

Macroeconomics III - Ph.D.

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Introduction: Nominal Rigidities, the Role of Technology Shocks, and Monetary Policy

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- The paradigm so far: **Real Business Cycle Model** (neoclassical growth model)
- Bulk of fluctuations explained by technology shocks (Kydland-Prescott, 1982)

- Main **ingredients** of RBC

1. Microfoundations

2. Dynamic (Stochastic) General Equilibrium

3. All markets frictionless

4. Prices adjust instantaneously

→Note: (1) and (2) alive and kicking, (3) and (4) questionable

- In this course:

1. We will go **beyond RBC** paradigm → Build so-called **New Keynesian Framework**
2. Role of money and **monetary policy**
3. Imperfections in goods markets (monopolistic competition)
4. Role of nominal rigidities (price and/or wage stickiness)
5. Reconsideration of role of technology shocks

- Why **beyond RBC?** → (at least) **4 arguments**

1. No role for monetary policy / monetary policy shocks


2. Perfect flexibility of prices (and wages)

3. Weak propagation mechanism (Cogley-Nason, 1995)


4. Effects of technology shocks on labor market (Gali, 1999 and Gali and Rabanal, 2004)

- **Reading:** Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), "Price Rigidity: Microeconomic Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications", *Annual Review of Economics*
- <http://www.columbia.edu/~en2198/papers.html>

- **Criticism 1:** RBC model cannot replicate evidence of **non-neutrality** of money (Christiano et al., 2005)



Effects of an increase in the money supply (source CEE, 2005)



Effects of an increase in the money supply (CEE, 2005)

→An increase in **money supply**

1. Prolonged, but not immediate, positive effect on **output** and **consumption**

→Clear **non-neutrality**

2. Delayed positive effect on **inflation** (persistence)

3. Negative effect on **nominal interest rate** (liquidity effect)

Criticism 2: Prices change only **infrequently**: (*monthly*) evidence for Euro Area (source Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets, 2006)


Euro Area	consumer	producer
Share of prices changed each month	15%	15-23%

Table 4.1 Frequency of consumer price changes by product type, in %

Country	Unprocessed food	Processed food	Energy (oil products)	Non-energy industrial goods	Services	Total, country weights	Total, Euro area weights
Belgium	31.5	19.1	81.6	5.9	3.0	17.6	15.6
Germany	25.2	8.9	91.4	5.4	4.3	13.5	15.0
Spain	50.9	17.7	n.a.	6.1	4.6	13.3	11.5
France	24.7	20.3	76.9	18.0	7.4	20.9	20.4
Italy	19.3	9.4	61.6	5.8	4.6	10.0	12.0
Luxembourg	54.6	10.5	73.9	14.5	4.8	23.0	19.2
The Netherlands	30.8	17.3	72.6	14.2	7.9	16.2	19.0
Austria	37.5	15.5	72.3	8.4	7.1	15.4	17.1
Portugal	55.3	24.5	15.9	14.3	13.6	21.1	18.7
Finland	52.7	12.8	89.3	18.1	11.6	20.3	-
Euro Area	28.3	13.7	78.0	9.2	5.6	15.1	15.8

→ Substantial degree of **heterogeneity** in the frequency of (monthly) price changes across products (source Altissimo, Ehrmann and Smets, 2006)

Figure 4.1 Distribution of product-specific and country-specific frequencies of price changes




Source: Dhyne et al. (2005).

Median duration of price spell in Euro Area: between **4 to 5 quarters**

- What about the **US**?

→Recent micro-based evidence points to **smaller degree of price stickiness**
(Bils and Klenow, 2004)



- Median duration of price spell in the US is **4.3 months** (Bils and Klenow, 2004)
- Nakamura-Steinsson (2006): accounting for **sales** bring it back to median duration of **8-11 months**.

- Non-neutrality of money is big challenge for RBC model
- Yet, is it monetary **shocks** or is it monetary **policy**? **Systematic** (rule-based) vs. **Non-Systematic** (shocks) component of policy

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE VARIANCE DUE TO MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS


	4 Quarters Ahead	8 Quarters Ahead	20 Quarters Ahead
Output	15 (4,26)	38 (15,48)	27 (9,35)
Inflation	1 (0,8)	4 (1,11)	7 (3,18)
Consumption	14 (4,26)	21 (5,37)	14 (4,26)
Investment	10 (2,21)	26 (7,39)	23 (6,32)
Real wage	2 (0,8)	2 (0,14)	4 (0,15)
Productivity	15 (3,25)	14 (3,26)	10 (3,20)
Federal funds rate	32 (18,44)	19 (8,27)	18 (5,27)
M2 growth	19 (8,29)	19 (8,26)	19 (8,24)
Real profits	13 (5,25)	18 (6,31)	7 (2,20)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are the boundaries of the associated 95 percent confidence interval.

Contribution of monetary policy **shocks** to variance of output is **small** (source: CEE, 2005)

Criticism 3: RBC model has **weak propagation mechanism** (Cogley and Nason, 1995)

ACF for Output Growth



- **Criticism 4:** Are Technology Shocks Really the **Source** of Business Cycle Fluctuations?
- **Reading.** Gali J., "Technology, Employment and the Business Cycle: Do Technology Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations ?", *American Economic Review* (1999)

→ Note: productivity \simeq real wage




Figure 1: **Unconditional** Correlation between Productivity and Hours in the Data is close to zero (Gali 1999)

- Effect of a Technology Shock on labor demand


Suppose production function

$$Y_t = A_t N_t^\alpha$$

First order condition for choice of labor input


$$\frac{W_t}{P_t} = \alpha \frac{A_t}{N_t^{1-\alpha}}$$

For any given real wage, a rise in productivity entails a rise in labor input
→ Labor demand shifts outward



Effect of a positive technology shock in the labor market


- RBC model predicts strong positive correlation between real wage (productivity) and hours
- To obtain low correlation between W/P and N need also a **shift in labor supply**
- Candidate: **government spending** shock (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992)
- A rise in G financed with lump-sum taxes makes household poorer (marginal utility of wealth rises) → household is willing to **work more** → labor supply shifts outward







Simultaneous Effect on the Labor Market of Technology and Government Spending Shocks


- Are Government spending shocks enough?
- Gali (AER, 1999)

Positive Output-Employment **comovement** is key business cycle fact (unconditional correlation)





The **Estimated** Effects of Technology Shocks (source Gali and Rabanal, 2004)



Estimated correlation between hours and productivity **conditional** on technology shocks (Gali 1999)

- Data seem to suggest that labor hours **decrease** in response to technology shocks (large literature on this)
- Hence it is the transmission mechanism of technology shocks in RBC models which seems questionable
- However, lively debate on this (Altig et al., 2006)




Figure 2: Effects of technology shocks in the Euro Area: GDP (source Gali 2004)





Figure 3: Effects of technology shocks in the Euro Area: Employment (source Gali 2004)



Decomposing **technology** vs. **non-technology** component in the comovement between **Output and Hours**