account of the Italian political system before the advent of fascism. We then turn to the WWII period—discussing the nature of the foreign occupation and of the civil war (i.e., our treatment)—and finally to the postwar Italian political system.²

2.1 Prewar period

At the end of World War I, Italy was a constitutional monarchy and the government was supported by a parliamentary majority of liberal-moderate representatives elected in 1913. Socialist and catholic movements were emerging, however. These new parties appealed to Italian voters who had only recently been enfranchised.

Before the consolidation of Mussolini’s dictatorship, three free elections were held in 1919, 1921, and 1924 under universal male suffrage. Average turnout was around 60%. In 1919 and 1921, the electoral system was proportional, but voters could cast a preference vote for candidates running in different lists (the so called “panachage” system). In 1924, the electoral system entailed a large majority premium that gave two thirds of the seats to the party gaining a relative majority in a single national district, and assigned the remaining seats to the other parties according to a proportional rule. Thus, none of these electoral rules was identical to the pure proportional system with preference votes

²A more detailed historical account of these periods and episodes is provided in [Romanelli \(1995\)](#), [Leoni \(2001\)](#), [Baldissara \(2000\)](#), [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2000\)](#), [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2006\)](#), [Gentile \(2015\)](#), [Pavone \(1991\)](#), and [Matta \(1996\)](#).

created after WWII, although all of them had important elements of proportionality.

In the 1919 election, the Italian political system was essentially split between three groups: A liberal-moderate coalition representing the political elites that had ruled Italy in the previous decades, and two emerging and antagonistic political groups, the catholics and the socialists. These new parties were on different positions on many issues, and were unable to form viable political alliances between them. In 1919 the liberal coalition retained a relative majority but, despite a large absenteeism rate, it lost many votes and seats to the socialist and catholic parties. This outcome led to a short period of instability, which resulted in a new election in 1921. The main novelties of the 1921 election were the gains obtained by the fascist candidates, who ran in the same lists as the traditional liberal bloc, and the fact that the Communist Party entered the ballot for the first time.³ The votes and seats obtained by the catholics and socialists were roughly unchanged (or slightly lower) compared to 1919.

After a period of political violence and instability, in 1922 Mussolini was asked by the King to form a government. He received a vote of confidence by a parliamentary majority that included the catholic party, while the socialists (and the small communist group) voted against him. Mussolini soon changed the electoral law to a proportional system with a large majority premium for the party with a relative majority (see above). In 1924, a new election was held, and the fascist party obtained two thirds of the votes. Although formally free and regular, this election was held in a climate of violence and intimidation. Within a few years Mussolini further consolidated his power into a dictatorship.

Elections in 1919, 1921, and 1924 are not easily comparable between each other, but each of them displays within-municipality variation that conveys information on the underlying political preferences of the (local) population. General elections were also held in 1929 and 1934. Following a parliamentary reform enacted in 1928, these elections took the form of a referendum with only the Fascist party running and with a voting system that did not guarantee the secrecy of the vote.⁴ More-

³The Italian Communist Party was founded on January 21, 1919 in Livorno as a split from the socialist movement. This was clearly a split from the extreme left as the reference model of the new party was the Bolshevik Revolution, and it was motivated by the claim “we want to do as in Russia.”

⁴Voters could vote either “Yes” or “No” to approve the list of deputies appointed by the Grand Council of Fascism. Voters were provided with two equally sized sheets, white outside, inside bearing the words “Do you approve the list of members appointed by the Grand National Council of Fascism?” The electoral sheet with the “Yes” was also accompanied by the Italian flag and a fascist symbol, the one with the “No” had no symbol. Inside the voting booth there was a first ballot box where the voter left the discarded sheet and then delivered to the scrutineers the chosen sheet, so that they would ensure that it was “carefully sealed.” Turnout was around 90% and approval of the fascist list over 98%.

over, to our knowledge, no data are available at the municipal level. We thus ignore these last two elections.

2.2 War period

2.2.1 The Gothic line

We can date the beginning of the Italian “civil war” (Pavone, 1991) in July 1943, when the Allies landed in Sicily. Since then and until May 1945, Italy was ravaged by war. On one side were the Germans, supported by the forces that remained loyal to Mussolini. On the opposite side were the Allies, supported by the Italian resistance movement (operating in the areas occupied by the Germans). Throughout this period, the overall estimated casualties were about 360,000, of which about 155,000 Italians. The Italian victims of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war were 70,000–80,000. Of these, at least 10,000 were civilians killed by Nazis or fascists, about 30,000 were resistance fighters, and about as many were fascists (see Gentile, 2015, pp. 4–5). In addition, about 40,000 civilians were deported to Germany (of which 7,500 were Jews), 90% of these died (see Rochat, 2005, p. 443).

The battlefield moved overtime, but it remained stuck for several months near a defensive line prepared by the Germans in Central Italy, the so called “Gothic line.” Figure D.10 illustrates the areas under German occupation, by number of days, as well as the Gothic line. Northern-Central Italy remained under German occupation for over two years, while the South for two to five months. As can be seen from Figure D.10, the Germans were able to stop the Allies for several months between Rome and Naples (along the so called “Gustav Line,” which was held by the Germans between December 1943 and May 1944). From there, the battlefield moved rapidly toward Northern-Central Italy, in the area between Florence and Bologna, where the Germans had prepared a strong and continuous line of defense. Preparation for the Gothic line had began well in advance, while the Germans were still trying to defend the area South of Rome. This allowed the Germans to prepare an effective defense system, which stopped the Allies between the Summer of 1944 and the Spring of 1945. The Gothic line was conceived as the last defense for German retreat. The barrier extended from the Western coast between *La Spezia* and *Massa* to the Eastern coast between *Pesaro* and *Rimini*. Basically, the line consisted of defensive positions and bunkers, hundreds of thousands of mines and booby traps,

and a continuous anti-tank ditch almost six miles long; “Allied aerial reconnaissance photographs showed a dense network of machine-gun posts, gun positions and ditches.” (Holland, 2008, p. 301).⁵

As can be seen from Figure D.10, during the Summer of 1944 the battlefront remained stuck in an area about 50 Km South of the Gothic line. The continuous line in Figure D.10 is the Gothic, which was held by the Germans between November 1944 and April 1945. The line was finally overcome by the Allies in April 1945, and in May the Germans surrendered control of Italy. The battles around the Gothic line brought much destruction to the area, with heavy casualties amongst Germans (around 48,000), Allies (32,000), and Italian fascists, partisans and civilians (altogether 30,000–40,000), see Montemaggi (1980). As discussed below, the Allies were extremely close to overcome the Gothic line before the Winter of 1944, but a combination of hard weather and divergences between the US and UK—with the former prioritizing the invasion of France and the latter paying more attention to the Mediterranean—froze the battlefront at the Gothic line for six months.

Figure D.2 zooms in the area around the Gothic line, illustrating the size and elevation of each municipality and how the battlefront moved during the Summer of 1944. There are three demarcation lines. The line labeled “Allies” is where the Allies stopped between August and mid-September 1944. The line labeled “Fall 1944” is the original line set up by the Germans. Between late August and mid-September 1944 the Allies succeeded in breaching this line (so called operation “Olive”). The line labeled “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945” is where the Germans managed to contain the US-British offensive. From the end of October onwards, the Allies and the Germans were fighting along this line. It was finally breached in April 1945. Our RDD is on the Northern-most line “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945,” which was held for the longest period.

For the sake of our empirical analysis, it is important to note that the position of the last line of defense was not only the outcome of a German decision. It was also largely due to random events, which forced the Allies to stop their offensive between late October 1944 and the Spring of 1945. In August 1944, the Allies withdrew several divisions from the Italian front to launch a new offensive in Southern France. This decision was highly controversial: It was supported by the Americans, who wanted to create a distraction for the Germans from the ongoing battles in the rest of France, but it

⁵It is estimated that over 50,000 Italian forced workers were involved in building the Gothic line (Ronchetti, 2009).

was opposed by the British, who instead leaned toward a stronger offensive in Italy. The American point of view prevailed, and this weakened the efforts of the Allies in Italy at a critical point in time (see [Churchill, 1959](#)). A second important random event was the weather, which deteriorated harshly in late October. These are the words used by Churchill to describe those critical moments in October 1944: “The weather was appalling. Heavy rains had swollen the numberless rivers and irrigation channels [...]. Off the roads movement was often impossible. It was with the greatest difficulty that the troops toiled forward. [...] Not until the spring were the armies rewarded with the victory they had so well earned, and so nearly won, in the autumn” (see [Churchill, 1959](#), p.839).

2.2.2 Foreign occupation and resistance movement

In the North, Mussolini tried to revamp the fascist regime by claiming statehood for the areas under German occupation (with the exclusion of two territories directly annexed to the German Reich, close to the Alps and to the Northern Adriatic coastland) and by setting the new capital of his *Repubblica Sociale Italiana* (RSI) in the small town of *Salò*. But this experiment resulted in little more than a Nazi-backed puppet state, dependent entirely upon Germany and with no autonomous domestic or foreign policy of any sort. The Nazi occupation of Northern Italy is unanimously deemed as violent and extractive by the historical literature. As Rudolf Rahn, the German diplomat who was the plenipotentiary to the RSI, put it: “Everything in occupied Italy must be exploited by us for our war effort” (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 111). This meant coerced labor and deportations, handing over of all gold reserves, shutting down of factories to ship equipment to Germany, full control of the remaining factories for military purposes, and food reserves (if any) packed off to Germany.

In Allied-held Italy, all areas close to the battlefield were directly run by the Allied Military Government (AMG) and then, as the front advanced up toward the North, they were passed back to the authority of the Italian government, formally appointed by the King. At first, under prime minister Pietro Badoglio, the political legitimacy of the government was weak, since the monarchy was implicated with the fascist regime. But then the political parties outlawed by the fascist regime and active in the resistance movement (see below) gradually took responsibility and joined the governments lead by Ivanoe Bonomi from June 1944 until the end of WWII.

Although the autonomy of the government was severely limited by the Allied Control Commission, self-determination was much stronger South of the line and, most importantly, free speech was moving Italy closer to democracy. In particular, the Bonomi government started having greater responsibility after September 1944, when Churchill and Roosevelt made a joined declaration shaping the future path toward Italy's self-determination and economic recovery. The sharp divide between the political (and psychological) situation North vs South of the Gothic line is best described by Italian lieutenant Eugenio Corti (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 251, italics ours): "I wondered if the British and Americans realized that *behind their lines* one could feel a respect for men. It felt like this whenever one saw notices where occupation troops threatened fines and at most jail sentences that *on the other side* were invariably punished with death. We would no longer hear talk of executions, and this fear—which makes man nothing more than a beast—would no longer hang over us."

Throughout the civil war period, the resistance movement grew rapidly, from a few thousands of fighters in the Fall of 1943 to several tens of thousands one year later. In addition, it is estimated that around 20,000 civilians were directly connected to the resistance movement, even if only few of them nested into political coordination (see [Bocca, 2012](#), p. 265). Although the movement was spontaneous and did not have strong party affiliations, the leaders of the various groups were active members of political parties that the fascist regime had disbanded. Three main political affiliations can be identified: The left-wing groups, linked with the communist and socialist parties; the catholic groups, linked with the Christian Democratic party; and other centrist groups, linked with liberals that had opposed Mussolini. In addition there were several other small groups with no explicit political affiliation.⁶ The left-wing brigades, and to a smaller extent the catholic, were by far the largest and more active organizations. The political parties active in the resistance movement joined forces in the "National Liberation Committee," which gave crucial support to the Bonomi governments.

In the North, the civil-war nature of the conflict was reinforced by the decision of Mussolini to give birth to the "black brigades," paramilitary groups directly run by the Fascist Party, who also attracted tens of thousands of volunteers, although poorly trained and equipped.

⁶In our data set referring to the area around the Gothic line, we count 115 communist brigades (*Garibaldi*), 44 other left wing brigades (*Matteotti* and *Giustizia e Libertà*), and 59 non-marxist brigades (*Fiamme Verdi* and others).

According to historical accounts, the effects of German occupation and of the civil war on the civilian population were not evenly distributed in time and space. As stressed by [Cavaglioni \(2015, p.96\)](#), the civil war was almost absent in most regions of the South as they were rapidly freed by the Allies, it was long and harsh in Piedmont, and it varied in Emilia-Romagna based on the duration of the Nazi occupation. [Gentile \(2015\)](#) stresses two stylized facts about the German occupation. First, combat troops near the front line were more ruthless and prone to hurt civilians than other troops in charge of logistics and administration. This reflected both the selection and composition of such troops, as well as the additional stress and danger that they faced. Second, following hierarchical orders, the German attitudes and tactics changed over time, and became particularly aggressive toward partisans and civilians alike from the Summer of 1944 onwards, when the danger posed by the resistance movement became more apparent. On June 17, 1944 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in chief in the Mediterranean, issued an order promising indemnity to soldiers who should exceed “normal restraint” in the choice of repression methods.⁷

Our (local) source of exogenous variation—the Gothic line—captures a treatment made up of both (i) the extractive Nazi occupation that characterized the last period of WWII and (ii) the civil war between the fascist and partisan brigades. The compound nature of this treatment reinforces its occurrence, as both elements operate along the same spectrum of political alignment. The control group includes municipalities occupied by the Allies, where free speech was allowed and self-determination by Italian authorities gradually developed.

2.3 Postwar period

The resistance movement and the political parties to which it was linked played a key role in the immediate aftermath of the war. Several leaders of the movement became prominent political figures and were elected in the postwar Parliament for several legislatures. The civil war contributed to shape the political identity of these parties and gave them a visibility and popularity that they had not enjoyed before, also due to the repression imposed by the fascist regime.

⁷Nazi authorities also tried to make this clear to the Italian population. In the Summer of 1944, German planes dropped leaflets over Central Italy with the warning: “Whoever knows the place where a band of rebels is in hiding and does not immediately inform the German Army, will be shot. Whoever gives food or shelter to a band or to individual rebels, will be shot. Every house in which rebels are found or have stayed, will be blown up” (see [Holland, 2008, p. 145](#)).

The first key decision of the new political leadership was to hold an election for a constitutional assembly. The election was held in 1946, simultaneously with a referendum on whether to abandon the monarchy. Monarchy lost and Italy became a Republic. With this election, suffrage became universal, thus women had the right to vote for the first time. The electoral rule for the constitutional assembly and for all subsequent elections until 1992 was proportional. All the main parties presented lists of candidates at the constitutional assembly, and the party system did not change significantly afterward. Hence, the election for the constitutional assembly is comparable to subsequent political elections. The first regular election was held in 1948. The only difference in party labels is that in 1948 the communist and socialist parties ran together under the label of “Popular Front,” whereas they had run separately in the 1946 constitutional election. In 1953 and in subsequent elections they split again. Monarchist parties progressively disappeared from the political scene; the last election in which they ran was in 1968. On the extreme right, a party close to the fascists, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), was founded on December 26, 1946 and appeared on the ballot in the 1948 election, but consolidated its vote share (around 5–7%) only from the 1953 election onwards.

The political system that emerged in the late 1940s reflected the legacy of the civil war in several respects. First, as already noted, most political leaders had played an important role in the resistance movement, at least in the period 1943–45. Second, the party system was highly polarized. On the left the largest party were the communists (the biggest communist party in Western countries), which at the time had strong ideological and financial links with the Soviet Union, while the extreme right remained loyal to the fascist regime.⁸ The Italian Communist Party always maintained strong links with the Soviet regime; for instance, it supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, most of its leaders received training in Moscow, and financial aids from the Soviet Union reached the Italian communists as late as in the early 1980s (Cervetti, 1999). Also on economic policy, the Communist Party maintained an extremist stance until the early 1980s, for instance opposing the Bill of Workers’ Rights in 1970 (as it would have tempered and delayed the fall of capitalism) and the entry of Italy in the European monetary system in 1979. Third, and partly as a result of such ideological polarization,

⁸Until the early 1990s, the two biggest parties were the Christian Democrats, the ruling party over all of this period, with average vote shares of 35–40%, and the Communist Party, whose vote share grew from 15–20% right after the war to more than 30% in 1976. The vote share of the Socialist Party oscillated around 10–15%.

one of the main goals of the Constitutional assembly was to create a very inclusive and consensual political system, to minimize the risk of violent conflict. This resulted in a strictly proportional system, perfect bicameralism, and several checks and balances that diluted executive powers.

The main features of the Italian postwar political system remained roughly unchanged until the early 1990s, when several things changed. First, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Italian Communist Party made a credible and pronounced shift toward social democracy. Second, the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party collapsed under the weight of corruption scandals, leaving room for new moderate forces led by Silvio Berlusconi. Third, the electoral rule was changed to a mixed-member system. Our analysis ends just on the edge of this transition.

3 Data

This section describes our variables. Appendix B provides more detail on the data. The unit of observation is the municipality.

3.1 Political outcomes

We measure political outcomes by the percentage of votes received by political parties at the 1946 election for the constitutional assembly, and in all subsequent 10 national elections for the Chamber of Deputies until 1987 included.

We consider four political groups. First, the radical left, measured by the votes given to the Communist Party. We call this variable *Communist*. Since in 1948 the communists and the socialists formed a single electoral list, we also consider the votes received by these two parties together, and we call it *Communist and Socialist*. The second group is the Christian Democratic Party, which we call *Catholic*. The third group, which we call *Right Wing*, consists of the post-fascist party (MSI) and smaller parties that supported the monarchy. The source of the electoral data is the Italian Ministry of Interior.

We also collected data on the last free elections held before the advent of fascism, namely in 1919, 1921, and 1924. The Communist Party was very small in the 1921 and 1924 elections (and did not exist in 1919), so we lump together the socialist and communist votes in the pre-fascist period to gain

precision. The right-wing vote cannot be separately measured in 1921, since fascists were running together with the more traditional and moderate liberals in that election. Hence, for the pre-fascist period we only use the *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist* vote shares.

Since there are several missing observations in prewar data, in our baseline analysis we fill the missing observations in each election exploiting the remaining two elections plus additional observables. Our baseline sample consists of about 5,700 municipalities for which we have both postwar and prewar political outcomes. As shown below, the results are robust to only using available pre-war data, with no imputation for missing observations.

