Populism and Civil Society

Final draft: April 2021

Abstract

Since Tocqueville (1835), civil society has been recognized as a cornerstone of liberal democracy. But populists claim to be the only legitimate representatives of the people, leaving no space for civil society. Are populism and civil society enemies? To answer this question, we look at voters' choices in Europe. We find that individuals belonging to associations are less likely by 1.6 to 2.8 percentage points to vote for populist parties, which is large considering that the average vote share for populist parties is between 12 and 22 percent. This results survives to a large number of robustness checks.

JEL Classification Numbers: P16.

Keywords: Democracy, voting, populist parties, associations, Europe.

I. Introduction[1]

Populism is not new. Waves of populism have spread through Russia and the U.S. at the end of the XIX century and through several European countries in the XX century (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016; Judis, 2016; Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020.) [2] In previous episodes, populism remained marginal (like in Europe in the second half of the XX century) or became dominant in weak democracies. What is peculiar in the recent wave is that populism has spread and sometimes become dominant in countries with well-established liberal democracies. This begs the question of how populism can not only co-exist but even thrive and prosper in liberal democracies.

What is populism? Populism has been defined in various ways and often in the political debate is used as a derogative term. In line with a common view in political science, we use the definition of populism as "…an ideology that considers society ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonist groups, 'the pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite' …" (Mudde, 2004.) The key issue of interest here is that the populist ideology considers the "people" as a monolith, and populist leaders claim to have the monopoly of the political representation of the people. This monopoly on representing the "people" is almost a moral right which delegitimizes all other parties, associations, and groups in the populist discourse. In the populist view, a (corrupt and detached) elite is in opposition with the (homogenous and virtuous) "people." In the populists' Manichean view, there is no intermediate space between the 'virtuous people' and the corrupt elites. This view is in contrast with the concept of liberal democracy.

Liberal democracies are political systems based on pluralism where different groups represent different interests and values, which are all legitimate provided they respect the rules. In liberal democracies, multiple political parties compete in free elections, branches of government are separated, and a system of checks-and-balances exists protecting minorities. Associations are a form to organize and

[1] Tito Boeri tito.boeri@unibocconi.it; Prachi Mishra pmishra@imf.org; Chris Papageorgiou cpapageorgiou@imf.org; Antonio Spilimbergo aspilimbergo@imf.org. We are grateful to Nina Wiesehomeier and Kirk Hawkins for sharing with us their datasets on populist parties in Latin America, populist presidents, and prime ministers in power. Zidong An, Hanbo Qi and Jordan Miller provided superb research assistance. We also thank Olivier Blanchard, Andrea Ichino, Dennis Quinn and participants at the IMF and the 2018 AEA meetings for insightful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this study are the sole responsibility of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management.

[2] Throughout the paper we use Europe as a shortcut for countries in this continent. Individual countries had different experiences with liberal democracy and populism.

give voice to these different values. Associations play a key role in liberal democracies. Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America (1835) writes on the role of associations in democracies:

"*Americans of all ages, all conditions, all minds constantly unite. … Thus, the most democratic country on earth is found to be, above all, the one where men in our day have most perfected the art of pursuing the object of their common desires in common and have applied this new science to the most objects. Does this result from an accident or could it be that there in fact exists a necessary relation between associations and equality? … all citizens are independent and weak; they can do almost nothing by themselves, and none of them can oblige those like themselves to lend them their cooperation. They therefore all fall into impotence if they do not learn to aid each other freely. If men who live in democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste to unite in political goals, their independence would run great risks, but they could preserve their wealth and their enlightenment for a long time; whereas if they did not acquire the practice of associating with each other in ordinary life, civilization itself would be in peril. … The morality and intelligence of a democratic people would risk no fewer dangers than its business and its industry if the government came to take the place of associations everywhere. … In democratic countries, the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.*"

This citation illustrates well the role of associations in well-functioning liberal democracies. Liberal democracies are pluralistic, and associations are a key point of aggregation; in contrast, populists consider 'the people' as a homogeneous group, which cannot be divided. But what is the role of associations if the populist leaders are the only legitimate representative of the people?

This paper looks at the issue of individuals' preferences in a large sample of European countries. Are individuals who belong to associations more prone to vote for populist parties? Did the global economic crisis and the Euro area crisis change this relation? Based on the theoretical literature, as well as real world examples, civil society could provide an ideological anchor, or a protective shield against populism (i.e. for membership in civil society associations to reduce the likelihood to vote for populist parties), or alternatively as a vehicle or means to foster populist ideology (i.e. for populism to result in greater civil society membership). Which effect is stronger is ultimately an empirical question.

We bring these questions to the data by using several waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), which comprises more than 60,000 individual observations, covering 17 European countries with populist parties for about 15 years.

We test whether belonging to a body in civil society (as proxied by belonging to a civil society association or a trade union) reduces the probability to vote (as stated in retrospective questions) for a populist party. Our main finding is that individuals belonging to associations are *less* likely to vote

for populist parties, and the effect is stronger during post crisis periods. In Europe, individuals belonging to associations are, on average over our sample period, 1.6 to 2.8 percentage points less likely to vote for populist parties. The result is driven specifically by membership in civil associations rather than trade unions. The finding is robust to controlling for several variables that could co-determine jointly the voting behaviour in favour of populist parties and the decision to join an association, removal of outliers as well as to estimating a 2-step Heckman model that accounts for the probability of participation in voting.

We interpret the findings as associations providing ideological anchors, identities and voice mechanisms, as alternatives to voting for outsiders. Another interpretation is that associations promote social responsibility becoming a protective shield against populism. We also find some evidence that the negative association between associations and populist vote became stronger post crisis, likely as individual beliefs became more unhinged from ideological anchors, and people felt more open to voting for new parties – although the change is economically sizeable; the statistical tests, however, do not provide robust evidence that the coefficients on association membership to be significantly different during post crisis years.

This paper makes four contributions to the literature. First, even though economic crises like the great depression in the thirties, the global financial crisis in 2008-9, the euro periphery crisis in 2020-12 are generally associated with the rise of populist leaders, there are noticeable exceptions. [3] For instance, despite the deep economic crisis, Ireland and Iceland did not have strong populist movements. On the other hand, Poland, which did not experience a recession during the global financial crisis, has a party classified as populist in power. Moreover, Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) note how 'most studies are "reduced -form" and do not pin down the exact channels driving the relationship between crisis and populism. But the few studies that do pin it down, these point to the importance of the impact of the crisis on attitudes and beliefs, especially on trust in political institutions.' Our contribution is exactly on the mechanisms, and how the presence (or absence) of civil society can explain these differences across countries.

Second, there is an ongoing debate about the importance of economic versus cultural and social factors in explaining the rise of populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2016 and 2017; Margalit, 2019; Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés. 2017.) Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) identify the study of culture in intermediating the effects of the economic shocks as an area for future work. Our approach focusing

[3] For a comprehensive discussion see Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020. The political science literature is less sanguine on the correlation between economic crises and the rise of populism (Kriese and Pappas, 2015.)

on the intermediate bodies argue that these factors need to be complemented as the diffusion of populist ideas depends on the presence of a civil society.

Third, our results provide indirect evidence for the old idea that populism may be the response of a society losing its 'collective consciousness.' The idea, which is old in sociology, is that a society needs a system of solidarity between individuals (Durkheim, 1893; Arendt, 1973) providing cross-cutting social ties. When this system breaks down, individuals feel anomia and are ready to support new movements. According to this view, populists gain support after big shocks only if the society does not have enough intermediate institutions which provide an 'ideological anchor' to individuals.

Fourth, a growing strand of the literature looks at the impact of social media on the diffusion of populism (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020). Social media in principle should facilitate the direct communication between the leader and the masses, which is central to populism (Tufekci, 2018). By using a novel database on tweets sent by political leaders, we are able to control for the role played by social media in our framework.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on populism and economics with a focus on the effect of the recent global financial and euro crises. Section III describes the data sources used in the empirical analysis and takes a first look at these data. Section IV discusses the empirical strategy followed by Section V that reports and discusses the results. Section VI draws conclusions.

II. Literature on Populism and Civil Society

The literature on the causes and the electoral success of populism is old (Ionesco and Gellner, 1969; Di Tella, 1965) and vast,[4] but so far answers have been elusive for historians or political scientists (Hawkins et al., 2017).[5] The recent rise of populism is due to supply (by politicians) and by demand (by voters). There is a growing literature on the supply effect (Guiso et al., 2017).[6] This paper is focused on the voters' preferences.

For this paper, we focus on three questions generally addressed by economists: 1) what is the role of populism in rich postmodern societies? and why has populism been on the rise even before the global

[4] For an excellent recent overview see Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020.
[5] Political scientists have worked extensively on populism. Even a simple review of the literature on populism in political science is well beyond the scope of this paper. We quote only few authors whose work is close to our approach.
[6] Populism is a phenomenon in democracies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) which implies elections. The role of electoral system, which intermediates between supply and demand factors, is important but outside the scope of this paper.

financial crisis? 2) what are the effects of the global financial crisis and, in particular, the euro crisis on politics? 3) why do voters vote for parties which are ultimately against their own interest?

