20296 - ADVANCED MICROECONOMICS
CLMG - M - IM - MM - AFC - CLEFIN-FINANCE - CLELI - ACME - DES-ESS - EMIT - GIO
Course taught in English
Go to class group/s: 31
Most of the topics covered in the course have been developed by Nobel Memorial Prize laureates. You learn about some of the most important contributions to market design by Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth (Nobel Prize winners 2012) and by J. Tirole (2014), to mechanism design by Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson (2007), to asymmetric information by George A. Akerlof, Michael Spence, Joseph E. Stiglitz (2001) and William Vickrey (1996).
This course introduces the student to two advanced topics in Microeconomics: asymmetric information and general equilibrium with time and uncertainty. The goal is to provide students with the analytical tools required to read and understand the current economic literature and its debates.
- General equilibrium in exchange economies.
- Pareto optimality and Welfare Theorems.
- General Eequilibrium with time and uncertainty.
- Introduction to asset pricing.
- Hidden information: screening.
- Hidden action: moral hazard.
- Introduction to Signaling and Competitive Screening.
- Dynamic contracts and Auctions.
- Applications to optimal income taxation and financial contracting.
- P. BOLTON, M. DEWATRIPONT, Contract Theory, MIT press;
- J.H. COCHRANE, Asset Pricing, Princeton University press;
- J.J. LAFFONT, D. MARTIMORT, The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University press;
- I. MACHO-STADLER, J.D. PEREZ-CASTILLO, An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Oxford University press;
- M.D. MAS-COLELL, M. WHINSTON, J.R. GREEN, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University press;
- B. SALANIE, The Economics of Contracts, MIT press.
- Slides and other teaching material are distributed during the course.
Good knowledge of Microeconomic at undergraduate level and knowledge of (nonlinear) static optimisation.