Thanks to [Acemoglu et al. \(Forthcoming\)](#) we have also information on fascist presence at municipality level. They construct fascist vote share in 1921 and in 1924 elections combining [Corbetta and Piretti \(2009\)](#), 1,200 local and national historical newspapers and local state archives. Moreover they construct a measure of violence (number of violent episodes per 1,000 inhabitants for the period 1920-1922) from [Franzinelli \(2003\)](#). Finally, they collected information on local branches of the Fascist Party in September 1921 from the prefect reports located in state archives throughout Italy from which a dummy for the presence of a Fascist branch is constructed.

Since no elections were held after 1924, we collected two variables that measure opposition to the regime in the municipality during the fascist period. Our first variable is the fraction of citizens under political surveillance (source: Casellario Politico Centrale).⁹ The original source reports the political affiliation, the municipality of residence and the year in which the citizen became under surveillance. We construct the share of Left wing citizens under surveillance as the sum of communist, socialist or anti-fascism citizens under surveillance between 1925 and 1942 over the 1921 population (x1000). As shown in Appendix Table [D.1](#), this variable correlates positively with Communist and Socialist prewar vote shares while it is uncorrelated with the prewar Catholic vote.

Second, from ANPI (National Association of Italian Partisans) we collected a list of 3,117 partisans with a short biography. This database is only a sample of all partisans, but it was built to represent the political diversity of the resistance movement and includes almost all of the national and local leaders of the movement. From this source we create two dummy variables, for whether at least

⁹We thank Francesco Barilari for helping collecting these data.

a partisan in our sample was born in the municipality, and for whether he/she was linked to a left-wing party in the postwar period. These variables thus capture the strength of local opposition to the fascist regime, rather than the presence of brigades in the area even if it is positively correlated with it. As shown in Appendix Table [D.1](#), this measure of local opposition to fascism too correlates positively with Communist and Socialist prewar vote shares while it does not correlate with the Catholic vote.

3.2 War-related variables

To explore the mechanisms that could affect political outcomes, we collected several variables related to the Nazi occupation and the civil war. First, using [Baldissara \(2000\)](#), we coded the presence of partisan brigades in the municipal area. We distinguish between left-wing brigades and other partisan brigades, but the results are robust to a finer disaggregation between different partisan groups.

Second, we code episodes of violence by the fascists or by the Germans. We define a dummy variable for municipalities with at least one episode of violence, and distinguish between episodes where the majority of victims were civilians or partisans. The source is the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” ([ANPI-INSMLI 2016](#)).

Third, we code the location of two German division that were particularly violent and committed several crimes against civilians: the 16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and the “Hermann Goering” division ([Gentile 2015](#)). Their exceptional violence can be seen in Appendix Figure [D.1](#) in Appendix [D](#). Based on the German archives consulted by [Gentile \(2015\)](#), we have records on the precise location of these troops throughout the Italian civil war. We construct a dummy variable that equals 1 for municipalities within 15 Km from the location of either one of these divisions.

Fourth, we collected data on deportations to Germany. During WWII, about 40,000 Italians were deported to Germany (about 7,500 were Jewish). Thanks to [Mantelli and Tranfaglia \(2013\)](#), we have data on the number of political deportations by the municipality of capture (about 6,500 individuals).

Finally, we code the duration of the German occupation in each province, from the detailed maps in [Baldissara \(2000\)](#). We were able to reconstruct the duration of the German occupation at the municipal level only near the Gothic and the Gustav lines, where the battlefield was more clearly

defined. Throughout the rest of Italy, data on the duration of the German occupation are at the province level only.

3.3 Other city characteristics

From the Census (ISTAT) we collected data on total resident population, population density, and literacy rates for the years 1911, 1921, and then 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. As an indicator of economic development, from the 1951 Census, we collected data on the number of industrial plants per capita in each municipality. We also collected data on the elevation at the city hall, and on maximum and minimum elevation in the municipality. Finally, to include appropriate fixed effects, we reconstructed provincial borders at different dates. As a default, we use provinces and regions as defined in 1921, but results are robust to use administrative boundaries defined on the basis of the boundaries at later dates. Thanks to [Fontana et al. \(2021\)](#) we also got data on the number of industrial plants and workers in 1927 (*Censimento Industriale 1927*), the number of agricultural firms and workers, the number of livestock, and surface devoted to agricultural production in 1929 (*Catasto Agrario 1929*). Appendix Table [D.2](#) reports summary statistics of these variables in the entire sample; Appendix Table [D.3](#) provides the same summary statistics for municipalities within a 50 Km radius around the Gothic line.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Prior hypotheses

Did the German occupation and the civil conflict leave a mark on the postwar Italian political system? In particular, did it affect the support enjoyed by extremist political parties? A priori, there are three main reasons to expect a lasting impact, the first two operating directly on citizens' attitudes, and the third one operating on political organizations.

First, in the areas under German occupation, the civil war between the fascists and their opponents was both longer and harsher. This in turn could lead to more entrenched and radicalized positions on both sides, reinforcing political identities and shaping attitudes in favor of both the communists and the extreme right-wing parties at the expense of the moderate parties. The Italian Communist Party

tried indeed to capitalize on this identity channel in the aftermath of WWII, by pitching itself as the true guardian of the legacy of the resistance movement.

Second, the German occupation was actively opposed by the Italian resistance movement. To suppress it, Nazis often resorted to extreme forms of violence, not only against resistance fighters but also against civilians. This violence could leave a mark on political attitudes. A priori, the effect could go either way. On the one hand, Nazi violence (actual or just threatened) could lead to more antagonistic attitudes against the enemy. This would favor the communists, who were more involved in the resistance movement and stood up more forcefully against the Nazis. On the other hand, civilians could blame the partisan brigades (and hence mainly the communists), who were responsible for the German retaliation against civilians. Moreover, the extractive nature of the Nazi occupation, especially when contrasted to the Allies' behavior, could affect political attitudes directly.

Third, the German occupation could affect political organizations. Right-wing parties loyal to Mussolini were more free to self-organize in the areas under German occupation. But the presence of active partisan brigades could also matter, since the postwar party system grew out of the resistance movement, and partisan brigades could be exploited to build grassroots organizations, as stressed by [Costalli and Ruggeri \(2015\)](#). Through this channel, a longer German occupation should thus give an advantage to the Communist Party (since its partisan brigades were more active and better organized), as well as to the right-wing parties linked to fascism.

4.2 Identification

Our estimation strategy exploits geographic heterogeneity in the duration and nature of the Nazi occupation. We start by looking at the OLS correlations in all of Italy:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 DUR_i + \alpha_1 V_i + \alpha_2 PB_i + x_i' \beta + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is the vote share of the Communist Party in municipality i in the 1946 elections (or in later elections); DUR_i is the duration of the Nazi occupation (measured in years); V_i measures the occurrence of violence; PB_i measures the presence of partisan brigades in the area of the municipality;

x_i is a vector of covariates including our measures of opposition to the fascist regime, electoral outcomes in 1919, 1921, and 1924, illiterate share and population density in 1921 and 1951, altitude, longitude, latitude, and a constant; γ_r are region or province fixed effects (as defined in 1921); ε_i is the random error term, capturing all omitted factors. The parameter α_0 captures the association between the treatment of interest and electoral outcomes. The parameters α_1 and α_2 shed light on possible mechanisms, operating on the supply or demand side respectively.

Despite the inclusion of all these covariates and province or region fixed effects, some of the omitted factors in ε_i might be correlated with both the treatment and political outcomes. This is why, to identify the causal effect of the Nazi occupation, we implement a geographic RDD and compare post-war political outcomes in municipalities just above vs below the Gothic line. As argued in Section [A.2.1](#), this defensive line can be seen both as continuous and as good as random. To avoid the risk of confounding the effect of the Gothic line with that of pre-existing administrative boundaries, we always control for region fixed effects - as shown in the appendix, results are similar when controlling for province fixed effects (as defined in 1921).¹⁰ This implies that we draw inferences by comparing municipalities within the same region or province that are North vs South of the line. Our identifying assumption is that, after controlling for distance from the line (and for other covariates), being just North or just South of the Gothic line is a random event uncorrelated with other unobservable determinants of political outcomes. This assumption can be indirectly tested and cannot be rejected for several pre-treatment observables. Any difference in political outcomes between municipalities North vs South of the Gothic Line can thus be attributed to the difference in the duration of the Nazi occupation. The treatment for being North of the line is a longer exposure to the Nazi occupation and a more intense civil war for about six more months.

Formally, let d_i be the distance (in Km) from the Gothic line, with negative (positive) values identifying towns South (North) of the line, We estimate the following model in the interval $d_i \in$

¹⁰In the 100 km neighborhood of the Gothic line there are 742 municipalities (in our sample), belonging to 5 regions and 25 provinces. Several of these provinces lie entirely North or South of the Gothic line, however. The Gothic line cuts through four provinces (Bologna, Firenze, Lucca and Ravenna) that belong to two different regions (Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna) and that include 172 municipalities.

$[-\Delta, +\Delta]$:

$$Y_i^{post} = \sum_{k=0}^p (\delta_k d_i^k) + T_i \sum_{k=0}^p (\alpha_k d_i^k) + x_i' \beta + \eta_i, \quad (2)$$

where Y_i^{post} is any post-treatment outcome; T_i is a dummy identifying whether municipality i is North or South of the Gothic line; x_i is a vector of (time-invariant and pre-treatment) covariates that include pre-war vote shares and region or province fixed effects; p captures the order of the (spline) polynomial control function; η_i is the error term.¹¹ The bandwidth Δ is either a (multiple) discretionary threshold or an optimal bandwidth as in [Calonico et al. \(2017\)](#). The parameter α_0 identifies the treatment effect of interest.¹² To avoid comparing municipalities close to the line but located far from each other along the East-West dimension, we perform a series of robustness checks by including latitude and longitude or fixed effects for 25 Km intervals of the Gothic line in the vector x_i ([Dell 2010](#)).

RDD allows us to estimate the causal effect of the Nazi occupation on postwar elections but does not uniquely identify a particular mechanism. To discriminate between alternative hypotheses, we need additional (and stricter) assumptions. First, note that if we replace the outcome variable in equation (2) with a set of pre-treatment variables Y_i^{pre} , we can run balance tests that should normally deliver zero effects for the RDD to be valid. If we instead replace the outcome variable with “contextual” factors that happen to be potentially present in the context of Nazi occupation, we can test for demand-side vs supply-side potential mechanisms. Assume, for example, that we find a significant discontinuity in contextual factors that are likely to affect voters’ behavior (the demand side), but not party organizations (the supply side). To interpret this as evidence of a demand-side mechanism, we also need to assume that there are no unobserved variables that impact the demand side and that hap-

¹¹In very few cases the command `rdrobust` requires us to exclude some of the covariates included in the baseline specification for multicollinearity issues. This happens only when the outcome considered is *Right Wing*, which contains many missing observations. We have only 93 (262) municipalities with *Right Wing* 1946 not missing within 50 (100) km from the Gothic line.

¹²The estimated coefficient $\hat{\alpha}_0$ from equation (2) is not directly comparable with $\hat{\alpha}_0$ from equation (1), because they are measured in different metrics and because the former is a local effect. Indeed, α_0 in (2) is the causal effect of six more months of Nazi occupation in a period associated with intense violence (experienced or threatened). For the sake of comparison between the OLS and RDD coefficients, one should keep in mind that, if we use DUR_i as the outcome variable of the RDD estimations defined in equation (2), we find point estimates in the range between 0.463 and 0.563 (depending on the estimation method; all statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level), corresponding to half a year as expected.

pen to have a discontinuity at the Gothic line. In our data, the variables V_i (occurrence of violence) and PB_i (presence of brigades) are natural candidates for demand-side and supply-side contextual factors, respectively.

Given the number of hypothesis tested, as suggested in [Eggers et al. \(2015\)](#) and [de la Cuesta and Imai \(2016\)](#), we verify whether some rejections of the null hypothesis should be considered as false rejections. In Appendix [C.1](#) we consider [Westfall and Young \(1993\)](#) technique.

5 OLS Baseline Estimates

In this section, we estimate equation (1) by OLS. In Table 1, the dependent variable is the Communist Party vote share in 1946. We report both robust standard errors (second row) and standard errors corrected for spatial correlation (third row) as in [Conley \(1996\)](#). In column (1) the Communist vote share is positively associated with the duration of Nazi occupation (in years) and with the occurrence of violence during the war (measured both by having at least one episode of violence and being within 15 Km from violent Nazi divisions). In column (2) we add two indicators for the presence of partisan brigades (left-wing or any other brigade). The remaining estimated coefficients are unaffected. The presence of partisan brigades is negatively correlated with the Communist vote share, but this result is not very robust to the inclusion of control variables and fixed effects.

In column (3) we include our proxies for local opposition to the fascist regime, namely the dummy variables for the birthplace of a partisan (either any partisan or a left-wing partisan) and the share of citizens under surveillance for political reason (either because left-wing or any other political affiliation). These variables are highly positively correlated with the postwar communist vote share, but the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest (the duration of the Nazi occupation, the indicators violence and for presence of partisan brigades) are not affected.

In column (4) we include the remaining control variables. As expected all the magnitudes are affected, but the estimated coefficients of interest remain highly significant and don't change much, except for the coefficient on the presence of left-wing brigades. Inclusion of region (5) and province fixed effects (6) further reduces the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, but once again the coefficients of interest remain significant except for that on the presence of partisan brigades.

Table 1: OLS Estimates – Baseline

	Dependent variable: Communist 1946						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Years of occupation	5.223 (0.250)*** (1.525)***	5.653 (0.276)*** (1.610)***	5.019 (0.278)*** (1.544)***	4.733 (0.970)*** (3.974)	3.774 (1.727)** (3.800)	3.523 (1.753)** (2.864)	3.680 (1.754)** (2.785)
At least one episode of violence	3.881 (0.440)*** (1.405)***	4.313 (0.443)*** (1.332)***	2.426 (0.438)*** (1.149)**	1.338 (0.352)*** (0.636)**	1.146 (0.328)*** (0.455)**	0.669 (0.317)** (0.411)	1.223 (0.421)*** (0.589)**
Within 15 km of violent Nazi division	8.102 (0.578)*** (3.152)**	8.114 (0.579)*** (3.179)**	7.420 (0.561)*** (2.864)***	5.011 (0.457)*** (1.939)***	2.660 (0.518)*** (1.292)**	1.643 (0.585)*** (1.358)	1.992 (0.640)*** (1.395)
Presence of left wing partisan brigades		-1.302 (0.471)*** (1.452)	-1.080 (0.465)** (1.528)	0.069 (0.373) (1.018)	0.030 (0.345) (0.752)	-0.039 (0.348) (0.587)	0.456 (0.404) (0.651)
Presence of other brigades than left wing		-6.010 (0.562)*** (1.904)***	-6.063 (0.539)*** (1.725)***	-1.467 (0.450)*** (1.027)	-1.350 (0.419)*** (0.798)*	-0.898 (0.422)** (0.685)	-0.288 (0.489) (0.702)
Birthplace of a partisan			5.332 (0.588)*** (1.299)***	3.680 (0.463)*** (0.770)***	2.163 (0.413)*** (0.407)***	1.618 (0.389)*** (0.343)***	1.604 (0.390)*** (0.343)***
Birthplace of a left wing partisan			3.967 (1.330)*** (1.366)***	3.360 (1.081)*** (1.013)***	2.731 (0.973)*** (0.974)***	2.283 (0.910)** (0.922)**	2.264 (0.912)** (0.931)**
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942			1.660 (0.174)*** (0.419)***	1.289 (0.133)*** (0.261)***	0.945 (0.123)*** (0.206)***	0.943 (0.118)*** (0.168)***	0.940 (0.118)*** (0.166)***
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942			1.670 (0.828)** (1.276)	1.189 (0.674)* (1.001)	-0.529 (0.576) (0.678)	0.322 (0.523) (0.626)	0.333 (0.522) (0.623)
At least one violence episode * Presence of left wing brigades							-1.117 (0.635)* (0.733)
At least one violence episode * Presence of other brigades than left-wing							-1.363 (0.771)* (1.002)
Within 15 km of violent Nazi division * Presence of left wing brigades							-0.911 (1.035) (1.399)
Within 15 km of violent Nazi division * Presence of other brigades than left-wing							-0.796 (1.361) (2.139)
Observations	5559	5559	5357	5357	5357	5357	5357
R-squared	0.123	0.138	0.204	0.504	0.590	0.647	0.647
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effect	No	No	No	No	Region	Province	Province

Note: Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses in each second row; standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are displayed in parentheses in each third row. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. *Communist 1946*: Vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the 1946 election. *Years of occupation*: years of occupation measured at province level (see Appendix for exceptions) *At least one violence episode*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in the period considered. *Within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions*: Dummy equal to 1 if the minimum distance of the municipality from one occupied by either RFSS or HG Division is less than 15 Km (using city hall as reference point). *Birthplace of a partisan*: Dummy equal to 1 if a partisan (or a left-wing partisan) is born in the municipality. *Citizens under surveillance*: Number of citizens (left-wing or other political affiliations) under surveillance over 1921 population (x1000) *Presence of partisan brigades*: Dummy equal to 1 if the area of the municipality intersects the area of operation of the partisan brigade (left-wing or other). Other regressors include: Share of illiterate 1921 and 1951, population density 1921 and 1951, latitude, longitude, maximum altitude in the municipality, elevation city hall, vote shares of Communist-Socialist and Catholic in 1919, 1921, and 1924 and Province or Region Fixed Effects.

According to column (6), half a year of additional Nazi occupation is associated with an increase in the Communist vote share of about 1.8 percentage points (i.e., about 11.6% of the average vote

share in the whole sample of 5,559 municipalities with no missing values). The occurrence of at least one episode of violence is associated with an increase in the communist vote share of 0.7 percentage point (i.e., about 4.6%). Being close to the two violent Nazi divisions is associated with an increase in the communist vote share of 1.6 percentage points (i.e., about 10.6%). The association between the communist votes and the presence of left-wing partisan brigades is not statistically different from zero, while the presence of other brigades is negatively associated with the communist votes, although this negative association is not particularly robust.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes residents blamed the partisans for the German retaliation. If so, episodes of Nazi violence that occur where brigades are more active should shift fewer votes toward the communists. As shown in column (7), this is what we find: episodes of Nazi violence are positively correlated with communist votes only in municipalities that do not intersect with the area of operation of any brigade. This finding is reassuring also because it reduces identification concerns about omitted variables possibly correlated with both the propensity to resist German troops and the likelihood to vote for the communists.