Populism in post-modern societies

The rise of populist parties in Europe since the 1980s has revived the literature on populism in political science. The success of (far right) populist parties in the last thirty years has been remarkable (Algan et al. 2017, and Algan et al. 2019). With the Green parties, the populist far right parties are the only new party family in Europe in the last seventy years and the only one to spread consistently in both Eastern and Western Europe. The reasons for the rise of populist parties are complex, involving both demand and supply factors (Mudde, 2007; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 2017) A key issue is the revival of populist parties in rich countries where democracy is well established.

Inglehart and Norris (2016, 2017) explore two leading explanations. First, the widely held view that economic insecurity has caused the rise of populism. According to this view, the deep structural transformations of the last fifty years have created economic uncertainty and social malaise, especially amongst the economic losers of these transformations. The second view focuses on cultural backlash. In addition to deep economic changes, the last fifty years have seen profound social transformation; the introduction of new values in the society has caused a reaction in sectors of the population which felt threatened. Using the European Social Survey, Inglehart and Norris (2016) find strong evidence in favour of the cultural backlash hypothesis. Their finding suggests that the traditional left-right cleavage, on which politics was based before the 80s, is being substituted by a new cleavage between traditional and progressive values in (post-modern) Western societies. Inglehart and Norris (2016) also find evidence that the support for populist parties comes from small shop keepers and not from low-wage workers and that unemployment status and income are bad predictors of populist votes.

The view that in post-modern societies voting is more affected by cultural factors than by wealth or income is important for this paper. In fact, in a post-modern world, associations, which are part of the individual's cultural world, should play an increasing role in determining voting intentions.

Social capital and populism

The role of social capital has been recognized in economics for a long time. Building on Tocqueville's intuition, Putnam (1995; and later developed in a famous book, *Making Democracy Work* or *Bowling Alone*) argues that social capital, which was key in building American society, has been declining since the 1960s. According to Putnam, the decline in social capital has increased unhappiness and political

apathy. Crucially, low levels of social capital also decrease confidence in government and lower frequency in voting and participating in political activity. In his original work, he did not deal directly with populism, but all these correlates of social capital are often associated with populism. Satyanath et al. (2018) argue instead that there is a "dark side" of social capital, documenting that social capital aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany's first democracy.[7] More recently, the connection between social capital and populism has been explored to interpret the results of elections both in the US and in Europe. In the US, Giuliano and Wacziarg (2020) explore the role of (the lack of) social capital in explaining the support for Donald Trump in the 2016 elections. In France, Algan et al. (2019) analyze in depth the role of social capital in the context of the 2017 presidential elections. They show that voters with low interpersonal trust were more likely to vote for Le Pen. Moreover, Le Pen and Mélenchon voters have similarly low levels of income and life satisfaction, but Mélenchon voters strongly support redistribution, Le Pen voters reject it. Crucially, the preferences for redistribution are associated to the large differences in social capital (trust).

This paper builds on this strand of the literature in linking social capital as measured by membership in association with populism.[8] We could argue based on this literature that an increase in social capital, as proxied by greater civil society membership, would be associated with reduced unhappiness, less political apathy, and therefore lower likelihood of voting for populist parties. Indeed, the empirical evidence presented in this paper is supportive of this hypothesis.

Economic crises and populism

The global financial crisis (or Great Recession) in 2008/9 and the Euro crisis in 2012 have had unprecedented economic consequences; did the economic crises also cause political crises? After all, political crises and the ascent of Nazism followed the economic crisis in the thirties. Political scientists and economists give different answers to this question.

Rovira Kaltwasser and Lisa Zanotti (2016) state that "in contrast to alarmist reports in the media claiming that the Great Recession is triggering the rise of anger, extremism and protest across Europe, most comparative (party) politics literature on the Great Recession tends to argue that so far the

[7] Even Tocqueville (1835) warned about the dark side of civil capital: "the liberty of association is only a source of advantage and prosperity to some nations, it may be perverted … and … changed into a cause of destruction."
[8] Putnam distinguishes between two types of social capital - bonding and bridging capital. Bonding capital is among similar people with similar race, age, level of education. Bridging capital is among other people who do not necessarily share the same characteristics but share some value. In our empirical analysis we cannot distinguish between the two types of capital. In any case, Putnam himself argues that bonding and bridging capitals are correlated.

political consequences of the crisis have been limited." The extended welfare state is credited for preventing a different outcome than in the 30s. Moreover, the evidence points that the recession itself has not caused a large increase of votes for the French Front National (Mayer, 2014). The discontent caused by the economic crisis seems to have been channelled through retrospective voting (i.e. voters punish incumbents in government irrespective of their ideology). According to this view, the rise of populism after the Great Recession is the continuation of a pre-existing trend of punishment of the ruling class via voting for parties with mostly inexperienced politicians presenting themselves as anti-establishment.

Economists hold the opposite view that the economic crises had profound political effects and, in particular, are fostering populism. Guiso et al. (2017), Algan et al. (2017), the EEAG report (2017), Dustmann et al. (2017) argue that the crises and the attendant economic insecurity undermined trust in institutions, in particular, European institutions. Similarly, Funke et. al. (2016) find that voters flock to extremist parties, located at both ends of the political spectrum, after financial crises.

Contributing to this literature, our paper finds that the crises had indeed an effect on the voting preferences, and that this was intermediated by associations. In particular, we find that civil society plays an important role in providing a protective shield against populism, i.e. membership in associations is associated with reduced likelihood to vote for populist parties. Results somewhat similar to ours were obtained by Coffé et al. (2007) in their analysis of the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in the 2004 Flemish regional elections. They found the right-wing populists to be particularly successful in municipalities with a small network of social organizations. Finally, attempting to reconcile the economic and the cultural views, Margalit (2019) argues that cultural explanations have "explanatory significance" but not "outcome significance." So, economic factors, including globalization and the global financial crisis and austerity, have determined the Brexit referendum but historical factors explain the bulk of the pro-Brexit vote.

III. Data

This section starts with a brief account of the sources from which data were obtained followed by a first look at basic trends and descriptive statistics.

Sources

Our dataset is at an individual level and is drawn primarily from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS maps the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour patterns to socio-economic and demographic variables. The surveys take place every two years, though not all countries and individuals participate in all the waves. Therefore, we have a repeated cross-section rather than a panel. The data measure voting patterns at the individual level. The ESS asks individuals whether they voted in the last Parliamentary election and if they did, which party they voted for. The sample covers 17 European countries over the period 2002-16 (Table A1).

To identify populist parties in Europe, we follow the recent literature (Inglehart and Norris 2016). Inglehart and Norris classify populist parties based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). The CHES uses expert ratings on position of parties on a range of characteristics such as support for traditional values, liberal lifestyles, and multiculturalism, including economic characteristics such as state of the economy, and market deregulation. Inglehart and Norris classify a party as populist if it scores more than 80 points on a standardized 100-point scale built using thirteen selected indicators contained in the CHES. This definition of populist party is time-invariant. We follow the same methodology to classify populist parties in Europe. Based on this methodology, we define 29 parties in Europe as populist (see Tables A4 for a list of populist parties in Europe).

The key variable in our analysis is membership of civil society associations. We construct association membership rates for Europe using the ESS. Membership of civil society associations is elicited from a question on personal involvement in actions "trying to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong". We consider members of civil society associations as *only* those stating to have "worked in another organization or association during the last 12 months".[9] More specifically, an individual is defined to be a member of a civil society association, if during the last 12 months, she has worked in an organization or association trying to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong in her country. Importantly, we do not code as association members those stating to have "contacted a politician, government, or local government official" or "worked in a political party or action group". In some specifications we also use a measure of self-reported trade union membership, though we argue later in the paper that this measure is more likely to be contaminated by endogeneity concerns than membership of civil societies. We define an individual to be a member of a trade union if he/she is currently "a member of a trade union or similar organization".

[9] As long as the individual reports to have worked in another association, we code the individual as member of civil society associations. In particular, we code our main variable ASSOC=1 if B15 ("worked in another organization or association") =1, and ASSOC=0 if B15=2.

We use several other socio-economic variables such as age, gender, income, and education. Details of all the variables used in the empirical analysis is provided in Table A2. Table A3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.

A first look at the data

Before going into the econometric analysis, we analyse the evolution of our key variables over time and analyse simple correlations (Figure 1). In Europe, there is no clear trend in populist vote intention between 2002 and 2016. Close to 10 percent of the population said they would vote for populist parties in 2002; the figure increased to close to 15 percent by mid-2000, before beginning to decline again more recently. This is consistent with the fact that, despite popular perceptions, there is not an overwhelming trend in favour of populism in Europe (Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2017.)

The rise in populism in Europe till mid 2000s has coincided with a rather constant level of civil association membership whilst union membership has been on a declining trend. In general union membership rates display a much higher time variation than membership to civil society associations. Only for selected countries in Europe, such as Turkey, populist in power were associated with declining membership of associations. More recently since 2012 or so, however, we do find increasing association membership to be associated with a decline in populist vote.

