30171 - THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS
CLEAM - CLEF - CLEACC - BESS-CLES - BIEMF
Course taught in English
Go to class group/s: 31
This course aims at covering basic materials in the domain of information economics. We build on the courses of Microeconomics to study the new issues that come up in standard economies when informational imperfections impact the markets. The interests of such models are illustrated through a number of applications: financial markets, compensation policies, with special attention given to optimal income taxation.
- Introduction to the theory of contracts
- Hidden information: screening
- Hidden information: signalling
- Hidden action: moral hazard
- Applications to optimal income taxation
- Applications to financial contracting
- Applications to labour markets
- Incomplete contracts: theory and applications
(not compulsory to purchase)
- P. BOLTON, M. DEWATRIPONT, Introduction to Contract Theory, MIT press.
- J.J. LAFFONT, D. MARTIMORT, The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University press.
- B. SALANIE, The Economics of Contracts, MIT press.
- I. MACHO-STADLER, I. and J.D. PEREZ-CASTILLO, An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Oxford University Press.
- Lecture notes + some survey article.