When considering spatially corrected standard errors, years of occupation lose significance. This is not surprising, given that here (unlike in the RDD estimates around the Gothic line) years of occupation are mainly measured at the province level. The statistical significance of the correlation between communist votes and episodes of violence, which are always measured at the municipality level, survives to the spatial correction procedure when considering regional fixed effects (column 5) but not when including province fixed effects (column 6). This may reflect spatial correlation in the occurrence of Nazi violence.¹³

Overall, these results suggest that demand, rather than supply side factors, explain the support for communism in the aftermath of the civil war. The Communist Party gained votes in municipalities where the Nazi occupation lasted longer and was more violent, and where citizens were more willing to embrace the cause of radical opposition to the fascist regime, as captured by the dummy variable

¹³Results in Appendix Table D.4, column 1, also show that the relationship between the communist vote and days of occupation is non-linear. As the duration of the occupation increases, the positive relationship with the postwar electoral results is stronger. A municipality with 700 (or more) days of occupation has, on average, 12.7% higher vote share for the communists in 1946 than one with roughly 150 days. Moreover, all results are qualitatively similar or stronger if we restrict the sample to regions where the occupation lasted more than one year for at least one municipality (see column 2).

for being the birthplace of a partisan or a left-wing partisan and by the share of left-wing citizens under surveillance. On the other hand, the actual presence of partisan brigades connected with the Communist Party is not correlated with the communist vote share.

These estimates cannot be taken as entirely causal, however. Some (though not all) of the German violence was in retaliation against previous attacks by partisan troops, or induced by local hostility, so that there could be some omitted variables. Although [Holland \(2008\)](#) and [Gentile \(2015\)](#) stress that the location of elite troops was generally driven by military or logistical concerns (the war against the Allies, or the need to rest and train new conscripts), we cannot rule out that they were sent in areas with stauncher Italian opposition. We now turn to a causal test of these findings through geographic RDD.

6 RDD Causal Effects

This section compares outcomes in municipalities just above and just below the Gothic line. Throughout we report five sets of RDD estimates. In the first four regressions, the control function in the running variable (distance from the line) is expressed as a first and second degree spline polynomial, and the sample is restricted to municipalities within 50 Km and 100 Km from the line. Following [Gelman and Imbens \(2019\)](#), we do not report polynomial specifications of higher degree. The fifth specification is a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth, estimated as in [Calonico et al. \(2017\)](#). As noted above, throughout we include region fixed effects and pre-war vote shares, but results are very similar or stronger without these conditioning variables.

6.1 Balance tests

We start by reporting balance tests for pre-treatment observables (Y_i^{pre}). Results are shown in Appendix Table [D.5](#). Very few estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero, and none of them for more than two out of five estimation methods; therefore, no consistent pattern emerges. Note that almost all of these variables have highly significant estimated coefficients in the OLS regressions estimated in Table [1](#) above, suggesting that they are relevant correlates of political outcomes.

Appendix Table [D.6](#) considers prewar vote shares (Panel A), fascist presence variables (Panel B)

and proxies of opposition to fascism after the last free elections and before the civil war (Panel C). Communist and Socialist vote shares seem to be higher above the line in 1919 and 1921, but very few estimated coefficients are statistically significant. Fascist presence looks balanced above and below the Gothic line. The few estimates statistically significant are very sensitive to the specification and cutoffs considered both in term of magnitude and sign.¹⁴ Given the large number of tests run in Appendix Tables D.5 and D.6, we could have some false rejections of the null that all prewar variables are balanced. This conclusion is also suggested by the placebo tests discussed below, where no systematic unbalance in prewar vote shares is visible (see Appendix Figure D.6). In any case, in what follows when reporting RDD results on the postwar vote shares we always condition on prewar vote shares.

These slight unbalances raise the concern that voters' preferences may have become even more unbalanced during the fascist period. Unfortunately, we do not observe political attitudes in the intervening years. Nevertheless, the estimates in Panel C of Appendix Table D.6 are reassuring in this respect. Here the outcome variables are our proxies of opposition to the regime, namely the shares of citizens under surveillance for political reasons and the dummy variables for the birthplace of partisans. We can never reject that these two variables are balanced around the Gothic line. Note that partisans were disproportionately recruited from the left, and their birthplace is strongly correlated with the postwar communist vote share (see Table 1 above) and with prewar vote shares (Appendix Table D.1). Likewise, the share of citizens under surveillance correlates positively with Communist and Socialist vote shares both in the post-war period (as shown in Table 1 above) and in the prewar period (as shown in Appendix Table D.1).¹⁵

6.2 Election outcomes and persistence

We start by illustrating graphically the difference between communist vs catholic votes in 1946 around the Gothic line. In Appendix Figure D.7 we plot the difference between the communist and catholic vote shares in 1946. Darker shades correspond to a larger communist vs catholic vote (black indicates

¹⁴Notice for example Fascist 1924: comparing Column 2 and Column 4 where the only difference is the polynomial considered.

¹⁵As discussed below, we also do not find any significant unbalances on the presence of partisan brigades.

a missing observation). Overall, the figure suggests that a longer German occupation is associated with left-wing radicalism, compared to what happens below the line.

The formal RDD tests reported in Table 2 confirm this visual impression. Electoral outcomes refer to the 1946 election for the constitutional assembly and the 1948 national election. In 1946 the Communist Party ran alone, while in 1948 it merged with the Socialist Party. For the sake of comparison, we also report the sum of socialist and communist votes in 1946. As noted above, we always include region fixed effects and the vote shares of communists and socialists, and the catholics, in 1919, 1921 and 1924.¹⁶ Estimates not conditional on postwar vote shares are qualitatively similar or have larger estimated coefficients (see Appendix Table D.10). Replacing the region with province fixed effects has negligible effects on the estimates (Appendix Table D.9), and dropping region fixed effects all together also does not affect the estimates (Appendix Table D.10). Unless indicated otherwise, in what follows we always condition on pre-war vote shares and region fixed effects.

The results are very stark. For all estimation methods and for all indicators, the average vote share of the Communist Party (or of communists and socialists together) is significantly larger above the Gothic line. The size of the RDD coefficient is also large, generally 6-10 percentage points, depending on the estimation method and the outcome measure. Within 50 Km of the Gothic line, the Communist Party obtained on average about 36.7% of the votes, thus the effect of being above the line corresponds to around 20% of the average vote share. Taking into account that being just North vs just South of the line corresponds to an additional half year of occupation, if the effect was linear in time, one more year of Nazi occupation would increase the vote share of the extreme left by 40%. This is approximately four times as much as the effect estimated in the above OLS regressions. Note that the effect of being North of the line is stronger on the communist votes alone than on the communist and socialist votes combined, suggesting that the effect is mainly a shift to the extreme left.

The larger communist vote is mainly at the expenses of the moderate catholic party. According to

¹⁶As indicated in the footnotes to some Tables, for the 1946 *Right Wing* vote shares some times the region fixed effects and some covariates are not included because the estimates do not converge.

Table 2: **RDD Causal Effects – Electoral Outcomes**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	8.162 (2.328)*** 275	7.376 (2.021)*** 742	10.442 (2.894)*** 275	6.011 (2.612)** 742	8.839 (2.463)*** 247
Communist and Socialist 1946	6.367 (2.477)** 275	10.965 (2.287)*** 742	5.698 (3.143)* 275	6.680 (2.995)** 742	5.587 (2.497)** 337
Communist and Socialist 1948	7.126 (2.609)*** 275	11.585 (2.274)*** 742	8.997 (3.276)*** 275	6.683 (2.962)** 742	7.098 (2.506)*** 299
Catholic 1946	-0.610 (1.910) 275	-1.548 (1.557) 742	-3.999 (2.520) 275	-0.601 (2.085) 742	-1.286 (2.045) 443
Catholic 1948	-3.840 (2.174)* 275	-7.152 (1.863)*** 742	-8.178 (2.921)*** 275	-3.392 (2.381) 742	-4.185 (2.233)* 370
Right Wing 1946	-0.110 (0.788) 93	-0.323 (0.652) 262	1.221 (1.277) 93	0.255 (0.859) 262	0.904 (0.529)** 37
Right Wing 1948	-0.363 (0.248) 224	-0.395 (0.198)** 599	-0.158 (0.305) 224	-0.454 (0.265)* 599	-0.201 (0.189) 263

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects, with the exception of regression for *Right Wing* in 1946. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

the estimates, the catholic vote share is systematically lower above the Gothic line, particularly in the 1948 election when the effect of being North of the line varies between -4 and -8 percentage points (4 percentage points correspond to about 7% of the catholic vote share within 50 Km of the Gothic line). The vote share for the extreme right is balanced around the Gothic line in both 1946 and 1948. Note that the estimated gain in the communist vote is generally larger than the catholic loss, implying that other parties (the Socialist Party or other centrist parties) lost votes to the communists North of the

line.¹⁷ Moreover, the composition of the center-right vote North of the line shifted toward the extreme right, since the catholic party lost votes while the extreme right did not. Thus, overall the longer Nazi occupation and civil war induced a shift to the extreme left in the immediate postwar elections, and increased the polarization of the electorate.


Appendix Figure D.3 illustrates graphically the main polynomial regressions reported in Table 2, using a second order polynomial to fit the data. Each dot represents the average vote share in municipalities within 10 Km intervals North/South of the Gothic line. A discontinuity is visible, and it is particularly strong for the communist vote.

These political effects lasted until the end of the First Republic in the early 1990s. Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of RDD coefficients and confidence intervals for all elections between 1946 and 1987, estimated by local linear regressions conditioning on prewar election outcomes and region fixed effects (the last column in Table 2). As shown in Appendix Figure D.4, results are very similar when conditioning on province (rather than region) fixed effects. The left-wing parties retained a gain above the Gothic line, that shrinks from about 9 toward 5 percentage points in the late 1980s and remains statistically different from zero for several decades. The catholic party bears a loss of votes of 4-5 percentage points, also declining slightly in absolute value and statistically significant throughout much of the period. The extreme right-wing parties also lose votes above the line, but only from the 1950s onwards, and this effect too is quite persistent. Overall, the political effects of being exposed to a longer Nazi occupation North of the Gothic line are very large and persistent.

Robustness checks In Appendix C we report various robustness checks. As apparent from Appendix Figure D.7, voting outcomes exhibit some patterns in the East-West direction. We thus want to be sure that the RDD estimates only reflect the impact of being North vs South of the line, without being contaminated by other geographic patterns in the data. For this purpose, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we estimate the same regressions with a first and second degree spline polynomial in distance that also includes as regressors a first and second degree polynomial in latitude and longitude, as well as the interaction of latitude and longitude and the same interaction squared.

¹⁷The vote share of the small (centrist) Republican party is also lower by about 2-3 percentage points North of the line, while there is no significant discontinuity in voters' turnout (results available upon request).

Figure 1: Long-Term Persistence – RDD



Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regressions as in the last column of Table 2, for all national elections from 1946 to 1987 and controlling for prewar electoral results and Region Fixed Effects, with the exception of regression for *Right Wing* in 1946. Data for the Communist Party are missing in 1948 as it ran with the Socialist Party.

All results remain very similar, as shown in Appendix Table D.11. Second, we split the Gothic line in 25 Km intervals and we test our hypothesis including fixed effects for each interval (here we omit the region fixed effects). Appendix Table D.12 displays the results. All estimates are robust in terms of significance and magnitude.

Appendix Figure D.5 reports placebo tests for the main variables of interest to test whether our results might be attributed to random chance rather than a true causal effect. We shifted the location of the Gothic line North or South of its true position. Estimation is by local linear regression as in the last column of Table 2. The results indicate a clear discontinuity in the estimated coefficient at the true location of the Gothic line, but not at the fake discontinuities. We also estimated the same placebo tests on prewar electoral outcomes. Here no clear pattern is evident, and the true location of the Gothic line generally does not stand out relative to the other position – see Appendix Figure D.6.

This again corroborates the conclusion that no structural unbalance of pre-treatment political attitudes is evident.

The main results are also robust to the method of dealing with missing observations. Appendix Table D.13 restricts the sample by only including municipalities for which we have data on all three prewar elections (thus avoiding any imputation), and the results remain very similar.

Finally, there is generally no evidence of amplification effects, meaning that the treatment effect of being North of the line is homogeneous across municipalities, irrespective of their prewar vote share (Appendix Table D.14), whether there were more citizens under surveillance or whether they gave birth to a partisan (results available upon request). This too supports our identification strategy, because it suggests that the results do not reflect pre-existing trends.

Overall, these robustness checks confirm that the positive effect on the communist vote share is very robust, while the inference that the increase in the communist vote is only at the expense of the catholic vote (rather than also at the expense of the socialists or of other moderate parties) is more sensitive to the sample and to the estimation method.

6.3 Mechanisms and contextual factors

How could the prolonged German occupation and associated civil war have such important political effects? We now address this question, reporting the RDD estimates for alternative contextual factors as outcomes.

Partisan brigades. As discussed above, partisan brigades were disproportionately associated with the Communist party. This might give an advantage to the Communist party, who could exploit their grassroots network to build local party organizations. The Nazi occupation might have enhanced this advantage, because partisan brigades remained operative for longer North of the line.

We have already seen that the OLS regressions do not support this argument, since the presence of brigades is not correlated with election outcomes in the full sample of Italian municipalities. Similar negative results hold when comparing outcomes above and below the Gothic line. Table 3 considers as proxy of partisan activity around the Gothic line the presence of partisan brigades (left-wing or

other).¹⁸ All of these outcomes are balanced around the Gothic line, except for the presence of non left-wing brigades, which seems higher South of the line. Similarly, as shown in Panel B of Appendix D.6, municipalities that were birthplaces of a partisan are balanced around the Gothic line. These results are also apparent from Appendix Figure D.8 and D.9.

Table 3: **RDD Contextual Factors – Presence of Partisan Brigades**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Presence of partisan brigades	-0.147 (0.121)	0.103 (0.096)	-0.311 (0.186)*	-0.120 (0.128)	-0.235 (0.162)
	275	742	275	742	149
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	0.004 (0.127)	0.165 (0.098)*	-0.169 (0.188)	0.054 (0.132)	-0.142 (0.167)
	275	742	275	742	160
Presence of other partisan brigades	-0.152 (0.069)**	-0.063 (0.052)	-0.142 (0.067)**	-0.173 (0.070)**	-0.153 (0.060)***
	275	742	275	742	283

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *Presence of partisan brigades*: Dummy equal to 1 if the area of the municipality intersects the area of operation of the partisan brigade (left-wing or other). See Appendix B for a description of left-wing vs other partisan brigades, and for data sources.

Next, we ask whether the presence of active brigades amplified the effect of a longer Nazi occupation in favor the Communist party. As shown in Table 4, this is not the case: the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the presence of a left-wing brigade and being North of the line is either negative or insignificant (or both) when the outcome is the Communist vote share, while it is positive and significant when the outcome is the vote share of the right-wing. Thus, the presence of partisan brigades dampened the effect of a longer Nazi occupation on the vote shares of extreme-left parties. This finding is inconsistent with the idea that a longer Nazi occupation favored the Communist party because it could exploit the partisan brigades to build grassroots local organizations.

Violence. Finally, we ask whether Nazi violence was higher North of the line. The recorded episodes only capture some of the violence actually born by civilians. In particular, forced labor,

¹⁸We obtain the same results (available upon request) using the closest distance to partisan brigades (left-wing or other).

Table 4: RDD Causal Effects by Presence of Partisan Brigades

	Polynomial Regression							
	First order				Second order			
	50 Km		100 Km		50 Km		100 Km	
up	up*left brig.	up	up*left brig.	up	up*left brig.	up	up*left brig.	
Communist 1946	7.358 (2.957)**	1.158 (2.731)	7.378 (2.198)***	0.800 (1.773)	9.870 (3.451)***	0.720 (2.673)	5.661 (2.875)**	0.618 (1.795)
	275	275	742	742	275	275	742	742
Communist and Socialist 1946	9.798 (3.159)***	-4.905 (2.775)*	12.743 (2.338)***	-3.920 (1.641)**	9.807 (3.666)***	-5.254 (2.729)*	9.317 (3.140)***	-4.058 (1.658)**
	275	275	742	742	275	275	742	742
Communist and Socialist 1948	8.522 (3.315)**	-1.988 (3.042)	12.603 (2.384)***	-1.860 (1.824)	10.907 (3.779)***	-2.475 (2.955)	7.916 (3.109)**	-1.862 (1.817)
	275	275	742	742	275	275	742	742
Catholic 1946	-0.607 (2.474)	0.026 (2.217)	-1.764 (1.742)	0.441 (1.330)	-4.637 (3.006)	0.482 (2.181)	-1.026 (2.341)	0.663 (1.350)
	275	275	742	742	275	275	742	742
Catholic 1948	-3.587 (2.880)	-0.356 (2.545)	-7.986 (2.036)***	1.484 (1.481)	-8.514 (3.523)**	0.300 (2.439)	-4.350 (2.629)*	1.437 (1.481)
	275	275	742	742	275	275	742	742
Right parties 1946	-0.649 (0.842)	0.643 (0.264)**	-0.535 (0.692)	0.233 (0.167)	0.716 (1.369)	0.496 (0.206)**	0.042 (0.909)	0.209 (0.173)
	93	93	262	262	93	93	262	262
Right parties 1948	-0.575 (0.290)**	0.312 (0.206)	-0.516 (0.210)**	0.237 (0.127)*	-0.371 (0.341)	0.301 (0.205)	-0.638 (0.285)**	0.277 (0.128)**
	224	224	599	599	224	224	599	599

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line (column up) and the interaction between a dummy for the presence of a left-wing brigade and being North of the line (column up*left brig). Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

evacuations of villages, and deportations are not included in our classification of episodes of violence. These other forms of violence were probably more diffuse North of the line, where the occupation lasted longer. Even where the violence did not actually occur, the threat of being hurt and the stress of the foreign occupation lasted longer North of the line, and this too could be reflected in political attitudes.