How does membership of civil society association interact with political preferences for populist parties? Do populism and decline in, broadly speaking, association membership rates (including unions) go hand in hand, or are they driven by a third factor? We analyse these issues more rigorously in the next section using a novel dataset on voting patterns and association membership rates.

IV. Empirical Specification

We set out the empirical analysis by first estimating a baseline logit model, followed by an extended specification based on the Heckman model.

Baseline specification

We estimate the drivers of populist vote using a linear probability model. The estimating equation is specified as follows:

(1) $D_{i,c,t} = aAssoc_{i,c,t} + \beta\ Sufficient\ Income_{i,c,t} + \gamma\ Difficult\ \ Income_{i,c,t} + \delta\ Gender_{i,c,t} + \zeta\ young_{\ i,c,t} + \eta\ old_{i,c,t} + \theta\ secondary\ education_{i,c,t} + \kappa\ tertiary\ education_{i,c,t} + s_c * v_t + \varepsilon_{i,t}$,

where $D_{i,c,t}$ is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if individual *i* in country *c* at time *t* votes for a populist party. $Assoc_{i,c,t}$ takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a civil society association. The variables $Sufficient\ Income_{i,c,t}$, $Difficult\ Income_{i,c,t}$, $Gender_{i,c,t}$, $Young_{i,c,t}$, $Old_{i,c,t}$, and $Secondary\ Education_{i,c,t}$ $Tertiary\ Education_{i,c,t}$ are indicators which take the value of 1 respectively if the individual reports to have sufficient income, to be in a difficult income situation, to be female, to be younger than 30, to be 65 or older, have secondary education with 12 years of completed schooling, and to have tertiary education with 16 or more years of completed schooling.[10]

The variables s_c and v_t denote country and time fixed effects respectively. Country fixed effects control for all time-invariant country characteristics that may affect individuals' preferences to vote for populist or non-populist parties, e.g. historical background, culture, or legal system. Time effects capture any year-specific voting behaviour that are common across countries, e.g. the global financial crisis, or a common rise in populism across the globe. The interactions $s_c * v_t$, capture any observed and unobserved country and time varying characteristics. The standard errors for the estimated coefficients in all regressions are clustered at the country-level.

V. Empirical Results

Baseline Evidence from European voting data

We first show results for drivers of voting for populists using the ESS. Our dataset includes observations from 17 European countries with eight waves.

Table 1 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) by OLS. Column 1 pools data from all available years from 2002-2016. Our key variable of interest is membership in a civil association. The estimated coefficient for this variable is negative in Column 1 of Table 1 indicating that individuals who belong to associations are less likely to vote for populist parties. The result holds also across all waves in with the exception of 2004.

Based on Table 1 Column 1, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on civil association is 2.5. This is a large number considering that the average vote share for populist parties is between 10 and 15

[10] The main findings in the paper are robust to including age and age-squared instead of indicators for young and old.

percent in most countries. In other words, membership of civil society reduces the vote for populist party by roughly 20 to 30 per cent.

In addition to membership in a civil organization, being female and having attained tertiary education are consistently negative and highly significant i.e. females and highly educated are significantly less likely to vote for populist parties. Self-reporting insufficient income or income difficulties are significant sporadically but, in general, are consistent with economic explanations of populism: self-reporting having sufficient income is negatively correlated with voting for populist parties while reporting income difficulties is positively associated with voting for populist parties.

Effect of the European crises

Europe experienced the global financial crisis in 2008-9 and the Southern part of the Eurozone another severe recession in 2012. Did the crises change the effect of associations on the voting pattern?

Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 report the results when we split the samples between 2002-10, and 2012-16. These two sub-periods are chosen also in light of the retrospective nature of the question on individuals votes. Columns 4-11 show the results for specific years. The coefficient on civil association membership is negative and statistically significant for every year (with the exception of 2004), but becomes even more negative after the global financial crisis. Note also that the coefficient of the variable for (self-reported) insufficient income is negative and significant after the global financial crisis; and its magnitude increases 2-3 times in the post crisis period.

What can explain the increasing negative correlation between civil association membership and populist vote? One potential explanation is that before the crisis party discipline was strong, and ideological vote was important. Post crisis, notably with the collapse of social-democratic parties across Europe, individual beliefs became unhinged. With more unhinged beliefs, people felt more open to vote for new parties. Civil associations, on the other hand, provided ideological anchors and voice mechanisms alternative to voting for outsiders. Therefore, individuals who belonged to these associations voted less for populist parties. This explanation is also consistent with the view that social capital represented by civil associations membership has a long-term effect which manifests itself in moment of crises. Another complementary explanation is that economic crises have a big role in the system of beliefs on the role of the state (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013). People, mostly young ones, demand more from the state but, at the same time, are more sceptical about the state. This unanswered demand is fulfilled by civil society associations and less by populist voting. Last but not least the crisis

had an impact on the supply of populist parties making the vote more responsive to civil association membership.

A word of caution in interpreting the difference in results between pre and post crisis is in place here. We tried to evaluate more formally if the time split of our sample is a statistically important dimension of heterogeneity. We find that the estimated coefficients on association membership increase over time, and in particular after the global financial crisis, and the change is economically sizeable; the statistical tests, however, did not provide robust evidence for the coefficients to be significantly different during post crisis years.

Extended specification correcting for potential sample selection bias

OLS regressions have the potential problem of self-selection given voters may decide not to vote. Indeed, individuals make two decisions: (i) whether to vote in an election, and (ii) conditional on voting, which party to vote for, whether to vote for a populist party or not. This issue has been recognized in the literature, e.g. in Guiso et. al. 2017, and has been addressed through a two-step Heckman model, to account for the bias that may result from the fact that party choice applies only to voters who turnout to vote.

Following the literature, we estimate a two-step Heckman model. In the first stage, we estimate the probability of participation. In the second stage, we estimate the probability of voting for a populist party. For identification, we need to introduce at least one variable which affects the probability of voting but does not have a direct effect on the choice of party. As instrument we use proxies for lack of awareness about public choice issues.

We assume that lack of awareness affects voter turnout, by increasing the cost of acquiring information about political platforms and candidates but does not directly impact choice of political party. We use several proxies for lack of awareness. The proxies are measured by the number of "don't know" or "no answer" to questions relating to "anything about politics": (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) how interested in politics, (iii) able to take active role in political group, (iv) confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) easy to take part in politics, (vi) placement on left right scale, (vii) state of education in country nowadays, (viii) state of health services in country nowadays.

Before we present the results, we would like to highlight the limitations of our identification strategy. Our analysis assumes that the instruments would capture the costs of acquiring information, therefore

would be correlated with participation, but not directly with political preferences. While our selection variables include proxies for the lack of awareness on specific public choice issues (e.g. the count of how many times the respondent answered "I don't know" to questions on the state of health services or education), and not only on political preferences, and we also define instruments based only on subsets of these issues (see robustness below); yet we do not rule out - as with all choices of instruments - that some of our proxies may be directly correlated with populist vote. Table 2 shows the results from estimating Equation (1) by 2-step Heckman respectively. Table 2a reports the estimates from the second stage of Heckman, while Table 2b reports the first stage estimates. The first stage reported in Table 2b shows that the coefficient on our proxies for lack of awareness is strongly negative and statistically significant.[11] We find strong evidence that individuals who are less aware are less likely to participate in elections, suggesting that lack of awareness is a strong instrument. Overall, the results from estimating the 2-step Heckman model support the main finding in Table 1 and establish more conclusively that populism is negatively associated with civil society membership in Europe. Women, high income, highly educated, and older individuals, are less likely to vote for populist parties. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that voting for populist parties is less likely among people who are likely to be more economically secure.

The rest of the findings are broadly consistent with the literature. Income affects participation positively. High income individuals are more likely to vote, but less likely to vote populist. Low income individuals are less likely to participate, but have an insignificant effect on voting populist, relative to other individuals.

Controlling for other variables, women participate as much as men but, conditional on voting, they are less likely to vote for populist parties. The coefficient on women is consistently (and significantly) negative. The negative relationship between women and far-right populist parties in Europe has been long noted (see Mudde, 2007, for a summary). In the past, authors have argued that women may be discouraged by the fact that far right European parties have conservative values on civil rights, which may be not appealing to many women. More recently, Mudde (2007) has proposed an alternative explanation: women tend to vote conservative parties but dislike extremist parties that are stigmatized as outsiders.

Age affects participation positively, but, conditional on voting, it has an opposite effect on populist vote. Education is considered in the literature to be a proxy for the ability to gauge long term costs of

[11] While awareness is not significant when the dependent variable is vote for populist parties.

current policies and is hypothesized to be negatively associated with populist vote. Our results support the significance of education; however, we find interesting variation across different categories of education. Individuals with tertiary education are more likely to participate in elections, but significantly less likely to vote for populist parties. Individuals with secondary education are also more likely to participate in elections relative to those who are not, but they are not significantly less likely to vote populist, unlike the tertiary educated. Therefore, while our results support the importance of education in determining populist voting patterns, we find that it is only the highly educated who are less likely to vote for populist parties.

