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Working papers

    Research and Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion
    Emeric Henry and Marco Ottaviani

    American Economic Review, forthcoming

    Organizational deconstruction of Wald's model of sequential information acquisition, bridging experimentation with persuasion. The payoff and control rights of a statistician (planner) are split between an evaluator and an informer. The informer provides costly information with the aim of persuading the evaluator to approve. Welfare analyis + application to approval regulation, including FDA's supervision of clinical trials.


    Modificato il 19/12/2018

    Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
    Emeric Henry, Marco Loseto, and Marco Ottaviani

    Tractable continuous-time model to study the optimal mix of the three instruments regulators employ to align the private incentives of firms: ex ante approval regulation, ex post withdrawal regulation, and liability. Results can rationalize the array of regulatory environments observed across applications ranging from product safety to patent protection.

    Modificato il 19/12/2018

    Looking into Crystal Balls: An Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk
    Debrah Meloso, Marco Ottaviani, and Salvatore Nunnari

    Do expert motivated by their reputation for being well informed have an incentive to misreport their information? As predicted by reputational cheap talk theory, reporters are more likely to report truthfully when the state of the world is more uncertain and when evaluators conjecture that reporters always report truthfully. However, evaluators have difficulty learning reporters' strategies and tend to overreact to message accuracy, exacerbating reporters' incentives to misreport.

    Modificato il 26/11/2018

    Strategic Sample Selection
    Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani, and Peter Norman Sorensen

    Develops framework based on dispersion to evaluate the impact of sample selection on the quality of statistical inference, with application to manipulation of empirical evidence.


    Modificato il 15/07/2018

    Persuasion through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation
    Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani

    Model of equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure. Positive and normative implications depending on: the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, whether firms are able to personalize prices, and whether receivers make individual or collective decisions.


    Modificato il 09/09/2017

    Separate or Joint Financing? Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs
    Albert Banal Estanol and Marco Ottaviani.

    How should multiple and possibly heterogeneous risky projects be optimally grouped into separately financed conglomerates?

    Modificato il 14/05/2013

    Approval Regulation and Learning, with Application to Timing of Merger Control
    Marco Ottaviani and Abraham Wickelgren

    This paper is the winner of the 2009 Robert F. Lanzillotti Prize for best paper in antitrust economics at the International Industrial Organization Conference. Casts tradeoff between ex ante regulation (based on limited information about sign and magnitude of externality) and ex post policy intervention (involving costly reversion) as a collective experimentation problem.          

    Modificato il 21/12/2012

    Search Agency
    Tracy R. Lewis and Marco Ottaviani

    How should a principal provide agents with incentives to conduct sequential search?

    Modificato il 21/12/2012

    The Timing of Parimutuel Bets
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen.

    Timing of parimutuel bets driven by two incentives: bettors want to place large early bets to pre-empt the rivals, but also want to wait to conceal information.

    Modificato il 21/06/2013

    Parimutuel versus Fixed-Odds Markets
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen

    Comparison of equilibrium outcomes in parimutuel and fixed-odds competitive markets with privately informed bettors.

    Modificato il 21/06/2013

    Forecasting and Rank-Order Contests
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen

    Characterization of equilibrium in Hotelling location model with private information, with applications to strategic forecasting and political economy.

    Modificato il 21/06/2013

    Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market
    David Harbord and Marco Ottaviani

    How is downstream competition affected by the contractual terms used to sell essential inputs to competitors?

    Modificato il 21/12/2012

    The Economics of Advice
    Marco Ottaviani

    Analysis of issues relevant for regulation of independent financial advisers: communication to unsophisticated audience, information acquisition by advisers, uncertainty about the conflict of interest, and optimal incentive design.

    Modificato il 21/12/2012

Modificato il 18/11/2011

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