To capture at least some of these other forms of violence, in Panel A of Table 5 the outcome refers to the number of deported individuals arrested in the municipality. The estimated coefficient is almost always positive and, even if not always significant, it suggests that there were more deportations North of the line.

Table 5 reports also RDD estimates for the occurrence of at least one episode of German or fascist violence in the municipality, disaggregated by whether they occurred before or after the end of October 1944, that is, the month when the Allies stopped South of the Gothic line. Appendix Table D.15 distinguishes episodes by whether a majority of the victims were partisans or civilians in.

Episodes of violence dated after October 1944 are significantly more widespread above the line, as expected, but episodes dated October 1944 or earlier occur more frequently below the line (the Germans also committed several atrocities during their retreat in the Summer of 1944). As a result, the overall occurrence of at least one episode is roughly balanced around the Gothic line. However, late-in-the-conflict violence was both more indiscriminate and more politically connotated, since it was associated with a more ruthless phase of the war and with the birth of the Italian fascist action squads.

Table 5: **RDD Contextual Factors – Episodes of Violence**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A. Number of deported people arrested in the municipality					
Entire Period	2.108 (1.249)* 275	0.669 (1.451) 742	-0.395 (2.357) 275	2.757 (1.345)** 742	0.443 (1.631) 229
Panel B. At least one violence episode					
Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945	0.262 (0.124)** 275	0.299 (0.082)*** 742	0.198 (0.177) 275	0.249 (0.125)** 742	0.281 (0.126)* 525
Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944	-0.230 (0.103)** 275	-0.035 (0.080) 742	-0.274 (0.155)* 275	-0.185 (0.108)* 742	-0.258 (0.139)* 155
Entire Period (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	-0.124 (0.079) 275	0.053 (0.072) 742	-0.129 (0.114) 275	-0.095 (0.085) 742	-0.157 (0.112) 160

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *At least one violence episode*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence. January 1943–August 1945 is the entire period for which we have episodes recorded. January 1943–October 1944 (November 1944–August 1945) is the period before (after) the battlefront moved to the Gothic line.

7 Survey data

To assess whether the legacy of the Nazi occupation is still detectable, in November-December 2015 we conducted a survey of residents near the Gothic line. Our goal is to explore whether left-wing respondents today have a stronger memory of the civil war, and whether this memory is stronger

North of the line, where the civil war lasted longer and was more intense. We interviewed 2,525 individuals, with at least 20 years of residence in their current municipality and above 40 years of age. The survey was conducted in 242 municipalities within 50 Km from the Gothic line (137 above and 105 below the line). All municipalities had a population of less than 25,000 inhabitants in 2011, and at least 7 individuals were interviewed in each municipality. The telephone interview lasted on average about 10 minutes, and contained about 30 questions (see the Appendix Tables [D.16](#) and [D.17](#)).

We start by exploring the correlations between individual political positions and the memory of the civil war in the whole sample of respondents. OLS estimates are shown in Appendix Table [D.18](#). In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the individual political position is left or center-left, and estimation is by Probit. In columns (3) and (4) estimation is by ordered Probit, and the dependent variable equals 2 if the political position is left, 1 if center-left, and 0 otherwise. Throughout we control for gender, age, years of education, and dummy variables for homeownership, college education, having children, vital record, being North of the Gothic line and 1921 Region fixed effects. As expected, individuals with a family member who took part in the civil war, or who suffered from WWII violence, or living in a municipality that commemorated the resistance are more likely to be on the left, irrespective of the specification. A left-wing position is also more likely if political attitudes when young were congruent with their father's position. Altogether these results suggest that a left-wing position is indeed more likely for individuals who retain a stronger memory of the civil war, and indirectly support the idea that a longer exposure to the civil war left a persistent mark on political attitudes in favor of the Communist Party.

Next, we consider RDD estimates, comparing residents in municipalities above and below the Gothic line. Appendix Table [D.19](#) reports balance tests around the Gothic for several socio-demographic variables and for political preferences. All variables are balanced, except perhaps a slight unbalance in sex, age and marital status, which anyway is not robust across estimation methods. There is also no evidence that today respondents North of the line are more likely to vote left, compared to those South of the line. This difference between our survey and the historical voting outcomes is likely to reflect the evolution of the Italian political system in the Second Republic (the Communist Party no longer exists, and its current re-incarnation, the Democratic Party, is a moderate party).

Panel A of Appendix Table D.20 shows that the memory of the Civil war trends to be stronger North of the Gothic line, as expected. Except for having a family member who was a victim of violence, all estimated coefficients are positive, and some of them are statistically different from zero.

In the same spirit, we attempted to elicit anti-German sentiments by asking questions on wedding preferences by nationality, and questions on the Euro. Appendix Table D.20, Panel B presents the RDD estimates, after recoding all the variables so that a positive coefficient indicates anti-German sentiment North of the line. All estimates have the expected positive sign, except for wedding preferences of French vs German. Only a few of them are statistically significant, however, suggesting only weak evidence of more anti-German sentiments.

8 Conclusion

The civil war and the Nazi occupation of Italy occurred at a critical historical juncture, just before the birth of a new democracy and the establishment of a new party system. For the first time in a generation Italian citizens were choosing political affiliations and forming political identities. We exploit the geographic heterogeneity in the duration and occurrence of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war, to study how these traumatic events shaped the newly-born political system.

Our main finding is that, where the foreign occupation and the civil war lasted longer and were more intense, the radical left emerged as a much stronger political force. This effect was not just a temporary reaction to war traumas but persisted until the late 1980s.

What accounts for this large impact? And why is it so persistent? We discuss two alternative explanations. They both revolve around the fact that the Communist Party was more active in the resistance movement. The first explanation stresses individual political attitudes. In reaction to longer and more intense exposure to the violent Nazi occupation, voters identified with the radical political forces that stood up more forcefully against the enemy, and that in the end won the civil war. The second explanation emphasizes party organizations: the partisan brigades gave the communists an advantage in building grassroots political organizations in the areas where the resistance movement was active for longer.

Although not conclusive, our evidence is more consistent with the first mechanism, operating

through voters' attitudes and identities. First, there is no correlation between the presence of partisan brigades and voting outcomes; this is true both in the OLS regressions and in the RDD estimates. Second, the pro-Mussolini right-wing parties turned out to be slightly weaker, not stronger, in the areas under Nazi occupation (although the extreme right lost fewer votes than the catholics in the areas under longer German occupation). Furthermore, other pieces of evidence support a demand side mechanism. First, in the sample of all Italian municipalities, there is a strong and robust correlation between the communist vote and two indicators of Nazi violence (the occurrence of episodes of violence by Germans or fascists, and the location of two very violent elite German divisions). Violence episodes are also larger North of the line in the final phase of WWII, when the civil war was harsher—although violence throughout all war years is balanced around the line. Second, a survey conducted in 2015 in municipalities around the Gothic line reveals that individuals with a stronger memory of the civil war are more likely to lean to the left. Moreover, there is a stronger memory of the civil war in the municipalities above the line, which endured a longer Nazi occupation.

Overall, our results have several implications of general interest. First, civil war and widespread political violence reshape political identities in favor of the political groups that emerge as winners from the struggle. This goes to the benefit of more extremist political forces, which typically are more involved in violent conflict. Second, these effects are very long-lasting, and persist even when the cleavages that gave rise to the civil war have disappeared. Third, these findings indirectly support an approach to voters' behavior that has a well-established tradition in political science (*e.g.*, [Campbell et al., 1960](#) and [Achen and Bartels, 2016](#)), but is more at odds with conventional theories in political economics. Citizens vote for the parties with which they identify on cultural, moral, or social grounds. Political identification, in turn, is also shaped by intense and widely shared emotional experiences, and once formed it evolves slowly over time.

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A Online Appendix – Historical Background

This section summarizes the main events that led to the birth of the post-WWII Italian political system. Since we compare the elections in the immediate postwar period to the latest free elections before the fascist dictatorship, we start with a brief account of the Italian political system before the advent of fascism. We then turn to the WWII period—discussing the nature of the foreign occupation and of the civil war (i.e., our treatment)—and finally to the postwar Italian political system.^{A.1}

A.1 Prewar period

At the end of World War I, Italy was a constitutional monarchy and the government was supported by a parliamentary majority of liberal-moderate representatives elected in 1913. Socialist and catholic movements were emerging, however. These new parties appealed to Italian voters who had only recently been enfranchised.

Before the consolidation of Mussolini’s dictatorship, three free elections were held in 1919, 1921, and 1924 under universal male suffrage. Average turnout was around 60%. In 1919 and 1921, the electoral system was proportional, but voters could cast a preference vote for candidates running in different lists (the so called “panachage” system). In 1924, the electoral system entailed a large majority premium that gave two thirds of the seats to the party gaining a relative majority in a single national district, and assigned the remaining seats to the other parties according to a proportional rule. Thus, none of these electoral rules was identical to the pure proportional system with preference votes created after WWII, although all of them had important elements of proportionality.

In the 1919 election, the Italian political system was essentially split between three groups: A liberal-moderate coalition representing the political elites that had ruled Italy in the previous decades, and two emerging and antagonistic political groups, the catholics and the socialists. These new parties were on different positions on many issues, and were unable to form viable political alliances between them. In 1919 the liberal coalition retained a relative majority but, despite a large absenteeism rate, it

^{A.1}A more detailed historical account of these periods and episodes is provided in [Romanelli \(1995\)](#), [Leoni \(2001\)](#), [Baldissara \(2000\)](#), [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2000\)](#), [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2006\)](#), [Gentile \(2015\)](#), [Pavone \(1991\)](#), and [Matta \(1996\)](#).

lost many votes and seats to the socialist and catholic parties. This outcome led to a short period of instability, which resulted in a new election in 1921. The main novelties of the 1921 election were the gains obtained by the fascist candidates, who ran in the same lists as the traditional liberal bloc, and the fact that the Communist Party entered the ballot for the first time.^{A.2} The votes and seats obtained by the catholics and socialists were roughly unchanged (or slightly lower) compared to 1919.

After a period of political violence and instability, in 1922 Mussolini was asked by the King to form a government. He received a vote of confidence by a parliamentary majority that included the catholic party, while the socialists (and the small communist group) voted against him. Mussolini soon changed the electoral law to a proportional system with a large majority premium for the party with a relative majority (see above). In 1924, a new election was held, and the fascist party obtained two thirds of the votes. Although formally free and regular, this election was held in a climate of violence and intimidation. Within a few years Mussolini further consolidated his power into a dictatorship.

Elections in 1919, 1921, and 1924 are not easily comparable between each other, but each of them displays within-municipality variation that conveys information on the underlying political preferences of the (local) population. General elections were also held in 1929 and 1934. Following a parliamentary reform enacted in 1928, these elections took the form of a referendum with only the Fascist party running and with a voting system that did not guarantee the secrecy of the vote.^{A.3} Moreover, to our knowledge, no data are available at the municipal level. We thus ignore these last two elections.

^{A.2}The Italian Communist Party was founded on January 21, 1919 in Livorno as a split from the socialist movement. This was clearly a split from the extreme left as the reference model of the new party was the Bolshevik Revolution, and it was motivated by the claim “we want to do as in Russia.”

^{A.3}Voters could vote either “Yes” or “No” to approve the list of deputies appointed by the Grand Council of Fascism. Voters were provided with two equally sized sheets, white outside, inside bearing the words “Do you approve the list of members appointed by the Grand National Council of Fascism?” The electoral sheet with the “Yes” was also accompanied by the Italian flag and a fascist symbol, the one with the “No” had no symbol. Inside the voting booth there was a first ballot box where the voter left the discarded sheet and then delivered to the scrutineers the chosen sheet, so that they would ensure that it was “carefully sealed.” Turnout was around 90% and approval of the fascist list over 98%.

A.2 War period

A.2.1 The Gothic line

We can date the beginning of the Italian “civil war” ([Pavone, 1991](#)) in July 1943, when the Allies landed in Sicily. Since then and until May 1945, Italy was ravaged by war. On one side were the Germans, supported by the forces that remained loyal to Mussolini. On the opposite side were the Allies, supported by the Italian resistance movement (operating in the areas occupied by the Germans). Throughout this period, the overall estimated casualties were about 360,000, of which about 155,000 Italians. The Italian victims of the Nazi occupation and of the civil war were 70,000–80,000. Of these, at least 10,000 were civilians killed by Nazis or fascists, about 30,000 were resistance fighters, and about as many were fascists (see [Gentile, 2015](#), pp. 4–5). In addition, about 40,000 civilians were deported to Germany (of which 7,500 were Jews), 90% of these died (see [Rochat, 2005](#), p. 443).

The battlefield moved overtime, but it remained stuck for several months near a defensive line prepared by the Germans in Central Italy, the so called “Gothic line.” Appendix Figure [D.10](#) illustrates the areas under German occupation, by number of days, as well as the Gothic line. Northern-Central Italy remained under German occupation for over two years, while the South for two to five months. As can be seen from Appendix Figure [D.10](#), the Germans were able to stop the Allies for several months between Rome and Naples (along the so called “Gustav Line,” which was held by the Germans between December 1943 and May 1944). From there, the battlefield moved rapidly toward Northern-Central Italy, in the area between Florence and Bologna, where the Germans had prepared a strong and continuous line of defense. Preparation for the Gothic line had began well in advance, while the Germans were still trying to defend the area South of Rome. This allowed the Germans to prepare an effective defense system, which stopped the Allies between the Summer of 1944 and the Spring of 1945. The Gothic line was conceived as the last defense for German retreat. The barrier extended from the Western coast between *La Spezia* and *Massa* to the Eastern coast between *Pesaro* and *Rimini*. Basically, the line consisted of defensive positions and bunkers, hundreds of thousands of mines and booby traps, and a continuous anti-tank ditch almost six miles long; “Allied aerial reconnaissance photographs showed a dense network of machine-gun posts, gun positions and ditches.” ([Holland,](#)

2008, p. 301).^{A.4}

As can be seen from Appendix Figure D.10, during the Summer of 1944 the battlefront remained stuck in an area about 50 Km South of the Gothic line. The continuous line in Appendix Figure D.10 is the Gothic, which was held by the Germans between November 1944 and April 1945. The line was finally overcome by the Allies in April 1945, and in May the Germans surrendered control of Italy. The battles around the Gothic line brought much destruction to the area, with heavy casualties amongst Germans (around 48,000), Allies (32,000), and Italian fascists, partisans and civilians (altogether 30,000–40,000), see Montemaggi (1980). As discussed below, the Allies were extremely close to overcome the Gothic line before the Winter of 1944, but a combination of hard weather and divergences between the US and UK—with the former prioritizing the invasion of France and the latter paying more attention to the Mediterranean—froze the battlefront at the Gothic line for six months.

Appendix Figure D.2 zooms in the area around the Gothic line, illustrating the size and elevation of each municipality and how the battlefront moved during the Summer of 1944. There are three demarcation lines. The line labeled “Allies” is where the Allies stopped between August and mid-September 1944. The line labeled “Fall 1944” is the original line set up by the Germans. Between late August and mid-September 1944 the Allies succeeded in breaching this line (so called operation “Olive”). The line labeled “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945” is where the Germans managed to contain the US-British offensive. From the end of October onwards, the Allies and the Germans were fighting along this line. It was finally breached in April 1945. Our RDD is on the Northern-most line “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945,” which was held for the longest period.

For the sake of our empirical analysis, it is important to note that the position of the last line of defense was not only the outcome of a German decision. It was also largely due to random events, which forced the Allies to stop their offensive between late October 1944 and the Spring of 1945. In August 1944, the Allies withdrew several divisions from the Italian front to launch a new offensive in Southern France. This decision was highly controversial: It was supported by the Americans, who wanted to create a distraction for the Germans from the ongoing battles in the rest of France, but it was opposed by the British, who instead leaned toward a stronger offensive in Italy. The American

^{A.4}It is estimated that over 50,000 Italian forced workers were involved in building the Gothic line (Ronchetti, 2009).

point of view prevailed, and this weakened the efforts of the Allies in Italy at a critical point in time (see [Churchill, 1959](#)). A second important random event was the weather, which deteriorated harshly in late October. These are the words used by Churchill to describe those critical moments in October 1944: “The weather was appalling. Heavy rains had swollen the numberless rivers and irrigation channels [...]. Off the roads movement was often impossible. It was with the greatest difficulty that the troops toiled forward. [...] Not until the spring were the armies rewarded with the victory they had so well earned, and so nearly won, in the autumn” (see [Churchill, 1959](#), p.839).

A.2.2 Foreign occupation and resistance movement

In the North, Mussolini tried to revamp the fascist regime by claiming statehood for the areas under German occupation (with the exclusion of two territories directly annexed to the German Reich, close to the Alps and to the Northern Adriatic coastland) and by setting the new capital of his *Repubblica Sociale Italiana* (RSI) in the small town of *Salò*. But this experiment resulted in little more than a Nazi-backed puppet state, dependent entirely upon Germany and with no autonomous domestic or foreign policy of any sort. The Nazi occupation of Northern Italy is unanimously deemed as violent and extractive by the historical literature. As Rudolf Rahn, the German diplomat who was the plenipotentiary to the RSI, put it: “Everything in occupied Italy must be exploited by us for our war effort” (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 111). This meant coerced labor and deportations, handing over of all gold reserves, shutting down of factories to ship equipment to Germany, full control of the remaining factories for military purposes, and food reserves (if any) packed off to Germany.

In Allied-held Italy, all areas close to the battlefield were directly run by the Allied Military Government (AMG) and then, as the front advanced up toward the North, they were passed back to the authority of the Italian government, formally appointed by the King. At first, under prime minister Pietro Badoglio, the political legitimacy of the government was weak, since the monarchy was implicated with the fascist regime. But then the political parties outlawed by the fascist regime and active in the resistance movement (see below) gradually took responsibility and joined the governments lead by Ivanoe Bonomi from June 1944 until the end of WWII.