Robustness tests

In this section, we conduct robustness checks to analyse whether the coefficient on membership to civil associations is robust to alternative specifications, explanatory variables, and instruments. Table 3 presents the first set of robustness tests. Panel A includes only a subset of selection variables for the first stage equation in the Heckman procedure. In particular, it excludes (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) how interested in politics, (iii) able to take active role in political group, from the set of selection variables listed above, in order to explore whether the results are driven by these variables.

Panel B presents estimates of the baseline regression specification to which we add dummies to control for different occupation categories available in the ESS database. Finally, another potential concern relates to omitted variables that could co-determine jointly the voting behaviour in favour of populist parties and the decision to join an association. Panel C includes a number of additional controls proposed in Guiso et. al. (2017.) These include indicators for risk aversion, trust in parties and institutions, watching television, watching politics news and programs, unemployment spells over the last 5 years, exposure to globalization, preference for lower immigration, perception of negative effects of immigrants, and right-wing ideology.

The main finding that membership of civil associations is negatively associated with voting for populist parties remains robust to the different specifications considered. It is worth noting that we do not introduce additional controls in the main specifications in Tables 1-2 to avoid issues of multicollinearity between the controls, and the Heckman 2-step estimates do not converge with the large set of additional controls.

We also performed the Oster (2017) test for coefficient stability comparing our baseline coefficient in Table 1, Column 1, with that in Table 3 Panel C, controlling for the number of observations, and

adding one control variable at a time. Specifically, we estimated the "lambda" parameter in Oster test which captures how strong the role of unobservables would have to be, relative to that of observables, to explain away the correlation. The value of "lambda" was found to be small in most specifications. In the specification where we include all controls as in Table 3 Panel C, though, we do find the estimate of "lambda" to be estimated at 1.1 indicating that the role of unobservables would have to be at least 110% that of observables to drive the correlation down to zero.

Overall, while the identification of the impact of civil association on populist vote poses numerous challenges discussed above, we would emphasize that , the sign of the estimated coefficient on association membership – which is a key finding of our paper – remains stable across a variety of specifications, different samples, and robustness checks. In terms of magnitudes, we prefer to present a range for the coefficient estimates on association membership – 1.2 to 3.9 – across different columns in Tables 1-3.

Including trade unions membership

Trade unions are a form of association and have traditionally played a big role in Europe. Do trade unions play the same role as other associations in diminishing the propensity for populist votes?

In our dataset, the average trade union and association membership rates in the sample are similar, at 27 percent and 22 percent respectively (Table A3). But the trends in the two variables are quite different. As shown in Figure 1, while trade union membership rates show a steady decline since 2002, membership of civil society associations, on average, remained relatively stable, and in fact, on an increasing path since 2012.

As a first pass, we do replicate the specification of Table 1 (OLS), and Table 2 (Heckman) but changing the definition of the key variable of interest. In Table 4 Panel A it is "belonging to a civil association or to a trade union". The results are not as strong as in the regressions using only membership to civil society as explanatory variable (as in Tables 1-3). The OLS results are significant only after the crisis; the results with Heckman are more consistent across the time periods.

One possible concern is reverse causality or omitted variables. Given that membership in trade unions is more likely to be endogenous than civil society membership at these frequencies, we use an instrumental variables strategy specifically to address this concern. We use as an instrument the sectoral trade union density in another country for the same sector in which the ESS individual works. We choose the United Kingdom, because it is a country where there is no extended coverage of

bargaining (or where "excess coverage" is low) and therefore trade union membership rates are an appropriate measure of the strength of collective workers organizations. We assume that the sectoral trade union membership rates in the United Kingdom are exogenous to populist votes in other countries in our sample, which we believe is a reasonable assumption. To implement this strategy, we drop the United Kingdom from our regressions. The results are shown in Panel B in Table 4. We estimate two specifications with the instrumental variable (IV) – first an IV regression corresponding to the OLS in Table 1, and the second where we include the instrumented explanatory variable in the Heckman 2 step selection model (i.e. corresponding to Table 2). The first stage IV regression is identical for both these empirical models; the F-statistics for the excluded instrument reported in the last row of Table 4, are significantly above conventional levels in all the specifications, increasing our confidence in the strength of the instrument. Importantly, the estimated coefficients on "association or trade union membership" remain negative and statistically significant in the second stage of the instrumental variable estimations – both in the simple IV, as well as in the Heckman-IV specifications.

Focusing on trade union membership

In order to focus exclusively on the role of the trade unions, we replicate the same specification with only membership to trade union as explanatory variable (Table 5.) The results show that membership to trade unions has little significant effect on the propensity to vote for populist parties except in the 2014 wave. This confirms that trade unions, despite being a form of association, are quite different from other associations. This is also confirmed from a historical point of view. In Argentina, trade unions played a big role during the Perón period in consolidating a populist regime. Instead of being a barrier to populism, trade unions did in fact become a transmission belt of populism.

Role of the trade unions vs. civil associations

Membership in trade unions and membership in associations are likely to be correlated. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between the two variables in our sample is positive and significant (0.25 and significant at 1 percent level). To disentangle the effects of these two variables we run our basic specification using the two variables (membership in trade unions and membership in civil associations) separately. The results are reported in Table 6, which follows the same structure as Table 5. The results show that membership in civil associations drives the results while membership in trade unions becomes insignificant in most of the cases.

Role of social media

One of the possible confounders is involvement in social media. Frequent access to social media may make people more vulnerable to populist rhetoric, which finds it easier to convey its rather simple messages and thin ideology in short statements. At the same time, social media may be a substitute for participation in civil society associations, as an alternative vehicle of social interactions and as a co-ordination device. Unfortunately, the ESS questionnaire up to 2016 does not provide information on whether individuals are involved in social media, and even in the 2016 wave of the survey, reference is made only to political involvement in social media.[12]

In order to control for the role played by social media in our framework, we collected data on tweets by political leaders in the same countries covered by the ESS and we computed the share of tweets by populist political leaders. Political leaders are defined as candidates for Prime Minister Office or Presidential elections, whose parties had received at least 5% of votes, and are considered populist based on their party affiliation. The sample is smaller compared to our original sample in Table 1, as Twitter started only in 2007, and political leaders in Eastern European countries are not using Twitter for the most.[13]

The results from regressions controlling for the penetration of populist leaders in social media are displayed in Table 7. As indicated by the first three columns of the table, a larger use of social media by populist leaders increases the likelihood of populist vote, but does not appear to affect the influence played on voting by involvement in civil society associations: the estimated coefficient on civil association membership remains negative, statistically significant, and quantitatively similar to our baseline specification in Table 1.

Role of urban vs. rural status

The dichotomy between urban and rural locations plays a key role in explaining populism. We test if the inclusion of this variable has an impact on our results.[14] Results reported in Table 8 show that individuals in urban areas are less likely to vote for populist parties, a finding which is statistically and economically significant and mainly driven by the post-2012 period. Importantly, it is shown that the

[12] The respondent is asked whether he/she "posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such Facebook or Twitter."
[13] Note that in these regressions, we include country fixed effects, but not country x year effects as they would be collinear with social media variable.
[14] We use the variable "domicil" in the ESS to classify urban/rural (urban=1 if the individual resides in "A big city", "Suburbs or outskirts of big city", or "Town or small city", and urban=0 if "Country village" or "Farm or home in countryside").

baseline coefficient estimates on civil associations are robust to inclusion of the "urban" status variable.[15]

Are the effects of association membership heterogeneous? Age and education

In this sub-section, we analyse if the negative association between populist vote and association membership is driven by particular groups of individuals. Specifically, we analyse whether the effects are different across different age and education groups. We estimate the relationship between populist vote and civil association membership separately for three different age groups – young, middle-aged, and old. The results shown in in Panel A of Table 9 show that populism and civil association membership do not depend on any specific age group. The negative correlation between populism and belonging to civil association, however, weakens in 2016 among the young, possibly indicating the importance of the new social media, as collective voice mechanisms, for younger generations.

Panel A of Table 9 shows the results for three different education groups—less than secondary (i.e. less than 12 years of schooling), secondary to tertiary (between 12 and 16 years of schooling), and greater than tertiary (more than 16 years of schooling). Again, the negative correlation between belonging to civil association and populism is not driven by any education group.

VI. Conclusions

Researchers have focused on the many reasons behind populism, including cultural backlash, economic uncertainty, and lack of trust. But no previous study has focused on the role of civil society. Civil society has long been recognized as a key defence of liberal democracy as Alexis de Tocqueville wrote almost two centuries ago. At the same time, populists, who do not see a role for civil society, may pragmatically use associations as transmission belts. Thus, one can find arguments for civil society being a protective shield against populism or a vehicle of the populist ideology. The role of civil society in the rise of populism is, therefore, an empirical matter. However, empirical tests have been lacking. This paper fills this gap. While most of the evidence we find is in line with the former hypothesis i.e.

