Selected Articles
- Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?, Economics and Politics, July 1999, (with R. Staiger)
- Reprinted in: The WTO, Safeguards and temporary protection from imports, ed. by C.P. Bown, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2006
- Reprinted in: The WTO, Safeguards and temporary protection from imports, ed. by C.P. Bown, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2006
- The size and scope of government: comparative politics with rational politicians – Marshall Lecture at EEA Congress, European Economic Review, April 1999 (with T. Persson)
- Political economics and macroeconomic policy, in: J. Taylor and M. Woodford eds, Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. III, North Holland, 1999 (with T. Persson)
- Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies, European Economic Review 42, 1295-1316, 1998 (with M. Rama)
- Towards micropolitical foundations of public finance, European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 42, 685-694, 1998 (with T. Persson and G. Roland)
- The optimality of nominal contracts, Economic Theory 11(3), 545-562, 1998 (with S. Freeman)
- Separation of powers and political accountability, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (4), 1163-1202, 1997 (with T. Persson and G. Roland).
- Reprinted in: The international library of critical writings in economics – edited by M. Blaug (volume: Constitutional Political Economy, ed. by S. Voigt)
- Reprinted in: The international library of critical writings in economics – edited by M. Blaug (volume: Constitutional Political Economy, ed. by S. Voigt)
- The theory of fiscal federalism: what does it mean for Europe?, in Siebert, H. (ed.), Quo Vadis Europe?, 1997, J.C.B. Mohr: Tübingen (with T. Persson and G. Roland)
- Federal fiscal constitutions: risk sharing and redistribution, Journal of Political Economy 104,979-1009, 1996 (with T. Persson)
- Monetary cohabitation in Europe, American Economic Review 86, 111-116, 1996. Longer version available as NBER Working paper, No. 5532 (with T. Persson)
- Federal fiscal constitutions: risk sharing and moral hazard, Econometrica 64, 623-646, 1996 (with T. Persson)
- Double-edged incentives: institutions and policy coordination, Chapter 38 in Grossman, G. and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International Economics, Vol III, North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1995 (with T. Persson)
- Is inequality harmful for growth?, American Economic Review 84, 600-621, 1994 (with T. Persson)
- Does centralization increase the size of government?, European Economic Review 38, 765-773, 1994 (with T. Persson)
- Representative democracy and capital taxation, Journal of Public Economics 55, 53-70, 1994 (with T. Persson)
- Designing institutions for monetary stability, Carnegie Rochester Series in Public Policy, Fall 1993 (with T. Persson)
- Default risk on government debt in OECD countries, Economic Policy n.15, Fall 1992 (with A. Alesina, M. de Broeck and A. Prati)
- The politics of 1992: fiscal policy and European integration, Review of Economic Studies, October 1992 (with T. Persson)
- Positive and normative theories of public debt and inflation in historical perspective, European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, April 1992 (with A. Alesina)
- Growth, distribution and politics, European Economic Review, April 1992.
- Reprinted in: The political economy of business cycles and growth, edited by A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, MIT Press, 1992 (with Torsten Persson)
- Reprinted in: The political economy of business cycles and growth, edited by A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, MIT Press, 1992 (with Torsten Persson)
- Seigniorage and political instability, American Economic Review, June 1992 (with A. Cukierman and S. Edwards)
- The Politics of intergenerational redistribution, Journal of Political Economy, April 1991. Reprinted in: The political economy of government debt, ed. by F. van Winden and H. Verbon, North Holland, 1992
- Political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrialized countries, Economic Policy, n.13, Fall 1991 (with D. Masciandaro and V. Grilli)
- Reprinted in: Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governance, ed. by S. Eijffinger and D. Masciandaro, E. Elgar Publishing ltd, 2013
- Reprinted in: Modern Monetary Policy and Central Bank Governance, ed. by S. Eijffinger and D. Masciandaro, E. Elgar Publishing ltd, 2013
- Explaining fiscal deficits and inflation in the developing countries, Journal of International Money and Finance, July 1991 (with S. Edwards)
- Political instability, political weakness and inflation – An empirical analysis, in: Advances in Economic Theory - Proceedings of the 1990 World Meetings of the Econometric Society (edited by C. Sims), Cambridge University Press, (with S. Edwards)
- Rules versus discretion in trade policy: an empirical investigation, in: Empirical studies in commercial policy (edited by Robert Baldwin), NBER, University of Chicago Press, 1991 (with R. Staiger)
- Public confidence and debt management - A model and a case study of Italy, in: Capital markets and debt management (edited by R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi), Cambridge University Press, 1990 (with A. Alesina and A. Prati)
- Exporting the inflation tax, in: Monetary policy in an era of change (edited by W. Haraf and T. Willett), American Enterprise Institute, 1990
- A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt, Review of Economic Studies, July 1990 (with A. Alesina)
- Domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies, Journal of International Economics, June 1990
- Voting on the budget deficit, American Economic Review, March 1990 (with A. Alesina)
- External debt, capital flights and political risk, Journal of International Economics, November 1989, and Estudios Economicos, 1989 (with A. Alesina)
- Rules and discretion in trade policy, European Economic Review, July 1989 (with R. Staiger)
- Money, deficits and public debt in the US, Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1989 (with V. La Via)
- Monetary institutions and fiscal deficits: a comparative analysis, in: Challenges to monetary policy in the Pacific basin countries, (edited by H. Cheng), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988 (with D. Masciandaro)
- Monetary and fiscal policy coordination in the presence of a high public debt, in: Surviving with a high public debt: lessons from the Italian experience (edited by F. Giavazzi and L. Spaventa), Cambridge University Press, 1988
- Learning and the volatility of exchange rates, Journal of International Money and Finance, June 1988
- Credibility and politics, European Economic Review, April 1988 (with A. Alesina)
- Centralized wage setting and monetary policy in a reputational equilibrium, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February 1988
- Discretionary trade policy and excessive protection, American Economic Review, December 1987 (with R. Staiger)
-
- Reprinted in: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO (series editors: K. Anderson and B. Hoekman), E. Elgar Publishing ltd, 2005
- Reprinted in: Critical perspectives on the global trading system and the WTO (series editors: K. Anderson and B. Hoekman), E. Elgar Publishing ltd, 2005
- Secrecy of monetary policy and the variability of interest rates, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, November 1987
- Rules and discretion with non-coordinated monetary and fiscal policies, Economic Inquiry, November 1987 (with A. Alesina)
- The politics of inflation and economic stagnation - A review essay, Journal of Monetary Economics, May 1987
- Central bank reputation and the monetization of deficits: the 1981 Italian monetary reform, Economic Inquiry, April 1987
- Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, December 1986
Modificato il 06/07/2021