Although the autonomy of the government was severely limited by the Allied Control Commis-

sion, self-determination was much stronger South of the line and, most importantly, free speech was moving Italy closer to democracy. In particular, the Bonomi government started having greater responsibility after September 1944, when Churchill and Roosevelt made a joined declaration shaping the future path toward Italy's self-determination and economic recovery. The sharp divide between the political (and psychological) situation North vs South of the Gothic line is best described by Italian lieutenant Eugenio Corti (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 251, italics ours): "I wondered if the British and Americans realized that *behind their lines* one could feel a respect for men. It felt like this whenever one saw notices where occupation troops threatened fines and at most jail sentences that *on the other side* were invariably punished with death. We would no longer hear talk of executions, and this fear—which makes man nothing more than a beast—would no longer hang over us."

Throughout the civil war period, the resistance movement grew rapidly, from a few thousands of fighters in the Fall of 1943 to several tens of thousands one year later. In addition, it is estimated that around 20,000 civilians were directly connected to the resistance movement, even if only few of them nested into political coordination (see [Bocca, 2012](#), p. 265). Although the movement was spontaneous and did not have strong party affiliations, the leaders of the various groups were active members of political parties that the fascist regime had disbanded. Three main political affiliations can be identified: The left-wing groups, linked with the communist and socialist parties; the catholic groups, linked with the Christian Democratic party; and other centrist groups, linked with liberals that had opposed Mussolini. In addition there were several other small groups with no explicit political affiliation.^{A.5} The left-wing brigades, and to a smaller extent the catholic, were by far the largest and more active organizations. The political parties active in the resistance movement joined forces in the "National Liberation Committee," which gave crucial support to the Bonomi governments.

In the North, the civil-war nature of the conflict was reinforced by the decision of Mussolini to give birth to the "black brigades," paramilitary groups directly run by the Fascist Party, who also attracted tens of thousands of volunteers, although poorly trained and equipped.

According to historical accounts, the effects of German occupation on the civilian population

^{A.5}In our data set referring to the area around the Gothic line, we count 115 communist brigades (*Garibaldi*), 44 other left-wing brigades (*Matteotti* and *Giustizia e Libertà*), and 59 non-marxist brigades (*Fiamme Verdi* and others).

were not evenly distributed in time and space. [Gentile \(2015\)](#), in particular, stresses two stylized facts. First, combat troops near the front line were more ruthless and prone to hurt civilians than other troops in charge of logistics and administration. This reflected both the selection and composition of such troops, as well as the additional stress and danger that they faced. Second, following hierarchical orders, the German attitudes and tactics changed over time, and became particularly aggressive toward partisans and civilians alike from the Summer of 1944 onwards, when the danger posed by the resistance movement became more apparent. On June 17, 1944 Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in chief in the Mediterranean, issued an order promising indemnity to soldiers who should exceed “normal restraint” in the choice of repression methods.^{A.6}

Our (local) source of exogenous variation—the Gothic line—captures a treatment made up of both (i) the extractive Nazi occupation that characterized the last period of WWII and (ii) the civil war between the fascist and partisan brigades. The compound nature of this treatment reinforces its occurrence, as both elements operate along the same spectrum of political alignment. The control group includes municipalities occupied by the Allies, where free speech was allowed and self-determination by Italian authorities gradually developed.

A.3 Postwar period

The resistance movement and the political parties to which it was linked played a key role in the immediate aftermath of the war. Several leaders of the movement became prominent political figures and were elected in the postwar Parliament for several legislatures. The civil war contributed to shape the political identity of these parties and gave them a visibility and popularity that they had not enjoyed before, also due to the repression imposed by the fascist regime.

The first key decision of the new political leadership was to hold an election for a constitutional assembly. The election was held in 1946, simultaneously with a referendum on whether to abandon the monarchy. Monarchy lost and Italy became a Republic. With this election, suffrage became universal, thus women had the right to vote for the first time. The electoral rule for the constitutional

^{A.6}Nazi authorities also tried to make this clear to the Italian population. In the Summer of 1944, German planes dropped leaflets over Central Italy with the warning: “Whoever knows the place where a band of rebels is in hiding and does not immediately inform the German Army, will be shot. Whoever gives food or shelter to a band or to individual rebels, will be shot. Every house in which rebels are found or have stayed, will be blown up” (see [Holland, 2008](#), p. 145).

assembly and for all subsequent elections until 1992 was proportional. All the main parties presented lists of candidates at the constitutional assembly, and the party system did not change significantly afterward. Hence, the election for the constitutional assembly is comparable to subsequent political elections. The first regular election was held in 1948. The only difference in party labels is that in 1948 the communist and socialist parties ran together under the label of “Popular Front,” whereas they had run separately in the 1946 constitutional election. In 1953 and in subsequent elections they split again. Monarchist parties progressively disappeared from the political scene; the last election in which they ran was in 1968. On the extreme right, a party close to the fascists, *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI), was founded on December 26, 1946 and appeared on the ballot in the 1948 election, but consolidated its vote share (around 5–7%) only from the 1953 election onwards.

The political system that emerged in the late 1940s reflected the legacy of the civil war in several respects. First, as already noted, most political leaders had played an important role in the resistance movement, at least in the period 1943–45. Second, the party system was highly polarized. On the left the largest party were the communists (the biggest communist party in Western countries), which at the time had strong ideological and financial links with the Soviet Union, while the extreme right remained loyal to the fascist regime.^{A.7} The Italian Communist Party always maintained strong links with the Soviet regime; for instance, it supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, most of its leaders received training in Moscow, and financial aids from the Soviet Union reached the Italian communists as late as in the early 1980s (Cervetti, 1999). Also on economic policy, the Communist Party maintained an extremist stance until the early 1980s, for instance opposing the Bill of Workers’ Rights in 1970 (as it would have tempered and delayed the fall of capitalism) and the entry of Italy in the European monetary system in 1979. Third, and partly as a result of such ideological polarization, one of the main goals of the Constitutional assembly was to create a very inclusive and consensual political system, to minimize the risk of violent conflict. This resulted in a strictly proportional system, perfect bicameralism, and several checks and balances that diluted executive powers.

The main features of the Italian postwar political system remained roughly unchanged until the

^{A.7}Until the early 1990s, the two biggest parties were the Christian Democrats, the ruling party overall of this period, with average vote shares of 35–40%, and the Communist Party, whose vote share grew from 15–20% right after the war to more than 30% in 1976. The vote share of the Socialist Party oscillated around 10–15%.

early 1990s, when several things changed. First, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Italian Communist Party made a credible and pronounced shift toward social democracy. Second, the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party collapsed under the weight of corruption scandals, leaving room for new moderate forces led by Silvio Berlusconi. Third, the electoral rule was changed to a mixed-member system. Our analysis ends just on the edge of this transition.

B Online Appendix – Data Sources and Description

The unit of observation is the municipality. We excluded the small region of Aosta Valley from our sample, because it always had a different electoral system. Moreover, its political scene has always been dominated by local parties. Geographic analysis used the Geographical Information Software (GIS) on the Italian 2001 administrative division map for what concerns municipalities structure (Source: ISTAT). In the main analysis we include 1921 Province or Region Fixed effects (Source: Elesh.it)

B.1 Political outcomes

Prewar political variables: We collected data on political outcomes before the war, for the elections held in 1919, 1921, and 1924. Here the source is [Corbetta and Piretti \(2009\)](#), who carried out a serious and meticulous work of reconstruction for that period. The Communist Party was very small in the 1921 and 1924 elections (and it did not exist in 1919), so we lump together the socialist and communist vote in the pre-fascist period using [Leoni \(2001\)](#) as reference. The right-wing vote cannot be separately measured in 1921, since fascists were running together with the more traditional and moderate liberals in that election. Hence for the pre-fascist period we only collect the *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist* variables. Since there are several missing observations, in our baseline analysis we fill the missing observations in each election exploiting the remaining two elections plus additional observables. Thus, to fill the missing observations in, say, vote shares for catholics in 1924 we impute predicted values of an OLS regression of the available vote shares on non-missing vote shares for catholics in 1919 and/or 1921 plus the following observables: Population density in 1921, illiterate share in 1921 and province fixed effect. And similarly for 1919 and 1921 and when communists-socialist vote shares are missing. The parties in the *Catholic* definition are: In 1919 Partito Popolare Italiano; in 1921 Partito Cristiano del Lavoro; Partito Popolare Dissidente; Partito Popolare Italiano and Popolari Dissidenti; in 1924 Partito Popolare Italiano. The parties in the *Communist and Socialist* definition are: In 1919 Blocco Socialista Reformista-Repubblicano e dei Combattenti; Partito Radicale-Socialista-Repubblicano; Partito Sindacalista; Partito Socialista Indipendente; Partito So-

cialista Indipendente; Partito Socialista Italiano; Partito Socialista Riformista; Partito Socialista Ufficiale; Partito del Lavoro; Sindacato dell'Impiego; Socialisti Autonomi and Unione Socialista Italiana; in 1921 Partito Socialista Autonomo; Partito Socialista Indipendente; Partito Socialista Riformista; Partito Socialista Ufficiale; Partito Comunista and Partito Comunista d'Italia; in 1924 Partito Socialista Massimalista; Partito Socialista Ufficiale; Partito Socialista Unitario; Partito Comunista and Partito Comunista d'Italia.

Fascist presence variables: Thanks to [Acemoglu et al. \(Forthcoming\)](#) we have also information on fascist presence at municipality level. They construct fascist vote share in 1921 and in 1924 elections combining [Corbetta and Piretti \(2009\)](#), 1,200 local and national historical newspapers and local state archives. Moreover they construct a measure of violence (number of violent episodes per 1,000 inhabitants for the period 1920-19222) from [Franzinelli \(2003\)](#). Finally, they collected information on local branches of the Fascist Party in September 1921 from the prefect reports located in state archives throughout Italy from which a dummy for the presence of a Fascist branch is constructed.

Fascism period political variables: To proxy political attitudes before the civil war and after the last free election, we collect data on the number of citizens under surveillance for political reason (source: Casellario Politico Centrale).^{B.1} The original source reports the political affiliation, the municipality of residence and the year in which the citizen became under surveillance. We construct the share of *Left wing citizens under surveillance* as the sum of communist, socialist or anti-fascism citizens under surveillance between 1925 and 1942 over 1921 population (x1000) for each municipality. As shown in Appendix Table [D.1](#), this variable correlates positively with *Communist and Socialist* prewar vote shares while it does not with *Catholic*. We also construct the variable *Other citizens under surveillance* as the sum of anarchic, republican and not available over 1921 population (x1000).

Moreover, from ANPI (National Association of Italian Partisans) we collected a list of 3,117 partisans with a short biography. This database is only a sample, but it was built to represent the political diversity of the resistance movement and includes almost all of the national and local leaders of the movement. From this source we create two dummy variables, for whether at least a partisan in our sample was born in the municipality, and for whether he/she was linked to a left-wing party in the

^{B.1}We thank Francesco Barilari for helping collecting these data.

postwar period. These variables capture the strength of local opposition to the fascist regime, rather than the presence of brigades in the area.

Postwar political variables: We measure political outcomes by the percentage of votes received by political parties at the 1946 election of the constitutional assembly, and in all subsequent 10 political elections for the Chamber of Deputies until 1987 (namely 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983 and 1987). Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. We consider three political groups. First the radical left, measured by the votes given to the Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano). We call this variable *Communist*. Since in 1946 the communist and the socialists (Partito Socialista Italiano) formed a single electoral list, the Popular Front, we also consider the votes received by these two parties together, and we call it *Communist and Socialist*. The second group is the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana), that we call *Catholic*. The third group, called *Right wing*, consists of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (a party close to the fascists) and of smaller parties that supported the monarchy (namely: In 1946 Blocco Nazionale della Libertà, in 1948 and 1953 Partito Nazionale Monarchico, in 1958 Partito Nazionale Monarchico and Partito Monarchico Popolare, in 1963 and 1968 Partito Democratico Italiano di Unità Monarchica). Since we are interested in how the German occupation shifted political preferences from a moderate to an extreme left vote, we also compute the difference between the vote to communist and the vote to catholic parties. This variable is called *Communist minus Catholic*.

B.2 War-related variables

Episodes of violence: We collected data on the number of episodes in each municipality, the date, and the number and kind of victims. The full data set includes: The number of violent episodes in each municipality (this is the variable used in Appendix Figure D.1); date and municipality; total number of victims by status (civilian, partisan, soldier). Although the meticulous work done by the authors of “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres”, since combining multiple sources entails the risk of double counting, and since counting the number of victims entails likely measurement error, our preferred measure is a dummy variable, that equals 1 if in the municipality (and interval of time where applicable) there was at least one episode of violence. We also consider dummy variables for whether

the majority of victims were partisans or civilians.

Our source is the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” ([ANPI-INSMLI, 2016](#)).^{B.2} This database lists all the massacres and the individual murders of civilians and resistance fighters killed in Italy during Second World War (mainly after September 8, 1943) both by German soldiers and soldiers of the Italian Social Republic outside of the armed fights.^{B.3} These range from the first murders in the South to the withdrawal massacres committed in the days after the Liberation. The historical inquiry was conducted locally by more than ninety researchers under the supervision of a joint historical commission established by Italian and German governments in 2009. The commission used the results of previous studies of the same kind made in Apulia, Campania, Tuscany, Emilia Romagna, and Piedmont and used three main national common sources: (i) The database of violent crimes perpetrated against civilians during the German occupation of Italy, established by the Joint Historical Italian-German Commission and based on police reports stored in the Archives of the Historical Office of Army General Staff and the Historical Archives of the Carabinieri of Rome. (ii) The General Repository of war crime reports collected from 1945 by the Army Prosecutors office in Rome; this report was illegally dismissed in 1960 and was later recovered by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry while investigating on the reasons for the concealment of some files about Nazi-fascist crimes (14th Parliamentary term). (iii) The rulings and files of the judiciary proceedings debated in the Military courts during the last trial season (from 1994 until now).

This source was not immediately available to us, however. In a previous version we had started from a composite dataset that mainly relied on record of charges pressed to “Carabinieri” (Italian Police, [CSIT \(2012\)](#)), for violence episodes and massacres against Italian citizens and Allied personnel committed by Nazi-fascists forces in the period 1943-1945. We then integrated this source with the following additional sources: [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2000\)](#) and [Collotti, Sandri and Sessi \(2006\)](#) and [Gentile \(2015\)](#).^{B.4} This last source is particularly rich and detailed, since besides the Italian sources, it also incorporates episodes of violence reported in the German War Archives. Since

^{B.2}Data downloaded in April 2016.

^{B.3}The data span from February 1943 to May 1945, but only 21 out of 5,594 events are dated before September 1943.

^{B.4}We also consider [Matta \(1996\)](#) for robustness checks, however since he reported only partial information for each episode we excluded it from the main analysis

[CSIT \(2012\)](#) (and partially also the other sources) reports single murders, we had assumed that two murders happening in the same municipality at no more than three days of distance were part of the same episodes. In order to avoid bias due to the same event counted twice we manually eliminated double episodes reported by [CSIT \(2012\)](#) or any other sources with meticulous checks on possible discrepancies on the location, the date or the number of victims involved in each episode.

Once we got access to the “Atlas of Nazi and fascist massacres” we recognized that this new source was more uniform and coherent than our first composite dataset, and thus in the current draft we only rely on the new source, the Atlas. Nevertheless, to assess robustness to possible measurement error, we merged the two data sets (our old composite dataset and the new data from the Atlas), trying to avoid double counting. The results reported in the paper are very similar to those obtained in the replications with this merged data set.

Line of conflict: Based on [Baldissara \(2000, figure 23\)](#), we have reconstructed the evolution of the battlefield around two main lines of conflicts, geo-referencing the corresponding maps: The Gustav line and the Gothic line. In both cases, a few months of adjustments before the final settlement of the battlefield have been necessary. Appendix Figure [D.2](#) illustrates the evolution of the battlefield around the Gothic line. There are three demarcation lines. (i) The line labelled “Allies” is where the Allies stopped between August 1944 and mid-September 1944. (ii) The line labelled “Fall 1944” is the original Gothic line set up by the Germans. Between late August and mid-September 1944 the Allies succeeded in breaching this line (the so called operation “Olive”). (iii) The line labelled “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945” is where the Germans managed to contain the US-British offensive. From the end of October onwards, the Allies and the Germans were fighting along this line. It was finally breached in April 1945. Our RDD analysis is on the Northern-most line “Nov. 1944–Apr. 1945”, which was held by the Germans for the longest period.

Years of occupation: Fraction (or multiples) of years of occupation by German troops. Data refer to provinces (all the municipalities in the same province have the same number of years of occupation), except for the provinces cut by a line of conflict (both for Gothic and Gustav line), where provincial data have been corrected as follows:

- For the municipalities above the line of conflict belonging to a province below the line, we assign the years of occupation of the closest province above the line.
- For the municipalities below the line of conflict belonging to a province above the line, we assign the years of occupation of the closest province below the line.

Definition of occupation: Physical presence of Nazi troops on the Italian territory, for military control or for defense against the Allies (for what concerns events after the Armistice of Cassibile). The starting date is the planning and constitution of the first Nazi troops of the Operation Achse (9 May 1943), after the end of the campaign of Tunisi. The aim of this operation was to react to the possible desertion of the Italian ally. Sources: Mainly [Baldissara \(2000\)](#). Minor adjustments have been made using province specific references.

Partisan Brigades: We geo-referenced the maps of [Baldissara \(2000\)](#) (figures 8, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) that report the area of activity of partisan brigades during World War II. We created a dummy variable for the presence of partisan brigades equal to one if the municipality partly overlaps with the area in which a partisan brigade was active during the conflict (*Presence of partisan brigades (Intersect)*) or whether the area of the municipality is contained entirely in the operation area of a brigade (*Presence of partisan brigades (Within)*). We also consider the minimum distance of each municipality city hall from the area of activity of each brigade. The brigades considered are the following:

- Left-wing brigades: Brigade Garibaldi (Italian Communist Party), brigade Matteotti (Italian Socialist Party) and brigade Giustizia e Libertà (Partito d’Azione).
- Other brigades: Brigade Fiamme Verdi (Christian Democrats) and residual autonomous brigades.