[15] We also interacted civil associations with the urban dummy to explore whether the coefficient estimates on civil associations differ significantly for rural and urban areas. While the baseline coefficient on associations (without the interaction) remains negative and significant, and robust across specifications; the estimated interaction term is positive for most years, though not consistent in sign and significance (in fact, the estimated interaction coefficient is negative for 2008). Overall, we are unable to detect robust and statistically different effects of civil associations on populist vote between rural and urban areas.

associations offer a protective shield against populism, we find little support for civil society to be a vehicle for populism.

Our main finding using a large number of European countries is that individuals belonging to associations are less likely to vote for populist parties. Specifically, we find that individuals belonging to associations are less likely by 1.6 to 2.8 percentage points to vote for populist parties, which is large considering that the average vote share for populist parties is between 12 and 22 percent. In addition, a larger use of social media by populist leaders increases the likelihood of populist vote, but does not appear to affect the influence played on voting by involvement in civil society associations. Moreover, individuals in urban areas are less likely to vote for populist parties.

Finally, this paper also sheds new light on the role of the global financial crisis in the political process. The global financial crisis has not simply caused a populist wave. Rather, it may have changed (and enhanced) the role of civil society. In a world where political systems, institutions, and ideologies have been put into question and even discredited, where social democracy in Europe almost disappeared, civil society assumes a new role.

This paper also opens important questions for future research. First, how did the role of civil associations as vaccine against the populist vote evolve with the spread of social media? Second, what are the specific mechanisms through which belonging to a civil association lowers the populist vote? Is it because associations provide alternative information or because they offer an ideological anchor? Is it because they promote social responsibility beyond the own self? Is it because they offer voice mechanisms alternative to exit-punishment of incumbents? Is it because civil society associations are identity providers moderating the impact of migration on the identity of local communities? Third, are all associations equivalent or some associations are more effective? Fourth, do associations have a similar impact on all members of society or is belonging to an association more relevant for some groups? Future research, possibly benefitting from data covering also the refugee crisis, should further investigate these issues.

Table 1. OLS Estimates of Drivers of Populist Party Vote

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Civil Associations	-2.53***	-2.06**	-3.24***	-2.02*	-1.99	-2.30**	-1.70**	-2.22***	-2.71***	-3.51***	-3.51***
	[0.59]	[0.82]	[0.68]	[1.14]	[1.18]	[0.88]	[0.74]	[0.73]	[0.83]	[0.73]	[0.85]
Income Sufficient	-1.07***	-0.64**	-1.72***	-0.97***	-0.58	-0.36	0.14	-1.56**	-1.11	-2.12***	-1.78*
	[0.35]	[0.29]	[0.50]	[0.31]	[0.50]	[0.60]	[0.50]	[0.59]	[0.65]	[0.57]	[0.88]
Income Difficult	1.70**	0.93	3.03**	0.18	-0.34	1.66	1.90	1.15	2.52	2.06*	5.61**
	[0.80]	[0.64]	[1.21]	[0.55]	[0.69]	[1.25]	[1.59]	[0.73]	[1.48]	[1.02]	[1.86]
Female	-2.45***	-2.05***	-3.06***	-1.58**	-2.28**	-2.27***	-1.71**	-2.40***	-2.75***	-2.85***	-3.72***
	[0.51]	[0.56]	[0.76]	[0.70]	[0.85]	[0.67]	[0.65]	[0.56]	[0.84]	[0.78]	[0.95]
Young	0.52	0.89	-0.14	0.95	0.42	1.21	0.63	1.21	1.29	-0.31	-1.82
	[0.66]	[0.68]	[0.83]	[0.57]	[0.42]	[1.79]	[1.13]	[1.13]	[0.85]	[1.16]	[1.62]
Old	-0.92	-0.15	-2.04**	0.74	-0.25	-0.81	0.12	-0.50	-1.38	-2.53**	-2.28**
	[0.70]	[0.63]	[0.88]	[0.45]	[0.61]	[0.79]	[1.17]	[1.06]	[1.11]	[1.15]	[0.99]
Secondary Education	0.50	0.89	-0.20	1.32*	0.63	0.72	1.81	0.07	-0.79	0.31	0.19
	[0.78]	[0.74]	[1.03]	[0.70]	[0.74]	[0.99]	[1.33]	[1.10]	[1.00]	[1.56]	[1.48]
Tertiary Education	-4.89***	-3.60***	-6.88***	-1.64*	-3.42**	-4.31**	-2.78*	-5.49**	-6.86***	-6.75***	-6.95***
	[1.14]	[1.22]	[1.44]	[0.85]	[1.51]	[1.78]	[1.56]	[1.99]	[1.74]	[1.85]	[1.47]
Country*Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	135980	84595	51385	17484	15466	16832	17140	17673	19198	17633	14554
R-Squared	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.09	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.30	0.27	0.20	0.13

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. "Civil Associations" takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a civil society association, and 0 otherwise. "Income sufficient" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. "Income difficult" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. "Young" takes a value of 1 if the individual is less than 30 years of age, and 0 otherwise. "Old" takes a value of 1 if the individual is 65 years or older, and 0 otherwise. "Secondary education" takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained secondary education, with 12 or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. "Tertiary education" takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with 16 or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 2a. Drivers of Populist Party Vote. Heckman 2nd Stage Estimates

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Civil Associations	-2.74***	-2.42***	-3.22***	-2.03***	-1.97**	-3.57***	-2.14***	-2.31***	-2.56***	-3.38***	-3.85***
	[0.36]	[0.55]	[0.42]	[0.60]	[0.86]	[0.83]	[0.73]	[0.66]	[0.64]	[0.49]	[0.56]
Income Sufficient	-1.24***	-1.01***	-1.53***	-1.07***	-0.61	-0.91	-0.52	-1.91***	-1.15*	-1.59**	-1.86*
	[0.39]	[0.36]	[0.48]	[0.41]	[0.48]	[0.72]	[0.81]	[0.66]	[0.61]	[0.63]	[0.97]
Income Difficult	1.24**	0.90*	1.68*	0.31	0.01	1.00	1.64	1.30***	1.36	0.73	3.57***
	[0.55]	[0.50]	[0.88]	[0.57]	[0.77]	[0.67]	[1.22]	[0.50]	[0.99]	[0.89]	[0.95]
Female	-2.49***	-2.25***	-2.89***	-1.73***	-2.50***	-2.55***	-1.86***	-2.68***	-2.65***	-2.60***	-3.58***
	[0.48]	[0.46]	[0.61]	[0.28]	[0.49]	[0.73]	[0.67]	[0.63]	[0.76]	[0.55]	[0.85]
Young	0.41	1.40**	-1.04**	1.44**	0.71	1.49	1.58	1.71	0.14	-1.80	-1.81**
	[0.44]	[0.59]	[0.48]	[0.56]	[0.67]	[1.58]	[1.09]	[1.07]	[0.63]	[1.10]	[0.90]
Old	-0.85	-0.42	-1.25**	0.53	-0.38	-0.93	-0.28	-1.00	-0.80	-1.32	-1.68***
	[0.61]	[0.63]	[0.62]	[0.42]	[0.61]	[0.78]	[1.18]	[1.15]	[0.94]	[0.83]	[0.65]
Secondary Education	-0.05	-0.04	0.10	0.44	-0.52	-0.16	0.97	-0.85	-0.51	0.58	0.33
	[0.64]	[0.77]	[0.79]	[0.78]	[1.17]	[1.07]	[1.56]	[1.06]	[0.66]	[1.27]	[0.89]
Tertiary Education	-5.68***	-5.32***	-6.05***	-3.25***	-5.03***	-6.20***	-4.70***	-7.32***	-6.17***	-5.33***	-6.84***
	[0.76]	[0.90]	[1.20]	[0.79]	[0.83]	[1.90]	[1.75]	[1.67]	[1.23]	[1.72]	[1.19]
Country*Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	135980	84595	51385	17484	15466	16832	17140	17673	19198	17633	14554

Notes. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes for a populist party, and 0 otherwise. "Civil Associations" takes a value of 1 if the individual is a member of a civil society association, and 0 otherwise. "Income sufficient" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. "Income difficult" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. "Young" takes a value of 1 if the individual is less than 30 years of age, and 0 otherwise. "Old" takes a value of 1 if the individual is 65 years or older, and 0 otherwise. "Secondary education" takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained secondary education, with 12 or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. "Tertiary education" takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with 16 or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 2b. Drivers of Populist Party Vote. Heckman 1st Stage Estimates

