Insegnamento a.a. 2014-2015

Go to class group/s: 31

CLMG (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - M (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - IM (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - MM (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - AFC (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - CLAPI (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - CLEFIN-FINANCE (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - CLELI (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - ACME (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - DES-ESS (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01) - EMIT (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/01)

Course Director:
NICOLA PAVONI

Course Objectives

This course introduces the student to two advanced topics in Microeconomics: asymmetric information and general equilibrium. The goal is to provide students with the analytical tools required to read and understand the current economic literature and its debates.

Course Content Summary

• Hidden information: screening.
• Hidden action: moral hazard.
• Signaling.
• Dynamic contracts.
• Applications to optimal income taxation.
• Applications to financial contracting.
• Applications to labour markets.

Detailed Description of Assessment Methods

Written Exam.

Textbooks

Examination is based on topics and exercises presented during the course. References are:

• P. BOLTON, M. DEWATRIPONT, Contract Theory, MIT press.
• J.J. LAFFONT, D. MARTIMORT, The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University press.
• I. MACHO-STADLER, J.D. PEREZ-CASTILLO, An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts, Oxford University Press.
• M.D. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, 1995.
• B. SALANIE, The Economics of Contracts, MIT press.
• Slides and other teaching material are distributed during the course.

Exam textbooks & Online Articles (check availability at the Library)

Last change 17/06/2014 14:32