16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and “Hermann Goering” divisions location: We coded the location of these two specific German divisions, particularly violent and responsible for a very large number of criminal episodes against civilians. We have records of the precise location of these troops throughout the Italian civil war. From this we construct a dummy variable that takes value 1 for the municipalities that are within 15 Km or 10 Km from where either

of these divisions have been located (measured as distance between city halls). We restrict attention to those two specific divisions, discarding all the other SS or Luftwaffe divisions, since in the reconstruction made by our main source ([Gentile, 2015](#)) those are the troops responsible for the majority and most dramatic episodes (*e.g.*, Sant’Anna di Stazzema, Marzabotto).

Deported: Number of political deportations to Germany by municipality of capture. Source: [Mantelli and Tranfaglia \(2013\)](#). We have data on only 6,500 individuals, out of about 40,000 deported.

B.3 Other city characteristics

Geographic variables: We collected data on city hall elevation, and on maximum and minimum elevation in the municipality. Source: National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We also created a grid of 25 Km width covering all the Italian territory.

Industrial plants per capita: We collected data on the number of industrial plants per capita in each municipality from the 1951 Census. Source: ISTAT. Thanks to [Fontana et al. \(2021\)](#), we got access to the number of industrial plants and workers in 1927, we divided both measures by population in 1921. Source: *Censimento Industriale 1927*, ISTAT.

Agricultural variables: Thanks to [Fontana et al. \(2021\)](#), we got access to the number of agricultural firms and workers in 1929, we divided both measures by population in 1921. We also got the number of livestock (again per capita in 1921) and the percentage of surface devoted to agricultural production. Source: *Catasto Agrario 1929*, ISTAT.

Population and illiterate share: We collected data on total resident population, population density and literacy rates (1911, 1921, and then 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991). Census were easily available only from 1971 onwards. For all the other Censuses we manually digitalized the data. Source: ISTAT.

B.4 Structure of Italian municipalities

The administrative structure in Italy changed over the years. In 1948 there were 7,392 municipalities, in 2001 the number had increased to 8,100. In order to build a time consistent panel, we took 2001 as the reference year. For all the years different from 2001 we performed the following adjustments:

- Change the names: Some municipalities changed their names, the main reason was to avoid confusion; names must be mapped in order to have a complete series for each municipality. One example is Madesimo in province of Sondrio that before 1983 was called Isolato.
- Consider aggregations (i): Some municipalities merged into a single entity. For instance, at date t we observe municipalities A and B , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipality C corresponding to the merger of A and B . In 2001 we only observe municipality C . Then only municipality C is included in the sample. For date t when C did not exist yet, we impute to C the data of $A + B$.
- Consider partial aggregations (ii): It may be that some municipalities absorb a municipality that no longer exists. For instance at date t we observe A , B and X , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipality A and B while territory of X has been split (not necessarily equally) between A and B . In 2001 we only observe municipality A and B . Then only municipalities A and B are included in the sample. For date t when also X existed, we impute data of X to both A and B ; that is, at date t , we impute $A = A + X$ and $B = B + X$
- Consider disaggregations (i): Some municipalities split their territory in two or more municipalities. This situation is quite common in Italy, since Fascism tried to reduce the administrative centres, while the number of municipalities increased in the postwar period. For instance, suppose that at date t we observe only municipality C , but at date $t' > t$, we observe municipalities A and B corresponding to the separation (not necessarily equally) of C . In 2001 we observe A and B , but not C . Then we include in the sample both A and B . For date t , when A and B did not exist yet, we impute to both of them the data of C ; that is, at t , we impute $A = C$, $B = C$.
- Consider partial disaggregations (ii): We also track the case where C still exists in 2001 but at $t' > t$ parts of C were dismembered to give birth to A and B , with C still existing today. In this case, for all date prior to t we impute $A = C$ and $B = C$.

We neglect changes in the boundaries that do not determine the end of a municipality or the birth of a new one, since they do not alter municipalities structures and since our variables mainly refer to

shares. All these adjustments used records in ISTAT and Italian Agency of Revenue, tracking changes in the period of interest. The only exception are municipalities born from municipalities that still exist: In these cases we had to manually check each split. These adjustments were made for all data at the municipality level (Census and electoral data, but also episodes of violence). When a municipality has data imputed as described above, we retain only the shares (e.g., illiterate share) and we discard absolute values (e.g., total number of illiterates).

Reference year for Provinces and Regions is 1921. We use GIS files (source Elesh.it) to assign each 2001 municipality to historical administrative units. As a robustness we also considered 1931, 1945 and 2001 administrative boundaries and the results are similar.

C Online Appendix – Additional Results and Robustness

C.1 Multiple hypothesis testing

Given the numerous tests considered under the same treatment, a concern is that we may falsely reject at least some null hypothesis of no effect. A vast literature has tackled the issue of multiple hypothesis testing. We perform various tests on the most demanding specification (Column 4) of Table 2, for all outcomes reported in Figure 1 and all the variables tested in Table 3, Table 5, Appendix Table D.5 and Appendix Table D.6.^{C.1}

One of the most popular ways to deal with this issue is to control the familywise error rate (FWER), which is the probability of making any type I error^{C.2}. We calculate Westfall-Young (Westfall and Young, 1993) stepdown adjusted p-values, which also control the FWER and allow for dependence amongst p-values.^{C.3} This method uses bootstrap resampling to allow for dependence across outcomes.^{C.4}

We report results from Table 2, for all outcomes reported in Figure 1 in Appendix Table D.7. In Appendix Table D.8 of Table 3 (Panel A), Table 5 (Panel B), Appendix Table D.5 (Panel C) and Appendix Table D.6 (Panel D).^{C.5} In Column 1 we report the p-values from Column 4 of the corresponding table (*i.e.* p-values not corrected) while Column 2 reports p-values corrected following Westfall and Young (1993). Once accounting for the proposed p-value corrections, the significance of all main results are preserved, reassuring us that results presented are not due to false rejections.

Joint test that no treatment has any effect A complementary approach, suggested in Young (2019), rather than adjusting each individual p-value for multiple testing, it conducts a joint test of the hypothesis that no treatment has any effect, and then uses the Westfall-Young approach to test this

^{C.1}Due to the complexity of these procedures it is too demanding to consider local linear regression with optimal bandwidth, as in Column 5.

^{C.2}An alternative approach would be to follow Anderson (2008) to compute sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values. A drawback of this method is that it does not account for any correlations among the p-values.

^{C.3}Stata code available as `randcmd`

^{C.4}We report bootstrap-t as it is generally considered superior to the -c because its rejection probabilities converge more rapidly asymptotically to nominal size, Hall (1992). We consider 1999 randomization iterations

^{C.5}They are presented in two separate tables just for practical reasons, they were all considered simultaneously in the analysis.

across equations.^{C.6} Looking at randomization-t p-value for the Westfall-Young multiple testing test of the significance of any treatment measure in each equation as a whole is 0.04. We can then reject the hypothesis that no treatment has any effect.

C.2 Robustness checks

In this subsection, we discuss the robustness of the causal inference presented in Table 2.

As apparent from Appendix Figure D.7, voting outcomes exhibit some patterns in the East-West direction. We thus want to be sure that the RDD estimates only reflect the impact of being North vs South of the line, without being contaminated by other geographic patterns in the data. For this purpose, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we estimate the same regressions with a first and second degree spline polynomial in distance that also includes as regressors a first and second degree polynomial in latitude and longitude, as well as the interaction of latitude and longitude and the same interaction squared. Region fixed effects are always included amongst the regressors. All results remain very similar, as shown in Appendix Table D.11.^{C.7}

Second, we split the Gothic line in 25 Km intervals and we test our hypothesis (again with spline polynomials and local linear regressions) including fixed effects for each interval (here we omit the region fixed effects). This is equivalent to comparing municipalities above and below the line within each of these 25 Km intervals. Appendix Table D.12 displays the results. All estimates are robust in terms of significance and magnitude.^{C.8}

Appendix Figure D.5 reports placebo tests for the main variables of interest to test whether our results might be attributed to random chance rather than a true causal effect. We shifted the location of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 50 Km at a time, up to a distance of 250 Km. Estimation is by local linear regression as in the last column of Table 2. The results indicate a clear discontinuity in the estimated coefficient at the true location of the Gothic line, but not at the fake discontinuities. The catholic vote also displays a clear discontinuity. We also estimated the same

^{C.6}Stata code available as `randcmd`

^{C.7}Both in Appendix Table D.11 and D.12 results for *Right parties* suffer of small sample sizes when applying the optimal bandwidth, it may explain some non fully robust specifications.

^{C.8}As a further check, we included fixed effects for provinces or for the electoral districts in the RDD regressions (there are 6 electoral districts within 50 Km of the Gothic line, and the line cuts through 3 of them). The results are similar and available upon request.

placebo tests on prewar electoral outcomes. Here no clear pattern is evident, and the true location of the Gothic line generally does not stand out relative to the other position – see Appendix Figure D.6. This again corroborates the conclusion that no structural unbalance of pre-treatment political attitudes is evident.

Next, we assess the robustness of the results to the method of dealing with missing observations. In Appendix Table D.13 we only include municipalities for which we have data on all three prewar elections (thus avoiding any imputation). Here the RDD estimates reveal even stronger effects than in the default sample, for both communist and catholic vote shares, except for the Communist and socialists combined in 1946.

Finally, there is no evidence of amplification effects, meaning that the treatment effect of being North of the line is homogeneous across municipalities, irrespective of their prewar vote share (Table 4) or of whether they gave birth to a partisan (results available upon request). This too supports our identification strategy, because it suggests that the results do not reflect pre-existing trends.

Overall, these robustness checks confirm that the positive effect on the communist vote share is very robust, while the inference that the increase in the communist vote is only at the expense of the catholic vote (rather than also at the expense of the socialists or of other moderate parties) is more sensitive to the sample and to the estimation method.

D Online Appendix – Additional Tables and Figures

In this section, we report additional tables and figures, which contain descriptive statistics and robustness checks, and are also discussed in the paper.

Table D.1: **Citizens under surveillance 1925-1942**

	Dependent variable:					
	Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942			Birthplace of a partisan		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Socialist and Communist 1919	0.627 (0.157)*** (0.285)**	0.768 (0.172)*** (0.206)***	0.925 (0.226)*** (0.246)***	0.231 (0.035)*** (0.067)***	0.077 (0.039)** (0.038)**	0.010 (0.046) (0.049)
Catholic 1919	-0.194 (0.194) (0.250)	-0.257 (0.176) (0.167)	-0.305 (0.199) (0.149)**	-0.021 (0.038) (0.046)	-0.009 (0.040) (0.039)	-0.027 (0.043) (0.047)
Socialist and Communist 1921	0.534 (0.207)*** (0.414)	0.052 (0.210) (0.294)	0.320 (0.243) (0.307)	0.060 (0.047) (0.088)	0.074 (0.048) (0.055)	0.147 (0.055)*** (0.054)***
Catholic 1921	0.352 (0.215) (0.296)	0.288 (0.191) (0.199)	0.205 (0.199) (0.170)	0.037 (0.039) (0.053)	-0.036 (0.039) (0.050)	-0.033 (0.040) (0.049)
Socialist and Communist 1924	0.567 (0.240)** (0.373)	1.071 (0.262)*** (0.320)***	1.525 (0.321)*** (0.316)***	-0.114 (0.049)** (0.105)	0.099 (0.049)** (0.057)*	0.156 (0.056)*** (0.050)***
Catholic 1924	-0.448 (0.251)* (0.380)	-0.278 (0.220) (0.260)	-0.183 (0.247) (0.237)	-0.059 (0.041) (0.051)	0.071 (0.044) (0.048)	0.044 (0.046) (0.046)
Observations	5490	5490	5490	5698	5698	5698
R-squared	0.053	0.166	0.202	0.054	0.116	0.152
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effect	No	Region	Province	No	Region	Province

Note: Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses in each second row; standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are displayed in parentheses in each third row. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. *Left wing citizens under surveillance*: Number of left wing (communist, socialist and anti-fascist) citizens under surveillance over 1921 population (x1000). Parties in the pre-fascist period have been lumped using as reference [Leoni \(2001\)](#), in this table only the vote shares has not been multiplied by 100. See Appendix B for more details on these aggregations. Other regressors include: Share of illiterate 1921, population density 1921, latitude, longitude, maximum altitude in the municipality, elevation city hall, and Province or Region Fixed Effects.

Table D.2: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Communist 1946 (%)	5,559	15.10	14.20	0.00	76.83
Socialist and Communist 1946 (%)	5,559	37.48	21.29	0.22	91.42
Catholic 1946 (%)	5,559	42.14	16.93	0.51	95.02
Right parties 1946 (%)	3,227	2.72	6.12	0.00	78.77
Socialist and Communist 1948 (%)	5,384	26.66	19.08	0.00	80.92
Catholic 1948 (%)	5,384	53.97	17.16	2.08	97.39
Right parties 1948 (%)	5,199	3.30	6.19	0.00	73.19
Socialist and Communist 1919 (%)	5,698	30.50	25.46	0.00	100.00
Catholic 1919 (%)	5,698	27.00	21.25	0.00	100.00
Socialist and Communist 1921 (%)	5,698	27.05	21.61	0.00	100.00
Catholic 1921 (%)	5,698	27.72	20.81	0.00	100.00
Socialist and Communist 1924 (%)	5,698	15.02	14.25	0.00	100.00
Catholic 1924 (%)	5,698	14.25	15.63	0.00	100.00
Fascist 1921 (%)	3,995	5.37	7.80	0.00	80.42
Fascist 1924 (%)	4,222	61.92	25.33	0.00	100.00
Fascist violence in 1920-1922	4,222	0.05	0.17	0.00	2.22
Fascist local branches in 1921	4,222	0.19	0.39	0	1
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	5,490	1.02	1.77	0.00	72.29
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	5,490	0.083	0.265	0	5.16
Birthplace of a partisan	5,698	0.158	0.365	0	1
Birthplace of a left wing partisan	5,698	0.029	0.167	0	1
Years of occupation	5,698	1.514	0.663	0.173	1.984
Presence of partisan brigades	5,698	0.360	0.480	0	1
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	5,698	0.269	0.444	0	1
Presence of partisan brigades other than left wing	5,698	0.091	0.288	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	5,698	0.286	0.452	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945)	5,698	0.122	0.328	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944)	5,698	0.214	0.410	0	1
Number of deported people arrested in the municipality	5,698	0.990	12.472	0	560
Municipality within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions	5,698	0.183	0.387	0	1
Maximum elevation of the municipality	5,698	789.4	796.1	2.0	4,554
Elevation of the city hall	5,698	316.9	290.3	0	2035
Total population 1921	5,490	4,796	21,951	84	775,203
Total population 1951	5,433	7,052	37,862	74	1,651,753
Population density 1921 (ab./Kmq)	5,698	177.5	445.0	1.236	22,977
Population density 1951 (ab./Kmq)	5,698	247.2	537.2	3.530	21,647
Share of illiterates 1921	5,698	0.236	0.201	0	0.857
Share of illiterates 1951	5,698	0.090	0.086	0	0.457
Plants 1927/population 1921	5,441	0.043	0.020	0	0.336
Industrial workers 1927/population 1921	5,441	0.123	0.132	0	2.2
Plants 1951/population 1951	5,401	0.035	0.065	0	4.7
Agricultural workers 1929/population 1921	2,477	0.368	0.197	0	2.3
Number livestock 1929/population 1921	4,881	1.163	1.524	0	17.2
Agricultural firms 1929/population 1921	2477	0.165	0.089	0.000	1

Note: See Section 3 for variables' description, and Appendix B for their sources and construction.

Table D.3: Summary Statistics Within 50 Km of the Gothic Line

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Communist 1946 (%)	275	36.75	13.52	5.68	69.89
Socialist and Communist 1946 (%)	275	63.50	15.06	15.02	91.05
Catholic 1946 (%)	275	25.86	12.09	6.36	66.66
Right parties 1946 (%)	93	1.10	0.73	0.21	5.04
Socialist and Communist 1948 (%)	275	51.30	14.99	7.77	80.92
Catholic 1948 (%)	275	35.79	13.27	9.61	76.36
Right parties 1948 (%)	224	1.19	0.88	0.17	5.02
Socialist and Communist 1919 (%)	275	52.35	22.61	0.64	99.18
Catholic 1919 (%)	275	22.98	14.91	0.56	76.98
Socialist and Communist 1921 (%)	275	38.21	19.52	0.00	80.92
Catholic 1921 (%)	275	24.51	19.37	0.00	100.00
Socialist and Communist 1924 (%)	275	13.66	10.93	0.00	82.29
Catholic 1924 (%)	275	8.27	9.23	0.00	52.60
Fascist 1921 (%)	222	14.19	13.93	0.00	65.84
Fascist 1924 (%)	253	73.88	19.59	14.77	100.00
Fascist violence in 1920-1922	253	0.17	0.25	0.00	1.96
Fascist local branches in 1921	253	0.50	0.50	0	1
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	254	1.882	1.673	0	11.61
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	254	0.246	0.520	0	5.16
Birthplace of a partisan	275	0.531	0.500	0	1
Birthplace of a left wing partisan	275	0.113	0.317	0	1
Years of occupation	275	1.696	0.294	1.189	1.967
Presence of partisan brigades	275	0.473	0.500	0	1
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	275	0.400	0.491	0	1
Presence of partisan brigades other than left wing	275	0.073	0.260	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	275	0.749	0.434	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945)	275	0.295	0.457	0	1
At least one episode of violence (Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944)	275	0.651	0.478	0	1
Number of deported people arrested in the municipality	275	2.531	14.343	0	180
Municipality within 15 Km of violent Nazi divisions	275	0.640	0.481	0	1
Maximum elevation of the municipality	275	619.1	602.2	2.0	2,165
Elevation of the city hall	275	203.0	270.2	0	1,388
Total population 1921	254	10,451	18,704	1,417	202,185
Total population 1951	266	13,924	28,177	823	340,526
Population density 1921 (ab./Kmq)	275	199.1	281.1	26.809	2,767
Population density 1951 (ab./Kmq)	275	243.9	372.4	26.328	4,221
Share of illiterates 1921	275	0.263	0.107	0	0.609
Share of illiterates 1951	275	0.098	0.040	0	0.236
Plants 1927/population 1921	254	0.045	0.016	0	0.147
Industrial workers 1927/population 1921	254	0.117	0.074	0	0.4
Plants 1951/population 1951	266	0.035	0.010	0	0.1
Agricultural workers 1929/population 1921	234	0.359	0.147	0	0.8
Number livestock 1929/population 1921	251	0.830	0.453	0	2.6
Agricultural firms 1929/population 1921	234	0.121	0.054	0.000	0

Note: See Section 3 for variables' description, and Appendix B for their sources and construction.