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]	[11]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Number of "don't know" response to "anything about politics"	-0.52***	-0.54***	-0.49***	-0.50***	-0.59***	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.44***	-0.52***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Income Sufficient	0.20***	0.19***	0.22***	0.18***	0.13***	0.15***	0.25***	0.23***	0.19***	0.23***	0.24***
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.03]
Income Difficult	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.24***	-0.25***	-0.27***	-0.25***	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.23***	-0.27***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Female	-0.02	0.00	-0.06***	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.05	-0.06***	-0.04**	-0.07**
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.03]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.03]
Young	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.50***	-0.59***	-0.57***	-0.52***	-0.56***	-0.48***	-0.50***	-0.52***	-0.49***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Old	0.33***	0.30***	0.38***	0.22***	0.29***	0.33***	0.28***	0.35***	0.36***	0.38***	0.40***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]
Secondary Education	0.20***	0.17***	0.25***	0.20***	0.17*	0.17**	0.09	0.21***	0.26***	0.21***	0.29***
	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.09]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.04]
Tertiary Education	0.56***	0.52***	0.63***	0.55***	0.58***	0.50***	0.45***	0.55***	0.61***	0.58***	0.71***
	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.09]	[0.11]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.09]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.07]
Country*Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	178289	110472	67817	22139	20795	21663	22325	23550	25461	23625	18731

Notes. This table shows the estimates from the first stage of the Heckman 2-step process. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy=1 if the individual votes, and 0 otherwise. The identifying variables used in the first stage regression includes proxies for lack of political awareness – as captured by the total number of "don't know" in response to any of the questions relating to "anything about politics": (i) TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average weekday, (ii) How interested in politics, (iii) Able to take active role in political group, (iv) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (v) Easy to take part in politics, (vi) Placement on left right scale, (vii) State of education in country nowadays, (viii) State of health services in country nowadays. "Income sufficient" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds that is income is sufficient, and 0 otherwise. "Income difficult" takes a value of 1 if the individual responds to be in a difficult income situation, and 0 otherwise. "Young" takes a value of 1 if the individual is less than 30 years of age, and 0 otherwise. "Old" takes a value of 1 if the individual is 65 years or older, and 0 otherwise. "Secondary education" takes a value of 1, if the individual has attained secondary education, with 12 or more years of completed schooling, and 0 otherwise. "Tertiary education" takes a value of 1 if the individual has attained tertiary education, with 16 or more years of completed schooling. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 3. Drivers of Populist Party Vote: Robustness

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	All	Pre-2010	Post-2012
***Panel A. Heckman II**: Selection variable. "Don't know" to (i) Confident in own ability to participate in politics, (ii) Easy to take part in politics, (iii) Placement on the left right scale, (iv) State of education in country nowadays, (v) State of health services in country nowadays.*			
Civil Associations	-2.77***	-2.44***	-3.24***
	[0.37]	[0.55]	[0.43]
Observations	135980	84595	51385
Panel B. OLS: controls for occupation dummies			
Civil Associations	-2.32***	-1.86**	-2.98***
	[0.55]	[0.77]	[0.66]
Observations	130376	80885	49491
Panel C. OLS: Additional controls			
Civil Associations	-1.55***	-1.22*	-1.99**
	[0.48]	[0.57]	[0.73]
Observations	115168	69727	45441

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates for key variables only. All regressions include the controls in Table 1. The additional controls in Panels C and D are those in Guiso et al. (2017), and include indicators for risk aversion, watching television, watching politics news and programs, unemployment spell over the last 5 years, exposure to globalization, preference for lower immigration, perception of negative effect of immigrants, trust in parties and institutions, and right-wing ideology. Heckman 2-step estimates are not reported with additional controls, as the estimates fail to converge with the large set of additional controls. The coefficient estimates in the Heckman specifications indicate marginal effects. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4. Populist Vote and Civil Associations / Trade Union Membership

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post-2012	[4] 2002	[5] 2004	[6] 2006	[7] 2008	[8] 2010	[9] 2012	[10] 2014	[11] 2016
Panel A. No IV											
OLS											
Civil Associations	-1.88**	-1.47	-2.51***	-1.57	-1.14	-1.96*	-1.31	-1.24	-1.74*	-3.26***	-2.51**
or Trade Union	[0.71]	[0.85]	[0.61]	[1.09]	[1.13]	[0.92]	[0.78]	[0.72]	[0.84]	[0.73]	[0.83]
Observations	135705	84426	51279	17455	15434	16800	17116	17621	19156	17577	14546
Heckman											
Heckman 2nd											
Civil Associations	-1.83***	-1.55**	-2.21***	-1.57**	-1.11	-2.44***	-1.46*	-1.08*	-1.50**	-2.79***	-2.35***
or Trade Union	[0.57]	[0.67]	[0.49]	[0.74]	[0.81]	[0.78]	[0.75]	[0.62]	[0.76]	[0.51]	[0.74]
Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.50***	-0.51***	-0.59***	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.54***	-0.55***	-0.45***	-0.53***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Observations	135705	84426	51279	17455	15434	16800	17116	17621	19156	17577	14546
Panel B. Using sectoral union membership rates in UK as IV											
OLS											
2nd stage –											
Civil Associations	-8.82*	-6.21	-13.36***	-1.51	-7.28	-9.90*	-6.35	-6.47	-8.04	-14.33**	-19.12***
or Trade Union	[0.05]	[5.73]	[4.16]	[4.92]	[7.41]	[5.56]	[8.00]	[8.08]	[6.58]	[5.98]	[7.38]
Observations	116540	71391	45149	13948	12838	14453	14765	15387	16841	15548	12760
Heckman											
2nd stage – Heckman 2nd											
Civil Associations	-9.08**	-6.45	-13.00***	-1.43	-6.90	-10.11*	-6.94	-8.20	-7.31	-14.02**	-19.89***
or Trade Union	[4.59]	[5.74]	[3.95]	[5.52]	[6.66]	[5.62]	[8.33]	[7.95]	[5.73]	[5.92]	[5.72]
2nd stage – Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.55***	-0.58***	-0.51***	-0.55***	-0.63***	-0.55***	-0.59***	-0.57***	-0.57***	-0.45***	-0.56***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.09]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Observations	116540	71391	45149	13948	12838	14453	14765	15387	16841	15548	12760
IV 1st – Stage											
UK UM	0.31***	0.34***	0.27***	0.38***	0.38***	0.32***	0.31***	0.29***	0.25***	0.26***	0.29***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.03]
F-Stat	81.49***	96.09***	54.51***	150.09***	54.87***	54.37***	43.18***	128.74***	66.34***	41.89***	24.51***

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates for key variables only. All regressions include the controls in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in Heckman specifications indicate marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 5. Populist Vote and Trade Union Membership

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post-2012	[4] 2002	[5] 2004	[6] 2006	[7] 2008	[8] 2010	[9] 2012	[10] 2014	[11] 2016
Panel A. No IV											
OLS											
Trade Union	-1.06	-0.93	-1.25*	-1.06	-0.99	-0.98	-0.88	-0.63	-0.83	-1.83***	-1.08
	[0.75]	[0.87]	[0.67]	[0.91]	[1.26]	[0.92]	[1.16]	[0.78]	[0.95]	[0.60]	[1.07]
Observations	135864	84534	51330	17475	15451	16827	17128	17653	19184	17600	14546
Heckman											
Heckman 2nd											
Trade Union	-1.00	-0.99	-0.95	-1.15	-1.06	-1.19	-0.96	-0.43	-0.69	-1.42**	-0.70
	[0.68]	[0.77]	[0.66]	[0.77]	[1.02]	[0.91]	[1.12]	[0.75]	[0.91]	[0.56]	[1.04]
Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.53***	-0.54***	-0.50***	-0.50***	-0.59***	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.54***	-0.55***	-0.45***	-0.53***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.03]
Observations	135864	84534	51330	17475	15451	16827	17128	17653	19184	17600	14546
Panel B. Using sectoral union membership rates in UK as IV											
OLS											
2nd stage –											
Trade Union	-7.71*	-5.40	-11.75***	-1.43	-6.16	-7.59*	-6.09	-5.75	-7.49	-12.43**	-16.42**
	[4.03]	[4.96]	[3.89]	[4.37]	[6.48]	[4.08]	[7.54]	[7.14]	[6.13]	[5.05]	[6.45]
Observations	116667	71475	45192	13966	12851	14470	14774	15414	16863	15569	12760
Heckman											
Heckman 2nd											
Trade Union	-7.94**	-5.63	-11.41***	-1.36	-5.85	-7.75*	-6.68	-7.29	-6.73	-12.20**	-17.10***
	[3.98]	[4.92]	[3.45]	[4.89]	[0.0571]	[0.0410]	[0.0798]	[0.0693]	[0.0506]	[0.0524]	[0.0480]
Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.55***	-0.52***	-0.51***	-0.54***	-0.62***	-0.55***	-0.59***	-0.56***	-0.57***	-0.45***	-0.56***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Observations	116667	71475	45192	13966	12851	14470	14774	15414	16863	15569	12760
IV 1st – Stage											
UK UM	0.36***	0.39***	0.31***	0.43***	0.44***	0.43***	0.33***	0.33***	0.29***	0.30***	0.34***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
F-Stat	46.89***	54.71***	34.17***	84.3***	34.94***	48.99***	23.79***	56.22***	34.02***	27.68***	27.09***

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates for key variables only. All regressions include the controls in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in Heckman specifications indicate marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6. Populist Vote and Trade Union and Civil Associations Membership

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post2012	[4] 2002	[5] 2004	[6] 2006	[7] 2008	[8] 2010	[9] 2012	[10] 2014	[11] 2016
Panel A. No IV											
OLS											
Civil Associations	-2.49***	-2.02**	-3.19***	-1.96*	-1.92	-2.27**	-1.68**	-2.20***	-2.68***	-3.46***	-3.45***
	[0.56]	[0.79]	[0.68]	[1.10]	[1.15]	[0.84]	[0.73]	[0.72]	[0.83]	[0.73]	[0.84]
Trade Union	-0.93	-0.81	-1.12	-0.96	-0.88	-0.84	-0.73	-0.54	-0.77	-1.71**	-0.86
	[0.72]	[0.83]	[0.65]	[0.87]	[1.23]	[0.88]	[1.14]	[0.79]	[0.93]	[0.58]	[1.05]
Observations	135623	84368	51255	17448	15417	16786	17106	17611	19144	17572	14539
Heckman											
Heckman 2nd											
Civil Associations	-2.70***	-2.37***	-3.19***	-1.95***	-1.90**	-3.52***	-2.12***	-2.30***	-2.53***	-3.35***	-3.83***
	[0.35]	[0.53]	[0.43]	[0.57]	[0.89]	[0.77]	[0.73]	[0.67]	[0.65]	[0.50]	[0.55]
Trade Union	-0.85	-0.84	-0.83	-1.04	-0.95	-0.94	-0.77	-0.33	-0.62	-1.31**	-0.46
	[0.66]	[0.75]	[0.64]	[0.74]	[1.02]	[0.89]	[1.11]	[0.76]	[0.89]	[0.56]	[1.02]
Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.53***	-0.55***	-0.50***	-0.51***	-0.59***	-0.53***	-0.56***	-0.54***	-0.55***	-0.45***	-0.53***
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.02]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Observations	135623	84368	51255	17448	15417	16786	17106	17611	19144	17572	14539
Panel B. Using sectoral union membership rates in UK as IV											
OLS											
2nd stage –											
Civil Associations	-2.59***	-2.11**	-3.29***	-2.01	-2.08	-2.45**	-1.78**	-2.24**	-2.62***	-3.75***	-3.50***
	[0.61]	[0.85]	[0.75]	[1.13]	[1.23]	[0.96]	[0.80]	[0.77]	[0.87]	[0.85]	[0.88]
Trade Union	-6.98	-4.84	-10.71**	-0.71	-5.66	-7.32	-5.46	-5.12	-6.34	-11.59*	-15.35*
	[4.09]	[5.04]	[4.31]	[4.37]	[6.50]	[4.13]	[8.22]	[7.27]	[6.12]	[5.85]	[7.45]
Observations	116471	71344	45127	13942	12823	14442	14756	15381	16829	15543	12755
Heckman											
Heckman 2nd											
Civil Associations	-2.96***	-2.57***	-3.25***	-2.15***	-2.27**	-3.69***	-2.28***	-2.42***	-2.52***	-3.57***	-3.73***
	[0.41]	[0.60]	[0.46]	[0.66]	[0.95]	[0.91]	[0.84]	[0.76]	[0.69]	[0.56]	[0.55]
Trade Union	-7.22*	-5.01	-10.47***	-0.50	-5.34	-7.46*	-5.93	-6.62	-5.68	11.56**	-16.04***
	[3.92]	[4.90]	[3.46]	[4.67]	[5.79]	[4.11]	[8.09]	[6.96]	[5.07]	[5.24]	[5.05]
Heckman 1st											
"Don't know"	-0.55***	-0.58***	-0.51***	-0.55***	-0.63***	-0.55***	-0.59***	-0.57***	-0.57***	-0.45***	-0.56***
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.09]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.04]	[0.03]
Observations	116471	71344	45127	13942	12823	14442	14756	15381	16829	15543	12755
IV 1st – Stage											
UK UM	0.36***	0.39***	0.31***	0.43***	0.44***	0.43***	0.33***	0.33***	0.29***	0.30***	0.34***
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]
F-Stat	45.81***	53.63***	33.15***	79.92***	33.42***	49.75***	22.93***	54.74***	32.9***	26.99***	27.11***

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates for key variables only. All regressions include the controls in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in Heckman specifications indicate marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 7. Social Media and Populist Party Vote

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	All	**Pre-2010**	**Post-2012**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**
Civil Associations	-2.69***	-1.77**	-3.10***	-1.11	-2.11**	-2.37**	-3.27***	-3.72***
	[0.58]	[0.66]	[0.72]	[0.81]	[0.78]	[0.82]	[0.76]	[0.87]
Populists Tweets	0.16***	0.17***	0.16***	0	-0.02***	0.82***	-0.75***	2.46***
	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[.]	[0.00]	[0.13]	[0.07]	[0.25]
Income Sufficient	-1.47***	-0.83*	-1.79***	-0.04	-1.38**	-1.18*	-2.27***	-1.87*
	[0.45]	[0.37]	[0.50]	[0.27]	[0.59]	[0.60]	[0.64]	[0.93]
Income Difficult	2.83*	1.1	3.73**	-0.31	1.75	3.32	2.59*	5.76**
	[1.33]	[1.01]	[1.53]	[1.72]	[1.06]	[1.95]	[1.34]	[1.93]
Female	-2.91***	-1.90***	-3.39***	-1.34*	-2.24***	-3.29***	-3.07***	-3.83***
	[0.71]	[0.55]	[0.87]	[0.66]	[0.69]	[1.01]	[0.87]	[0.99]
Young	-0.05	1.25	-0.72	1.81	0.99	0.63	-1.01	-1.87
	[0.84]	[1.08]	[0.80]	[1.04]	[1.28]	[0.87]	[1.07]	[1.72]
Old	-1.3	-0.47	-1.69*	-1.15*	-0.15	-0.86	-1.88*	-2.35**
	[0.78]	[0.79]	[0.85]	[0.57]	[1.12]	[1.15]	[0.93]	[1.05]
Secondary Education	0.38	1	-0.07	1.41	0.37	-0.99	0.72	0.35
	[1.02]	[1.17]	[1.08]	[1.61]	[1.29]	[1.01]	[1.54]	[1.53]
Tertiary Education	-6.00***	-4.41**	-6.90***	-3.37	-5.39**	-7.01***	-6.34***	-7.18***
	[1.46]	[1.73]	[1.47]	[1.92]	[2.24]	[1.82]	[1.82]	[1.51]
Country FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	65788	21836	43952	7897	13939	15074	15079	13799
R-Squared	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.12	0.08	0.13

Notes. This table reports regression results from specifications identical to Table1, with the inclusion of social media variable, computed the share of tweets by populist political leaders. Political leaders are defined as candidates for Prime Minister Office or Presidential elections, whose parties had received at least 5% of votes, and are considered populist based on their party affiliation. The sample is smaller compared to our original sample in Table 1, as Twitter started only in 2007, and political leaders in Eastern European countries are not using Twitter for the most. Note that in these regressions, we include country fixed effects, but not country x year effects as they would be collinear with social media variable. The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 8. Urban/rural domicile and Populist Party Vote

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post-2012	[4] 2002	[5] 2004	[6] 2006	[7] 2008	[8] 2010	[9] 2012	[10] 2014	[11] 2016
Civil Associations	-2.60***	-2.10**	-3.32***	-2.01	-2.02	-2.38**	-1.74**	-2.31***	-2.80***	-3.57***	-3.61***
	[0.58]	[0.82]	[0.68]	[1.14]	[1.17]	[0.88]	[0.74]	[0.72]	[0.83]	[0.74]	[0.84]
Urban	-1.43**	-0.94	-2.29**	-0.27	-0.46	-1.4	-0.98	-1.57*	-2.29**	-2.23**	-2.38
	[0.61]	[0.67]	[0.85]	[0.59]	[1.01]	[0.90]	[1.00]	[0.88]	[1.01]	[0.94]	[1.35]
Income Sufficient	-1.07***	-0.64**	-1.73***	-0.96***	-0.57	-0.37	0.14	-1.58**	-1.16*	-2.09***	-1.78*
	[0.34]	[0.29]	[0.48]	[0.31]	[0.51]	[0.59]	[0.50]	[0.60]	[0.65]	[0.55]	[0.86]
Income Difficult	1.74**	0.95	3.13**	0.16	-0.32	1.69	1.93	1.17	2.58	2.16**	5.73***
	[0.79]	[0.63]	[1.20]	[0.56]	[0.68]	[1.24]	[1.58]	[0.74]	[1.48]	[1.01]	[1.84]
Female	-2.43***	-2.04***	-3.05***	-1.58**	-2.27**	-2.25***	-1.69**	-2.37***	-2.74***	-2.84***	-3.69***
	[0.51]	[0.56]	[0.76]	[0.70]	[0.85]	[0.67]	[0.65]	[0.57]	[0.84]	[0.78]	[0.96]
Young	0.63	0.96	0.05	0.94	0.46	1.35	0.72	1.32	1.43	-0.09	-1.59
	[0.65]	[0.68]	[0.81]	[0.54]	[0.47]	[1.80]	[1.16]	[1.13]	[0.85]	[1.19]	[1.55]
Old	-0.88	-0.12	-1.98**	0.78*	-0.24	-0.76	0.13	-0.46	-1.32	-2.43*	-2.28**
	[0.70]	[0.63]	[0.88]	[0.44]	[0.61]	[0.78]	[1.17]	[1.05]	[1.10]	[1.13]	[1.01]
Secondary Education	0.6	0.96	-0.07	1.41*	0.65	0.79	1.9	0.19	-0.69	0.5	0.26
	[0.77]	[0.72]	[1.06]	[0.71]	[0.70]	[0.96]	[1.32]	[1.07]	[0.97]	[1.56]	[1.53]
Tertiary Education	-4.62***	-3.40***	-6.50***	-1.54*	-3.34**	-4.06**	-2.56*	-5.16**	-6.45***	-6.35***	-6.61***
	[1.07]	[1.14]	[1.38]	[0.82]	[1.40]	[1.67]	[1.43]	[1.93]	[1.63]	[1.76]	[1.52]
Country*Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Obs.	135827	84520	51307	17453	15455	16825	17127	17660	19162	17596	14549
R-Squared	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.09	0.12	0.21	0.21	0.3	0.27	0.2	0.14