Table D.4: OLS Estimates – Interactive Effects

	Dependent variable: Communist 1946	
	(1)	(2)
Years of occupation		4.667 (1.808)*** (3.123)
At least one violence episode	1.136 (0.326)*** (0.451)**	0.555 (0.320)* (0.422)
Within 15 km of violent Nazi division	2.470 (0.523)*** (1.314)*	1.927 (0.622)*** (1.475)
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	-0.094 (0.344) (0.719)	-0.031 (0.348) (0.582)
Presence of other brigades than left wing	-1.325 (0.421)*** (0.796)*	-0.912 (0.425)** (0.697)
Birthplace of a partisan	2.153 (0.414)*** (0.411)***	1.488 (0.400)*** (0.338)***
Birthplace of a left wing partisan	2.650 (0.979)*** (0.981)***	2.891 (0.956)*** (0.960)***
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	0.951 (0.123)*** (0.208)***	0.805 (0.114)*** (0.153)***
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	-0.331 (0.587) (0.661)	0.258 (0.540) (0.658)
Occupation ended between 05/11/1943 and 30/07/1944	2.327 (0.944)** (1.661)	
Occupation ended between 30/07/1944 and 08/04/1945	7.190 (1.764)*** (4.049)*	
Occupation ended after 08/04/1945	12.665 (2.389)*** (5.205)**	
Number of observations	5357	4503
R-squared	0.593	0.659
Controls	Yes	Yes
Fixed effect	Region	Province
Sample	Complete	Above Gustav

Note: Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses in each second row; standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are displayed in parentheses in each third row. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. See Table 1 for variables' definitions. Other regressors include: Share of illiterate 1921 and 1951, population density 1921 and 1951, latitude, longitude, maximum altitude in the municipality, elevation city hall, vote shares of Communist-Socialist and Catholic in 1919, 1921, and 1924 and Province or Region Fixed Effects. See Appendix B for data sources and description Above Gustav sample: Abruzzi e Molise, Campania, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Piemonte, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto, Venezia Giulia, Venezia Tridentina

Table D.5: **RDD Balance Tests – City Characteristics**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Share of illiterate 1921	-0.017 (0.023)	0.008 (0.018)	0.036 (0.035)	0.004 (0.024)	0.025 (0.031)
	275	742	275	742	181
Share of illiterate 1951	-0.012 (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)
	275	742	275	742	170
Total population 1921	84.478 (4477)	-584 (3166)	1213 (3595)	242 (4168)	-1414 (3448)
	254	702	254	702	805
Total population 1951	498 (6634)	-668 (4782)	1579 (4831)	3963 (6751)	2123 (5539)
	266	729	266	729	351
Population density 1921	74.993 (38.659)*	-111 (49.138)**	-16.755 (52.738)	69.101 (48.975)	25.824 (33.425)
	275	742	275	742	206
Population density 1951	90.552 (57.848)	-111 (67.907)	-64.576 (73.308)	114 (74.084)	-2.137 (41.992)
	275	742	275	742	155
Female population 1921	35.393 (2275)	-370 (1608)	642 (1808)	68.745 (2125)	-788 (1770)
	254	702	254	702	794
Female population 1951	262 (3477)	-409 (2506)	822 (2489)	2075 (3559)	1129 (2901)
	266	729	266	729	345
Plants 1927/population 1921	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)
	254	700	254	700	172
Industrial workers 1927/population 1921	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.023)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.020)
	254	700	254	700	337
Plants 1951/population 1951	0.001 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	0 (0.003)
	266	724	266	724	512
Agricultural workers 1929/population 1921	0.015 (0.034)	0.085 (0.029)***	0.020 (0.043)	0.016 (0.037)	0.011 (0.035)
	234	511	234	511	257
Number livestock 1929/population 1921	-0.067 (0.093)	0.451 (0.103)***	-0.051 (0.127)	-0.095 (0.119)	-0.067 (0.107)
	251	676	251	676	203
Agricultural firms 1929/population 1921	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.032 (0.010)***	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.011)
	234	511	234	511	480
Maximum elevation	-80.873 (159)	-35.289 (109)	-227 (229)	-26.114 (162)	-151 (189)
	275	742	275	742	217
Elevation of the city hall	-0.677 (84.891)	60.667 (55.681)	-98.304 (114)	61.844 (84.474)	-75.253 (102)
	275	742	275	742	181

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. See Appendix B for data sources and description.

Table D.6: RDD Balance Tests – Prewar Political Variables

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A: Pre-war electoral outcomes					
Socialist 1919	8.834 (4.517)*	21.089 (3.503)***	0.442 (5.835)	5.944 (4.580)	8.915 (4.389)
	275	742	275	742	596
Catholic 1919	0.518 (3.601)	-9.123 (2.650)***	-0.810 (5.135)	4.083 (3.804)	-0.911 (4.092)
	275	742	275	742	332
Communist and Socialist 1921	7.448 (4.221)*	0.641 (3.300)	3.836 (5.309)	13.677 (4.319)***	7.017 (4.796)
	275	742	275	742	315
Catholic 1921	-6.487 (4.127)	-9.703 (3.096)***	-5.575 (4.874)	-4.501 (4.091)	-7.902 (3.601)**
	275	742	275	742	862
Communist and Socialist 1924	1.740 (2.343)	-1.562 (1.745)	4.825 (3.323)	4.076 (2.382)*	0.637 (2.052)
	275	742	275	742	1059
Catholic 1924	2.102 (2.062)	-2.315 (1.510)	0.599 (2.919)	4.513 (2.103)**	1.679 (2.175)
	275	742	275	742	341
Panel B: Pre-war Fascist presence					
Fascist 1921	0.886 (2.430)	14.833 (2.234)***	-2.421 (3.525)	-2.821 (2.634)	-1.187 (3.044)
	222	602	222	602	180
Fascist 1924	-2.647 (4.671)	8.274 (3.665)**	-8.901 (6.634)	-9.796 (4.692)**	-4.944 (5.144)
	253	641	253	641	281
Fascist violence 1920-1922	0.130 (0.075)*	0.070 (0.048)	0.180 (0.117)	0.141 (0.077)*	0.070 (0.061)
	253	641	253	641	819
Fascist local branches 1921	0.073 (0.124)	0.252 (0.092)***	0.095 (0.175)	0.020 (0.131)	0.106 (0.125)
	253	641	253	641	355
Panel C: Political attitudes during fascist period					
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	0.639 (0.426)	-0.025 (0.299)	0.207 (0.496)	-0.128 (0.412)	-0.037 (0.364)
	254	702	254	702	670
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	0.276 (0.205)	0.001 (0.146)	0.199 (0.137)	0.180 (0.173)	0.187 (0.131)
	254	702	254	702	510
Birthplace of a partisan	0.129 (0.131)	0.180 (0.093)*	0.100 (0.186)	0.047 (0.134)	0.098 (0.118)
	275	742	275	742	519
Birthplace of a left wing partisan	0.087 (0.089)	0.093 (0.061)	0.088 (0.115)	0.058 (0.087)	0.080 (0.060)
	275	742	275	742	1596

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. Parties in the pre-fascist period have been lumped using as reference [Leoni \(2001\)](#). *Fascist violence*: Number of violent episodes per 1,000 inhabitants for the period 1920-1922. *Fascist local branches*: Dummy equal to 1 for the presence of local branch of the Fascist Party in September 2021. *Citizens under surveillance*: Number of citizens (left-wing or other political affiliations) under surveillance over 1921 population (x1000). *Birthplace of a partisan*: Dummy equal to 1 if a partisan (or a left-wing partisan) is born in the municipality. See Appendix B for data sources and description.

Table D.7: **Multiple hypothesis correction – Political outcomes**

	Column 4	Westfall-Young
Communist and Socialist 1946	0.026	0.015
Communist and Socialist 1948	0.024	0.015
Communist and Socialist 1953	0.070	0.033
Communist and Socialist 1958	0.134	0.054
Communist and Socialist 1963	0.057	0.028
Communist and Socialist 1972	0.260	0.111
Communist and Socialist 1976	0.140	0.059
Communist and Socialist 1979	0.130	0.063
Communist and Socialist 1983	0.212	0.118
Communist and Socialist 1987	0.254	0.121
Communist 1946	0.022	0.013
Communist 1953	0.131	0.058
Communist 1958	0.171	0.092
Communist 1963	0.112	0.056
Communist 1968	0.143	0.074
Communist 1972	0.087	0.049
Communist 1976	0.122	0.050
Communist 1979	0.076	0.043
Communist 1983	0.133	0.083
Communist 1987	0.194	0.116
Catholic 1946	0.773	0.430
Catholic 1948	0.155	0.091
Catholic 1953	0.565	0.367
Catholic 1958	0.828	0.476
Catholic 1963	0.623	0.426
Catholic 1968	0.500	0.334
Catholic 1972	0.811	0.518
Catholic 1976	0.459	0.264
Catholic 1979	0.455	0.292
Catholic 1983	0.539	0.336
Catholic 1987	0.786	0.430
Right Wing 1946	0.767	0.740
Right Wing 1948	0.088	0.021
Right Wing 1953	0.331	0.104
Right Wing 1958	0.049	0.006
Right Wing 1963	0.016	0.003
Right Wing 1968	0.132	0.034
Right Wing 1972	0.148	0.040
Right Wing 1976	0.180	0.056
Right Wing 1979	0.178	0.046
Right Wing 1983	0.574	0.232
Right Wing 1987	0.399	0.141

Note: Column 1 reports p-values from Column 4 of Table 2, for all outcomes reported in Figure 1. Column 2 reports p-values corrected following [Westfall and Young \(1993\)](#).

Table D.8: **Multiple hypothesis correction – Additional results and balance tests**

	Column 4	Westfall-Young
Panel A: Presence of Partisans		
Presence of partisan brigades	0.348	0.352
Presence of left wing partisan brigades	0.685	0.684
Presence of other partisan brigades	0.013	0.011
Panel B: Episodes of Violence		
Number of deported people arrested in the municipality	0.046	0.043
At least one violence episode (Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945)	0.089	0.044
At least one violence episode (Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944)	0.266	0.088
At least one violence episode (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	0.041	0.270
Panel C: City Characteristics		
Share of illiterate 1921	0.882	0.876
Share of illiterate 1951	0.342	0.346
Total population 1921	0.954	0.961
Total population 1951	0.557	0.579
Population density 1921	0.159	0.190
Population density 1951	0.124	0.136
Female population 1921	0.974	0.979
Female population 1951	0.560	0.581
Plants 1927/population 1921	0.509	0.507
Industrial workers 1927/population 1921	0.257	0.236
Plants 1951/population 1951	0.825	0.820
Agricultural workers 1929/population 1921	0.677	0.683
Number livestock 1929/population 1921	0.428	0.441
Agricultural firms 1929/population 1921	0.786	0.784
Maximum elevation	0.872	0.863
Elevation of the city hall	0.464	0.467
Panel D: Pre-war political attitudes		
Socialist and Communist 1919	0.195	0.173
Catholics 1919	0.283	0.284
Socialist and Communist 1921	0.002	0.004
Catholics 1921	0.272	0.270
Socialist and Communist 1924	0.087	0.094
Catholics 1924	0.032	0.034
Fascist 1921	0.285	0.277
Fascist 1924	0.037	0.041
Fascist violence 1920-1922	0.069	0.077
Fascist local branches 1921	0.876	0.872
Left wing citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	0.756	0.769
Other citizens under surveillance 1925-1942	0.297	0.316
Birthplace of a partisan	0.729	0.756
Birthplace of a left wing partisan	0.507	0.516

Note: Column 1 reports p-values from Column 4 of Table 3 (Panel A), Table 5 (Panel B), Appendix Table D.5 (Panel C) and Appendix Table D.6 (Panel D). Column 2 reports p-values corrected following Westfall and Young (1993).

Table D.9: RDD Causal Effects – Electoral Outcomes (Province Fixed Effects)

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	8.405 (2.361)*** 275	6.383 (2.448)*** 742	11.464 (2.870)*** 275	8.613 (2.464)*** 742	8.972 (2.493)*** 248
Communist and Socialist 1946	7.939 (2.203)*** 275	4.911 (2.273)** 742	9.218 (2.777)*** 275	7.755 (2.211)*** 742	6.750 (2.339)*** 342
Communist and Socialist 1948	7.500 (2.477)*** 275	4.959 (2.441)** 742	11.116 (3.024)*** 275	7.601 (2.400)*** 742	7.336 (2.376)*** 264
Catholic 1946	-2.585 (1.667) 275	-0.299 (1.463) 742	-5.639 (2.435)** 275	-2.711 (1.732) 742	-1.665 (1.837) 338
Catholic 1948	-5.160 (2.137)** 275	-3.413 (2.014)* 742	-8.820 (2.878)*** 275	-4.948 (2.128)** 742	-4.681 (2.090)** 291
Right Wing 1946	1.117 (1.509) 93	1.497 (1.559) 262	1.565 (1.479) 93	1.553 (1.619) 262	0.913 (0.997) 80
Right Wing 1948	-0.247 (0.188) 224	-0.111 (0.181) 599	-0.166 (0.276) 224	-0.255 (0.194) 599	-0.134 (0.173) 241

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Province Fixed Effects. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table D.10: **RDD Causal Effects – Electoral Outcomes (Unconditional)**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	10.411 (3.066)*** 275	14.159 (2.451)*** 742	10.886 (4.163)*** 275	8.145 (3.344)** 742	8.999 (3.151)*** 571
Communist and Socialist 1946	10.379 (3.496)*** 275	20.186 (2.827)*** 742	6.247 (4.702) 275	9.389 (3.843)** 742	10.860 (3.447)*** 626
Communist and Socialist 1948	10.729 (3.589)*** 275	20.965 (2.895)*** 742	9.677 (4.860)** 275	9.382 (3.942)** 742	9.630 (4.185)** 348
Catholic 1946	-3.230 (2.662) 275	-9.287 (2.007)*** 742	-4.982 (3.603) 275	-2.234 (2.844) 742	-5.489 (2.588)** 683
Catholic 1948	-6.349 (2.988)** 275	-15.388 (2.408)*** 742	-9.269 (4.143)** 275	-5.223 (3.222) 742	-6.695 (3.449)* 370
Right Wing 1946	0.044 (0.936) 93	-0.278 (0.664) 262	1.529 (1.429) 93	0.278 (0.852) 262	-0.674 (0.712) 429
Right Wing 1948	-0.607 (0.252)** 224	-0.569 (0.187)*** 599	-0.252 (0.321) 224	-0.643 (0.273)** 599	-0.367 (0.197)** 571

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects, with the exception of regression for *Right Wing* in 1946. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy.

Table D.11: **RDD Robustness – Controlling for Latitude and Longitude**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	8.374 (2.246)*** 275	3.512 (1.838)* 742	12.054 (2.910)*** 275	4.630 (2.462)* 742	8.730 (2.620)*** 190
Communist and Socialist 1946	7.182 (2.249)*** 275	8.055 (1.876)*** 742	5.848 (2.804)** 275	5.133 (2.427)** 742	3.717 (2.412) 155
Communist and Socialist 1948	7.530 (2.457)*** 275	6.992 (1.894)*** 742	10.367 (3.181)*** 275	4.871 (2.564)* 742	6.322 (2.534)*** 185
Catholic 1946	-2.158 (1.931) 275	-1.648 (1.583) 742	-3.878 (2.432) 275	-0.181 (2.016) 742	-2.197 (2.119) 180
Catholic 1948	-4.988 (2.163)** 275	-5.578 (1.783)*** 742	-8.264 (2.843)*** 275	-2.471 (2.306) 742	-5.392 (2.055)*** 179
Right parties 1946	0.386 (0.836) 93	-0.101 (0.693) 262	0.976 (1.117) 93	0.219 (0.973) 262	0.307 (1.365) 25
Right parties 1948	-0.416 (0.230)* 224	-0.442 (0.187)** 599	-0.162 (0.302) 224	-0.463 (0.250)* 599	-0.013 (0.193) 127

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*. Other regressors include: Latitude, longitude, latitude squared, longitude squared, latitude*longitude, latitude*longitude squared and Region Fixed Effects, with the exception of regression for *Right Wing* in 1946 where other regressors are: Latitude, longitude, latitude*longitude.