Notes: This table reports regression results from specifications identical to Table1, with the inclusion of the urban dummy, We use the variable "domicil" in the ESS survey to classify urban/rural (urban=1 if the individual resides in "A big city", "Suburbs or outskirts of big city", or "Town or small city", and =0 if "Country village" or "Farm or home in countryside"). The standard errors in all regressions are clustered at the country-level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Table 9. Heterogeneity in the Relationship between Populist Vote and Association Membership

	[1] All	[2] Pre-2010	[3] Post-2012	[4] 2002	[5] 2004	[6] 2006	[7] 2008	[8] 2010	[9] 2012	[10] 2014	[11] 2016
Panel A. By Age Group											
Young											
OLS	-2.51***	-1.93	-3.41***	-2.22*	-2.52*	-2.4	-1.56	-0.77	-4.66**	-2.99*	-2.46
	[0.85]	[1.17]	[0.85]	[1.23]	[1.35]	[1.95]	[1.05]	[1.66]	[1.81]	[1.41]	[1.74]
Heckman	-2.70***	-2.30**	-3.46***	-1.66***	-3.9	-3.49	-1.69**	-0.98	-4.91**	-3.55**	-2.08
	[0.69]	[0.93]	[0.86]	[0.47]	[2.47]	[3.00]	[0.79]	[1.60]	[2.49]	[1.45]	[1.36]
Middle											
OLS	-2.35***	-1.92**	-3.05***	-1.65	-2.45	-2.36**	-1.22*	-1.92**	-2.05*	-3.80***	-3.31***
	[0.51]	[0.71]	[0.70]	[0.95]	[1.43]	[0.83]	[0.69]	[0.84]	[0.99]	[0.76]	[0.89]
Heckman	-2.52***	-2.15***	-3.15***	-1.68***	-2.23***	-3.64***	-1.42*	-1.84**	-1.95*	-3.77***	-4.01***
	[0.40]	[0.52]	[0.53]	[0.60]	[0.85]	[0.91]	[0.82]	[0.85]	[1.00]	[0.61]	[0.82]
Old											
OLS	-2.91***	-2.25**	-3.71***	-2.74	-0.06	-1.59	-2.97*	-3.56***	-3.50***	-3.45***	-4.25***
	[0.75]	[0.95]	[0.94]	[1.80]	[1.21]	[1.13]	[1.55]	[0.91]	[1.06]	[1.08]	[1.29]
Heckman	-3.40***		-3.85***	-2.82**	0.13	-2.70**	-4.26***	-4.10***	-3.41***	-3.81***	-5.01***
	[0.55]		[0.75]	[1.13]	[1.52]	[1.33]	[1.56]	[0.71]	[0.75]	[1.13]	[1.49]
Panel B. By Education Group											
Below Sec.											
OLS	-3.21***	-1.76**	-6.16***	-1.72	-0.07	-0.68	-2.62	-3.78*	-4.20**	-8.26***	-5.74*
	[0.92]	[0.75]	[1.39]	[1.05]	[1.19]	[2.26]	[1.75]	[2.08]	[1.72]	[2.55]	[3.10]
Heckman	-3.79***			-2.05**	0.03	-2.32	-3.15	-4.43**	-2.74**	-9.33***	-4.73
	[0.98]			[0.92]	[1.18]	[5.47]	[2.61]	[2.11]	[1.31]	[2.61]	[3.00]
Secondary											
OLS	-3.28***	-2.49**	-4.60***	-2.27	-2.62	-3.22**	-1.23	-3.07**	-3.94***	-4.95***	-4.99***
	[0.84]	[1.17]	[1.01]	[1.50]	[1.73]	[1.16]	[1.04]	[1.15]	[1.25]	[1.17]	[1.01]
Heckman	-3.27***	-2.60***	-4.35***	-1.97**	-2.63*	-4.31***	-1.23	-3.02***	-3.70***	-4.45***	-5.09***
	[0.47]	[0.75]	[0.66]	[0.85]	[1.40]	[0.93]	[1.12]	[0.83]	[0.91]	[0.87]	[0.72]
Tertiary											
OLS	-1.27***	-1.36**	-1.14**	-1.57*	-1.06	-1.32*	-2.04***	-0.79	-0.68	-1.10*	-1.65**
	[0.34]	[0.47]	[0.44]	[0.87]	[0.70]	[0.65]	[0.66]	[0.56]	[0.79]	[0.57]	[0.72]
Heckman			-1.15***	-1.47**	-1.18*	-1.55**	-2.69***	-0.86	-0.8	-0.92*	-2.04**
			[0.42]	[0.58]	[0.63]	[0.63]	[0.61]	[0.55]	[0.69]	[0.47]	[1.02]

Notes. This table reports coefficient estimates for key variables only. All regressions include the controls in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in Heckman specifications indicate marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Figure 1. Share of Union or Civil Association Members, and Populist Vote



Table A1. Data Coverage

European Sample

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
Austria	Y	Y	Y				Y	Y
Belgium	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bulgaria			Y	Y	Y	Y		
Czech	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Denmark	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Finland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
France			Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Germany	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hungary	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Italy						Y		
Lithuania					Y	Y	Y	
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
UK							Y	Y

Table A2. Variables and Description

Variable	Description
Populist Vote	=1 if someone votes to a populist party. Populist party based on Inglehart and Norris list.
Civil Associations	=1 if someone worked in a civil organization or association last 12 months.
Union Member	=1 if someone is a current union member.
Income sufficient	=1 if someone feels living comfortably on present income.
Income difficult	=1 if someone feels difficult or very difficult on present income.
Female	=1 if gender is female
Young	=1 if age < 30
Old	=1 if age >= 65
Secondary education	=1 if someone finished secondary education but not tertiary education.
Tertiary education	=1 if someone finished tertiary education
Urban	=1 if someone resides in "A big city", "Suburbs or outskirts of big city", or "Town or small city", and urban=0 otherwise
Sum Don't Know	number of "Don't Know" to a list of 8 questions, including: • TV watching, news/politics/current affairs on average • How interested in politics • Able to take active role in political group • Confident in own ability to participate in politics • Easy to take part in politics • Placement on left right scale • State of education in country nowadays • State of health services in country nowadays
Populist in power	=1 if party in power is a populist party as defined in Allred, Nathaniel, Kirk A. Hawkins, and Saskia P. Ruth. 2015
Union density	net union membership as a proportion of wage earners in employment at (country, year) level, taken from Vissier(2016)

Table A3. Summary Statistics

Variable	ESS	
	Mean	St. Dev.
Populist Vote	0.13	0.33
Civil Association	0.22	0.41
Member of Civil association or union	0.41	0.49
Union only	0.27	0.45
Income sufficient	0.36	0.48
Income difficult	0.19	0.39
Female	0.52	0.50
Young	0.12	0.32
Old	0.24	0.43
Secondary education	0.62	0.49
Tertiary education	0.32	0.47

Table A4. List of Populist Parties in Europe

Country	Populist Parties
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria
Belgium	Flemish Block
Bulgaria	Attack Bulgarian National Movement National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
Czech	Freedom Union
Denmark	Danish People's Party
Finland	True Finns
France	National Front Popular Republican Movement
Germany	Alternative for Germany National Democratic Party
Hungary	Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary
Italy	Five Star Movement Northern League Brothers of Italy
Lithuania	The Way of Courage
Netherlands	Party for Freedom Reformed Political Party
Norway	Progress Party
Poland	Law and Justice Congress of the New Right United Poland
Sweden	Sweden Democrats
Switzerland	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland
UK	UK Independence Party National Front British National Party

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