Table D.12: **RDD Robustness – 25 Km-Width FE**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	13.105 (2.817)*** 275	18.058 (2.423)*** 742	11.123 (3.964)*** 275	12.406 (3.760)*** 742	12.869 (3.195)*** 265
Communist and Socialist 1946	13.174 (2.822)*** 275	23.355 (2.569)*** 742	5.621 (3.766) 275	12.921 (3.932)*** 742	7.848 (3.123)** 149
Communist and Socialist 1948	12.539 (3.078)*** 275	21.371 (2.710)*** 742	8.979 (4.275)** 275	12.076 (4.138)*** 742	10.476 (3.412)*** 179
Catholic 1946	-5.082 (2.283)** 275	-13.754 (2.222)*** 742	-3.363 (3.065) 275	-5.964 (3.315)* 742	-7.978 (2.158)*** 545
Catholic 1948	-8.292 (2.598)*** 275	-18.231 (2.478)*** 742	-7.739 (3.526)** 275	-8.727 (3.690)** 742	-8.354 (2.776)*** 218
Right parties 1946	0.641 (1.114) 93	0.316 (0.924) 262	0.923 (1.116) 93	0.793 (1.111) 262	-0.506 (0.508) 714
Right parties 1948	-0.702 (0.246)*** 224	-0.638 (0.185)*** 599	-0.250 (0.333) 224	-0.714 (0.282)** 599	-0.573 (0.218)*** 272

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include 25 Km-Width Fixed Effects. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table D.13: **RDD Robustness – Non-Missing Prewar Elections**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Communist 1946	10.018 (3.444)***	11.071 (3.113)***	14.514 (4.349)***	5.624 (4.185)	11.606 (3.288)***
	142	438	142	438	73
Communist and Socialist 1946	5.906 (3.571)	12.444 (3.620)***	4.688 (4.408)	2.208 (4.575)	3.468 (3.576)
	142	438	142	438	106
Communist and Socialist 1948	7.988 (3.866)**	12.918 (3.452)***	10.849 (4.658)**	2.470 (4.447)	6.115 (3.856)**
	142	438	142	438	77
Catholic 1946	-4.652 (2.724)*	-4.182 (2.150)*	-7.386 (3.429)**	0.061 (2.850)	-5.249 (3.191)**
	142	438	142	438	89
Catholic 1948	-7.283 (3.310)**	-8.515 (2.804)***	-11.869 (3.977)***	-1.157 (3.593)	-8.829 (4.114)**
	142	438	142	438	71
Right parties 1946	2.869 (1.736)	0.238 (1.298)	5.660 (1.758)***	1.639 (1.331)	1.736 (2.538)
	39	118	39	118	40
Right parties 1948	-0.294 (0.308)	-0.143 (0.276)	-0.195 (0.350)	-0.313 (0.363)	0.061 (0.255)
	112	333	112	333	59

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line on the sample of Italian municipalities with all the three political variables prewar (1919, 1921, 1924) not missing. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*. Regression for *Right Wing* in 1946 includes only 1921 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table D.14: RDD Causal Effects by Pre-war vote shares

	Polynomial Regression							
	First order				Second order			
	50 Km		100 Km		50 Km		100 Km	
up	up*pre war	up	up*pre war	up	up*pre war	up	up*pre war	
Communist 1946	5.549 (2.781)**	4.344 (2.682)	5.549 (2.781)**	4.344 (2.682)	8.025 (3.343)**	3.628 (2.667)	8.025 (3.343)**	3.628 (2.667)
	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Communist and Socialist 1946	3.277 (2.988)	4.498 (2.627)*	3.277 (2.988)	4.498 (2.627)*	2.675 (3.752)	3.992 (2.601)	2.675 (3.752)	3.992 (2.601)
	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Communist and Socialist 1948	4.354 (3.064)	3.937 (2.732)	4.354 (3.064)	3.937 (2.732)	6.480 (3.757)*	3.182 (2.680)	6.480 (3.757)*	3.182 (2.680)
	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Catholic 1946	1.904 (2.421)	-3.520 (1.979)*	1.904 (2.421)	-3.520 (1.979)*	-1.665 (3.062)	-2.905 (2.013)	-1.665 (3.062)	-2.905 (2.013)
	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Catholic 1948	-1.209 (2.609)	-3.468 (2.257)	-1.209 (2.609)	-3.468 (2.257)	-5.992 (3.350)*	-2.458 (2.240)	-5.992 (3.350)*	-2.458 (2.240)
	275	275	275	275	275	275	275	275
Right parties 1946	-0.090 (0.844)	-0.094 (0.298)	-0.090 (0.844)	-0.094 (0.298)	1.338 (1.343)	0.419 (0.268)	1.338 (1.343)	0.419 (0.268)
	93	93	93	93	93	93	93	93
Right parties 1948	-0.202 (0.344)	-0.172 (0.248)	-0.202 (0.344)	-0.172 (0.248)	-0.015 (0.394)	-0.166 (0.248)	-0.015 (0.394)	-0.166 (0.248)
	224	224	224	224	224	224	224	224

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line (column up) and the interaction between a dummy for the average 1919, 1921, 1924 *Communist and Socialist* vote share above the median in the sample (50 or 100km band), column up*pre-war. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *Communist* corresponds to the vote share of the Italian Communist Party (PCI); *Communist and Socialist* corresponds to the Popular Front (FP) in 1948, and for comparison we compute also *Communist and Socialist* in 1946 as Italian Communist Party (PCI) + Italian Socialist Party (PSI); *Catholic* corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC); *Right Wing* corresponds to Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) plus smaller parties supporting monarchy. Estimates are conditional on the 1919, 1921, and 1924 vote shares of *Catholic* and *Communist and Socialist*.

Table D.15: **RDD Contextual Factors – Episodes of Violence**

	Polynomial Regression				Local RDD
	First order		Second order		
	50 Km	100 Km	50 Km	100 Km	
Panel A. At least one violence episode against civilians					
Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945	0.249	0.177	0.184	0.230	0.216
	(0.120)**	(0.079)**	(0.174)	(0.121)*	(0.113)*
	275	742	275	742	567
Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944	-0.248	-0.120	-0.278	-0.223	-0.277
	(0.116)**	(0.086)	(0.170)	(0.119)*	(0.152)*
	275	742	275	742	176
Entire Period (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	-0.113	-0.061	-0.194	-0.115	-0.157
	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.140)	(0.106)	(0.123)
	275	742	275	742	170
Panel B. At least one violence episode against partisans					
Nov. 1944-Aug. 1945	0.140	0.255	0.080	0.126	0.256
	(0.096)	(0.065)***	(0.115)	(0.093)	(0.061)***
	275	742	275	742	1616
Jan. 1943-Oct. 1944	0.061	0.128	-0.004	0.093	0.046
	(0.131)	(0.093)	(0.183)	(0.135)	(0.139)
	275	742	275	742	454
Entire Period (Jan. 1943-Aug. 1945)	0.089	0.279	0.086	0.128	0.086
	(0.130)	(0.094)***	(0.183)	(0.134)	(0.161)
	275	742	275	742	262

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. *At least one violence episode against civilians*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in which the majority of victims were civilians. *At least one violence episode against partisans*: Dummy equal to 1 if records report at least one episode of violence in which the majority of victims were partisans. January 1943–August 1945 is the entire period for which we have episodes recorded. January 1943–October 1944 (November 1944–August 1945) is the period before (after) the battlefront moved to the Gothic line.

Table D.16: Survey Data – Variables Description

Variable	Definition	Question	Answers
Male	Dummy for male respondent		
Years of age	Age of the respondent		
Years of residency	Duration of the residency in the municipality		
College level education	Dummy equal to 1 if highest educational attainment is at least college (answers 1 or 2)	What is the highest educational degree you obtained?	1 - PhD/Master – 2 - College – 3 - Senior High School – 4 - Junior High School – 5 - Primary School – 6 - Primary School not finished
Years of education	Number of years spent at school (inferred from the answer to the previous question)		
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is married, widow(er), separated or divorced		
One or more children	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has at least one child		
House ownership	Dummy for house ownership		
Left wing political preferences	Dummy for left wing political preferences (answers 1 or 2)		
Center political preferences	Dummy for center political preferences (answer 3)	How would you define your political position with a single word?	1 - Left – 2 - Center-Left – 3 - Center – 4 - Center-Right – 5 - Right – 6 - Independent
Right wing political preferences	Dummy for right wing political preferences (answer 4 or 5)		
Independent political preferences	Dummy for independent political preferences (answer 6)		
Congruence with father's political preferences	Dummy for congruence with father's political preferences (answer 1)	How close were your vote to that of your father the first time you voted?	1 - Very close – 2 - Quite close – 3 - Not that close – 4 - Not close
One family member took part in the civil war	Dummy for the presence of a family member who took part in the civil war (answer 1 or 2)	Do you remember, or were you told whether any member of your family took part in the civil war in the period 1943-1945? If so, as a partisan or as a Mussolini's supporter – 3 - No	1 - Yes, as a partisan – 2 - Yes, as Mussolini's supporter – 3 - No
One family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	Dummy for the presence of a family member who took part in the civil war as a partisan (answer 1)		
One family member was victim of violence during WWII	Dummy for the presence of a family member who was victim of violence during WWII (answer 1)	Did you or any family member, or were you told whether a member of your family was a victim of violence or deprivations during WWII? If so, from whom?	1 - Yes (add description) – 2 - No
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	Dummy for the organisation of commemorating events in the municipality (answers 1 or 2)	Do you remember whether your municipality has ever organized an event to commemorate the Resistance and the Partisan war? If so, did you attend?	1 - Yes, but I did not attend – 2 - Yes, and I attended – 3 - No
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	Dummy for the participation to commemorating events in the municipality (answer 2)		
Excessive German predominance in Europe	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent agrees with excessive German predominance in Europe (answers 1 or 2)	How strongly do you agree with the statement "The Euro introduction has worsened the risk of an excessive German predominance in Europe"?	1 - Strongly Agree – 2 - Agree – 3 - Disagree – 4 - Strongly Disagree
The Euro was harmful for Italy	Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent believes that the introduction of Euro has been harmful to Italy (answers 1 or 2)	How strongly do you agree with the statement "The introduction of Euro in Italy has been positive for our country"?	1 - Strongly Agree – 2 - Agree – 3 - Disagree – 4 - Strongly Disagree
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	Dummy for Poland ranked over Germany	I am going to present different nationalities. Would you tell, in order, for which ones of them you wouldn't be particularly happy in the event of the wedding of a relative with a person of that nationality.	1 - Poland – 2 - UK – 3 - Germany – 4 - France
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	Dummy for UK ranked over Germany		
Wedding preference, France over Germany	Dummy for France ranked over Germany		
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	Dummy for Germany ranked last		

Note: The first column indicates the name of the variable used in the analysis. The second includes a brief description and, when appropriate, columns 3 and 4 contain the relevant survey question with possible answers. The original questionnaire was administered in Italian, the content has been translated to the benefit of non-Italian speakers.

Table D.17: Survey Data – Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
Male	2,491	0.299	0.458	0	1
Years of age	2,467	66.136	11.245	41	95
Years of residency	2,443	52.449	17.613	20	95
College level education	2,119	0.088	0.283	0	1
Years of education	2,119	9.683	4.241	0	21
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	2,112	0.911	0.286	0	1
One or more children	2,098	0.865	0.342	0	1
House ownership	2,029	0.934	0.248	0	1
Left wing political preferences	1,970	0.424	0.494	0	1
Center political preferences	1,970	0.072	0.258	0	1
Right wing political preferences	1,970	0.123	0.328	0	1
Independent political preferences	1,970	0.381	0.486	0	1
Congruence with father’s political preferences	1,713	0.779	0.415	0	1
One family member took part in the civil war	2,270	0.320	0.467	0	1
One family member was victim of violence during WWII	2,252	0.226	0.419	0	1
One family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	2,252	0.191	0.393	0	1
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	2,226	0.704	0.456	0	1
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	2,226	0.330	0.470	0	1
Excessive German predominance in Europe	1,940	0.308	0.462	0	1
The Euro was harmful for Italy	2,279	0.259	0.438	0	1
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	1,054	0.275	0.447	0	1
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	1,066	0.604	0.489	0	1
Wedding preference, France over Germany	1,064	0.647	0.478	0	1
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	1,081	0.189	0.391	0	1

Note: See Appendix Table D.16 for variables’ description.

Table D.18: Survey Data – Left-Wing Political Preferences

	left wing preferences (a)		left wing preferences (b)					
	(1)	(2)	Non-Left	Center-Left	Left	Center-Left	Left	
Family member was victim of violence during WWII	0.142 (0.071)**	0.155 (0.072)**	-0.053 (0.026)**	0.009 (0.005)**	0.044 (0.021)**	-0.060 (0.026)**	0.011 (0.005)**	0.049 (0.021)**
Family member took part in the civil war	0.170 (0.078)**	0.205 (0.079)**	-0.062 (0.028)**	0.011 (0.005)**	0.051 (0.023)**	-0.075 (0.029)**	0.014 (0.005)**	0.061 (0.023)**
Congruence with father's political preferences	0.162 (0.067)**	0.134 (0.069)*	-0.075 (0.025)**	0.013 (0.005)**	0.062 (0.021)**	-0.065 (0.025)**	0.012 (0.005)**	0.053 (0.021)**
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	0.496 (0.080)**	0.472 (0.081)**	-0.180 (0.031)**	0.032 (0.007)**	0.149 (0.025)**	-0.180 (0.031)**	0.033 (0.007)**	0.147 (0.025)**
Number of observations	1,481	1,481		1,481			1,481	
Wald	65.995	102.571		61.263			94.250	
Other covariates	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES

Note: Coefficients represent marginal effect at the mean value for Probit regressions in columns (1) and (2), for ordered Probit regressions in columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Dependent variables: (a) dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual declared Left or Center-Left political preferences; (b) Categorical variable equal to 2 if the individual declared Left political preferences, to 1 if Center-Left preferences, to 0 otherwise. Other covariates include: Age, sex, years of education, and dummies for house ownership, college education, children, vital record, and position with respect to the Gothic line. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. See Appendix Table D.16 for variables' description.

Table D.19: Survey data – Balance Tests

	Polynomial Regression		Local RDD
	First order	Second order	
Panel A: Socio-Demographic Variables			
Male	-0.001 (0.043)	0.007 (0.056)	0.105 (0.078)*
	2491	2491	567
Years of age	-0.180 (1.053)	-0.038 (1.434)	-3.740 (2.052)**
	2467	2467	554
College level education	0.027 (0.029)	0.036 (0.042)	0.047 (0.064)
	2119	2119	557
Married, widow(er), separated or divorced	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.043)	-0.072 (0.057)*
	2112	2112	658
One or more children	-0.042 (0.036)	-0.067 (0.049)	-0.047 (0.064)
	2098	2098	702
House ownership	-0.004 (0.027)	-0.021 (0.040)	-0.039 (0.060)
	2029	2029	752
Panel B: Political Preferences			
Left wing political preferences	0.066 (0.051)	-0.029 (0.069)	-0.004 (0.078)
	1970	1970	1075
Center political preferences	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.011 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.047)
	1970	1970	778
Right wing political preferences	-0.023 (0.033)	0.005 (0.044)	0.009 (0.054)
	1970	1970	909
Independent political preferences	-0.011 (0.051)	0.035 (0.069)	0.009 (0.079)
	1970	1970	1075


Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. See Appendix Table D.16 for variables' description.

Table D.20: Survey Data – Historical Memory, Civil War, and Germany

	Polynomial Regression		Local RDD
	First order	Second order	
Panel A: Historical memory and civil war			
Family member was victim of violence during WWII	-0.020 (0.046) 2270	0.027 (0.062) 2270	-0.027 (0.079) 758
Family member took part in the civil war	0.109 (0.040)*** 2252	0.091 (0.053)* 2252	0.133 (0.067)** 689
Family member took part in the civil war as a partisan	0.111 (0.038)*** 2252	0.127 (0.052)** 2252	0.143 (0.065)** 727
The municipality organized an event to commemorate the Resistance	0.018 (0.042) 2226	0.041 (0.055) 2226	0.039 (0.069) 696
Participation to an event organized to commemorate the Resistance	0.063 (0.046) 2226	0.050 (0.063) 2226	0.109 (0.086) 552
Panel B: Sentiment toward Germany			
Excessive German predominance in Europe	0.038 (0.048) 1940	0.108 (0.064)* 1940	0.058 (0.084) 609
The Euro was harmful for Italy	0.021 (0.042) 2279	0.111 (0.058)* 2279	0.043 (0.080) 678
Wedding preference, Poland over Germany	0.072 (0.063) 1054	0.166 (0.086)* 1054	0.142 (0.117) 243
Wedding preference, UK over Germany	0.069 (0.071) 1066	0.064 (0.099) 1066	-0.039 (0.146) 305
Wedding preference, France over Germany	-0.077 (0.068) 1064	-0.111 (0.096) 1064	-0.134 (0.136) 296
Wedding preference, Germany ranked last	0.058 (0.053) 1081	0.101 (0.076) 1081	0.063 (0.097) 478

Note: RDD coefficients of being (just) above vs being (just) below the Gothic line. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses for polynomial regressions. Conventional standard errors are displayed in parentheses for local RDD. Significance level: ***<0.01, **<0.05, *<0.1. Number of observations reported in each third row. Regressions include Region Fixed Effects. See Appendix Table D.16 for variables' description.

Figure D.1: Violence Episodes and Municipalities Occupied by “HG-RFSS”



Note: Geographic distribution of violence episodes (by number/intensity) and of violent Nazi divisions (16th SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Reichsfuhrer-SS” and “Hermann Goering”). See Appendix B for historical sources.

Figure D.2: Evolution of the Gothic Line






Figure D.3: RDD Discontinuities




Note: Second order polynomial regressions at the 100 Km bandwidth shown in the fourth column of Table 2. Each dot corresponds to the average vote share for all municipalities within the corresponding 10 Km interval.

Figure D.4: Long-Term Persistence – RDD (Province Fixed Effects)




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regressions as in the last column of Table D.9, for all national elections from 1946 to 1987 and controlling for prewar electoral results. Data for the Communist Party are missing in 1948 as it ran with the Socialist Party.

Figure D.5: Placebo Coefficients – Postwar Outcomes




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regression as in the last column of Table 2, including Region Fixed Effects, shifting the position of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 50 Km at a time up to plus or minus 250 Km.

Figure D.6: Placebo Coefficients (50 Km) – Prewar Elections




Note: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals, estimated by local linear regression as in the last column of Table D.6, including Region Fixed Effects, shifting the position of the Gothic line North or South of its true position by 50 Km at a time up to plus or minus 250 Km.

Figure D.7: Communist minus Catholic in 1946




Note: Geographic distribution of the variable *Communist minus Catholic* 1946

Figure D.8: Presence of Partisan Brigades




Note: Geographic distribution of left-wing and other partisan brigades. See Appendix B for historical sources.

Figure D.9: Municipality birthplace of a partisan



Note: Geographic distribution of birthplace of partisans. See Appendix B for historical sources.

Figure D.10: Italy under Nazi Occupation



E Appendix – Additional Bibliography

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